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ABSTRACT 
Nigeria, today, more or less operates under an intricate web of 
antagonistic ethnic colonies engaged in all-against-all, low-burning 
feuds everywhere across the land, nurturing puzzling existential 
questions.  This study seeks to validate the notion that the press may 
have played a significant role in the promotion of the ethno-regional 
culture that has dominated Nigeria’s post-colonial politics.  Studies on 
the effects of newspaper press have long established the significant role 
of the press in statecraft; however this study seeks to understand how 
the newspaper-press became complicit in the forging of a dysfunctional 
post-colonial political culture that makes identity politics a central 
electoral feature.  In order to provide a historic understanding of 
ethnicised politics, the study deploys content analysis of nine 
newspapers over six federal elections from 1959 to 2011.  But to unlock 
the present day construct of belonging, the study uses in-depth elite 
interviews with leading academics, politicians, and press owners and 
managers.  The study finds that the press did indeed help to construct 
ethnicised political culture and identities. It directly links strong elite 
ethno-regional exclusionist politics with the press.  However, the press 
neither acted alone nor was it always a willing accomplice.  Press 
owners sold the soul of the press to service their own political interests, 
being often in cohort with political elites through common ethnic 
interests and power pursuit.  Data from the study have forced fresh 
attention on the newspaper-press as an instrumentalised, 
predominantly urban-based elite-to-elite medium, and not in any 
measurable way a mass medium.  The study proves that, in reality, 
Nigeria does not have a populist press.  The study concludes with a 
proposition that the forum function of the press could still be deployed, 
from an agonistic perspective, to counter antagonism and re-imagine a 
more democratically productive ethno-federalist nation. 
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S E C T I O N  O N E  
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This section contains the first two chapters of this study, which deals 
first with introductory issues in Chapter One, and then moves on in 
Chapter Two to begin to explore the context of the study and its main 
strands. This mostly background section reviewed literature relevant to 
the study, including aspects of the British colonial system, the early 
days of ethnic and elite politics and the dual role of the press as a 
professional institution, and a mobilising tool of nationalists, and later 
of partisan politicians.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW  
This chapter provides an introductory overview to the entire study; it 
outlines the general background to the study, the motivation, research 
problems, study objectives, as well as the scope; and it situates the 
press as the focal point of the study.   
The Nigerian press as an institution preceded the Nigerian nation. In 
1959, the take off year of this study, journalism was exactly 100 years in 
practice, whereas the nation, as contrived by a British amalgamation 
fiat of 1914, was barely 45 years old and behaved more like cobbled 
patches of ethnic nationalities, and barely like one united nation.  The 
two protectorates of North and South were integrated in name and on 
paper, but the British administered them separately until 1947 when 
administration became somewhat unified into an ethnocentric 
federation of three regions (Lynn, 2006; Buhari, 2010) with the South 
being subdivided into two regions.  
Also in 1947, Northern and Southern political leaders met in a formal 
face-to-face meeting for the first time as citizens of the same country 
created over 30 years before (Osaghae, 2015). Up until 1947, colonial 
policies by design “fostered social distance among ethnic and religious 
groups” (Abdu, 2010, p67).  As self-rule or independence became a 
more possible reality, nationalists who had agitated and fought against 
British colonial rule began to see allies in the fight, as future opponents, 
and perhaps more dangerously, as antagonists and enemies.  The press 
became a major collaborator and weapon in the ensuing ethno regional 
combats, and as Aimufua (2007) notes, the press was “used and has 
continued to be used to promote regional, ethnic or sectional interests” 
(p3). 
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Nigeria today is a nation in a puzzling and enigmatic existence; its 
greatness is locked up in much discussed, but under-defined potentials 
as a much-endowed nation. More than a hundred years after the 1914 
amalgamation of the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, 
students of history are anxious that the nation-state may perpetually be 
oscillating between the brink of greatness and the verge of collapse.  
Because of the historical nature and significance of the events leading 
to independence, it has become necessary to give a fairly extensive 
introductory narrative of the milestones on the route leading up to 
1959.  This is necessary because seeds of ethno-regional politics and 
conflicts of identity and belonging were planted long before 1959. Case 
in point is the 1941 intra-party election, “which provoked curious 
allegations of 'tribalism'” (Adebanwi, 2008, p437). This crisis 
snowballed and led to the fractionalisation of the dominant southern-
based political party of the time – Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), 
and the eventual formation of two ethnic-based parties – the Action 
Group (AG) in the West; and the National Council of Nigeria and 
Cameroons (NCNC) in the East (Adebanwi, 2008). A Northern based 
party, the Northern Peoples’ Congress, emerged at about the same 
period.   
From the beginning, therefore, two major political parties were birthed 
through a crisis of ethnic belonging; a third party emerged also 
dependent on ethno-regional affiliations in reaction to the first two.  
According to Abdu (2010), Nigerians have never been weaned of their 
“different ethnic and religious backgrounds” (p67).  They tend to, and 
have continued to, “look more toward their primordial and parochial 
local groups for cultural, spiritual, social, ethical and linguistic 
satisfaction” (p67). In the search for clues as to how Nigeria became 
what it has become, it is important to seek out the roots of influences 
that framed ethnicity as a central constitution or a form of ideology, 
and therefore, an inevitable component in the nation’s politics.  How is 
it that critical issues of belonging, inclusion or exclusion, and 
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representation became inter-linked with the press at the very inception 
of organised politics? 
1.2.0 PRESS AND POLITICS: A BACKGROUND 
The decade between the mid 1930s and 1940s marked a significant era 
in the history of the press in Nigeria.  There are several events and 
occurrences between the mid 1930s and up to 1959, the time this study 
began, that not only significantly set the stage for independence, but 
also defined the character of the Nigerian press, and politics, in the 
years and decades after.  The era lasted about 25 years.  It began at 
about the midway period between the amalgamation of 1914 and the 
independence of 1960; a momentous period of “transition from the 
society of ‘Black Englishmen’ to that of educated Nigerians who had no 
roots in British guardianship...” (Omu, 2000, p60).    
The “Black Englishmen”, a community of returnee slaves, had up to 
this point, established themselves as the local power elite. They formed 
the clerical and middle level manpower cadre of the civil service and 
professional corps because of their education and knowledge of the 
English ways (Omu, 1978).   In the 1930s, power gradually went from 
these old and established elite descendants of freed slaves to an 
emerging young, indigenous, educated elite.  What these new leaders 
lacked by way of experience, they made up for in their adept use of the 
press to insistently demand for self-rule; and the press elevated them to 
the positions of nationalist heroes and legends. Whereas the voices of 
the old non-indigenous black elite demanded improvement in status, 
inclusion in governance, and for rights (to be treated fairly and 
decently), the new voices demanded full emancipation and self-rule – 
not accommodation or inclusion in governance or improvement in 
social status.  They wanted colonial rule to end. 
The period was also a significant era in the history of the press in 
Nigeria. The press began to have stronger influence on public 
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discourse. Its influence grew beyond a small circle of elite to include a 
growing number of ordinary literate Nigerians who were also growing 
in self-awareness and confidence; it was the beginning of a populist 
press. A newspaper colossus of the old order, Horatio Jackson, 
publisher of the highly influential Lagos Weekly Record, died in 1936: 
the Record itself, after over 40 years of publication, had collapsed three 
years earlier. Acclaimed father of modern Nigerian politics, Herbert 
Macaulay was old; the influence of his newspaper, the Lagos Daily 
News, which served his NNDP party as the “mouthpiece”, had waned 
significantly; it only managed to maintain sporadic appearances in the 
newsstand.  The Daily Service and the Daily Times of the period were 
barely surviving (Duyile, 2009; Omu, 1978). 
Then in 1937, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who would later become the first 
indigenous Governor-General, and President of the Republic, arrived 
from the United States of America via Gold Coast (now Ghana).  He 
immediately on arrival, established the West African Pilot, and set a 
new tone for the press and politics, redefining both.  Their arrival, the 
man and his newspaper, notably marked the end of the old staid 
journalism (Ige, 1995).  Azikiwe and the West African Pilot infused the 
Nigerian press with an American brand of journalism, with vibrancy 
and colour in style, urgency in tone and assertive language, along with 
new production techniques (Duyile, 2009). As a direct fall out of the 
war in Europe, educated indigenous Nigerian elite began to use the 
press to question colonialism and demand self-rule. The nationalist 
press grew to “become a plague to colonialism...” (Nwankwo et al. cited 
in Ajibade, 2010, p252), and “they constituted themselves into a potent 
opposition to the British administration” in Nigeria (Sobowale, 1985 
cited in Ajibade, 2010, p252).  
This was the period that real and national political parties began to 
emerge; it was the end of the reign of South-based NNDP, the 
beginning of the short-lived, transitory period of the Nigerian Youth 
Movement. Two mostly Southern ethnic-based parties emerged out of  
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the ashes of the NYM – the NCNC from the Igbo dominated Eastern 
Region, and the Action Group from the Yoruba controlled Western 
Region.  At about this time, two ideologically opposite parties emerged 
out of the Northern Region, the NPC representing the Northern 
establishment, and the NEPU claiming to represent the interest of the 
impoverished masses of the North. 
The period also saw the emergence of fairly powerful politically active 
professional groups, which were forced by the colonial experience to 
mature quickly into influential political pressure groups. Prominent 
among these bodies were: the Railway Workers Union, Nigerian Union 
of Teachers, Lawyers Association, and other labour unions whose 
growth reached points where their voices could no longer be ignored by 
the British colonial government (Omu, 1978; Ige, 1995; Enahoro, 1965).   
Very early in organised politics in Nigeria, newspapers took the front 
row positions of influence.  The publisher of the Weekly Record, 
Thomas Jackson and Herbert Macaulay, publisher of Lagos News were 
the initiators and promoters of the first and most prominent political 
party – the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP).  And for the 
better part of twenty-five years after its formation in 1922, the NNDP 
and its leader, Macaulay, almost singularly dominated the Nigerian 
press and political scenes (Omu, 1978). At about the same time in 1922, 
when the Clifford Constitution made it possible to engage in organised 
electoral politics, and the NNDP was being formed, two new 
newspapers, the Nigerian Spectator and the Nigerian Advocate, were 
established purposely as “electioneering newspapers” (Omu, 1978, 
p61).   According to Omu (1978), the Lagos Daily News became 
Macaulay’s “stormy mouthpiece” (p64), and for the next 25 years, the 
NNDP dominated and won nearly every election.  
Gradually, the institution of the press, not only served as a key 
armament of agitation, it also became a tool for framing the new 
nation-state. Much later, the press became a weapon against perceived 
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enemies and real opponents. Politicians used the press for flagrant self-
promotion, and for reinforcing group identities, depending on the 
politician’s need or preference (Sobowale, 2002; Jose, 1988; Awolowo, 
1960; Osuntokun, 2010). 
1.3.0 THE NIGERIAN NATION-STATE 
According to James Coleman (1958), “the name Nigeria was first given 
to the north” (p44) citing historian Anthony Kirk-Greene and the 
London Times of January 8 1897, Coleman said the name was coined in 
the search for a shorter title for the “agglomeration of pagan and 
Mohammedan states which have been brought by exertions of the 
Royal Niger Company within the confines of a British Protectorate” 
(1958, p44).  Two years later, “the first official recognition of the name 
Nigeria appeared in the debate in the House of Commons on the Royal 
Niger Company Bill in July, 1899” (Coleman, 1958, p44). 
In 1906, for example, Lagos, which became a Colony of Britain in 1861, 
and Oil River Protectorates with Headquarters in Calabar, were joined 
to become Southern Protectorate. Eight years later in 1914, the patched 
work merged the contiguous British colonial Northern and Southern 
Protectorates – on paper (Coleman, 1958, Omu, 1978). The Nigerian 
nation was birthed, divided, and carved out from “three separate, 
independent, and uncoordinated forces” (Coleman, 1958, p42) where 
“the north was in a sense tacked on to the south” (Coleman, 1958, p44) 
as “the two separate protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria 
had only been united in 1914” (Lynn, 2006, p145) from a vast and an 
undefined territory designated as “British Sphere of Influence” 
(Coleman, 1958, p43).  As such, political cleavages in Nigeria should 
not have surprised anyone; the surprise is that they have remained 
unresolved.  
British colonial rule over the amalgamated Nigerian entity lasted 46 
years, (1914-1960).   However, under Governor Fredrick Lugard’s “dual 
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mandate”, the two halves did not function as parts of one amalgamated 
state for 33 years (until 1947).  In that year, an ethno-regional, 
“federation” of some sort was introduced as a form of governance, and 
Southern Nigeria was split into Western and Eastern Nigeria. In 1954, 
Nigeria was officially declared a Federation (Coleman, 1958; Ige, 1995; 
Enahoro, 1965).  
Reasons, such as administrative convenience, were advanced as 
principal motivation, but the move inadvertently acknowledged and 
formalised the three main ethnic nationalities into semi self-governing 
regions. Between the time of the new constitution, introduction of new 
regional structures, and independence, the nation had barely 14 years 
to transition from a colonial state to an indigenous, democratic self-
governing state.  And in just two years after independence, in 1962, the 
euphoria of the adventure with self-rule had whittled considerably: the 
first major storm that rocked the boat of state was the Federal census of 
that year.  Regional unrests, particularly in the Western Region, 
eventually led to large-scale ethnic clashes, which led to a military take 
over and a civil war (Osaghae, 1991).  In Nigeria’s first 40 years of self-
government, (1960-2000) the military took the lion share of nearly 30 
years; and the nation became as much known for self-induced political 
instability for its profligacy, endemic corruption, as for its oil wealth. 
At every stage of Nigeria’s evolution, the role of the press has been 
prominent: it led in the fight against the British for independence; 
politicians dragged it with them into ethno-partisan politics, to fight 
real or imagined political opponents.  On its own, the press rose up 
against the military with one voice for the return of the country to 
democracy.  This study utilises key election periods and processes to 
illustrate and ascertain the roles and influences of the press that may 
have contributed to defining ethno-political culture that has shaped 
Nigeria. It seeks to understand how, in the quest to belong, ethnicity 
became a dominant factor in elections, in self-definition, and formation 
of Nigeria.  
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1.4.0 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
This study probes the claim that the Nigerian press may have played a 
far more significant role in the formation of the Nigerian nation-state.  
Quite early in the political history of Nigeria, newspapers became 
“outlets for electoral policies and propaganda” (Omu, 1978, p60).  As 
such, the genesis of organised politics in Nigeria is steeped in the 
history of the press; the earliest national constitution in 1922 (Clifford) 
was the result of “newspaper press initiative and campaign for elective 
franchise” (Omu, 1978, p232). 
Media scholars and professionals have understandably paid a great 
deal of attention to the role of newspaper-press in the struggle for 
independence from Britain; or in the struggle against military rule, for 
which many paid with their lives (Oso and Pate, 2011; Olukotun, 2005; 
Sobowale, 1985; Omu, 1978). While these struggles are very important, 
the problem remains: scant attention has been paid to what may have 
been a more fundamental role played by the press in the internal 
struggle for hegemonic supremacy by some; and the fight by others for 
inclusion within the Nigerian political space, their needs, and struggle 
to belong. 
As Aimufua (2007) puts it, “one of the inadequacies of the Nigerian 
press is that it is divisive and promotes the aspirations of their owners, 
which in most cases are sectional” (p183). In the immediate post-
independent Nigeria (1960-1966 in particular), true professionalism 
vanished from most newsrooms of press organisations.  Of the few that 
remained steadfast, many were further torn between serving their 
communities (ethnic groups or regions) and serving the larger 
imagined nation (Jose, 1988; Nyamnjoh, 2005).  They were also torn 
between intersectional conflicts of allegiance: loyalty to professionalism 
and ethnic politicians who owned and used the press as stepping-
stones to national political relevance and prominence.  
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The problem became compounded as press, rather than provide a level-
playing arena that integrates, became partisan, and more a probable 
agent of disunity. According to Sobowale (2002), the majority 
“promoted inter-ethnic hatred as well as inter-ethnic distrust and 
acrimony that eventually led to the collapse of the first republic” 
(p273). And Dare (1985) concurs, noting that through crude and 
overzealous partisanship, journalists transformed opponents of ruling 
parties into dissidents.  This study, therefore, seeks to investigate, 
outside the commonly acknowledged but limiting role of the press in 
agitating for independence, the problem that the press may have 
contributed in the more fundamental manner to the forging of a 
dysfunctional post-colonial identity and character that modern 
Nigerian state currently has.   
1.5.0 MOTIVATION 
The world of the Nigerian journalist is marked by constant tensions 
between the textbook ideals of the profession, and the reality of 
practice in a peculiar socio-political context: this is a driving 
ontological motivation. As a young practitioner, I imagined that 
journalism work should make Nigeria a fairer, more united and 
egalitarian nation, where everyone would feel a sense of belonging.  
However, as I matured in practice and as one from a minority ethnic 
group, I found my ideas and aspirations challenged and incongruent 
with the reality of everyday Nigerian journalism practice. 
As a student and teacher of media history, I have had recurrent 
moments of pride in reading or hearing about the role that journalists 
played in the “struggle for independence”. The often repeated and 
fascinating narratives of the historic roles that newspapers and 
journalists played to secure independence from an unwilling and 
unyielding British Empire, have always been told with enthusiasm and 
measured drama.   
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We were regaled with stories of how Herbert Macaulay was acerbic and 
a terror to the colonial officers through the might of the pen; how 
Anthony Enahoro practically became a jailbird in his crusade against 
the British colonial rule; how Azikiwe moved political rallies and 
newspaper readers with spoken and written bombastic English; how 
Samuel L. Akintola, a great mobiliser wrote and spoke impeccable 
Churchillian English; and how assertive and self-assured the duo of 
Obafemi Awolowo and Ahmadu Bello were – the British could not 
intimidate them (Osuntokun, 2010).  This list of leading nationalists 
duplicates itself as the list of remarkable journalists (except Ahmadu 
Bello, first Premier of the Northern Region), before they became 
prominent politicians. I have also been part of the struggle against 
military rule, during which I lost a very dear friend and professional 
mentor. 
With all the above in mind, I often wondered why such an erudite and 
astute group of professionals who became the first generation of 
political leaders produced such an ethnicised and divided nation, where 
virtually every group feels disaffected.  I have also often wondered if the 
complete story, of the role that the press and journalists played in the 
formation of Nigeria, had been told.  
1.6.0 JUSTIFICATION 
Since colonial days, the essential philosophies and ethos of the 
Nigerian political systems, as managed by the elite, has remained 
fundamentally unchanged. Some would argue that Nigeria’s political 
condition might have been worse, but for the press.  What is obvious 
then is that there is discernable tension between layers of 
interpretations of the roles that the press has played in post-colonial 
Nigeria. Many argue that the press played a far more significant role, if 
not in the designing of it, at least in the propagation and maintenance 
of the political culture on which modern Nigeria is built.  A central 
justification for this study is the need to clarify if political culture of 
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representation within democratic process may have been deliberately 
constructed to fit the Nigerian context, making identity and belonging 
contentious issues in the business of nation-state formation. 
This problem is not unique to Nigeria; it is a Pan-African problem.  
After over 50 years of independence for most African nations, issues of 
ethnicity, “citizenship and belonging have failed to disappear in favour 
of a single political and legal citizenship” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p19).  
Rather than disappear, there has been a “resurgence of identity politics 
and overt tensions over belonging”, as various ethno-cultural groups 
seek equity, better representation, and greater access to national 
resources and opportunities (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p19). 
There were early signs, in the case of Nigeria, to indicate that the 
structures and designs of political associations/parties pointed in the 
direction of where the nation has now eventually found itself.  Seeds 
planted in the 1940s, nurtured in the 1950s bore fruits in the mid-
1960s leading to a bloody civil war.  The nation has never recovered 
from the impact of established early patterns, which incidentally 
seemed to have been nurtured through the press. Today, after over 75 
years since the days of nationalist agitations, not much has changed – 
we have well established but twisted political culture of conflict and 
protest. 
In 2010, Muhamadu Buhari, who served as a Military Head of State 
about 30 years ago and was democratically elected the nation’s 
president in 2015, called the story of Nigeria, “a depressing story of a 
democracy without democrats, and of elections without the electorate 
having much say in the process” (Buhari, 2010, p3). Thus, Nigeria 
today presents a good case study as a nation in a paradoxical existence.  
Some experts (Ogundiya, 2005; Osaghae, 2015) see signs of looming 
implosion; they predict a great and gifted nation that may be about to 
fail – all of which are the result of a long history of ethnic distrust and 
divisions, regional loyalties, corruption, and inept leadership.  Under 
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the above conditions, finding a justification for the need for the study is 
not difficult: the study is seeking an explanation for how Nigeria 
became a democracy without democrats, and what role the press 
played to get Nigeria into the company of pseudo-democratic nations. 
If indeed, as Dare (2000) states, most pre-independence journalists 
were “firebrand nationalists who wanted to use journalism to change 
society” and build a nation (p15), what went wrong and at what point 
did the nation go wrong? And how did nationalist-journalists so 
quickly transform to so deeply polarised front-line politicians?  Why 
was it that the parties themselves seldom spoke with consensus on 
major national issues of the day? 
As noted earlier, media scholarship in Nigeria has focused on a partial 
narrative of the role of the early Nigerian press. They have tended to be 
celebrative about the press’ role in a self-congratulatory manner. While 
the applause may not be out of place entirely, it is only one of the many 
possible strands of narratives, as there is an undeniable role played by 
the press in the struggle for independence.  The other strands are still 
waiting to be investigated. 
Often, arguments have been advanced to the effect that the media 
cannot absolve itself of their contribution to the formation of today’s 
Nigerian nation (Omu, 1996; Dare, 2000).  However, few clear direct 
studies on the role of the press per se are available that I’m aware of – 
the likes of Omu (1978), Agbaje (1992), Adebanwi (2002: 2016). While 
Omu, Agbaje and Adebanwi have done excellent work in these regards 
along with likes of Aimufua, (2007) and Oso (2014), their generations 
have been comparatively scanty, with the spaces between them, large 
and far apart.  While other disciplines use the press’ narrative as 
authentic data sources to annotate, illustrate, or understand certain 
historic phenomena, there have been limited studies on media 
themselves and the role they played in the formation of nations like 
Nigeria. 
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One established assumption in scores of studies on media effects is that 
the press has the capacity to shape society (Nyamnjoh, 2005; Herman 
and Chomsky, 1994; Freedman, 2014); aside from this, alongside its 
role as the record keeper, it is the society’s mirror – reflecting the 
society to itself (Obasanjo and Mabogunje, 1991). Even in weak 
democracies “the media have a complex relationship with sources of 
power and the political system” (McQuail, 2010, p523). The 
newspaper-press provides knowledge and education in order for people 
to use the information at their disposal to participate meaningfully, and 
have strong influence on public discourse. 
Understanding the affiliation between the political power elite and the 
press, particularly during election periods, should provide deeper 
comprehension on the press, belonging, and democratisation 
(Nyamnjoh, 2005). According to Dare (2000), the press “operated 
primarily to strengthen the grip of (political) leaders over their 
followers, and thereby the fragmentation of the country” (p15). And 
Omu (1978) wrote that the newspaper-press provided “a remarkable 
example of over-zealousness and irresponsible partisanship” (p248). 
Could it then be that the press lost power to cause change when it 
became as polarised and as divided along the same political and ethnic 
fault lines that divided the politicians and the nation?  Could it be that 
the coalition of convenience between press and political elite in the 
pursuit of non-integrative ethno-cultural interests produced a 
detrimental political culture?  Could it be that the failure of the press to 
decouple itself from the political class meant that the press became a 
“vehicle for uncritical assumptions, beliefs, stereotypes, ideologies, and 
orthodoxies… that blunt critical awareness and make participatory 
democratisation difficult?” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p2). Providing answers 
to these questions is central to the main quest of this study. 
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1.7.0 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES/GOALS 
One key objective in this study is to hopefully unravel the roles of the 
press in the politics of identity and belonging, and whether these roles 
have been positive or negative.  These include issues of inclusion, 
exclusion, and the promotion of a sense of belonging in representative 
democracy.  The research seeks to investigate, assuming that Francis 
Nyamnjoh (2005) is right, why after over 50 years of independence 
“ethnicity and an obsession with belonging have remained active forces 
on the African political scene” (p17). 
1.8.0 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the struggle to belong within a society in search of an identity, it is 
not unusual to find the media willing and useful collaborators.  Even in 
homogeneous or developed societies, the media are frequently required 
to moderate the process of integration, to define and explain the basic 
ethos of the community or nation-state to its members, and act as 
moderators or umpires in the public sphere discourse.  Recent 
experiences in places like Rwanda or Egypt highlight the role that the 
press could play in mobilising nations towards set objectives.  In these 
places and others, the press also played opposite roles: either as agents 
of accord and building consensus, or of discord and aiding 
disintegration. As a result of the foregoing, the four guiding questions 
around which the study is organised therefore are these: 
1. Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define 
and construct Nigeria’s political culture and national 
identity? 
2. Did press reportage and commentary at federal election 
season reflect or affect the self-identity of the components 
ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”?  
CHAPTER 1 
 
15 
3. Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by 
exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to 
promote ethnicity or regionalism?  
4. Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion 
of nation building, and national unity, and the practice of 
democracy and federalism? 
1.9.0 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Problems associated with ethnicity, nationalism, and the use of media 
by owners to gain political advantages are not unique to Nigeria or 
Africa. What may not have been fully investigated, in the case of 
Nigeria and perhaps Africa, is the use of the press at election seasons to 
integrate component ethnic parts into one united nation, or use of the 
same process to keep the ethnic groups apart, and thereby perpetuating 
disunity. 
This study should expand the scope of scholarship and conversation on 
the subject, and provide some understanding of factors that helped 
form Nigeria’s press and contemporary political culture.  According to 
Taylor and Harris (2008), there has been a “lack of a critical edge” on 
the part of scholars, to the discussion about the media; and this lack 
has “profoundly dangerous political implications” (p1).  
The study should therefore help to understand some of the factors that 
have contributed to the formation of contemporary political and 
election culture. It should provide a holistic explanation of the role of 
press in the formation of the Nigerian nation-state for scholars, 
politicians, press moguls, regulators, practitioners, etc.  The 
expectation is that by raising issues in this field, other academics will 
be drawn into media leadership and impact studies, from the 
perspectives of developing nations. 
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Of immense interest to me is the press’ role not just as the provider of 
historical anecdotes, dates, data, and details which researchers in other 
disciplines use to make their claims and build their arguments but as a 
phenomenon worthy of investigation in its own right.  
1.10.0 THE SCOPE AND PERIODISATION (1959 – 2011) 
Focusing on the key election sub-themes in the topic, the study uses six 
nationwide federal elections (1959, 1964/65, 1979, 1983, 1999 and 
2011) to trace the evolution of, and the struggle to invent one coherent 
nation out of many socially and culturally incongruent regions and 
ethnic nationalities. In the overwhelming craving to acquire exclusive 
hold on power, as well as in the search to belong, elections became the 
most manifest reflection of the interplay of ethnic relations, and the 
press became not just a platform but also an active player and a 
reflector of reality.  Thus, the study uses transition and consolidation 
elections as markers of this evolution through the Nigerian press’ 
concomitant history with that of the nation and its operations in the 
delineated periods.  
Among the several federal elections of over half a century (1959 – 
2011), the significant pre-independence election of 1959, the post-
independence elections of 1964/65, 1979, 1983, and 1999 stand out.  
The federal election of 2011 also stands out but for different reasons: 
for the first time, a person from a minority ethnic groups foiled the 
struggle for power amongst and between the Northern and Southern 
majority ethnic groups. These six illustrative election years form the 
framework of the study, three of which were transition elections while 
the others were consolidation elections. 
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1.11.0 TRANSITION ELECTIONS AND CONSOLIDATION 
ELECTIONS 
A transition election, as against a consolidation election, has the 
possibility of being peaceful, though not always.  According to Orji and 
Uzodi (2012), “Based on available records, transition elections are 
relatively more peaceful than the consolidation elections” (p17). All 
other factors considered, it was therefore not totally surprising that the 
1959, 1979, and 1999 elections were devoid of the type of large-scale 
violence, which the nation witnessed in the consolidation elections of 
1964/65, 1983, and 2011. 
1.11.1 Transition Elections of 1959, 1979, and 1999 
The study begins with the last colonial election of 1959; it concludes 
with the 2011 election, the ninth nationwide federal election. The 1959, 
1979, and 1999 elections are unique, in that: 
i. They were transition elections – 1959, from the British 
rule to the first self-rule government; 1979 and 1999 
from the military rules to civilian administrations; 
ii. They were each a generation apart (twenty-year 
intervals); 
iii. The elections were fought and won with obvious strong 
ethnic exclusionist or inclusionist tendencies, if not 
agitations; 
iv. Using them allows the exploration of themes and factors 
rather than a chronological approach to the research. 
Prior to the 1959 election, there were pre-election clashes between rival 
supporters and thugs working for rival political parties in some regions. 
There were also reported acts of intimidation (including unlawful 
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arrest, detention, and assault) of opposition politicians.  However, 
these were manageable in the light of the novelty of democratic 
processes and culture.  Nonetheless, the unsettling news of recurrent 
sporadic violence during the campaign period led some newspapers to 
make gloomy predictions that there would be rioting on December 12, 
1959. But the day of the elections turned out to be relatively peaceful as 
“the innate decency and good sense of the Nigerian elector was once 
more displayed” (Post, 1964, p345).  Kenneth Post (1964), further 
noted in his assessment of the 1959 elections, “…polling in the 311 
constituencies…went off with remarkable smoothness. One particularly 
praiseworthy feature was the almost complete absence of outbreaks of 
violence on polling day” (p345). 
In the case of the 1979 elections, the relative peace at election was 
orchestrated by the departing military authority, which acted as a 
strong umpire. According to Kurfi (1983), the “calm atmosphere…was 
not brought about by the existence of a fine political culture in the 
Nigerian people but was due to threats of immediate military 
retribution should law and order breakdown” (cited in Orji and Uzodi, 
2012, p18). 
Koehn (1981), corroborates Kurfi’s view, noting that the military played 
open and strong oversight roles to ensure that the elections went 
peacefully (cited in Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p18).  The Head of State, 
General Obasanjo and his deputy, Major-General Yar'adua, effectively 
used the bully pulpit of government and left no one in doubt of their 
zero tolerance for anything that could truncate the electoral process, or 
threaten unity and peace of the country. Politicians themselves feared 
the possibility of postponement of the end to military rule should the 
elections fail (Orji and Uzodi, 2012). 
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1.11.2 Consolidation Elections of 1964/65, 1983, and 
2011  
For most consolidation elections, “violence and repression marred the 
democratic character of campaigns...(parties) regularly used the control 
of systems of justice and administration to obstruct, harass, and punish 
opposition candidates and their supporters” (Diamond, 1990 cited in 
Emenyeonu, 1997, p22). 
Contrasted with transition elections, Orji and Uzodi (2012) note that in 
consolidation elections, ruling parties tend to exhibit deliberate 
attempts to “contrive and monopolise the electoral space”, or else they 
“engineer grand electoral fraud, as well as hatch deliberate plots” (p19) 
to move the process in their favour. “This pattern is reflected in 
‘simulated landslide’ victories recorded by the ruling parties in the 
1964/65, 1983, 2003, and 2007 elections” (Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p19). 
1.12.0 THE LIMITATIONS 
Virtually all research studies have limitations that are unique to the 
subject of study, the research design or choice of methods of 
investigation.  According to James Price and Judy Murnan (2004),  “A 
limitation of a study design or instrument is the systematic bias that 
the researcher did not or could not control and which could 
inappropriately affect the results” (p66).  In this study, some 
limitations occur in the chosen method of investigation, and in some 
areas of the research process itself.   
1.12.1 Limitations 
Interviews, which by their very nature produce self-reported data, have 
propensity for bias, inadvertently because of inclination of people to be 
selective in remembering past events; to exaggerate the impact of 
personal achievements or be defensive of one’s failures.  In order to 
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mitigate some of these biases, I stretched the four research questions 
into 14 questions, some of them deliberately designed to ask the same 
thing in different ways.   
Another area of limitation was gender inclusion. Of the 22 interviews, I 
could not, despite all efforts, as discussed in Chapter 6, get one female 
interviewee into the group. While I think that a female perspective 
would have been beneficial, because of the nature of the subject matter, 
I do not think it affected the overall result of the findings. 
The scope of what newspaper materials to include for content analysis, 
in the data gathering process posed a form of limitation to the study.  
In designing the study, I chose to limit the genres to analyse to front 
pages and editorial comments for the simple reasons that editorials 
carry the paper’s institutional position or opinions, and front pages are 
devoted to the most important news stories. It is now my belief that the 
study might have been more robust if it had included political news 
stories in the inner pages as well.  A pilot study would have flagged this 
limitation early and narrowed the scope of materials to a fewer number 
of years of study and digging deeper into those materials could have 
ameliorated it. This said however, the front-page political news items 
still provided enough materials for analysis. 
1.12.2 Delimitation 
On the opposite side of limitation is ‘delimitation’ which is a 
“systematic bias intentionally introduced into the study design or 
instrument by the researcher. In other words, the researcher has 
control over a delimitation” (Price and Murnan, 2004, p66). For this 
study, one delimitating factor is my decision to limit the scope in the 
choice of interview participants to elites who have had direct contact 
with the subject of investigation and have impacted it, or have been 
impacted by it.  To include others outside the elite group may have 
distorted the overall findings. 
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Another issue was the decision to limit the study to newspaper-press 
and not include other mass media forms, particularly radio and 
television.  This delimitation was informed by several factors: 1) 
Nigeria’s broadcast organisations mostly do not archive news and 
programmes; records of old broadcasts are hard to find. 2) Until the 
early 1990s, they were all owned and directly controlled by 
government’s agencies like the federal or state ministries of 
information.  3) With the deregulation of the electronic/broadcast 
industry, most radio and television stations are urban based and are 
driven mostly to commercial interests.  
1.13.0 THESIS STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW 
This thesis is structured into four main chapters of eight chapters, each 
with subtitles for ease of understanding, access, and reference.  
1.13.1 Chapter One. Introduction and Background 
This first chapter is a broad introduction to the theme of the study; it 
attempts to define the nature and scope of the research, its focus, and 
limitations. A central part of this introductory chapter is the historical 
and contextual background of some significant features of the study 
and how they interrelate. The chapter also looks at the motivation and 
justification for the research, questions for which the study aspires to 
provide answers; and lastly the chapter outlines the entire thesis 
structure.  
1.13.2 Chapter Two. Historical Context and Empirical 
Literature Review 
The research is anchored on the trifocal nation-building relationships 
between the press, democratic process of elections, and the concept of 
belonging in a multi-ethnic nation-state like Nigeria. The second 
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chapter is set out to review relevant literature central to the subject of 
study in six sections. The first section deals with signposts derived from 
Nigeria’s status as a postcolonial state, and the second section reports 
on the result and consequences of the first – today’s Nigeria as a much-
divided nation.  The focus in the third section shifts to the tangled 
relationship between press and politics; the fourth section highlights 
significant eras in the evolution of the Nigerian press. The fifth outlines 
attempts at national unity and integration over the years; and the final 
section provides a survey of the selected elections covered in the study, 
centring on how today’s political culture has evolved over the years.  
1.13.3 Chapter Three. Theoretical Literature Review 
This chapter surveys, reviews, and assesses conceptual thinking on 
press, electoral democracy, and the politics of belonging. The review 
examines relevant and related theories in the context of newspaper-
press operating in multi-ethnic, post-colonial states where the 
newspaper is a relatively new phenomenon. To arrive at a theoretical 
framework in line with the objective of the study, attention is paid to 
aggregative and deliberative models with particular interest in the 
agonism as a likely theoretical platform on which a new applicable 
framework may be constructed.  
1.13.4 Chapter Four. Methodology and Research Design  
This chapter discusses mixed methods of elite semi-structured, in-
depth interviews and content analysis, which were my preferred 
methods for this study. The chapter also explains and justifies the 
overall research design and methods employed to drive the process of 
data collection, organisation, and analysis. To provide a background it 
was important to foreground the choices with a philosophical paradigm 
and in particular, the peculiarities of the African research cosmos.  The 
chapter is divided into seven sections.  
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1.13.5 Chapter Five. Elite Interview Data Analysis and 
Results  
The specific objectives in this chapter are to analyse the collected data, 
develop themes, and display data results. The data for analysis were 
obtained in Nigeria through in-depth elite interviews of 22 subjects in 
three categories of press leaders, political leaders, and academicians.   
1.13.6 Chapter Six. Newspaper Data Content Analysis 
and Results  
The focus of this chapter is similar to the previous one.  It deals with 
content analysing data obtained from selected archival newspaper 
materials for the designated six election periods, spanning 52 years, 
(1959 to 2011). The objective in using content analysis is to establish 
the nature and patterns of press coverage over the election periods. 
1.13.7 Chapter Seven. Discussion of Findings  
This chapter pulls everything together in terms of providing answers to 
the research questions, within the designed thematic framework of the 
research. 
1.13.8 Chapter Eight. Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
Chapter eight provides an overall conclusion to the thesis. This chapter 
also includes the study’s key contribution to knowledge, recommended 
areas for further research and investigation.  
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1.14.0  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide an introductory overview 
based on the theme of the study; it situates the press as the focal point 
of the study.  The chapter provides a background to the study and 
outlines the research problems and study objectives, as well as the 
scope and limitations.  A central part of the chapter touches on 
historical and contextual backgrounds of some significant features of 
the study and how they interrelate. The chapter also looks at the 
motivation and justification for the research, questions for which the 
study aspires to provide answers; and lastly the chapter outlines the 
entire thesis structure. In the next chapter, I shall be looking at the 
factors that have combined to form characteristic of the press, and 
groomed the culture of politics, and how both have fared in the post-
colonial Nigerian state. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out to review relevant literature central to the subject 
of study; it contains six segments. The first segment is introductory: it 
briefly signposts derived postcolonial status from an ontological 
bearing, beginning a philosophical conversation that enfolds the 
study.  Building on the postcolonial experience contextually, the 
second segment discusses the peculiar reality in today’s Nigeria as a 
much-divided nation.  In the third segment, the study focuses on the 
origins of the symbiotic, but also tangled relationship between the 
press and politics in Nigeria; and the fourth segment highlights the 
significant eras in the evolution of the press. The fifth outlines 
attempts at national unity and integration over the years, particularly 
during the era of the military.  The sixth and final segment provides a 
survey of the selected elections covered in the study, centring on how 
today’s political culture has evolved over the years. The research is 
anchored on the trifocal nation-building relationships between the 
press, democratic process of elections, and the concept of belonging in 
a multi-ethnic nation-state like Nigeria.   
2.2.0 COLONIAL ONTOLOGY AND THE POST-COLONIAL 
STATE 
From an ontological perspective, it is impossible to meaningfully 
discuss the state of the Nigerian nation-state without paying particular 
attention to the nation’s deeply rooted colonial past and the overall 
experience of the nature and character of post-colonialism.  In the 
light of Nigeria’s current social-political realities, its peculiarities, 
proclivities and their attendant consequences, it is imperative to first 
examine the colonial legacies of the British Empire’s largest geo-
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political construct in Africa. Citing a 1987 report of the Political 
Bureau, Ayoade, Akinsanya and Ojo (2014) note:  
Nigeria inherited a weak social-political structure, a 
defective and unbalanced federation, an 
intensification of ethnic consciousness and 
rivalries…and an inexperienced leadership… 
Independent Nigeria, despite the euphoria that 
greeted her birth, was [saddled with a] crisis-ridden 
future (p344). 
Put slightly differently, Ekeh (1975) says, “Our post-colonial present 
has been fashioned by our colonial past. It is that colonial past that has 
defined for us the spheres of morality that have come to dominate our 
politics” (p111). The questions then become pertinent: How do 
contesting historical ontologies of an African nation-state, which are 
invariably informed by colonial experience, explain modern-day 
divided realities, which bear striking resemblances to the past? Does 
the postcolonial reality explain the politicisation of ethnicity that led 
to ethnicisation of politics? 
Most scholars are agreed that the British led an already polarised 
nation to independence; as such, they established the fact that the 
colonial experience is largely to be held responsible for Nigeria’s 
defective structure from the start (Ayoade, Akinsanya and Ojo, 2014; 
Osaghae, 2015; Ogundiya, 2005).  Understanding colonialism, and 
post colonialism – its direct consequence, remains relevant to the 
understanding of the ontological realities of most modern African 
states (Ekeh, 1975; Mamdani, 2012; Bhabha, 1994; Spivak 1999).  For 
Peter Ekeh (1975), post colonialism directly produced two publics in 
Africa, instead of one as in everywhere else: 
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…the experiences of colonialism in Africa have led to 
the emergence of a unique historical configuration in 
modern post-colonial Africa: the existence of two 
publics instead of one public, as in the West. Many of 
Africa's political problems are due to the dialectical 
relationships between the two publics (p91). 
Another significant consequence of colonial history on the 
postcolonial nation-state relevant to this study is what Mahmud 
Mamdani called “the politicisation of indigeneity”. According to him, 
citing Bala Usman, contemporary ethnic nationalities were actually 
created in the process of the formation of the colonial state in Nigeria” 
(2012, p105).  It is therefore important that we begin by looking a little 
into Nigeria’s colonial history to understand how the effect has not 
only constructed a modern nation-state, but may also be responsible 
for its inability to shake itself free of its dark past. This postcolonial 
theme will be further pursued in the subsequent chapters on theory 
and methodology in order to provide a common philosophical 
orientation and framework for the study.  Specifically on elections and 
ethnic relations, many would dispute that the British left behind an 
enviable legacy. 
2.2.1 Historical Background 
One hundred years after the amalgamation of disparate ethnic groups 
that formed two large British colonial protectorates into one nation-
state, political integration and unity for Nigeria have remained elusive, 
but the leading role that the press played in the quest for self-rule is 
not in question (Diamond, 1988; Agbaje, 1992). However, there have 
existed lingering questions about whether journalists, many of who 
were activists as nationalists, and then became national leaders, could 
have used the power of newspaper-press, the dominant mass medium 
from the beginning, to construct a more stable and united nation, 
rather than what has become contemporary Nigeria.   
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The constitutional history of Nigeria, and introduction to Western 
forms of politics and governance began in 1861 with the conquest of 
Lagos and the dethronement of Oba Kosoko by the British.  A year 
after, Lagos was declared a ‘Crown Colony’ and a legislative council 
was introduced to advise the governor in framing legislation for the 
new Colony (Coleman, 1958, p50).   
Lord Frederick Lugard, the colonial Governor-General and architect of 
the Nigerian-state was perhaps the most dominant and influential of 
colonial figures in the formation of Nigeria.  In the years between 
Lugard’s amalgamation of 1914 and the late 1940s, ethnically 
moderated politics, was hardly part of the dominant discourse.  
However, from about 1947 and into the nation’s independence in 1960 
and beyond, ethnic and regional tensions became the staple feature in 
increasing measures in the Nigerian press.  Lugard’s bias in favour of 
the Muslim Northern Nigeria was not disguised (Diamond, 1988; 
Cole, 1975).  His administration and those of his line of successors 
were characterised by differential and preferential treatment of ethnic 
groups, religions, and regions.  As observed by Diamond (1988), the 
creation of Nigeria was not done for the benefit of Nigeria or 
Nigerians. The British “carved out a highly artificial nation for their 
own convenience” and economic benefits (p14).   
In particular, Lord Lugard regarded Africans as “the child races of the 
world… people in a low stage of development”.  As such, he promoted 
“racial distinction” which he said should be accepted as “the true basis 
of African education” (Lugard, 1923, pp72-80 cited in Turaki, 2013, 
p33).  Following up on this worldview, various colonial administrators 
were openly contemptuous of the educated African elite. 
Contemporary elites like Henry Carr, and journalists like Herbert 
Macaulay and Horatio Jackson were perpetually at loggerheads with 
colonial rulers in the press (Cole, 1975).  A case in point: Lugard 
appointed six illiterate African paramount chiefs as members of the 
Consultative Council, ostensibly to ‘represent their people’.  The 
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indigenous press of the time openly denigrated the Governor-General, 
regarding the appointments as an open mockery and a twisted model 
of inclusive governance (Coleman, 1958). Indeed, scholars like Turaki 
stated that colonial rulers felt threatened by educated Africans and for 
this reason, they actively discouraged missionary schools (Turaki, 
2013; Cole, 1975).  
2.3.0 THE POLITICAL JOURNEY: FROM DUAL MANDATE 
TO MULTIPLE MANDATES 
Nigeria became a nation-state through the 1914 amalgamation of three 
existing British colonial entities:  the Lagos Colony (which became a 
colony in 1862) and the protectorates of British Northern and 
Southern Nigeria.  Between the 1914 amalgamation and the 1960 
independence, British colonial rule over the entity called Nigeria 
lasted for 46 years. However, because Lord Lugard deliberately kept 
the administration of the North separate from that of the South, with 
different laws, different policies, and different educational systems; 
the nation did not function as one amalgamated unit for about 33 of 
those 46 years.  
Colonial rulers created administrative structures where an outsized 
majority of members was expatriate civil servants and resident 
businessmen. Elections were introduced for the first time in 1922; 
before then, a minute representation of African members “held their 
seats at the pleasure of the government” (Enahoro, 1965, p64). But the 
1922 political system was designed “to see that government was not 
caused any embarrassment. The elected members could only play the 
role of very impoverished or weak opposition” (Enahoro, 1965, p64). 
2.3.1 1947 
In 1947, a “federal” type of governance and regionalism was proposed; 
Nigeria was officially on the journey to becoming a federation (Cole, 
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1975). Reasons of administrative convenience were advanced as the 
principal motivation for the split of the Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria into Western and Eastern Nigeria. The move officially 
acknowledged and formalised the three main ethnic nationalities into 
semi-self governing regions in 1954.  Ideally, federalism may have 
been the best option for Nigeria, however, the immediate consequence 
of this peculiar federalism was that it motivated its leaders and sent 
them back to their mothers’ huts, as ethnic boundary lines were drawn 
- officially.  By independence, in 1960, then only a short 13 years away, 
ethnic, and tribal cleavages that were barely visible in 1947 had 
become political gorges. 
2.3.2 The Challenge of Belonging:  The State of 
Continuous Social Unrest 
The country, as it exists today, is vastly different from the Nigeria the 
nationalists had imagined. In the early days of the 1First Republic 
(1960-1966), there were ominous predictive signals of the bloody 
conflicts that have become commonplace today. Signs of instability 
were manifest, but politicians, lost in the euphoria of independence, 
declared them as normal teething problems of new nations.  For 
instance, to Muhammadu Buhari, the current president, “while its 
First Republic lasted, Nigeria was the example and toast of Africa” 
(2010, p5).  Yet, by 1963, in just three years of independence, the 
excitement of self-governance had whittled considerably.  The first 
major storm that rocked the boat of state was the federal census of 
1962; it became a litmus test of readiness for self-rule.  The unresolved 
controversy over the census results became a divisive crisis that 
snowballed into the election years of 1964/1965. The nation reeled and 
muddled from the much disputed census to much more disputed 
                                                    
1  To distinguish between military regimes and civilian governments, politicians have 
numbered elected governments by Republics.  Consequently, the First Republic lasted 
between 1960 and 1966; the Second Republic – 1979-1983; the Third Republic – 1993; and 
the Fourth Republic is still on-going since 1999. 
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elections of 1964/65 until the military, under the guise of wanting to 
save the nation, overthrew an elected government in 1966; the Civil 
War followed the year after.  
2.3.3 Fast Forward 51 Years (1966-2017) 
In today’s Nigeria, ‘ethnic militias’ are spearheading “political contests 
between the politics of identity and citizenship” (Gore and Pratten, 
2003, p212).  A state of continuous social unrest has been made worse 
by perceived disenfranchisement by virtually all major ethnic groups. 
As a result of real or imagined non-inclusion, some now openly 
canvass breaking away. As Gore and Pratten (2003) put it, “ethnic 
militias invoke the spectre of separatism…” (p212). In addition, 
feelings of oppression, exclusion, or marginalisation by other minority 
ethnic groups have also birthed more ethnic militias. As Joshua (2013) 
puts it, “The inability of the state to perform its constitutional duties of 
maintaining law and order, justice and providing social services for 
the people has culminated in the emergence of ethnic militias” in 
virtually all parts of the country (p330). They emerged as defenders of 
whichever oppressed groups they claimed to represent. Gore and 
Pratten (2003), submit that some of these militias are further driven 
by “ethnic chauvinism, and vigilantism against crime and ‘moral 
degradation’” (p212).  
Some of the ethnic militias and pressure groups in Nigeria include: the 
O'dua People’s Congress (OPC), the Bakassi Boys, the Egbesu Boys, 
the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC), and the Igbo People Congress (IPC). 
Others include the Arewa People’s Congress (APC), the Movement for 
the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the 
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the dreaded Boko Haram.  
While several of them are only engaged in rhetorical warfare with the 
state, some of them are armed and, have overtime, constituted 
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themselves into agents of terror across the nation. Describing the 
situation, Ajayi (2013) states, “a more dangerous dimension has been 
brought into the picture in the form of the terrorist activities of the 
Boko Haram movement” (p141). The situation has led to further social 
and political destabilisation, which has in turn fuelled economic 
stagnation. 
Nigeria's unemployment rate as at June 2015, was given as 8.2% by 
the National Bureau of Statistics, a rise from 7.5% in the first quarter 
of the same year (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015, p4). These 
figures do not account for the gross underemployment situation where 
graduates are left with little alternatives but to take on roles far below 
their qualifications.  The National Bureau of Statistics (2015) reports 
that the underemployment rate rose from 16.6% in the first quarter of 
2015 to 18.3% in the second quarter (p4).  
Gross mismanagement of funds and looting of the national treasury 
have not allowed Nigeria to realise its economic potentials and the 
country is in a situation where the few 'feast' on the commonwealth of 
all. Segun Joshua (2013), a political scientist, perhaps, best expressed 
the feeling of discontent by virtually all ethnic groups in the nation:   
The Ogonis felt neglected, the oil producing states felt 
cheated, the northern minorities felt left out, the West 
felt robbed, the core North felt they only held the titles 
but real power has been elsewhere, the East has always 
felt oppressed and marginalized” (p331).  
2.3.4 A Failing Democracy? 
Democracy failed early in Nigeria.  The first elected civilian 
administration lasted barely six tumultuous years; the second, four 
years of wholesale and high-end corruption, and the third, though 
elected in 1993, it never took off.  Failure of elected civil governments 
to govern well always gave the military needed excuses to intervene in 
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governance; it led to the first military coup d’état in 1966, and the 
fourth in 1983. Over time, leadership and governance became a 
revolving door for successions of military rulers and dictators with 
only a brief interlude of one civilian administration. Thus, in the first 
39 years (1960-1999) of Nigeria’s existence, the military ruled for 
nearly 30 years.  What then was the role of the press before and after 
independence?  
2.4.0 POLITICS, PRESS, AND NIGERIA 
2.4.1 The Pre-Independence Press and the Anti-
Colonial Struggle 
This section deals with historical sketches of the evolution of early 
newspaper-press in Nigeria.  But more significantly, it traces the 
origins of politicisation of ethnicity and the role of the press in the 
development.  The newspaper-press existed when the territory that 
would later be called Nigeria was littered with scattered trading posts 
of the British Royal Niger Company, hedged in some place between 
the two British Colonies of Calabar and Lagos (Coleman, 1958) in the 
Gulf of Guinea off the West African Coast.  By 1914, when the 
Southern and Northern protectorates were forged to become one 
political entity, the press was already in existence for 55 years of 
unbroken, even if erratic and hyperactive, service in parts of the 
country. According to Omu (1978), between 1859 and 1914, Nigeria 
witnessed the rise and fall of over 40 press publications, long before 
the name Nigeria, was even imagined. Before the 1914 amalgamation, 
there were newspapers that already carried the name Nigeria in their 
mastheads such as the Nigerian Times, several years before 
amalgamation (Omu, 1978).   
During this period, newspapers in the protectorates had “constituted 
themselves into a potent opposition to the British administration of 
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the West Coast of Africa, particularly Nigeria” (Sobowale, 1985, p29) as 
the “Indigenous African newspapers were almost unavoidably highly 
critical of the colonial administration” (Omu, 1968, p279). An 
emerging educated elite established newspapers, for use in 
questioning colonialism and demanding self-rule. Soon enough, a 
national press emerged, which in direct response to the political 
exigencies of the time grew to “become a plague to colonialism” 
(Nwankwo et al., 1993, p2). 
Kopytoff (1965) explains: “the newspapers of this period were often 
filled with ‘vitriolic comments’ on the policies and actions of the 
British colonial administrations” (cited in Ajibade, 2010, p252). 
According to Sobowale (1985), the contents of the newspapers were so 
critical that the opening decades of the twentieth century marked the 
beginning of government’s regulation of the newspaper industry 
through various laws that were enacted “to stem the growing power 
and popularity of the press” (1985, p29) as “colonial administrators 
sought to control them” (Omu, 1968, p298). In Sobowale’s view, the 
journalists and the nationalist press were very influential because 
“they were able to appeal to the political instinct of the people” (1985, 
p30) and they were the “most effective constitutional weapon for 
ventilating grievances and influencing the trend of events” (Omu, 
1968, p279). 
2.4.2 Politics, Ethnicity, and the Press 
Somewhere between the late 1920s and 1930s, the Nigerian press 
began to shed its ‘Black Englishman’s’ ownership image.  The Black 
Englishmen were mostly freed slaves from Liberia, the United 
Kingdom, Jamaica and other places in the then British Empire, trying 
to establish themselves as the bourgeoisie of the emerging Nigerian 
state.  Natives or indigenous Nigerians began to own and operate 
newspaper houses.  As stated in the previous chapter, this was about 
the period when older and former influential papers like the Lagos 
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Weekly Record and the Lagos Daily News went out of circulation; 
more recently established papers like the Daily Times and the Daily 
Service were barely surviving. It was also the era in which two great 
publishers died – Horatio Jackson, who had co-published the Lagos 
Weekly Record with his father died, and Herbert Macaulay, publisher 
of the Daily News.  
Then came, in 1937, the West African Pilot and Nnamdi Azikiwe its 
publisher; Azikiwe set a new tone for the press and for politics. The 
arrival of the West African Pilot also marked the “transition from the 
society of...‘black Englishmen’ to that of educated Nigerians who had 
no roots in British guardianship” (Omu, 2000, p60). The replacement 
new owners/operators were native born who had little or no umbilical 
connection to England except for their sound English or American 
Education.  
Journalists of the nationalist period (1920-1940) were consumed by 
one driving ambition – gain independence from the British. Enahoro 
(2000) noted that:  
Colonialism...and Nationalism had great influences in 
shaping early Nigerian journalism... the educated elite 
used the press as a means of propaganda. Journalism 
became a political weapon, a social force that 
championed the people’s rights and liberties. 
Nationalism and Journalism became synonymous. 
The [more prominent] journalists were also the 
leading nationalists...Herbert Macaulay...Azikiwe... 
Awolowo (p18).    
The origins and wobbly substructure of ethnic politics in Nigeria, and 
the enlistment of the press as an ally in ethno-regional political 
warfare began to be publicly exhibited in the early 1940s, after a short 
but purposeful nationalist era.  Political elite began to use the press to 
openly mobilise based on ethnic ideology.  In this regard, the press 
became complicit in helping politicians to achieve their “demagogic 
CHAPTER 2 
 
36 
ends, to manipulate one section or interest against another” (Obasanjo 
and Mabogunje, 1991, p22).  
2.4.3 Elective Democracy and the Press: Origins 
In 1922, Governor Hugh Clifford reconstituted the Legislative Council 
and modified it to include a minority of four (4) elected seats out of a 
46 member Council. The marginal change may have seemed palliative 
at the time, and it was. In essence, the Council was still guided by the 
Lugardian worldview; it was “so carefully composed that nothing 
startling or unexpected could ever happen in it or to it” (Enahoro, 
1965, p64). However, the effect of the Clifford Constitution was that it 
opened the Pandora’s Box concerning elections and political 
participation actively stimulating the formation of political 
organisations. Clifford stirred up a voracious appetite for elective 
office in Nigeria.  However, the operation of the new Constitution was 
limited to the South, in an amalgamated Nigeria of eight years. And it 
would remain so for 25 more years in the new nation that was still 
governed by the Lugardian ‘dual mandate’ policies which effectively 
was, two systems of government in one country where “the twain did 
not meet” (Enahoro, 1965, p64). 
As the elected members of the Council grew in political sophistication, 
they became ingenious, always finding ways to amplify their voices 
through their use of the press. These marginal African elected officials 
established a liaison with the press so that questions in the Council 
became merely a means of obtaining information upon which debates 
followed on the pages of newspapers. Thus, “the press was in the 
vanguard of the progressive movement in Nigeria, leading rather than 
reflecting public opinion and moulding rather than reporting political 
developments” (Enahoro, 1965, p65). 
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2.4.4 The Origins of Ethno-Tribal Politics of Exclusion 
versus Inclusion 
The indigenous elites of Lagos in the 1930s were somewhat a clearly 
defined homogenous elite group. Ige (1995), noted “newspapers 
published in Lagos before Zik (Azikiwe) started the West African Pilot 
hardly ever mentioned the ethnic origins of whoever they reported on” 
(Ige, 1995, p27).  There was hardly anyone outside of the city elite 
worth reporting on; most people in the social and political world were 
British expatriates, ‘Westernised’ Yorubas and émigrés from other 
places like Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Brazil, and the United Kingdom. The 
rest of the people were mostly ordinary Lagosians of Yoruba origin, 
who were largely ignored by the press.  
All began to change, beginning in the late 1930s into the 1940s: the 
demography of non-Yoruba residents and an educated middle class of 
other ethnic groups grew rapidly; with the growth, came ethnic and 
class tension. Significantly affected was the relationship between the 
old Lagos Yoruba residents on the one hand, and the newcomers 
comprising of Igbos and other ethnic entities, including Yorubas from 
the hinterland.  Most of the new comers were professionals educated 
abroad, people like, Sir Francis Akanu Ibiam, the first Igbo doctor; 
Louis Mbanefo, the first Igbo lawyer, and Nnamdi Azikiwe, whom 
Sklar (1963) described as the “the first great Igbo leader of the 
twentieth century” (p55). In addition, “an ever-increasing number of 
industrious Igbos from the densely populated East had settled in quest 
of economic opportunities” (Sklar, 1963, p54).   
The new arrivals demanded inclusion and a footing in the narrow 
political space from the more established occupiers; it was the genesis 
of overtly political ethnic tensions, which was played out on the pages 
of the press. Ige posits that the press, particularly the West African 
Pilot, began what seemed at first, a harmless ethnic contention, when 
it began to overtly celebrate news about the first so-and-so from Igbo 
land, and excluding achievements of other tribes, particularly the 
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Yoruba. According to Ige, Azikiwe and those who opposed him 
dragged everything about Nigeria into a deep quagmire of chauvinistic 
“tribal or ethnic politics and the stench has covered this country ever 
since” (Ige, 1995, p28). 
The 1941 intra-party candidates' selection process of the Nigerian 
Youth Movement may very well be the genesis of the ethnicisation of 
the electoral process in Nigeria, and the press played an active 
supportive role. Enahoro said political pundits of the time assumed 
that the process, which preceded the Legislative Council election of 
1941, would be “a mere ritual, with a predictable result” (Enahoro, 
1965). But it became, perhaps, the crisis point in time in which 
ethnicity, as a complication-inducing factor, began to corrode the 
nascent foundations of the Nigerian body politic.  The press of the day, 
particularly the Daily Service and the West African Pilot, the two 
leading political papers took firm and opposite end positions in the 
ethnic and personality divide that ensued.   
The irony is that many modern-day narratives celebrate the event, 
viewing the era as one in which Nigerian politics was ‘detribalised’ and 
free of overt ethnic considerations.  This view is understandable: the 
two candidates – Samuel Akisanya and Ernest Ikoli – received support 
across ethnic lines (Chief Awolowo, a Yoruba by tribe, backed Ikoli, a 
non-Yoruba from Eastern Nigeria and Dr Azikiwe, an Igbo man 
backed Akisanya, a non-Igbo from Western Nigeria).  The West 
African Pilot and the Daily Service went to town across ethnic divide 
in the effort to build support for their respective candidates; Azikiwe’s 
Pilot for Akisanya, and Awolowo’s Daily Service for Ikoli (Ige, 1995). 
According to Ige (1995), the Yoruba elite of Lagos began “to unite and 
fight Zik” (p29). Using the Pilot as his bully pulpit, Azikiwe fought 
back and began to champion the cause of the Igbo, whom he said, 
“God had not created to be a slave to anyone” (Ige, 1995, p29). West 
African Pilot encouraged the formation and active promotion of town 
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and tribal unions (Ige, 1995) including the Ibibio State Union, the Igbo 
State Union, but most vehemently opposed the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. 
According to Ige, this opposition to Egbe Omo Oduduwa by Azikiwe 
and his paper “alienated Yorubas” (p29). “Inside Stuff”, Azikiwe’s 
newspaper column was written twice a week. It treated the Nigerian 
reading public to what Sklar (1963) called, “pungent, incisive, 
sometimes malevolent, but always informed commentaries on 
Nigerian and world affairs” (p51). 
2.4.5 Death of a Promising Start 
One notable and immediate consequence of Akisanya’s loss was that 
Azikiwe with his fellow Igbos in tow, and Akisanya with his ethnic 
group of Ijebu supporters walked out of the Youth Movement.  The 
struggle “was fatal to the Youth Movement”; it never recovered to 
contest another election as one united party (Sklar, 1963, p54). 
Alayande (2010) said the NYM was a promising beginning but 
“internal divisions in which ethnic loyalties emerged triumphant” 
(p104) stopped it short.  The breakup set an unsteady foundation for 
ethnic and tribal politics in Nigeria, in which “party lines were sharply 
drawn on the basis of ethnicity and regionalism” (Alayande, 2010, 
p107). 
Out of the ashes of the Nigerian Youth Movement, ethno-regional 
splinter parties emerged.  Thus, alignments of tribal or ethnic support 
behind political leaders became one of the cardinal legacies. Hereafter, 
the ethnic factor became a permanent feature of disproportionate 
significance in the Nigerian electoral process. The conflict birthed two 
ethnic-based Southern political movements, which became the basis 
of the two parties that emerged from the Western and Eastern regions 
eventually. Ige (1995) records that the crisis of 1941 was a factor and 
part of “the genesis of tribal politics in Nigeria” (p27).  According to 
Sklar, Azikiwe’s role virtually destroyed the multi-tribal character of 
CHAPTER 2 
 
40 
the Movement. And he succeeded because of West African Pilot 
(1963), with active contributions from other newspapers of the time. 
2.5.0 SIGNIFICANT PERIODS IN THE NIGERIAN PRESS 
This section focuses on the genesis of the press in Nigeria through six 
time periods.  These include: 1) the Early Press, 1859-1920; 2) the 
Nationalist Press, 1920-1944; 3) the pre-Independent Political Press, 
1944-1960; 4) the post-Independent Partisan Press 1960-1966; 5) the 
Military Press, 1966-1979; 1983-1999 and 6) the Post-Military Press, 
1999-2011.  Though these time demarcations are my own creation for 
expediency, the beginning and ending of each era are tied to particular 
historical events, which affected the character and nature of the press. 
These delineations, notwithstanding, it is important to post a note that 
the timelines, as with most historical segmentations, are not as cast in 
stone as they might appear.  
2.5.1 The Early Press (1859-1920) 
In the period between 1890 and 1930, émigrés or returnee freed slaves 
from the UK, the Caribbean, Brazil, and Sierra Leone dominated the 
press as owners and journalists.  The early period of Nigerian 
journalism is marked by two distinct phases - the era of religious 
press, when the press was used mainly for the propagation of the 
Gospel and for literacy, and the phase of pioneers, which marked a 
major shift from the era of religious press. In the second phase, the 
press took on the role of political opposition, policy critics, advocates, 
a crucial information source, and educator. 
Some of the great names in journalism of this period were John Payne 
Jackson, and his son, Thomas Horatio Jackson, who, like a tag-team, 
for 40 years published the Lagos Weekly Record from 1890 to 1930 
(Omu, 1978). Others were Ernest Ikoli, publisher of the African 
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Messenger, who in 1926 became the founding editor of the legendary 
Daily Times; and Herbert Macaulay who published the Lagos Daily 
News. Horatio Jackson and Macaulay took the nation’s press 
combative tradition to new levels. They used their firebrand 
journalism to vehemently oppose the colonial authorities and 
passionately supported an indigenous political agenda  (Omu, 1978; 
Duyile, 2009). According to Duyile (2009), the Jackson’s Weekly 
Record was by far the best paper in West Africa in its time; and on 
account of its uncompromising editorials, it was denied even the 
British expatriate non-government business advertisements. For 
Ernest Ikoli, a contemporary of Jackson’s, the newspaper's popularity 
was often measured by the intensity of its assault on the colonial 
government. Jackson's “pungent criticisms expressed in lengthy 
editorials always hung on the edge of sedition” (Coleman, 1958, p184). 
It is obvious from the above that the early press took a strong stand 
against established colonial political structures and government.  
2.5.2 The Nationalist Press (1920-1944) 
From the 1920s and up until the mid-1940s, indigenous or native-
born owners and publishers began to step to the plate. The tone 
changed: they were demanding for new political arrangements – for 
participation in electoral politics. This new brand of journalism was on 
a warpath against the British colonial establishment, and anyone who 
was deemed to collaborate with them in the economic exploitation, 
social and political domination of the land and people. New papers 
were born as quickly as others were dying off.  It was also a period of 
growth in the newspaper management and production technology, 
which enabled the first set of daily papers to be established in the 
country.  
The genesis of organised politics in Nigeria also signified the 
beginning of a new era in newspaper journalism in the country.  As 
earlier noted, press initiative and vigorous campaign for “elective 
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franchise” forced the hand of Governor Clifford to enact Nigeria’s first 
Constitution in 1922. Newspaper journalists, rather quickly, organised 
to take advantage of the new era dawning, as initiators and promoters 
of the first two political parties in Nigeria, one of which was the 
NNDP.  As a result, newspapers became “outlets for electoral policies 
and propaganda” (Omu, 1978, p 60).  
Thomas Jackson, the publisher of the Weekly Record, and Herbert 
Macaulay, publisher of Lagos News became the brains behind the 
formation of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), 
arguably the most prominent political party in its time. And according 
to Omu (1978), two newspapers, the Nigerian Spectator of Dr. 
Richard Akinwande Savage and the Nigerian Advocate of S. H. 
Braithwaite, were founded purposely as electioneering newspapers. 
The Clifford Constitution provided for the election of four (non-
appointed) members of the Legislative Council – three were from 
Lagos and one from Calabar (Ezera, 1960).  This first Constitution 
opened the door to partisan politics and, therefore, election coverage 
by newspapers. The first Nigerian daily newspaper, the Lagos Daily 
News became “the stormy mouthpiece” of Macaulay, easily the most 
prominent politician in the first era of electoral politics in Nigeria 
(Omu, 1978, p64). 
The journalists of this era did not really see a discernible distinction 
between their roles as journalists and their calling as politicians. 
According to Dare (2000), they wanted to use journalism “to change 
society and advance their own political fortunes” (p15). Media 
scholars, Golding and Elliot (1979), in their much-referenced 
statement, captured the inter-dependent relationship between the 
media and politics. They observed that the Nigerian Press was born of 
“anti-colonial protests, baptised in the waters of nationalist’s 
propaganda and matured into party politics” (p31), though many will 
dispute that the work of the nationalists was mere propaganda.   
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Many members of the educated elite were nationalist-politicians, 
journalists, and newspaper proprietors; and in some cases, these roles 
were combined in one person. They used “their newspapers to 
articulate anti-colonial positions and mobilise the people and public 
opinion against the colonial authority” (Oso, Odunlami and Adaja, 
2011, p3).  One success story from this era was the Daily Times, 
established in 1926 as the second daily newspaper in Nigeria. 
Choosing to be non-partisan in politics and independent in outlook, 
many regarded it as an establishment paper from inception.  The 
paper raised the professional standard of journalism and introduced 
market-driven innovations in production technology, marketing and 
distribution, and general management to the newspaper industry in 
Nigeria. The Daily Times' rapid expansion and impact redefined 
professionalism in the journalism industry. It grew to become the 
paper of record and the paper that served as the point of reference in 
matters of news.   
This period may be sub-divided into two broad phases: before, and 
after the Second World War.  Before the Second World War, there 
were agitations by politicians for inclusion as co-participants in 
governance, and for non-whites to be treated with dignity, fairness 
and some respect. Galadima and Enighe (2001), observed that the 
period was perhaps “the most intensive, radical and militant media 
onslaught on colonialism” (p27). Another feature of this era was direct 
ownership of newspapers by political parties or politicians.  
Of the four noteworthy newspapers that formed the foundation of 
modern Nigerian press, three were directly affiliated with one political 
party or another. First, the Daily Times, which viewed itself as an 
“independent” paper, was seen by some others as sympathetic to the 
colonial administration. The paper was founded in 1926 with Ernest 
Ikoli as the founding editor; he later became a leading political figure.  
Second, West African Pilot (1937) unarguably the most influential 
paper of the time, whose founder and Editor-In-Chief was Dr Nnamdi 
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Azikiwe, leader of the NCNC Party and first president of independent 
Nigeria. The Pilot, established in 1937 became the undisputed star 
nationalist paper of the period. The paper was unsurpassed and 
unsparing in its criticism of colonial rule (Nwankwo et al., 1993). Its 
popularity was extraordinary among the growing elite and others, 
such that by the 1940s it had reached an unprecedented daily 
circulation of 30,000 (Nwankwo, 1993)   
Third, there was the Daily News, (founded in 1925), which served as 
the powerful unequivocal political voice of the Nigerian National 
Democratic Party owned by Herbert Macaulay; it lasted up till about 
1948.  And lastly, there was the Daily Service, (founded in 1933), 
which became the significant mouthpiece of the Nigerian Youth 
Movement; its influence was gradually eclipsed by the arrival of 
Azikiwe’s West African Pilot. In 1949, it was rested to make way for 
the formation of the Nigerian Tribune, a paper steeped in the politics 
of the Western Region in Nigeria. Of all the papers, it is only the 
Tribune that is still in circulation today, 68 years after it was founded. 
The Tribune remains the oldest Nigerian daily paper to have been in 
circulation for that long.   
After the Second World War, the language and tone of journalists 
changed: the demand was for outright independence and self-rule. It 
was the period of migration from a nationalist press to political 
newspapers and as Coleman (1955) notes, “a territorial nationalist 
movement progressively takes on the attributes of a territorial political 
party” (p102).  From a historical point of view, the political landscape 
of the late 1930s and 1940s was the most nationalistic in which the 
emerging leaders were perhaps most united. The press of the time and 
the politicians had one objective – to rid Nigeria of colonial rulers as 
Aimufua (2007) puts it, “the history of the struggle to realise a 
Nigerian State free from colonial oppression was mainly expressed 
through the Nigerian press” (p70). However, with the gradual 
institutionalisation of political associations and processes, and along 
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with a changing political landscape, the character and tone of the 
press began to change also.  
2.5.3 The Pre-Independence Political Press (1944-
1960) 
The third significant era of the Nigerian press is the overtly political 
and partisan press. Most of the daily and weekly newspapers in the 
country before and shortly after independence were private 
newspapers, and politicians owned them (Abati, 2000; Ajibade 2010; 
Tador, 1996). As party publications, the papers expressed “a great deal 
of enthusiasm and support for particular political parties” (Edeani, 
1985 cited in Ajibade, 2010, p253).  While political papers provided 
some form of needed plurality of choices, they were unable to rise 
above ethnic jingoism in their coverage (Abati, 2000).  Their 
unbridled advocacy for ethnic interests coupled with their style of 
combativeness not only had negative effects on the nation's political 
and social development, it also created persistent tensions or a 
semblance of war in the nation (Abati, 2000). 
Regional, individual, or party-based ownership structure reflected 
ethnic segmentation and sympathies in coverage and patronage, 
serving a constant, but unhealthy menu of “vitriolic vituperations 
against the groups' opponents (often with) little or no consideration 
for the merits of the issues involved” (Folarin, 1998, p36).  The result 
was that most of these newspapers were unable to see or promote 
national interests or a united nation (Tador, 1996, p48). In character, 
Omu (1978) noted that newspapers of this period “provided a 
remarkable example of over-zealous and irresponsible partisanship 
and recklessness” (p248). 
Whereas there may be nothing wrong with politicians or political 
parties owning papers, what made the Nigerian case peculiar was that 
virtually all the available papers were segregated along party, region, 
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or ethnic interests (Sobowale, 1985, p31 cited in Ajibade, 2010). With 
the exception of the Daily Times, partisan papers almost entirely 
dominated the journalism space. There was hardly any other 
independent newspaper of note that was not party-owned or aligned 
in the significant middle ground. This trend of extremities denied 
discerning readers a pluralism of views and opinions.  
Newspapers began to freely affiliate with political parties, as they were 
being established, from the mid-1940s. The West African Pilot had 
been an unabashed nationalist paper but, as Azikiwe became less a 
journalist-publisher and more a politician, the paper became more 
and more the voice of his political party. After the formation of the 
NCNC in 1944, many began to see the Pilot more in terms of a party, 
or an ethnic, or a regional paper. From the North, came Gaskiya Ta Fi 
Kwabo, edited by Mallam Abubakar Iman.  Gaskiya was published in 
Hausa language; it began publication in 1939. The other Northern 
paper, a weekly from the North was Nigerian Citizen, which began 
publication in English much later. Chief Awolowo established the 
Tribune in 1949 to amplify his political voice and extend his reach.  
There were other papers, like the Daily Times, the only acknowledged 
non-partisan paper, even though it was often suspected of, and 
accused of being pro-government (Duyile, 1989).  
In pursuance of their political dreams, Azikiwe and Awolowo began to 
establish newspapers in key Nigerian cities – Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, 
Warri, Enugu, Onitsha, Calabar, and Jos. Most papers in this era were 
owned or strongly affiliated to one political party or another.  Apart 
from Azikiwe and Awolowo, many other notable journalists from this 
era went on to play prominent political roles, including Anthony 
Enahoro, Lateef Jakande, Bisi Onabanjo, MCK Ajuluchukwu, and 
several others. 
2.5.4 The Post-Independence Partisan Press (1960-1966) 
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The fourth significant period is the period after independence, leading 
up to the civil unrest in various parts of the country and the Civil War.  
After Britain, the perceived common enemy had departed,  
the Nigerian journalist was faced with new problems 
of adjustment to the new situation... There was the 
need to change the tempo of criticism and agitation to 
the chorus of nation building, which is a more 
complicating song (Enahoro, 2000, p18). 
This period saw the beginning of government-funded media 
institutions, newspapers being paramount. In 1961, the Federal 
Government established the Morning Post as a daily, and the Sunday 
Post, as a weekly. Regional Governments followed suit by establishing 
their own newspapers. Eastern Region established the Eastern 
Nigeria Outlook, Western Region, the Daily Sketch, and the Northern 
Regional government acquired the Nigerian Citizen and completely 
rebranded it as the New Nigerian. 
As governments and political parties’ ownership patterns of the press 
dominated the media; professional lines began to blur. Journalists 
who could not toe the party or government lines left the profession 
altogether. Those who remained, Dare noted, failed to clearly separate 
their professional roles from the demands of their affiliated political 
parties or governments; “for all practical purposes, they were party 
organs financed by the public” (Dare, 2000, p20).  
So intense was the rivalry and the bitterness among the contending 
political groups that editors and the staffers working on newspapers of 
different political persuasions, were hardly on speaking terms (Omu, 
1978). The duties of the press as Bisi Onabanjo, one of the leading 
journalists of the era put it was, “to carry out as far as it is possible the 
policy” of their principals (Jose, 1987, p52). The high degree of 
professional breaches in the media was well catalogued by U.A. James 
(1984), manifesting through “character assassinations, false 
accusations, blackmail and misinterpretation of facts... to the extent 
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that facts were muzzled and whole media organs became megaphones 
and machineries for propaganda to political parties and vested 
interests” (p33). This pattern of journalism practice would return 
during the post military civilian politics civil rule, indicative of the fact 
that journalism had become a firm tool in the hand of political elite or 
subjugation of opponents.  
2.5.5 The Military and the Press (1966-1979; 1983-
1999) 
The relationship between the military and the press was a troubled 
relationship. With time, “prodemocracy journalists and their 
newspapers and newsmagazines became the strongest opposition 
force to the military regimes” (Adebanwi, 2011, p49). From the first 
Military Head of State, General Ironsi, to the last one in 1999, General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar, military relationship with the press was tense. 
The press “became the pivot on which the larger opposition to military 
rule and the emergent civil society rotated” (Adebanwi, 2011, p49) and 
they “kept alive the commitment to democracy and sought to establish 
some kind of accountability during periods of authoritarian rule” 
(Diamond, 1990, p1).  
Military governments are oppressive by nature, but the press became 
the mouthpiece of the oppressed people in their call for democracy 
and a return of the military to their barracks. As Diamond (1990), also 
notes, the press held the military accountable for their actions while in 
government; they played their role as the fourth estate of the realm, 
even while under military dictatorship. Of all the eight military 
regimes that ruled the country, hardly any had it easy with the press. 
When General Ironsi came to power by a coup in 1966, the nation was 
already on the verge of disintegration. One of Ironsi’s greatest 
problems was media communication, a problem that “plagued him 
throughout his tenure of office” (Olayiwola, 1991, p37). His short-lived 
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regime of six months marked the beginning of a tense and turbulent 
military-press relationship that lasted through every military regime. 
Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon became the second military head of state 
following the Northern officers-led counter coup; General Ironsi was 
assassinated. The nation was now even closer to disintegration, the 
direct result of full-scale bloody ethnic conflicts that birthed a pogrom 
of the Igbos in the Northern Region; the situation plummeted the 
nation directly into a civil war within the next year.  
The Gowon administration did relatively better than Ironsi’s; he 
“experienced much of cooperation from the press in its nascent stage, 
and during the civil war” (Alimi, 2011, p51). However, when by 1974 he 
kept shifting the date of returning power to civilians, the press and 
politicians became impatient with him and his military cohorts; a 
third successful coup in the history of Nigeria unseated General 
Gowon in 1975. The regime of Generals Murtala Mohammed and 
Olusegun Obasanjo, on taking power, immediately set a date for the 
return of government to civilians, but military tension with the press 
continued. As Olayiwola (1991) puts it, “The first major step taken by 
the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime regarding the Nigerian press and 
political communications was the acquisition of 60 per cent of the 
shares in the Daily Times and the total takeover (ownership) of the 
New Nigerian by 31 August, 1975” (p37). In addition, the regime also 
enacted laws to gag the press (Olayiwola, 1991).  
Shehu Shagari’s government to which General Obasanjo handed over 
power in 1979 lasted for only four years in office.  The military sacked 
President Shagari’s elected civilian government in December of 1983. 
The new Head of State was another northerner, General Muhammadu 
Buhari who declared a massive onslaught against the press.  His 
government  “made it clear that, like all previous regimes, it had no 
intention of letting itself be held accountable” (Diamond, 1991, p75). 
The Buhari regime could be described as a black period for the 
Nigerian press as several of the activist journalists were jailed and the 
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press was persecuted. Abdulraheem and Olukoshi (1986), report that 
during the Buhari regime, 
Journalists were arrested for publishing things the 
regime did not like. Scores of noted journalists, 
Haroun Adamu, Tunde Thompson, Rufai Ibrahim, 
Nduka Irabor and Tai Solarin were among those who 
were imprisoned (p78).  
General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew General Buhari’s regime and 
installed himself in power for eight years as president, albeit a self-
declared unelected military president. Babangida’s era was another 
bitter tale of press-government relations: he also introduced several 
measures in order to tame the press including the “promulgation of 
decrees to gag the press” (Olayiwola, 1991, p37). Under his leadership, 
“journalists were imprisoned, newspapers/magazines were 
proscribed” (Olayiwola, 1991, p38). Larry Diamond (1991), summed 
up the Babangida regime’s lack of concern for accountability and its 
persecution of press critics as tragic for the nation.  
General Sani Abacha unseated an ambiguous interim political 
arrangement that General Babangida had made when his own eight-
year rule became more and more politically untenable.  General 
Abacha, perhaps, had the worst relationship with the press; his 
position was not at all disguised; he “warned journalists to be careful 
what they report and write” (Adeyemi, 1995, p7). Under his regime, 
being a journalist or a newspaper publisher critical of his regime 
became a matter of life or death. According to Olukotun (2002), “a 
section of the media located mainly in the South West area of the 
country, drawing on a tradition of activism, even militancy, dating 
back to the colonial days, invented a guerrilla strategy to oppose the 
military” (p318). As Abacha handled the press, so the press handled 
his regime until his sudden death. 
General Abdulsalami Abubakar became the Nigerian military head of 
state, following the sudden but unexplained death of General Abacha 
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in June of 1998. General Abubakar’s relationship with the press could 
best be described as the most cordial any military head of state had 
with the Nigerian press.  This is understandable; his tenure was brief, 
just about one year, and he had one main agenda: return power back 
to an elected democratic government, which the press applauded.  In 
spite of the relatively good relationship that General Abubakar seemed 
to have had with the press, some of his economic policies negatively 
affected the press.  His “imposition of 5 [five] per cent Value Added 
Tax on newspapers in the 1999 budget stiffened further the climate in 
which many newspapers found themselves” (Olukotun, 2000, p34). 
The military in most parts of the world have little patience or regard 
for news peddling journalists.  In the case of Nigeria, there was a 
regional, if not an ethnic twist to an already toxic relationship under a 
normal situation. Because most of the military rulers in Nigeria were 
from the North, and the press had a greater presence in the South 
West, some people read the endless battle between the military and 
the press as a battle between the North and the South in another form. 
Thus, the sour relationship between the military and the press was 
given an ethnic colouration. 
2.5.6 The Press and the Fourth Republic (1999-2011) 
In the years leading up to 1999, the Nigerian press had basically 
transformed into an activist (anti-military, pro-democracy) press.  The 
newspaper and magazine press led the onslaught against the military 
dictatorship in Nigeria. It is important to point out that governments 
– the States and Federal - still predominantly owned and controlled 
other media platforms - radio and television systems. The few 
fledgling private radio and television stations were dependent on 
government patronage and licences to run their businesses.   
After 1999, hard-hitting magazine-press had lost their lustre and many 
of “the main newspapers are those established by politicians” (Oso, 
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2012, p29). With news now gradually available on demand, the fate of 
weekly news magazines was sealed. In the Fourth Republic, no 
political parties directly owned newspapers, but according to Oso, “the 
political sympathies of the main national newspapers are quite 
evident,” and their owners served as their links to the political parties.  
As such, in the new millennium, most papers’ political partisanship 
was vaguely disguised but only to the uninitiated reader: they 
intensely shadowed the partisan political and business interests of 
their owners. 
However, by 2011, a worldwide media revolution was on-going and 
Nigeria was not immune to it. The gathering, presentation, and 
dissemination of news had changed considerably, and an array of new 
forms of mass and multiple media systems had also emerged. The 
assortment of new media platforms was bewildering: it was textual, 
auditory, and visual; and it was mobile – all at the same time. The new 
platform was not limiting but flexible: it could be presented in hard 
print or in e-format on mobile hand-held devices, on tablets as well as 
laptops and on screens of all shapes and sizes in real time.  Text, 
especially in-depth news-text, was no longer the exclusive monopoly 
of the newspaper-press.  By 2011, a hugely different media 
environment emerged: more fragmented and flexible; the voices more 
opinionated and more vociferous; the goal more to entertain than to 
educate or even inform. 
Consequently for Nigeria, the strong voice of direction that the press 
once provided was lost in the new media mayhem.  As news became 
more and more multi-sourced; the newspaper-press became weaker in 
its ability to influence and provide much needed thought-leadership, 
as it once did. The press, as a single medium and all by itself, could no 
longer determine popular will; it must now depend on other media 
forms to do so, in a convergent environment. While the press may not 
have entirely lost its power to influence government policy, its ability 
to affect decision-making has been reduced considerably.  Although, 
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according to Oso (2011), journalists have continued to be critical of  
“the policies and wrongdoings by state officials” (p30), it was no 
longer possessed the strong voice that once took on the mighty British 
Empire or the massive military hegemony.  
As the influence and power of traditional media diminishes and that of 
the social media increases, the frequency of state-directed attacks on 
the press has reduced when compared with the earlier years under 
military or even in the Second Republic. Oso (2011), reports that the 
relationship between the press and the state “has relatively improved 
since 1999, Nigerian journalists are still subjected to intimidation, 
harassment brutalisation and arbitrary arrest and detention” (p45). 
The new media forms have begun to play important roles “in the 
monitoring of how transparent the Nigerian elections are. This 
happened in 2011  (Adelaja, 2013).  Nigerians, according to Campbell 
(2013), have begun to use social media “to counter blatant election 
abuse. The enthusiastic engagement of young people and women who 
hitherto had played lesser roles in Nigerian elections was a positive 
sign of change” (pp123–124).  While this assertion may be true 
comparative with the past, the reality is that the level of usage and 
engagement is still significantly low to have any serious impact. 
2.6.0 THE MEDIA IN NIGERIA: SCOPE AND CHARACTER 
Since its early history, the Nigerian Press, now well over one hundred 
and fifty years old, has had close affinity with the political class, and 
been almost exclusively captured by the elites, whether political, 
military or the business elites.  Even today as a presidential 
democracy, Nigeria’s colonial past and long years of military rule have 
left deep markers, which have made social inequality more evident 
and more difficult to eradicate. 
However, the overwhelming control of, or authority over the media, 
particularly the traditional media, has come from politicians and 
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governments.  Vibrant as Nigeria’s media have been acclaimed to be, 
their main preoccupation until lately has been partisan politics, of 
both civil and military, in government or out of it.  Of late, the 
character of the media has shifted to strong commercial orientation, 
moving more in the direction of entertainment even though politics 
continues to occupy a significant portion of its engagement.  Nigeria’s 
main media export attests to this fact in Nollywood, the nation’s 
homegrown film and video industry. Nollywood bestows on Nigeria, a 
strong inter-African and black diaspora media presence.   
Survival imperatives have joined politics as key motivators that 
animate the Nigerian media.  Elite domination of the industry 
inadvertently alienates the so-called common man as subject and 
consumer of media products.  Their role as owners, objects of focus, 
participants, and primary consumers of media products has meant 
that media coverage and content target middle class and urban 
dwellers, almost exclusively.   The centrality of elites’ role and 
involvement in media has also meant that the choice of language and 
(urban) location are determined in relations to elites’ needs. 
A new form of commercial motivation now directly erodes the media’s 
erstwhile public service orientation.  Because it is now more profit 
oriented and focused, content production and dissemination have 
become more urban-driven.  Technically, and in the more pervasive 
usage of the concept, Nigeria does not have “community media”; it has 
been deeply politicised. Whereas in the past, civic interests, expressed 
through various forms of public service broadcasting, were central to 
the mission of the government-funded media organisations, this has 
changed gradually since the commercialisation of state-owned media 
enterprises, which had been dominant in the nation’s media space up 
until about twenty years ago. 
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2.6.1 Media Ownership 
The rate of failure of, particularly, newspaper titles in Nigeria is 
alarming.  According to Agbaje (1992), 
newspapers which were not published in English, did not 
have strong political affiliations to the major political 
parties, did not seek to influence national politics or which 
did not belong to one government or the other, to have very 
short life-spans, (152). 
 Setting up newspapers has become almost the exclusive preserve of 
the rich and deep pocket politicians.  Listed below are 15 of the leading 
Nigerian newspaper titles; of which politicians own at least 60%, while 
the rest are owned by rich elites with varying degrees of political 
affiliation or leanings.  
Table 2.1: Some Nigerian Newspaper Titles 
The Guardian Daily Trust Tribune* 
The Punch Independent* National Mirror* 
Vanguard Champion* Leadership* 
Thisday Nation* Daily Telegraph* 
The Sun* Compass** Westerner** 
*Newspapers with direct political affiliations 
**The Compass and the Westerner were both owned by one politician who became a state governor.  
Not long after he left office, the Westerner seized to exist and the Compass became an on line 
publication. 
As most governments have significantly reduced their investments in 
newspaper publishing business, commercial interests have stepped in.  
And as media have become more engrossed as business or commercial 
ventures, their capacity to be watchdogs over governments and big 
businesses in their communities has diminished.  Yet, for a nation of 
over 180 million people, the circulation figures of most average 
newspapers are abysmally low. There are few local language 
newspapers, many of which are obscure and irregular at newsstands. 
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2.6.2  Newspapers and Magazine Publications in Nigeria 
(Including Online Papers) 
The Nigerian Press Council (NPC), in 2013 conducted an inventory of 
Newspapers and Magazines in the 36 states and FCT in which it 
recorded 267 newspapers and 128 magazines, making a total of 395 
print media in Nigeria. But since the last review was carried out five 
years ago, it was necessary to verify which of the newspapers still exist.  
The meticulous verification proved useful as many of the publications 
listed by the NPC in 2013 have either gone online or have altogether 
seized to exist. Table 2.2 shows the ones verified. Please see Appendix 
8 for details.  
Table 2.2: Newspaper and Magazine Publications   
S/N PUBLICATION 
NUMBER OF 
TITLES 
FREQUENCY LANGUAGE 
1.  Daily Newspapers 33 Daily English 
2.  Online Papers 17 Daily/ Real Time English 
3.  Community, 
State/Ethnic 
Newspapers  
40 Mostly Twice 
Weekly/Monthly 
English 
4.  Monthly and 
Quarterly 
Publications 
58 Monthly and 
Quarterly 
English 
5.  Publications in 
Indigenous Languages 
25 Indeterminate 
Frequencies but 
mostly 
Fortnightly and 
Monthly 
Hausa (12)  
Yoruba (9) 
Ibo (2)  
Igala (1) 
Tiv (1) 
6.  Other Publications 79 Indeterminate 
Frequencies 
English 
 Total Press 
Publications 
252   
 
Some of the language publications above are magazines, while others 
are papers; most of them are monthly publications.  There are other 
publications with indeterminate appearances on the newsstand. Some 
are irregular and we imagine there are 79 of other publications; many 
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of them are community papers mostly published in English like Izon 
Link, Anioma Trust, Okun People Magazine, Bakatsiniya, e.t.c.  Many 
of the daily newspapers above have weekend publications on Saturday 
and Sunday. 
2.6.3  Radio 
Radio is perhaps the most accessible medium to the non-elite 
Nigerian.  The broadcast media was in the exclusive control of 
governments (Federal and States) until 1993 when broadcasting was 
deregulated, meaning the private sector could now participate. In the 
20 years since, the number of private stations has exceeded those of 
government.  In spite of this development, the rural dwellers and the 
urban poor are still grossly underserved because the private stations 
are interested in producing content that generates advertising income 
mainly, and the more state-owned stations are put under intense 
pressure to generate their own income, the less they pay attention to 
public service programming.  In addition, most of the urban-located 
stations broadcast in English, with very few broadcasting exclusively 
in local languages or pidgin (creole) or bi or multi-lingual 
programming.   
Table 2.3: Summary of Radio Stations in Nigeria’s Six Geo-Political Zones 
S/N GEOPOLITICAL ZONE PUBLIC PRIVATE COMMUNITY/CAMPUS TOTAL 
1 North Central 21 28 8 57 
2 North East 14 7 1 22 
3 North West 25 22 4 51 
4 South West 23 54 13 90 
5 South East 13 24 15 52 
6 South South 15 33 8 56 
 TOTAL 111 168 49 328 
CHAPTER 2 
 
58 
2.6.4 Television 
After over two decades since the deregulation of the broadcasting 
industry in Nigeria, the state and federal government owned stations 
still own and control a lion share of the television broadcasting 
stations in Nigeria. In the private sector, six licenced operators own 44 
networked stations of which one operator, the African Independent 
Television (AIT) owns a network of about 26 stations across the nation 
with 14 stations in the North and 12 in the South; the North is mostly 
underserved by private TV stations. In terms of programming, most of 
the private stations devote a large portion of their airtime to 
entertainment while government stations are also chasing the 
commercialisation route to supplement their dwindling government 
funding support.  Of the licenced private operators, most lean towards 
general programming with a lion share of airtime devoted to 
entertainment.  Only Channels Television broadcasts exclusively news 
programmes.  Silverbird Television on the other hand, broadcasts 
exclusively entertainment content. All the others are general 
programming; one of the stations broadcasts solely in Yoruba; three 
stations in mixed languages of Hausa/English, Yoruba/English, and 
Pidgin/ English.  
Table 2.4: Summary of Television Stations 
S/N OWNERSHIP NUMBER 
OF 
STATIONS 
BROADCAST FOCUS LANGUAGE 
1.  Federal Government 
Owned Nigerian 
Television Authority 
(NTA) 
55 General English 
2.  State Government 
Owned Stations 
38 General English 
3.  Private Television 
Stations 
53 Mostly entertainment Mostly 
English  
4.  Cable/Satellite 
Television Stations  
27 Various, but mostly 
entertainment 
English 
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2.7.0 THE PRESS, ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL 
(DIS)INTEGRATION 
2.7.1 The Militarisation of Politics in Nigeria 
The incursion of the Nigerian military into the Nigerian political 
system began on January 15, 1966 when, as a result of a military coup, 
General J.T.U Aguiyi Ironsi took over power as the first military head 
of state. It was the first Nigerian military coup d’état, which put an 
end to the First Republic that started with the elections of 1959. Five 
more successful and several unsuccessful coups would follow.  The 
First Republic “was marked by widespread corruption” (Ogbeidi, 
2012, p6) and “inter-ethnic rivalry in allocation of resources” 
(Onwuka, 2011, p31).  Issues of corruption and interplay of tribal 
politics “provided the pretext for a group of young middle-rank army 
officers to sack the Nigerian First Republic politicians from power” 
(Ogbeidi, 2012, p6).   
The first military rule lasted for 13 years (1966-1979), until “General 
Olusegun Obasanjo handed power over to an elected civilian 
successor” (Joseph, 1981, p78).  Barely four years after, the military 
gave themselves a reason to return to power as “General Muhammadu 
Buhari forced an elected civilian government out of power at the 
beginning of 1984, with a strong popular mandate to attack political 
corruption” (Diamond, 1991, p74).  
Through self-succession, the military lasted for another 16 years, from 
one coup d’état to the next. In May 1999, General Abubakar handed 
over to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the former military leader who, 20 
years earlier, had handed power to an elected civilian government 
(George, Amujo and Cornelius, 2012). This marked the end of the 
journey of about 30 summative years of military rule in Nigeria. By 
this period, aspects of military culture had been injected into the 
Nigerian body politic in a definite manner.  
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2.7.2 National Integration and Belonging 
In their incursions into the Nigerian political landscape, the military 
were obsessed with issues of unity, ethnicity, national integration, and 
belonging.  Yet, six of the eight military heads of state that ruled 
Nigeria from 1966 to 1999 were from the North, running the country 
for over 25 of the 40 cumulative years of military rule. The other two 
were one each from the West and the East; but none was from any of 
the minority ethnic groups of the South. While the military were in 
power for all those years, there was an absence of a viable opposition 
in national politics, consequently, a vocal section of the press 
constituted itself into a veritable opposition group. 
Excesses of an extremely ethnicised and corrupt political culture were 
the reasons advanced for the first military takeover of power in 
Nigeria.  As Ojo (2012) submitted, “ethnicity was the hallmark of 
Nigerian politics up till the time Ironsi assumed office” (p15).  
Ironically, even the coup, which was purported to correct the 
situation, became embroiled in the ethnic politics of exclusion. 
Onwuka (2011) noted that the northern-led remedial coup only 
“succeeded in deepening the division which had already existed in the 
Army” (p31).  The mastermind of the January 1966 coup, Major 
Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, was an Igbo by tribe; General Aguiyi 
Ironsi, who became the first military head of state, as a result of the 
coup was also an Igbo man, both men from the Eastern Region of 
Nigeria. To compound issues, the victims of the January 1966 coup 
were mostly from the Northern Region.  This led some northern 
military officers to believe that the 'purging' of the Nigerian political 
system as claimed by the military was actually the purging of 
northerners from governance. Ojo (2012) noted that what 
“exacerbated northern anger” was that the coup “annihilated the ranks 
of the civil and military leadership of the North”, and its planners were 
seen as heroes by many Igbo people (p15). According to Onwuka 
(2011), General Ironsi’s regime only further deepened the ethnic 
division that was already entrenched in the Nigerian army.  
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As a result, the people of the Northern Region saw the appointments 
in General Ironsi’s government and many of his policies as against 
overall Northern regional interest. For example, barely four months in 
office, in April 1966, General Ironsi promoted military officers from 
Majors to Lt. Colonels: 18 out of the 21 officers promoted were of Igbo 
extraction (Ojo, 2012). By design or otherwise, “Ironsi’s appointments 
tilted too much in favour of the Igbo” (Ojo 2012, p14), and this 
“aggravated ethnic suspicions” (p15). His government was accused of 
promoting an eastern regional agenda. Most of his policies were met 
with protests from the Northern Region; the “Hausa-Fulani abhorred 
some of the policies of the Ironsi regime” (Ojo, 2012, p16). 
Unsurprisingly, the interplay of ethnicity in the Nigerian military 
became so intense that it led to a second military coup in one year – 
29 July 1966, in which General Ironsi was assassinated.  Mostly army 
officers of northern extraction carried out this second coup, and they 
installed Lt. Col. Gowon, a northerner as the second military head of 
state (Ojo, 2012).   
Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu was the military governor of the Eastern 
Region during General Ironsi’s short-lived regime. He objected to the 
installation of Lt. Col. Gowon, a northern officer, as the military head 
of state.  According to him, Gowon was not the most senior officer at 
that time; the military officer in line for that position was Brigadier-
General Babafemi Ogundipe, of the Yoruba ethnic extraction. For 
Ojukwu, installing a junior officer as Commander-in-Chief would be 
going against ordinances of the military, anywhere. But Gowon 
remained as the head of state and Ojukwu refused to acknowledge him 
in that position. Another round of tension and tussle between the East 
and the North began and eventually resulted in an attempted 
secession by the Eastern Region from the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  
Failure at the Aburi (Ghana) negotiation table to persuade them to 
remain in the union led to the Nigerian Civil War of 1967; it lasted 
nearly three years and claimed the death of about two million people 
(Uzokwe, 2003). 
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The Biafran War of secession, according to Jega and Farris (2010), 
became “an important factor that combined to push the nationalistic 
drive exhibited by the Gowon regime” (p141). To whittle down on the 
excessive powers of regions, Gowon dissolved the four ethnically 
conceived regions of the country and created twelve states in their 
stead – six states in the North and six states in the South.  This 
singular move, according to Osaghae and Suberu (2005) “contributed 
crucially to the collapse of the Igbo secessionist campaign” (p20). It 
also helped in the process of national integration, and in the “relative 
stabilization of post-war Nigeria, and to the prevention of any further 
major secessionist conflict in the federation” (Osaghae and Suberu, 
2005, p20).  
After the Civil War, and after the regime of General Gowon, all 
subsequent military heads of state and one civilian president were of 
Northern origin, except General Olusegun Obasanjo, whose rise to 
power many saw as accidental, considering the circumstance of his 
ascension.  (General Obasanjo became the head of state following the 
assassination of General Murtala Mohammed in a failed coup attempt 
in February 1976. Obasanjo, as Chief of General Staff, Supreme 
Headquarters, had been Mohammed’s deputy.) 
The heads of state that ruled Nigeria thereafter were seen in the light 
of trying to promote and protect a “northern” agenda.  According to 
Orji (2008), General Buhari’s regime was accused of favouring 
northern hegemony.  It is still regarded as “one of the most narrowly-
based Northern leadership” (p176).  From one military dictatorship to 
another, the leaders surrounded themselves with aides that were close 
and of the same ethnic backgrounds. According to Tamuno, “many 
within the southern political elite read the Buhari coup as a further 
narrowing of the base of political power to a core Hausa-Fulani 
oligarchy” (Tamuno, 1999, cited in Ibrahim, 1999, p13).   Military 
intervention in politics did not solve the ethnic and national unity 
problems, it intensified them. 
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MAPS OF NIGERIA BY YEARS AND SEASONS 
Figure 2.1: 1959 – 3 REGIONS 
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Figure 2.2: 1963 – 4 REGIONS 
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Figure 2.3: 1967 – 12 STATES 
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Figure 2.4: 1976 – 19 STATES 
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Figure 2.5: 1987 – 21 STATES 
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Figure 2.6: 1991 – 30 STATES 
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Figure 2.7: 1996 – 36 STATES 
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2.8.0 THE SIX FEDERAL ELECTIONS 
In this section I looked at the six federal elections in the study.  
Structurally, the elections have evolved in scope and administrations: 
the 1959 election was conducted under three regions, but the 1964/65 
one was conducted under four regions. By 1979, the nation had moved 
from regional to state structures, as such 1979 and 1983, unlike 1965 
were conducted under the 19 states structure; while the 1999 and 2011 
were under 36 states formation. The first two elections were 
conducted under parliamentary system, but that of 1979 and 
subsequent ones under an American type presidential system.  
Table 2.5: Changing Political Structure and Election Supervisor 
YEAR OF 
ELECTION 
NUMBER OF 
REGIONS 
NUMBER OF 
STATES 
TYPE OF 
GOVERNMENT 
ELECTION 
SUPERVISION 
1959 3  Parliamentary Colonial 
1964/65 4  Parliamentary Civilian 
1979  19 Presidential Military 
1983  19 Presidential Civilian 
1999  36 Presidential Military 
2011  36 Presidential Civilian 
 
These changes in geopolitical structures, however, did not significantly 
reduce the influences of ethnicity on politics. They may indeed have 
exacerbated such differences as more ethnic groups began to agitate 
for states that reflected their own tribal or ethnic compositions.  
2.8.1 The Federal Elections of 1959 
The 1959 elections were the first (multi-party and national) elections 
to be held in Nigeria based on a Westminster-Parliamentary system of 
government, adopted without any adaptation to suit the Nigerian 
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cultural and political environment. For the first time, a special 
electoral management body, the Electoral Commission of Nigeria 
(ECN), was established by the colonial administration (Ogbeidi, 
2010).  The main registered political parties were regional or ethnic in 
composition, underscored by their regional identity-reflecting names: 
Northern People's Congress (NPC), Northern Elements Progressive 
Union (NEPU), Borno Youth Movement (BYM), and the United 
Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) (Horowitz, 1985). The three most 
prominent parties in 1959 were the northern-based Northern People's 
Congress (NPC), led by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Action Group (AG), led 
by Chief Obafemi Awolowo led and the National Council of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons (NCNC), under the leadership of Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe.  The elections were held on the 12th of December 1959, with 
three major ethnic affiliated regional political parties as the main 
contestants and “each of the parties proved its strength in its home 
region, particularly in the ethnic area of its leadership, and none was 
able to break into the national arena” (Ibodje and Dode, 2007, p131). 
All these goes to prove the point made by numerous researchers that 
British intensions were not always in the interest of the Nigerian 
nation-state. 
There were scattered pre-election clashes between supporters of rival 
political parties, but these did not mar the relatively peaceful state of 
the nation during the elections as Kenneth Post (1964), cited in Orji 
and Uzodi (2012, pp292, 345) noted in his assessment of the 1959 
elections. The electorates were highly optimistic, but the campaigns 
were marked by a singular absence of serious electoral issue.  Rather, 
the campaigns were characterised by  “vituperative personal 
condemnations, hateful ethnic recriminations, official intimidation 
and obstruction, and physical violence by party thugs” (Diamond, 
1983, p477), which completely drowned out the substance of party 
programs and proposals. According to Ojo (2012), “from about 1951, 
ethnicity became the hallmark of Nigerian politics” (p15). 
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Table 2.6: Voting patterns of the regions in the 1959 Federal Elections 
PARTY NORTH WEST EAST LAGOS TOTAL 
NPC 134 0 0 0 134 
NCNC/NEPU 8 21 58 2 89 
AG 25 33 14 1 73 
OTHERS 7 8 1 - 16 
TOTAL 174 62 73 3 312 
Source: Ngou, C.M., (1989). The 1959 Elections and Formation of the Independence 
Government. In Ekeh, P., Cole, P.D., & Olusanya, G. (Eds.) Politics and Constitutions. 
Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, pp. 80 – 105 
The 1959 election results in Table 1 reflect the ethnic strongholds of 
the regional parties even though the AG and the NCNC, through 
alliances, made inroads into the Northern Region. 
Also commonly reported was widespread electoral fraud; in some 
parts of the country, there was the issue of women showing up in 
voting booths, “pregnant” with already marked ballot papers.  The 
press election coverage focused on personalities, ethnicity, and region. 
The newspapers, established by the politicians, avidly supported the 
ambitions of their owners. According to Fred Omu (1978)  
old antagonisms were intensified and the atmosphere 
of politics and the press seethed with bitter rivalry and 
enmity… the newspapers were completely immersed 
in the vortex of partisan politics and were in no 
position to prepare the people for the challenges of 
independence and national unity.(p247)  
In the elections results, all the parties won the majority of their seats 
in their respective regions, but the AG and the NCNC also recorded 
marginal victories outside their respective regions having formed 
alliances with minor parties in the regions outside their own. 
“Generally, then no party emerged sufficiently strong in all the regions 
CHAPTER 2 
 
73 
to qualify as a national party. The ensuing government of 1960 thus 
had to be a coalition government” (Ngou, 1989, p100). 
Figure 2.8: Distribution of majority votes in the 1959 Parliamentary elections by 
regions on the Nigerian map 
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2.8.1.1 A Significant British Coup 
Following the elections, two Southern parties, the Action Group and 
NCNC were in negotiations to form a coalition government when the 
British Governor-General, Sir James Robertson invited Balewa of the 
NPC to form a government.  The move pre-empted the coalition talks 
by other parties. According to Professor Itse Sagay’s commentary on 
Sir Olaniwun Ajayi’s book, Nigeria: Africa’s Failed Asset, Balewa’s 
NPC “was a minority…against…the other two parties. Immediately this 
happened, the NCNC party of the East abandoned negotiation with the 
Action Group to form a coalition with the Northern NPC” (Sagay, 
2012, p10). 
The British feared that the North would not agree to independence, “if 
they did not control the federal government, or were not, at the very 
least, part of it” (Osaghae, 2015, p33).  According to Adebanwi (2008), 
“The NPC, as the senior partner, and the NCNC, as the junior partner, 
entered into an alliance which subsequently formed the federal 
government under a parliamentary system at independence in 1960” 
(p422). 
For southern politicians, who were vastly read and knowledgeable 
about British colonial empire politics, they were distrustful of their 
colonial administrators.  The Indian-Pakistan experience was common 
knowledge in the current affairs of the 1940s and 1950s.  When the 
Colonial British administrators broke virtually all their own rules 
about electoral democracy, it was generally not a surprise among the 
Nigerian elite, given Britain’s reputation in Europe before the First 
World War, as Perfidious Albion, a phrase, which according to Keith 
Somerville (2006) was “much used to describe Britain’s reputation for 
bad faith, reneging on agreements and to back up accusations of 
outright treachery in her diplomacy and treaty-making” (par 2).  
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2.8.2 The Federal Elections of 1964/65 
The coalition between northern-dominated NPC and eastern-led 
NCNC that formed the independence government of 1960 in which 
Tafawa Balewa became Prime Minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe became 
President of the new Federation lasted for barely two years (Ngou, 
1989).  The alliance began to untangle with the controversy over the 
1962 census, the first for Nigeria as an independent nation. The 
Southern politicians had hoped to use the census to correct arbitrary 
allotment of census figures by the colonial administration, in which 
they felt the North was unduly favoured.  They wanted to use what 
they hoped would be new census figures to break the domination of 
the North at the federal level.  
However, the first national census as an independent nation only 
made matters worse: it produced controversy upon controversy. By 
the election year of 1964, the partnership between the Northern NPC 
and the Eastern NCNC had broken down irretrievably.  “Elite conflict 
over the census polarized” the two members of the 1959 coalition 
government of the NPC and NCNC; the division “in turn shaped the 
year-long struggle around the 1964 federal election” (Diamond, 1983, 
p485).  This led to two new alliances, in the election year of 1964. 
According to Dudley (1982), “Two broad coalitions, the Nigeria 
National Alliance (NNA), made up of the NPC and the NNDP, and the 
United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) composed of the NCNC 
and the AG, emerged to contest the 1964 federal elections” (p67). To 
fight the election, the ethnic card became the dominant ticket.    
In what Diamond calls blatant and vicious ethnic tones, the NNA, an 
alliance between the Northern NPC and Western NNDP, fought with 
fury and crudity, they attacked the Igbo leaders of the  NCNC, 
accusing them of “ethnic imperialism” and raising fears about Igbo 
domination, if  UPGA, the AG-NCNC alliance should win. Various 
configurations of ethnic fears gripped the land during the election 
period.  The NCNC politicians, on the other hand, declared the Igbo, 
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“embattled people”, and urged their voters and those of their alliance 
partners, the Action Group urged voters throughout the South to end 
the domination of the Hausa-Fulani and the unfair share of 
development resources they were appropriating to the North 
(Diamond, 1983, p485). 
It is not a surprise therefore, that first, the elections had to be 
conducted two times. The first one held on December 30, 1964 was 
inconclusive; it was boycotted by the NCNC of the East.  It took three 
months to persuade them to go to the polls, which eventually held on  
March 18 1965. However, the acrimony continued even after the 
election results were declared in favour of the NPC. According to Dare 
(1989),  
Nigerian political parties failed to build bridges across 
ethnic and linguistic lines and instead reinforced 
existing societal cleavages. They could not perform the 
integrative functions, which political parties must 
perform if the federal experiment is to succeed (p121). 
Table 2.7: Voting patterns of the regions in the 1964/1965 Federal Elections 
PARTY NORTH WEST MID WEST EAST LAGOS TOTAL 
NPC 162 0 0 0 0 162 
NNDP 0 36 0 0 0 36 
NCNC 0 5 14 64 1 84 
AG 0 15 0 4 2 21 
NPF 4 0 0 0 0 4 
INDS. 1 1 0 2 1 5 
TOTAL 167 57 14 70 4 312 
 
Source: Dare, L., (1989). The 1964 Elections and the Collapse of the First Republic. In Ekeh, P.,  Cole, 
P.D., & Olusanya, G. (Eds.) Politics and Constitutions. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) 
Limited, pp. 106 – 122 
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Table 2 adequately illustrates the ethnic influences in voting patterns 
during the 1964/65 elections. No southern-based party won even one 
seat in the north, which was dominated by the NPC. On the other 
hand, the NPC did not win a single seat in the East or West except for 
seats  won by its alliance member in the West.  
Going by the manner politicians carried on, an imminent falling apart 
was predictable, without a political soothsayer. The system collapsed 
within eighteen months of the general election, war followed and the 
military came and hugged power for a cumulative period of nearly 30 
years.  
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of majority votes in the 1964/1965 Parliamentary elections by 
regions on the Nigerian map 
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2.8.3 The Federal Elections of 1979 
The 1979 presidential election conducted under a new Constitution 
was held on August 11, after 13 years of military rule (1966-1979). 
Significant about this election is the change from a parliamentary 
system of government to an American-styled presidential system 
(Ogbeidi, 2010). INEC Report (2008) states: the political parties 
“were re-incarnations of the old regionally based parties of the First 
Republic with new names but about the same leadership” (p89) and 
still organised around ethnic and regional tables. Many of the 
politicians were also veterans of previous ethnic-based politics: Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN); Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe of the Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP); Mallam Aminu Kano of 
the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP); Adisa Akinloye, and Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN); and Alhaji 
Waziri Ibrahim of the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP).  
However from a structural and geographical standpoint, there were 
fundamental changes; the geographical compositions of the federating 
units had been redefined since the election of 1964/65 when the 
nation had four regions, then 12 states in 1967.  In 1979, there were 19 
States in the federation. Thus, states replaced regions in Nigeria’s 
political lexicon: “The growth of state consciousness played a major 
role in altering the parameters of political orientation” (Ollawa, 1989, 
p129).  This, though significant, structural change did not necessarily 
drastically alter ethnically influenced voting patterns.  
The elections were relatively peaceful because the military played a 
strong oversight role demanding the candidates to desist from 
personal attacks on one another, or making statements that would 
encourage violence.  Issues of electoral fraud and corruption dogged 
the voting process. Daramola (2013) observes that the 1979 election 
saw the establishment of many election newspapers, which were 
focused on personalities and confined themselves to promoting their 
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owners’ preferred candidates.   The scenarios in the 1959 and 1964 
elections played themselves out again as the voting pattern of the 1979 
elections reflected ethnic affiliations. In the result analysis of 
Nnabuihe, Aghemalo and Okebugwu (2014) of the 1979 elections, they 
“showed remarkable parallels between the parties, their candidates, 
and their ethnic affiliations.  Not surprisingly “the UPN won in all the 
Yoruba states, the NPP won the Igbo states of Anambra & Imo while 
the NPN won a good proportion of the Hausa/Fulani states. This is a 
repeat of the 1959 scenario” (p164). Shehu Shagari’s NPN was 
declared winner, but his victory was hotly contested by two of the 
parties - Awolowo’s UPN and Waziri Ibrahim’s GNPP – they lost 
(Agbaje, 1990). 
Table 2.4: Percentage share of votes in the 1979 Presidential elections 
REGIONS NPN 
NO. OF VOTES 
(%) 
UPN 
NO. OF VOTES 
(%) 
NPP 
NO. OF VOTES 
(%) 
GNPP 
NO. OF VOTES 
(%) 
PRP 
NO. OF VOTES 
(%) 
NORTH 3,914,951 
(48.18) 
530,917 
(6.53) 
512,603 
(6.31) 
1,488,766 
(18.32) 
1,678,948 
(20.66) 
WEST 281,718 
(8.02) 
3,182,304 
(90.64) 
21,827 
(0.62) 
15,564 
(0.44) 
9,651 
(0.27) 
MID WEST 
(BENDEL) 
242,320 
(36.19) 
356,381 
(53.23) 
57,629 
(8.61) 
8,242 
(1.23) 
4,939 
(0.74) 
EAST 1,190,341 
(32.07) 
165,287 
(4.45) 
2,151,144 
(57.96) 
169,974 
(4.58) 
34,701 
(0.94) 
LAGOS 59,515 
(7.18) 
681,762 
(82.30) 
79,320 
(9.57) 
3,943 
(0.48) 
3,874 
(0.47) 
 
Source: Compiled/computed from Ollawa, P.E., (1989). The 1979 Elections. In Ekeh, P., 
Cole, P.D., & Olusanya, G. (Eds.) Politics and Constitutions. Ibadan: Heinemann 
Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, p. 139. 
 
Not surprisingly, Table 3 demonstrates again that the strength of each 
of the regional parties was in their ethnic areas of influence. The two 
southern parties performed poorly in the North, each scoring below 
7% of votes cast in the North.  But NPN with an Igbo VP scored 
surprisingly high in the East but the UPN held on strongly to the West, 
Mid West and Lagos. 
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In the aftermath of the elections, at least two politically controlled 
newspapers from the South West – the Tribune and the Sketch – 
declared Shagari’s federal government illegitimate, and refused to 
acknowledge his presidency.  According to Agbaje (1990), it took the 
intervention of Awolowo, owner of the Tribune  and leader of the 
UPN, for the position to be reversed.  
According to Osaghae (2015), “the results confirmed the sectional 
character of the political parties. As in the First Republic, each secured 
control of its ethno-regional (or state) base” (p126).  Reflecting on 
ethnic alignments of the parties 10 years later, General Obasanjo who 
as Head of States midwifed the elections noted,  
…the 1979 elections indicated that the ethnic 
allegiances and bases of the First Republic parties 
merely laid in waiting to be resuscitated. The nature of 
political competition and voting pattern merely 
followed the same old pattern by and large exploring 
and exploiting ethnic differences along the way (1989, 
p79). 
These developments, in no small measures, compounded the 
problems and derailed the attempts at national integration and 
development. 
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Figure 2:10: Distribution of majority votes in the 1979 Presidential elections by states 
on the Nigerian map 
 
Source: Compiled/computed from Ollawa, P.E., (1989). The 1979 Elections. In Ekeh, P., 
Cole, P.D., & Olusanya, G. (Eds.) Politics and Constitutions. Ibadan: Heinemann 
Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, p. 139. 
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2.8.4 The Federal Elections of 1983 
The 1983 elections were held on August 6, 1983. Like other elections, 
rioting, arson, assassination, vandalism, and hooliganism marked the 
campaign that preceded the election. These acts exacerbated ethnic 
distrust and antagonism.  One distinguishing feature in this election 
was the role played by the media. Olayiwola (1991) noted,  
“It was difficult to distinguish between the political 
parties and the mass media under them. Each political 
party made use of its own press; personalities were 
attacked while the real campaign issues and principles 
were ignored” (p40). 
The political parties in the 1983 federal elections were the Unity Party 
of Nigeria (UPN) in South Western Region, the Nigeria People’s Party 
(NPP) in South Eastern Region; Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP) 
in the North Eastern Region; National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the 
North Western Region and a collection of minority ethnicities reacting 
against the dominant groups in their region; and the People’s 
Redemption Party (PRP) a populist party based in the North.  Some of 
the key personalities were Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the nation’s 
President, seeking re-election as the NPN presidential candidate; Dr. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe (Presidential Candidate of the NPP), Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo (Presidential Candidate of the UPN), Waziri Ibrahim 
(Presidential Candidate, GNPP), and Hassan Yusuf (PRP). 
The political parties were believed to have widely rigged the elections 
in their various areas of political influence. According to the Guardian 
Newspaper in an editorial, “There [was] sufficient evidence of brazen 
and cynical rigging of the votes, to suggest that…[all parties] 
approached the elections without much faith in either themselves or in 
the electorate” (cited in Osaghae, 2015, p150). As such, parties traded 
accusations freely, pointing accusing fingers at one another. At the 
CHAPTER 2 
 
84 
federal level, “the party with control over the electoral and security 
apparatus, and the resources to out-rig the other parties – the NPN - 
won the elections” (Osaghae, 2015, p150). 
Notwithstanding, the fraud that was the hallmark of the elections and 
perpetrated by all parties, or maybe as a result of it, the parties 
retained power in their various areas of ethnic controls.  “The NPP 
won in the Igbo-dominated states”, the NPN won in parts of the 
Hausa-Fulani North as well as in the minority ethnic areas of the 
South, and UPN maintained its “position in the Yoruba-dominated 
states of the West including Lagos” (Nnadozie, 2007, p66).  However, 
within three months of the election, the mismanagement of the 
elections and the notion of fraud and rigging provided the military a 
perfect reason to take over the government again in the nation’s fourth 
military coup. 
Table 2.5: Percentage share of votes in the 1983 Presidential elections 
REGION NPN 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
UPN 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
NPP 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
GNPP 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
PRP 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
NAP 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
NORTH 7,644,156 
(65.07) 
1,138,438 
(9.69) 
1,365,742 
(11.62) 
464, 027 
(3.95) 
954,909 
(8.13) 
181,023 
(1.54) 
WEST 1,295,163 
(23.81) 
4,006,798 
(73.65) 
60, 214 
(1.11) 
34,235 
(0.63) 
20,675 
(0.38) 
23,319 
(0.43) 
MID-
WEST 
(BENDEL) 
452,776 
(41.17) 
566,035 
(51.46) 
53,306 
(4.85) 
11,723 
(1.07) 
7,358 
(0.67) 
8,653 
(0.79) 
EAST 2,402,016 
(44.56) 
805, 254 
(14.94) 
1,931,760 
(35.83) 
118, 092 
(2.19) 
47, 328 
(0.88) 
86, 233 
(1.60) 
LAGOS 126,165 
(7.69) 
1,367,807 
(83.38) 
119,455 
(7.28) 
11,748 
(0.72) 
6,570 
(0.40) 
8,636 
(0.53) 
FCT 127,372 
(94.11) 
1,102 
(0.81) 
4,156 
(3.07) 
1,103 
(0.81) 
641 
(0.47) 
977 
(0.72) 
 
Source: Compiled/Computed from Oyediran, O., (1989). The 1983 Elections. In Ekeh, 
P., Cole, P.D., & Olusanya, G. (Eds.) Politics and Constitutions. Ibadan: Heinemann 
Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, p. 176. 
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Fig. 2.11: Distribution of votes in the 1983 Presidential elections by states on the 
Nigerian map 
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2.8.5 The Federal Elections of 1999 
The 1999 elections ended 16 years of military rule (1983-1999); the 
Presidential election was held on February 27, 1999.   The press and 
other civil society organisations played crucial roles by their persistent 
call for the military to return power to an elected government.  
 The leaders and key personalities, in the build-up to the elections, 
included a handful of politicians from the previous elections but an 
important factor in these elections, was a strong show of retired 
military generals, including: Lt. General T.Y. Danjuma, Major-General 
Mohammed Gusau, Lt. General I. Wushishi, General I.B. Babangida, 
Rear Admiral Ndubusi Kanu, General Alani Akinrinade, and 
Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe. It was not surprising therefore that General 
Olusegun Obasanjo, former Military Head of State, who handed over 
power to an elected civilian government in 1979, emerged as the 
preferred candidate.   
The outgoing military government registered only three political 
parties for the 1999 elections – the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), 
All Peoples Party (APP), and Alliance for Democracy (AD).  The PDP 
turned out to be a party for retired military and police officers, 
buccaneer capitalists, old politicians of the conservative NPN stock 
and former technocrats. The AD was led by remnants of the UPN, who 
were mostly ethnic ideologues and erstwhile pro-democracy activists; 
and the ANPP on the other hand, had its origins and support base in 
the north (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006, p35). 
Of these three, according to Ubani (2014), only the PDP managed a 
national footprint; the ANPP tried but created a semi-national image, 
but the AD held on firmly to its regional position in the South West.  A 
two-party alliance formed too late in the day between AD and APP 
failed to stop the PDP candidate, former General, now Chief Obasanjo. 
However, an interesting twist was that the leadership of the Yoruba 
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nation, his own ethnic group, neither endorsed nor supported him; 
rather the Yoruba fielded their own presidential candidate, Chief Olu 
Falae, and proceeded to campaign against Obasanjo. 
The election was unique in that it was the first overt display of elite 
leadership recruitment in action.  The retired generals prodded 
Olusegun Obasanjo and united behind him as presidential candidate 
for the leading political party, the PDP.  His candidacy was presented 
to the public as a way to compensate the Yoruba ethnic group of South 
West Nigeria whose candidate had won the annulled Presidential 
election of 1993.  In a manner unprecedented, the main parties all 
agreed to cede the presidential ticket for that year and election, to the 
South West zone.  Not surprising, therefore, and unlike most previous 
elections, voting patterns did not reflect ethnic affiliations.  As a result 
of this agreement, the two leading candidates were not only from the 
same geo-political zone-the South West - but also from the same 
ethnic group - the Yoruba (Nnadozie, 2007).   "The eventual winner of 
the election did not even win in his own state but rode to victory with 
votes from other parts of the country" (Nnabuihe, Aghemalo and 
Okebugwu, 2014, p164). 
According to Akubo and Yakubu (2014) citing Prof. Abubakar Momoh 
(2006), real issues did not drive the election “political parties lacked 
well thought-out programmes and manifestos…” (p86). All the 
candidates promised to fight corruption, which had become a 
dominant social-economic matter. “Nigeria was ranked the most 
corrupt nation by Transparency International” (Letjolane, Nawaigo, 
and Rocca 2010, p6). Corruption coupled with an authoritarian 
military culture had produced weak political institutions.  According 
to INEC (2008), 
By 1999, Nigeria had been ruled by military 
regimes for 29 of its first 39 years of 
independence. The years of military rule impeded 
the development of democratic institutions and 
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leaders, and hampered the emergence of a 
democratic culture (p3). 
However, the press played its role as the fourth estate of the realm;  “it 
kept the authorities on their toes and prevented the programme from 
derailing or tolerating gross abuses that could delegitimize the entire 
exercise” (Olukotun, 2000, p39).  
Table 2.6: Percentage share of votes in the 1999 Presidential elections 
STATE APP/AD 
NO. OF VOTES 
(%) 
PDP 
NO. OF VOTES 
(%) 
NORTH WEST 1,684,934  
(30.25) 
3,884,536  
(69.75) 
NORTH EAST 1,412,426  
(28.45) 
3,552,354  
(71.55) 
NORTH CENTRAL 1,461,840  
(28.46) 
3,675,027  
(71.54) 
SOUTH WEST 4,366,993  
(80.00) 
1,092,216  
(20.00) 
SOUTH EAST 978,997  
(29.79) 
2,307,712  
(70.21) 
SOUTH SOUTH 1,205,087  
(22.19) 
4,226,330  
(77.81) 
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Fig. 2.12: Distribution of votes in the 1999 Presidential elections by states on the 
Nigerian map 
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2.8.6 The Federal Elections of 2011 
Of the six elections in the study, the 2011 election remains easily the 
least comparable to any other, among other reasons, for being the 
most violent; hundreds, perhaps thousands of people died in the post-
election violence. “Following the April 2011 presidential election, 
which Jonathan (a southern minority Christian) won with almost 59 
per cent of the vote, widespread rioting in northern states led to much 
loss of life and property” (Joseph, 2014, pp71–72). 
President Umaru Yar’Adua, a Northern Muslim, elected into office in 
2007, died midway through his tenure; the Vice-President, Dr. 
Goodluck Jonathan, an ethnic minority from the South, became the 
president. When Jonathan then decided to run for the office, 
according to Alli and Kwaja (2014), some politicians, mostly from the 
North, opposed him on the grounds that another northerner should 
complete the Yar’Adua eight-year tenure.  This view though loudly 
canvassed by some northerners had no constitutional backing; most of 
the press stood with the Constitution. The campaign on both sides 
reopened deep old tribal wounds in a manner only vaguely analogous 
to the 1964 elections. 
Social media and other Internet platforms were ablaze with divisive 
ethno-religious vituperations.  The setting of the entire election took 
on the North vs. South and Buhari vs. Jonathan outlook.  “The anti-
Jonathan rhetoric in the North hardened the stance of many 
Southerners against Buhari, setting up an inevitable clash between 
[the] followers” (Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p15).  The political tension 
increased with each day nearer the election, across the nation. “In the 
weeks preceding the presidential election, Nigeria experienced a wave 
of violent incidents ranging from communal unrest to bombings” (Orji 
and Uzodi, 2012, p8).  At about the same time, Amnesty International 
reported many people had already been killed in “politically 
motivated, communal and sectarian violence across Nigeria ahead of 
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presidential and parliamentary polls” (cited in Gberie, 2011, p11).  
These attacks almost crippled the electioneering process. 
Table 2.7: Percentage share of votes in the 2011 Presidential elections 
STATE PDP 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
CPC 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
ACN 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
ANPP 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
OTHER 
PARTIES 
NO. OF 
VOTES 
(%) 
NORTH WEST 3,395,724 
(31.44) 
6,453,437 
(59.75) 
146,216 
(1.35) 
612,541 
(5.67) 
192,157 
(1.78) 
NORTH EAST 1,832,622 
(31.45) 
3,624,919 
(62.21) 
84,273 
(1.45) 
198,837 
(3.41) 
85,994 
(1.48) 
NORTH 
CENTRAL 
3,376,570 
(60.87) 
1,744, 575 
(31.45) 
309,011 
(5.57) 
43,345 
(0.78) 
73,649 
(1.33) 
SOUTH WEST 2,786,417 
(60.39) 
321,609 
(6.97) 
1,369, 943 
(29.69) 
30,906 
(0.67) 
104,837 
(2.27) 
SOUTH EAST 4,985,246 
(98.28) 
20,335 
(0.40) 
25,517 
(0.50) 
20,357 
(0.40) 
20,866 
(0.41) 
SOUTH 
SOUTH 
6,118,608 
(96.34) 
49,978 
(0.79) 
144,141 
(2.27) 
11,026 
(0.17) 
27,363 
(0.43) 
 
Source: Nigeria's Critical Election, 2011 G - Reference, Information and 
Interdisciplinary Subjects Series by John A. A. Ayoade, Adeoye A. Akinsanya. 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013 
 
Isola (2014) notes that many newspapers dedicated special pages to 
the coverage of the elections.  In reporting events leading to the 
elections, the papers tried to be as neutral as was possible. 
Nevertheless, the press was accused of partisanship and of "fanning 
the already inflamed discourse by reporting partisan stories with 
sensational headlines” (Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p15). But according to a 
2011 report of the European Union Election Observation Mission to 
Nigeria (2011), the “print media offered a profound analysis and an 
equitable political discourse with a slight preference towards PDP and 
the incumbent President…. The tone in the print media was mainly 
positive or neutral towards candidates until the week before the 
Presidential Polls (p34). 
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One major irony of the 2011 elections is that against the backdrop of 
being the most divisive and violent, it was also adjudged by “observers 
and analysts as the most credible election in the series of elections 
organized since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999" (Orji and 
Uzodi, 2012, p6).  The United States Ambassador to Nigeria, Terence 
McCulley, ECOWAS, and EU election observation missions, all praised 
the conduct and results of the elections.    "The ECOWAS mission 
described it as ‘fair and transparent’ (ICG, 2011 cited in Orji and 
Uzodi, 2012, p7).  And the EU Mission said, “the 2011 general 
elections marked an important step towards strengthening democratic 
elections in Nigeria, but challenges remain” (EU EOM, 2011, p1)).  
As soon as the results were declared, violence followed in the North 
until the 2011 election became known for being the one with the most 
violent post-elections violence in Nigeria. All these elections prove a 
pattern - most political parties are heavily dependent on their ethno 
regional roots for success at the polls and political relevance.  
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Fig. 2.13: Distribution of votes in the 2011 Presidential elections by states on the 
Nigerian map 
 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/swac/presidentialelectioninnigeria-16april2011.htm 
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2.9.0 CONCLUSION: ALL AGAINST ALL 
This chapter looked at the various defining environmental factors and 
influences that have formed the ‘character’ of the Nigerian press since 
1859, when the first newspaper, Iwe Irohin was established.  At the 
beginning, the quest for national independence, as a central pursuit 
naturally unified the nationalists, who were predominantly southern 
politicians among whom many were journalists. The press’ struggle 
against colonialism was also a political struggle against perceived 
enslavement in one's own country (Enahoro, 1965). 
The Colonial administration’s regionalisation of politics inadvertently 
led to the regionalisation of journalism, as well. Inherent in the 
Nigerian brand of federalism was an unhealthy craving for political 
domination of other ethnic groups. The contrived federal state became 
a platform for tribal rivalry, which spilled into every facet of social 
interaction, but most manifest, perhaps, in politics, the press and later 
the military.  The resultant regionalised press provided platforms, 
which amplified the voices of regional politicians on the national stage 
(Folarin, 1998; Duyile, 1989). The structure set a new tone for politics 
as well as journalism far beyond the early independence years; and 
notably, it characterised the press. With time, journalists lined up 
behind their owners, who were invariably leading regional politicians 
“in a war of all against all” (Williams, 2011, p35). 
In this chapter the role of the military in politics and their cold-hot 
adversarial relationship with the press was also highlighted. Their 
need to conquer and dominate all within their area of control proved 
their limited knowledge of civil politics. Their long incursions into 
politics and media ownership damaged the media’s perception in 
more ways than any other group of elites who ruled Nigeria in the 
past. 
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In the years between 1959 and 2011, the role of the press has 
diminished. The 1950s epitomised the age of the press in all its power 
– the age prior to the popularisation of radio, and advent of television.  
Newspaper press was the main mass communication medium. By 
2011, however, the face and character of the media, and the 
newspaper-press in particular had changed with the arrival of new 
forms of mass and multiple media systems. There has been a 
systematic move away from a largely text-based press-media to text, 
audio-visual forms of media.  A hugely different media environment 
emerged – more fragmented, more opinionated, with more vociferous 
voices. In the arena of politics and ethnic relations, the new media 
environment reflected in definite colours what has always been 
known: a deeply divided and conflicted nation.  However, among the 
elite, the old press has not completely diminished – many decision 
makers still want the physical copy of a daily paper. 
In this chapter, the focus has been on the trifocal nature of this study 
being anchored on the nation-building relationships between the 
press, democratic process of elections, and the concept of belonging in 
a multi-ethnic nation-state like Nigeria. Essentially, this chapter 
highlights press dealings with the inevitably derived issues familiar 
with most postcolonial states, which are also the issues that have 
combined to create the modern Nigerian-state. The chapter also dealt 
with the symbiotic relationship between press and politics, and it 
concluded with a survey of the selected elections covered in the study, 
centring on how today’s political culture has evolved over the years. 
In the next chapter, I shall be looking at conceptual thinking on press, 
electoral democracy, and the politics of belonging, in the context of 
newspaper-press operating in multi-ethnic, post-colonial states where 
the newspaper is a relatively new phenomenon. 
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S E C T I O N  2  
This section contains Chapters 3 and 4, the theoretical and 
methodological chapters of the study.  In Chapter 3, I further examined 
contextual theories such as the post-colonial state, positionality, and 
elite theory. 
Chapter 4 is the methodology chapter.  It is wrapped around 
contextualised philosophical concepts that under guard the research 
framework and the choice of methods for the study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3.1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter surveys, reviews, and assesses conceptual thinking on press, electoral 
democracy, and the politics of belonging. The review examines relevant and related 
theories in the context of newspaper-press operating in multi-ethnic, post-colonial 
states where the newspaper is a relatively new phenomenon. In this regard, the 
chapter examines the multi-dimensional dynamics of electoral democracy in Nigeria, 
with particular regard to the roles and effects of press under military dictatorship, 
where the elite dominate ownership and control. To arrive at a theoretical framework 
in line with the objective of the study, in the concluding section, I examined 
aggregative and deliberative models with particular interest in the agonistic 
framework. 
3.1.1 Theoretical Perspectives  
At the risk of overextending a concept, it is safe to say that all theories are 
underpinned by defined philosophical perspectives; and perspectives are usually tied 
to localities – culturally, politically and sociologically.  From a theoretical point of 
view, therefore, it is necessary to highlight the peculiar contexts of this study of 
nation-states emerging from the shadows of colonialism, struggling with self-
discovery and self-definition.  Typically, these are nations where the concept of 
democracy is alien and/or nascent; where knowledge is a scarce commodity, paper-
thin and superficial; and where the (mass) newspaper-press is a novel phenomenon. 
These nations cannot be placed on the same theoretical scale, bearing in mind the 
dissimilar historical backgrounds, experiences, and realities, with older nations. In 
these settings, wholesale adoption and application of Western political theories, 
concepts, and models, without an understanding of the context, is likely to yield a 
distorted picture. The chapter, therefore, begins by providing a perspective on the 
current absence of a situation-specific theoretical philosophy. 
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To begin with, Paolo Mancini makes the point that journalism and the structures that 
support them do not grow in a vacuum.  “They are born and developed within a 
network of interactions and negotiations with a number of other social system and 
factors, most of all with economic and politics” (Mancini, 2005, p234).  McQuail 
(2010) reflected the same view when he noted that even though media and 
communication institutions display what he called, 
apparent similarities, they are affected by differences of culture at the 
level of individual, subgroup, nation, etc. The production and use of 
mass media are cultural practices that resist the universalizing 
tendencies of the technology and the mass-produced content (p8). 
Although Mancini and McQuail may not have made the point directly about 
philosophies and theories in the above submissions, Baran and Davis (2008) did, 
when they posit that theories are “more or less relevant to a given medium, audience, 
time, condition and theorist... Mass communication theory can be personalised; it is 
ever-evolving; it is dynamic” (p18).  This nails the point that it is difficult to 
pigeonhole theories into one size that fits all situations. 
3.1.2 Communication and Theories 
Baran and Davis (2008) pushed the point further: “all theory is a human 
construction, an active effort by communities of scholars to make sense of their 
social world” (p40). But they also noted that scholarly communities have different 
objectives and goals for “the theories they build and champion” (Baran and Davis, 
2008, p40).  To make their point, they cite Katherine Miller (2005), who states 
“Different schools of thought will define theory in different ways depending on the 
needs of the theorist and on beliefs about the social world and the nature of 
knowledge” (Baran and Davis, 2009, p11).  Because of these differences in objectives 
and goals, communication theories are plentiful.   Thus,  
An important reality of communication and mass communication 
theories [is that] there are a lot of them, the questions they produce 
are testable to varying degrees, they are situationally based, and they 
sometimes seem contradictory and chaotic (Baran and Davis, 2009, 
p11). 
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Baran and Davis make it safe to propose that situationality of media or press theories 
directly negates the attempts to universalise theories and research methods by many 
Western scholars.   On this issue, James Curran and Myung-Jin Park (2005) note an 
undisguised 
self-absorption and parochialism of much Western media theory.  It 
has become routine for universalistic observation about the media to 
be advanced in English-language books on the basis of evidence 
derived from a tiny handful of countries… The universe is changing in 
a way that makes this narrowness transparently absurd (p2).  
Curran and Park (2005) then post hopeful signs to suggest, “many western media 
scholars are now recognising these absurdities”, which they noted, started in the 
1950s “when Four Theories tradition saw the universe only through Western eyes, 
followed in the 1960s by a theory which assumed the developing world should 
imitate the West” (p3).  Recognising an absurdity is only one half of the problem 
solved; doing something about it is the other half. That the absurdity has endured is 
no longer entirely the fault of non-African theorists; African researchers also need to 
step up and take responsibility for defining their own environment. 
All theories are local to a specific study and personal to the theorist. They can only be 
universalised after due adjustments to accommodate local sensitivities. 
Thirty years ago, Charles Okigbo (1987) made the point that Baran and Davis would 
later make in 2009, that most theories are founded on the philosophical position of 
the culture or the environment of the theorist. Okigbo contended that Africa needed 
“a philosophy in communication…to give meaning and direction to African 
communication research” Okigbo (1987, p18).  According to him,  
most research efforts in African communication are episodic, casual, 
serendipitous, and non-systematic. Most tragically, these efforts are 
not informed by any identifiable philosophies, be they indigenous or 
foreign (p26). 
Okigbo (1987) further contends that though philosophy as an orientation is not alien 
to Africa, the absence of its application in African research has relegated the field to 
copycatism.  
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What makes Okigbo’s point still pertinent, about three decades after, is that in 2015, 
Ghanaian researchers, Eshun, Zakaria, and Segbefia are still making the point, as 
several others have. They critiqued the dominance of particular categories of 
research perspectives in the African social research space, citing Bryce et al. (2015, 
p579), who posited that social research, in nations with post-colonial history, 
continues to be “largely filtered through Western institutional lenses” (Eshun, 
Zakaria, and Segbefia, 2015, p3).  African scholars are trapped in what these 
researchers called ‘Afro-pessimism’ in their thinking. African scholars, they contest, 
should not borrow “‘Northern theories’ in their research without contesting their 
appropriateness and relevance to African situations” (2015, p4).  
3.1.3 Journalism: Representation and the Production of 
Ideologies 
The point made by Okigbo and Eshun, et al. is all the more important because, 
according to Stuart Hall (2003), “The media’s main sphere of operation is the 
production and transformation of ideologies” (p89). For his purpose, Hall (2003) 
defined ideology as “those images, concepts, and premises which provide the 
frameworks through which we represent interpret, understand and make sense of 
some aspect of social existence” (p89).   
In a unique way, perhaps more than any other institution involved in the production 
of ideology, which inevitably benefits the transformation efforts, the press as part of 
the media serves as a convergent first point of call for reflecting or defining reality, 
and propagating information and knowledge. In these functions, the press not only 
helps to create and to construct realities, knowledge, and meaning, it also helps in 
the preservation of memories.  In the view of Stuart Hall (1986), “What we know of 
society depends on how things are represented to us and the knowledge, in turn, 
informs what we do” (p9). The media provide us with reports or reflections of this 
reality, “with varying degree of accuracy, completeness or dependability” (McQuail, 
2000, p8). 
With the foregoing, it is important to examine the principal role of the press within 
the backdrop of ideology formation and creation of meaning and “the principal 
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democratic role of the media according to traditional liberal theory is to act as a 
check on the state... and fearlessly expose abuses of official authority” (Curran, 2002, 
p217). The fact that Curran’s proposal is limited in application to “traditional liberal 
theory” is a significant redeeming feature.  It is a far cry from the prescriptive 
position to globalise a small selection of Western philosophy in media research, for, 
according to Colin Sparks (2005), some authors have no “qualms in making it clear 
to their readers that the American way was better” (p30).   
What is obvious is that what may be good and applicable in the West may not be so 
in many non-Western democracies where governments fund the media and demand 
loyalty of service, not to the people but the government in power.  Needless to assert 
that there are significant system differences between the press in the West, and those 
that operate in non-Western worlds. In most other parts of the world, under 
authoritarian or totalitarian governments with superficial democracies, media 
operate under constraints of fragile and distorted institutional structures; whereas in 
most parts, the Western press operates in affluent, liberal democracies, under 
conditions that are in stark contrast to what obtains in the global South.  While it is 
important to understand the basic state of things, the one starting point is a recall to 
the past. 
3.2.0 POST-COLONIALISM AS AN AFRICAN REALITY 
Bearing in mind that all realities are constructed, one must note that no situation is 
static; if the colonial experience had not created the current African reality some 
other factors would have, albeit differently.  According to Peter Ekeh (1975), “Our 
post-colonial present has been fashioned by our colonial past. It is that colonial past 
that has defined for us the spheres of morality that have come to dominate our 
politics” (p111). Ekeh’s argument is that colonialism has produced a distortion in the 
political mind-set, ethics, and structures of post-colonial states in Africa.  Also, in the 
view of Edward Said (1994), the struggle against colonialism and for independence 
not only produced new states and new boundaries, the immediate consequences 
were calamitous for people who found themselves trapped between the old African 
empires and new states as  
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homeless wanderers, nomads, and vagrants, unassimilated to the 
emerging structures of institutional power, rejected by the established 
order for their intransigence and obdurate rebelliousness… their 
condition articulates the tensions, irresolution, and contradictions in 
the overlapping territories shown on the cultural map of imperialism 
(p332). 
In the advent of the colonial-state in Africa, therefore, various ethnic nationalities 
and traditional political societies have had to negotiate their relationships with each 
other, and with a new centre organised around an alien political system, culture and 
process.  “They then had to engage not only with ‘modernity’” but “with the new 
‘rules of the game’ that colonial conquest imposed.” And these “negotiation processes 
occurred, against the backdrop of outright violence, coercion and exploitation on the 
part of the colonizing powers” (Hagmann and P´eclard, 2010, p557).  These multi-
level dynamics in various degrees have combined to create African post-colonial 
reality. 
Taken from the above perspective, Peter Ekeh (1975) suggests that a fundamental 
consequence of colonialism was the inadvertent creation of two publics, in contrast 
with the West where only one public exists. “Many of Africa's political problems are 
due to the dialectical relationships between the two publics” (Ekeh, 1975, p91).  He 
calls the first the primordial public; an imperative developed to meet the welfare 
needs of the people that were denied by the colonial state.  Then there is the civic 
public, which he said “is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives 
operative in the primordial public” (Ekeh, 1975, p92).  Ekeh further postulates that, 
“the most outstanding characteristic of African politics is that the same political 
actors simultaneously operate in the primordial and the civic publics” (pp92-93).   
Agreeing with Ekeh's concept of two publics, Ukiwo (2015) states “ethnicity has 
flourished because the Nigerian elite who inherited the colonial state have 
conceptualised development as transferring resources from the civic public to the 
primordial public” (p9).  
Ekeh’s two publics illustrate Said’s point about the tension between the old empires 
and the new states, but that tension goes further; it exists in the different types of 
moral linkages between the civic public, historically associated with colonialism, and 
the private realms of the primordial public, more associated with the traditional 
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Africa (Ekeh, 1975). To understand post-colonialism, therefore, it is essential to 
understand the substance of colonialism, for colonial law, in a place like Nigeria 
made “cultural identity the basis for political identity, it inevitably turns ethnicity 
into a political identity” (Mamdani, 2005, p13).  It is easy to see why in most African 
post-colonial states, “the premium on power is exceptionally high, and the 
institutional mechanisms for moderating political competition are (unsurprisingly) 
lacking. As a result, political competition tends to assume the character of warfare. 
So absorbing (intense) is the struggle for power that everything else… is 
marginalized” (Ake, 1996, p16). 
From the foregoing, it is clear that colonialism and its inevitable aftermath – post-
colonialism together create the complex historical context of most of Africa’s political 
cosmos.  Understanding this context is essential to understanding African 
nationalism as well.  There is a euro-centrism in the prevalent literature on 
nationalism, which, with little thought sets up European nationalism as the norm.  
This is all the more important because African nationalism is different from 
European or other forms of nationalism. In order to understand African nationalism, 
it is necessary to understand the role played by the African elite, as well as the ethnic-
nations that gave the elite a political relevance and foothold, under a colonial and a 
post colonial setting. 
3.2.1 Nigeria and Elite-Led Democracy 
In 2008, nearly ten years into Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, researcher Henry Kifordu 
(2011a) undertook a public perception survey on the state of democracy in Nigeria.  
His finding showed that about 78 per cent of people had a positive disposition 
towards democracy, but only 42 per cent were “satisfied with the country’s 
democratic governance and an even lower 32 per cent could perceive democracy 
extensively in their respective experiences” (p16) Compared with neighbouring 
Ghana, the story was different – “83 per cent was able to perceive the extensiveness 
of democracy, while 78 per cent supported it and 80 per cent felt satisfied with 
Ghana’s democratic governance” (p16). 
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To what extent is what Kifordu calls, “the cumulative effect on elite rotation on 
Nigeria’s power structure and regime type”, responsible for this poor report card on 
democracy? (2011a, p.17). Collier and Mahon (cited in Kifordu, 2011a) argued that 
mere electoral democracy, typically manipulated by the elite, weakens democracy, 
and is not necessarily its true form. Their point is that a competitive election requires 
more than just the act, but rather, institutions as well as continuous practice that 
build experience.  These essential components are what new democracies like 
Nigeria lack in adequate quantities, and sufficient quality.  The Nigerian political 
regime, as led by the elites, Kifordu further submits,  
is characterized by a typical hybrid pattern of incomplete 
liberalization, lack of inclusiveness and deficient application of the 
rule of law. These conditions strengthen the power of the political elite 
but weaken the very fabric of democratic governance (2011a p29). 
Kifordu’s point proved the gross deficiencies of elite driven democracy. It is neither in 
the interest of the grand nation -state nor in the interest of the mass of the people. It 
is obvious that while much attention has been drawn to the issue of colonialism and 
ethnicity, not much attention has been devoted to home-grown problems created by 
elite-centred democracies: a government of the elite, by the elite for the sole benefit of 
the elite.   
3.2.1.1 The Elite 
Osaghae (1991a) borrows from Vilfredo Pareto who commodified social values like 
knowledge, power, and riches saying that those who score highest on these are the 
elite.  Osaghae then goes on to define elites as 
those who occupy leading positions and roles in all facets of society - 
the political leaders, top civil servants and bureaucrats, top military 
officers and academicians, leading professionals, businessmen and 
other top members of the merchant class (p45). 
On his part, Diamond (1988) suggests that “ethnically divided societies with low 
levels of socioeconomic development but relatively large state sectors” are typical of 
conditions under which elite mobilisation of ethnicity thrive and their roles magnify.  
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Although Kifordu (2011) submits that political elite began to emerge in the early 
1960s, there is evidence to indicate that their origin dates further back to the late 
1930s and early 1960 with the advent and exploits of the NYM and the NNDP 
political parties and the events of the Lagos Council of 1941.  It is therefore safe to 
state that the Nigerian political elite began to emerge during this period, and their 
early membership that Kifordu described as an assemblage of mostly “low-skilled 
professionals” (Kifordu, 2011a, p29), would only apply to 1940s, and not the 1960s as 
he suggests. What began with such a lowly background grew in number, networks, 
and improved skills. Since the early period, however, the system that produced them 
has barely changed from an essentially oligarchic disposition that reflects its perfect 
post-colonial nature. The system has now matured into layers of networks of self-
serving interest groups that admits civilian and military leaders into an elite club of 
privileged few. 
3.2.1.2 Ethnicity: Serving Elite Political Interests 
According to Osaghae (1991a), “one of the most popular perspectives in the study of 
ethnicity is the perspective which posits that ethnicity is an ideology employed by the 
elites to further their constitutive interests” (p43). Indeed, Sklar (1967) calls ethnicity 
“a mask for class privilege” (p6).  Nnoli (1978) also sees ethnicity as an ideology.  But 
he contends that it is an ideology that was developed, nurtured, and reinforced by the 
advent of colonialism, when the African was uprooted from his familiar “setting 
which had valid meaning for him, in which history had effectively and organically 
related him to his local environment and culture had produced salutary patterns of 
interactions with others” (Nnoli, cited in Ukiwo, 2005, p8). 
Beyond ideology, Osaghae (1991a) suggests that ethnicity is also “an effective strategy 
and major manipulative tool in the competition for societal resources,” employed by 
the elite to further their constitutive interests (p43). To drive home this point, he 
uses Awolowo’s position about his own leadership of the Yorubas to illustrate the 
notion of ethnic strategy as a viable and pragmatic route to the centre stage of 
national politics. Says Awolowo (1981) as cited by Osaghae: 
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I pity the ignorance of those who believe that I can become a leader of 
Nigeria only if I renounce my leadership of the Yorubas. I could not 
become a leader of the country if I were rejected by those among 
whom I was born. What would be my credentials for ruling the whole 
country if I failed with a small group? (Osaghae, 1991a, p51). 
Nnoli blames colonialism for political standpoints typical of the one taken by 
Awolowo above. He argues that the “colonial administration deliberately promoted 
ethnicity through policies of indirect rule, categorization of Africans by ‘tribe’, and 
promotion of separate settlements between natives and settlers of urban centres” 
(cited in Ukiwo, 2005, p8).  Nnoli extends this position and argues that, in the bid to 
survive with the limited socio-economic opportunities and inadequate socio-political 
resources, which were themselves the result of a situation created by the colonisers, 
the African began to see other ethnic groups as competitors.  This new competitive 
spirit gave birth to a new antagonistic form of ethnicity.  
3.2.1.3 Mobilising the Masses through the Press 
There has been much attention paid to ethnicity as an elite strategy, but less 
attention to a similarly important mobilisation strategy through the press 
particularly in the earlier years, and without which the ethnic strategy would have 
failed or been severely stunted, given that (even ethnic) nations are imagined.  As 
typical with elite groups everywhere, Nigerian elites have managed to construct their 
interest as tantamount to the interest of the larger group whose interest they claim to 
represent.  And they have used the press effectively to mobilise the groups, to 
propagate their narrow agenda, sold as the people’s but which often, do not reflect 
the people’s real need. 
According to Osaghae (1991a), “the elites succeed in recruiting the masses by 
promoting the elite interest as the common interest” (p45). One key detail, which has 
often been overlooked, is that the elite depend upon the press, perhaps, just as much 
as they do on ethnicity, to achieve their objective of hegemonic domination. In the 
view of van Dijk (1993) “many discourse types and communicative events (are) 
controlled by the elites” (p9). 
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Mobilisation is a key function of the elite, for which the press is a necessity used to 
activate and maintain ethnic consciousness, and foster internal group unity. 
According to van Dijk (1993), elite groups control and dominate “forms of public 
discourse” (p289), including the “communicative conditions” necessary for the 
formation of the popular mind that leads to the ethnic consensus (p10).  In order to 
constantly antagonise rival out-groups to sharpen “ethnic consciousness and 
differentiation – the 'us' vs 'they'”, elites need the loud, far-reaching voice of the 
media (Osaghae, 1991a, p51). 
Elite’s deliberate and intentional capture of the press and media is not unique to 
Nigeria.  It is a common occurrence in most post colonial states, but it manifests in 
various forms, as this comparative examination of post colonial media in India, 
Brazil and South Africa demonstrates. 
3.3.0 ELITE MEDIA CAPTURE IN THREE POSTCOLONIAL NATIONS 
OF BRAZIL, INDIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA 
All nations with colonial experiences do not necessary follow the same postcolonial 
trajectory, in part, because the practice of colonial system by nature is usually very 
dissimilar from place to place.  Some of the dissimilarities are often reflected in how 
the media, including the newspaper-press, are organised. Greffrath (2016) makes an 
additional but highly perceptive point that though there is routinely strong emphasis 
on 
civic nationalism during independence struggles as a means to unite 
disparate ethnicities towards the goal of national self-determination and 
prevent tribalist tendencies, […] such civic nationalism rarely proved durable 
in the post-colony (Greffrath, 2016, p168). 
Greffrath’s point proves that civic national unity under a colonial system is usually 
not difficult to attain; but it disintegrates rather quickly, the result of entrenched 
patterns of postcolonial ethnic nationalism, under the strong influences of interested 
elites.  Sectional elite interests invariably undermine attempts at national unity. 
Although civic nationalism under most postcolonial governments enjoys lip services 
as an ideal, it lasts only but for a season, and usually cannot withstand the onslaught 
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of ethnic or tribal nationalism.  Forrest (2006), as cited in Greffrath (2016) refers to 
this process as a 
degeneration of civic nationalist unity in the wake of parochial, ‘ethnic-nation 
protecting’ political claimants, while narrowly based patrimonial regimes 
cling to power by relying on a praetorian, centralist, and exclusivist pattern of 
rule (Greffrath, 2016, pp 168-169). 
However, in virtually all cases, the elites occupy the front row seats in politics, 
economy or commerce, and media.  While variations in experiences exist, an 
apparent hegemonic contest dominates press and politics, in most places thereby 
unsettling nations.  
Table 3.1: COMPARATIVE MEDIA POLITICAL & MEDIA INDICATORS IN THREE BRICS NATIONS AND NIGERIA 
COUNTRY POPULATION 
(MILLION) 
GDP 
($TRILLION) 
SOCIO-
POLITICAL 
CONTEXT 
MEDIA  
SYSTEM 
NUMBER OF 
NEWSPAPER 
AND  
MAGAZINE 
TITLES 
INTERNET 
PENETRATION, 
% OF 
 POPULATION 
MAIN  
GLOBAL 
PRESENCE 
Brazil 203 2.2 Presidential 
democracy, 
Colonial 
history, 
Deep social 
inequality 
Commercial, 
Limited 
public 
service, 
Abundant 
community 
media 
11,000 52 Telenovelas 
India 1, 236 1.9 Parliamentary 
democracy, 
Colonial 
history, 
Deep social 
inequality 
Commercial, 
Strong 
public-
service, 
Multi-lingual 
94,000 20* Bollywood 
South Africa 48 0.3 Parliamentary 
democracy, 
Colonial 
history and 
apartheid, 
Deep social 
inequality 
Commercial, 
Strong 
public-
service with 
community 
media, 
Multi-lingual 
1,000 49 Entertainment, 
mainly in 
Africa 
**Nigeria 180 0.51 Presidential 
democracy, 
Colonial 
history with 
long years of 
military 
rule, Deep 
social 
inequality 
Commercial, 
Limited/wea
k public 
service, 
lacks 
community 
media 
395 43* Nollywood 
*Figure for 2014, all other figures for 2013.  
Main source: Mapping BRICS Media (2015). Edited by Kaarle Nodenstreng and Daya Kishan Thussu.   
**Nigerian Figures compiled from various sources. 
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3.3.1 Three BRICS Nations and Nigeria 
Wilmsen, Dubow, and Sharp (1994) hold the view that processes of ethnicisation are 
“diverse in different parts of the world under varying kinds of stimuli”, but they also 
maintained that subsequent trajectories were not uniform (p347).  However, 
whatever the trajectory, the media play a significant role.  Without doubt democracy 
has made a difference in the nations of India, Brazil, and South Africa.  Patrick Heller 
calls the three nations “the most successful cases of consolidated democracy in the 
developing world” (2009, p2).  The relative democratic progress in these nations has 
been made against many odds, and   
achieved against a social backdrop of extreme social exclusions (the caste 
system in India) and the worst maldistribution of wealth in the world (South 
Africa and Brazil) only underscores the achievements (Heller, 2009, p4) 
All told, since 1947, India has enjoyed a longer period as an established democracy.  
Brazil’s current democratic experiment emerged from long periods of military rule in 
2000, and South Africa in 1994 finally became a democracy, emerging from an 
apartheid system, which had succeeded a British colonial system (Sparks, 2015).  As 
such there are substantial differences in the paths that led each to becoming a 
democratic nation even though, in all cases, “there is strong evidence of interchange 
between political, economic and media power at other levels” (Sparks, 2015, p51).  It 
is also important to reflect the fact that the three nations are still struggling to 
incorporate other sub-groups outside the elite classes of whatever sub-groups they 
claim to represent. As such, they are still “characterized by deep and durable social 
inequalities that have limited the effective political incorporation of subordinate 
groups” (Heller, 2009, p2).   
3.3.2 India 
In the case of India, which Homi Bhabha (1994) called “the original symbol of 
colonial authority”, (p186), elite politics and people politics were organised 
differently.   Whereas elite politics 
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tended to be relatively more legalistic and constitutional in orientation, 
[people politics on the other hand,] depended on […] traditional organization 
of kinship and territoriality or on class consciousness depending on the level 
of the consciousness of the people involved. They tended to be more violent 
than elite politics (Chakrabarty, 2000, pp15 – 16) 
Further on India, Guha (1982) states, “Indian nationalism has for a long time been 
dominated by elitism — colonialist elitism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism” (p1).  
What is obvious from the foregoing is that in most postcolonial nations, the elite by 
necessity stepped into the leadership vacuum created at independence, eager to 
serve, but they usually arrived at the service posts with undisguised elite-centred 
interests and usually did not hesitate to apply the same questionable means or 
methods did the colonialists to suppress their people, in order to maintain their hold 
on power.   
Nordenstreng and Thussu, (2015), underscore the fact that with nearly 300 round-
the-clock news channels and a strong tradition of English language journalism, 
Indian media are as vast as they are diverse and complex.  Jain (2015) further makes 
the point that the nation has “more newspapers and 24 hour television news 
channels than any other country” (p150).   In the early decades of independence, the 
Indian press remained an integral part of the nation-building project even as they 
espoused a watchdog role of the media.  Newspapers understood their role to be one 
that incorporated development journalism. Public radio and television “were 
expressly mandated to perform a positive social role” (Jain, 2015, p149).  It is hard 
not to see the value of the press in Indian politics even if, at times, the voices on the 
face value, might appear divisive. 
3.3.3 Brazil 
At the end of colonialism in Brazil, in what would later be known as internal 
colonialism, oligarchic elites effectively replaced the former colonialists by creating a 
patrimonial system. This network of relationships among close-knit families or 
groups controlled and consolidated power among a small group of elites.  
Partimonialism, as a characteristic is common to media systems in democratic 
countries with a recent history of dictatorships and authoritarian rule.  According to 
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Colin Sparks (2015), “the direct benefits of this type of close ties between the media 
and the ruling groups have long been evident” (p52). 
In Brazil, a handful of family-owned media groups control the mainstream press, 
mostly concentrated in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. They usually reaffirm their 
commitment to classic Western liberal journalistic values like the watchdog role and 
the Fourth Estate model, but in practice their behaviour differs from the liberal 
tradition of journalism in many significant ways.  Although these same media 
conglomerates have championed democratisation of politics, and played a crucial 
role for the democratic transition in Brazilian politics, they have paradoxically 
resisted the democratisation of the media system itself (Sodré (1999) cited in Paiva, 
Sodré and Custódio, 2015, p 117). 
3.3.4 South Africa 
The postcolonial/apartheid South African press was organised around ethno-
linguistic frames of a dominant English-language press; the Afrikaans-language 
press, which became an important political force, and the Black press, of which 
“systematic persecution by the South African government kept it from developing” 
(Albuquerque, 2016, p3048).  But wanting to correct the wrongs of the past, the 
“architects of the post-apartheid constitution envisioned a media that could function 
within the overlapping models of libertarian theory, social responsibility theory and 
development theory” By this they committed to  “freedom of expression, including 
media freedom, and the right of access to information and the independence of 
broadcasting legislation” (Milton and Fourie, 2015, pp181-82). 
However, the consequences of segregation and systematic underdevelopment of the 
majority of South Africans, which started under British colonial rule, has continued 
to impact the South African media in many ways. As a result, “while the media 
landscape may be characterised by the availability of a wide range of media, 
accessibility remains an impediment as there are many people in remote” (Milton 
and Fourie, 2015, pp182).   This is no doubt another characteristic of the press in 
most postcolonial nations – the neglect of the rural and urban poor in the 
communication grid.  In Nigeria, there is an unmistakable absence of community 
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and rural media as well as an erosion of public service media, the consequences of 
poor funding.  
3.3.5 Elite (Minority) Media Capture 
Among other factors, media capture by the elite and their containment of civil 
societies made social inequalities possible.  In South Africa, for example, civil 
societies that were successful in the anti-apartheid struggle, now struggle to impact 
political society (Heller, 2009). This is understandable as both the new political class 
and the reformed civil society groups are from the same old anti-apartheid trenches.  
The result is that civil society groups are effectively contained as the press is in 
Nigeria.   Also as in Nigeria, “containerization of civil society is in turn fuelling class 
polarisation in South Africa. The three countries have experienced deeply entrenched 
practices of social exclusions that have resulted in different manifestations of social 
inequality; these have obstructed the “path to democratic deepening” (Heller, 2009, 
p7). 
In most postcolonial nations, there exists a perennial conflict between media and 
society with varying intensity, almost always traceable to a colonial past.  
Albuquerque (2016) notes that in the particular cases of Brazil and South Africa, “the 
societies are ethnically diverse and have a westernized white minority that has 
enjoyed dominance since these nations’ independence” (p3045).   
As with most postcolonial nations, what is common to these nations and Nigeria is 
the emergence of an elite-oriented mainstream press, characterised by low 
circulation, high elite readership, and strategic political positioning. An advantaged 
political position allows them to cultivate close relationships with governments, 
which, in turn provide them with “economic advantages and political influence, often 
at the expense of journalistic independence” (Albuquerque, 2016, p3048).  Dijk 
(1993), corroborates this assertion; reporting on his own research, as well as studies 
done by others on the representation of ethnic affairs in the media, van Dijk submits 
that the media is participatory “in the elite consensus of positive self-presentation 
and negative other-presentation” (p288).  The above comparative glimpses from 
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India, Brazil and South Africa make the issue almost universal as it affects nations 
with colonial histories. 
Reporting on his research, as well as other studies of the representation of ethnic 
affairs in the media, van Dijk (1993) confirms the media as participatory “in the elite 
consensus of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation” (p288). The 
consequences of elite manipulations of the media and ethnicity are far reaching, 
often beyond even their own imagination.  These consequences usually end up 
defining and midwifing a national culture and the ethos of politics in an imagined 
and emerging nation.  They also form the foundations of belonging – of who is 
included or excluded in the emerging grand nation. 
3.4.0 NATIONALISM, BELONGING, AND NATION-STATE 
Nationalism has its origins in nationhood, whether of ethnic nationalities or of 
nation-states. Gellner (1978) and other researchers demonstrate that there is not one 
sure-proof route to modern state formation (Lagerspetz, 2000; Anderson, 2006).  
Also obvious from these propositions is that nationalism is intrinsically tied to the 
existence of a nation. 
In defining nationalism, Calhoun (1993) suggests that it goes beyond ethnic 
similarity, submitting that, “the relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is 
complex” (p235). For him, it is impossible to dissociate nationalism entirely from 
ethnicity, but he notes that it is equally “impossible to explain it simply as a 
continuation of ethnicity” (Calhoun, 1993, p235). He makes the claim that, 
“nationalism, involves a distinctive new form of group identity or membership. It is a 
new rhetoric of belonging to large-scale collectivities” (Calhoun, 1993, p229).  
However, the notion of a national identity cannot exist in the absence of a nation. 
Scholars also generally agreed that a cluster of ethno-cultural groups by themselves, 
or a geographical space by itself, does not necessarily make a nation (Gellner, 1983; 
Miller, 1995; Miscevic, 2000). What this suggests is that it may be impossible to 
create an identity for a nation-state, where a nation in the original conception did 
not exist. 
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The conception of nationalism, with roots in ethnic primordial loyalties, is vastly 
different from a more constructivist perspective of the same notion for the nation-
state. And modern nationalism, viewed particularly in the light of an across-the-
continent colonial experience, is only partly explained by Calhoun’s “new rhetoric of 
belonging”.  Using Ekeh’s concept of two publics as basis, one might say that the civic 
public is constructed while the primordial public is an integral part of the ethnic 
nation from time. The tension between the two publics, the constructed and the 
primordial, exacerbates the post-colonial nation’s already complicated ontological 
problem.  Whereas in the West, the problem has a single dimension, in Africa, it is 
not the case: the same reality would have multiple dimensions.  It may be easier for a 
theorist, who may not have experienced the debilitating consequences of post-
colonialism, to view nationalism as an “excuse used to start wars and foment ethnic 
strife in the modern era” (Anju, 2013, p558). Others, still, may view nationalism as 
“obsolete in a 21st century globalized world, in which cosmopolitanism should be the 
order of the day” (Anju, 2013, p558). But in Africa, ethnic nationalism is a cause for 
perpetual trans-national ethnic conflicts, but not of the peripheral type. 
It is therefore important to note that both nationalism and ethnicity, according to 
Calhoun (1993), are part of a “set of categorical identities invoked by elites and other 
participants in political and social struggles” (p235). For example, Anju (2013) 
demonstrates the uses of nationalism “by both individuals and states as a means of 
self-definition (and) as a way of constructing and categorizing in-groups and out-
groups” (p558).  In other words, ethnicity and nationalism have two sides: one side 
pushes for modern democracy against global inequities; the other side constructs 
and categorises the in-groups and the out-groups.  
It is obvious then that ethnic-based nationalism may have served either purpose.  In 
most of Africa, Nigeria inclusive, creating those that belong as against those that do 
not qualify to belong, and discriminating against such, is a prevailing occurrence. 
Osaghae’s (1991) perspective is this: “Ethnicity only occurs in situations involving 
more than one ethnic group or identity with a clear ‘us’ and ‘they’ differentiation” 
(p44). Central to the character of ethnicity as a phenomenon is that it “is conflictual 
rather than consensual. In fact, it has been found to be positively correlated with 
political instability” (Osaghae, 1991, p44). For Aimufua (2007) therefore, “Nigeria is 
CHAPTER 3 
 
115 
not effectively a nation-state”, yet. And he gives his reason: “ethnic nationalism and 
therefore, regional, religious or cultural sentiments take precedence over what 
should be the pan-national objectives” (p174). The idea that ethnicity is conflictual is 
a central assumptive position in this study, in the search of what role the press has 
played in the resolution of conflictual dynamics. 
3.4.1 Ethnicity and the Search to Belong in Modern African 
Nations  
In recent years, and in most African nations, according to Nyamnjoh (2005), ethnic 
citizenship and belonging have failed to disappear in favour of a single political and 
legal citizenship.  He observes that there has been a “resurgence of identity politics 
and overt tensions over belonging, as various groups seek equity, better 
representation and to have access to national resources and opportunities” 
(Nyamnjoh, 2005, p19).  The question then arises: are there African states or 
nations?  The argument can be made that African states are not nations yet  because 
ethnic-based identities, and loyalties to ethnic, racial, religious and regional groups 
are often stronger than those to the collective nation-state. This phenomenon of 
multiple identity tension is not peculiar to Africa where it has often been attributed 
variously to: 
a. The ‘artificiality’ of the state and inorganic nature as a colonial creation;  
b. The state’s irrelevance, due to its inability to provide for the material well-
being of its citizens; and  
c. A nation-state’s general “inability to satisfy the imperatives of statehood” 
(Osaghae, 1999 cited in Osaghae, 2006, p4).  
 In other words, “the process of nation building entails reversing the order to make 
national identity and loyalty attractive and stronger than those to the sub-national 
groups” (Palmberg, 1999 cited in Osaghae, 2006, p4). Some forms of multiple 
identities exist in all nations. The key problems with most African identities is that 
the identity of the grand nation is made subject to those of the ethnic identities, 
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causing unprofitable friction and crisis.  And the media are active agents in the 
process of role-reversal. 
3.4.2 The Press, Imagined Communities, and Nation-Building 
In the political and structural evolution of Nigeria, control of the press became a 
significant necessity, a “part of the struggle for the control of the political space and 
the mind of the society” (Abati, 1999, p70).  It was Hagerstrand (1976), who inferred 
that all “human activities take place in the crossfire of information flow and 
communication” (Cited in Nwosu, 1990, p87). In most theories and practice of nation 
building, communication occupies a prime position. Bogdanor (1991), also suggested 
that the dominant provider and/or source of political communication in the mass 
media of which the press is an integral part, eventually becomes the definer of what 
is significant in the politics of any given society at the time (cited in Adebanwi, 2004, 
p763). Over the years, media scholars have posited that  
communication is the most vital factor in building or developing an 
organised, united and progressive nation; without it, there will be no 
national entity and no effective solution to national problems (Nwosu, 
1990, p87).   
Others have argued that the media have capacity to impact on society – to influence, 
change, or to maintain (Abati, 1999; Obasanjo and Mabogunje, 1991).  
In his work on Imagined Communities, Anderson (2006) lists the newspaper and the 
novel as central to nation-state formation.  He further acknowledges the crucial role 
of the press in nation-state formation. These two forms of imagining (the newspaper 
press and the novel) “provided the technical means for 're-presenting' the kind of 
imagined community that is the nation” (p25).  Anderson (2006) further notes that, 
in the case of a nation in formation with several ethnic groups, the platform of the 
newspaper, along with other print formats, creates 
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the bases for national consciousness…[and] unified fields of exchange 
and communication… speakers of a variety of (languages) became 
aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their 
particular language-field… fellow-readers, to whom they were 
connected through print, formed… the embryo of the nationally 
imagined community  (p44). 
Corroborating Anderson’s point, Calhoun (1993) states that nationalism and nation 
formation depend on a distinctive new form of “group identity or membership…a 
new rhetoric of belonging to large-scale collectivities” (p229). The rhetoric itself 
depends on “new forms of collective imagination, and also on communications 
capacities and social organizational conditions that encourage a sense of identity 
with large populations of distant and largely anonymous others” (Calhoun, 1993, 
pp229–230). 
In a nation in the state of formation, therefore, the press becomes a veritable vehicle 
that brings cohesion to the cultural narratives and historic myths to help legitimise 
the imagined nation into reality. As Anderson (2006) puts it, this process “helped to 
build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation” (p44).  
He summarises the crucial role of the press in the politics of belonging as that of 
creating the “possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic 
morphology set the stage for the modern nation” (Anderson, 2006, p46). 
Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) referenced Anderson’s work on nationalism to say, 
“the emerging reading public shared a narrative cosmos and soon imagined itself as a 
national community of common origin and future political destiny” (p768). It could 
then be argued that the press contributed to the sharing of narratives for a nation in 
formation through the use of common language understood by all. Thus, the press 
made individuals begin to imagine their homelands and recognise them as their 
nations and nation-states, as the case may be. This is a fundamental role for the 
press – to help generate a new form of collective imagination, a new rhetoric of 
belonging or a new form of group identity or membership.  Deutsch (1966) proposes 
in his Social Communication Concept that intra-nation communication holds nations 
together from within. In Deutsch’s view, although the nation-state remains the chief 
political instrument for getting things done, people are “held together from within by 
(a) communicative efficiency, the complementarity of the communicative facilities 
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acquired by their members” (p98). What this implies, is that a lack of communicative 
efficiency or poor communicative facilities or bad communicative motives can have 
disastrous effects on the formation or even maintenance of the state. He referenced 
the example of the misuse, but effective communication principles in the nationalism 
in Nazism.  Deutsch further submits that in industrial economy, social mobilisation 
and national integration are essential, and that communication is central for these 
roles (Deutsch, 1996). 
3.5.0 WHEN A NATION IS AN ASPIRATION: THE WORKS OF OMU, 
AGBAJE, AND ADEBANWI  
Alfred Omu’s work is an impressive industry study of the early Nigerian press, which 
spans its first six decades. He called the newspaper enterprise a complex social and 
political organ, and he sets out “to place the rise of the newspaper industry in 
historical context” and examine what drives or influences them, among other 
objectives (Omu, 1978, ppvii).  He is clear-minded that Nigeria’s early press was a 
political press, and he sketches out “the part, which the newspapers played in 
cultural nationalism and in resistance to imperialism” (Omu, 1978, p100).  According 
to Omu, this early press “attracted many people of intellectual competence and 
quality”, and it “provided the most distinguished intellectual forum in Nigerian 
history” (Omu, 1978, p69). They “laid a good foundation for the new epoch of 
nationalism” which began later (Omu, 1978, p166).   
 
In his quest, Adigun Agbaje (1992) set out to investigate the role of modern mass 
media which he calls, “bearers of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic symbols” (p27), 
in which the press constructs, distributes, and mirrors a society’s common sense in 
its politics, everyday, over consent and dissent.  Adebanwi (2016) also makes the 
point that “the nation exists in and through its narratives” (p18), and that, 
importantly, there exists what he terms a “media-nation interface”, the 
understanding of which is “critical to the analysis of the crisis of nationhood in 
postcolonial states” (p7).  In the particular case of Nigeria, he states that no account 
of the nation’s evolution is adequate without an examination of press narratives.  
Adebanwi’s position is in tandem with Agbaje and Omu’s, and also with my own 
findings – that the “Nigerian press has influenced—both positively and negatively—
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the pattern of interaction among the disparate ethnic nationalities” (Adebanwi, 2016, 
p20).  In this, Adebanwi establishes clearly, as did Omu (1978) and Agbaje (1992), 
the prime place of the newspaper press in understanding Nigeria and its politics, 
noting that the crisis of nationhood is reflected and contested in the press.  To 
Adebanwi (2016), therefore, “Print media narratives constitute one of the most 
powerful means of constructing, mobilizing, and contesting meaning in the service of 
power” (p25). These three, in their propositions and findings, confirm my own 
finding that the press has helped to define and establish the culture of politics in 
Nigeria.  
3.5.1 On Elites in Politics 
Omu posits that early journalists were successful in their trade.  Their success 
elevated the press industry to “the centre of the stage” (Omu 1978, p166), making it 
“an important instrument of resistance to foreign domination (p129).  As the nation 
evolved and the power of the press grew, “certain people” (p233), otherwise known 
as the political elite, began to establish newspapers essentially to serve their ethno-
political ambitions.  These brands of newspapers seethed with bitter rivalry and 
enmity, and introduced vehemence and antagonism into politics (Omu, 1978,).  
Omu laments this development as one of the tragedies of Nigerian history in that in 
the crucial period leading to independence, newspapers were engulfed “in the vortex 
of partisan politics” and could not in any way prepare the people for the challenges of 
a post independent nation (Omu, 1978, p247). 
In every major crisis that visited the nation in its post independent years, the press 
was at hand either to ignite or provide further fuel for an already raging fire.  Omu’s 
verdict: “the newspaper press provided a remarkable example of over-zealous and 
irresponsible partisanship and recklessness” (1978, p248).  What Omu proved is that 
the newspaper press were instrumental from the beginning of organised politics in 
forming the type of politics we inherited, particularly in the manner that the political 
elite took capture of the press, thus validating my findings, as very little has changed 
since the days of Omu’s investigation. 
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The political elites, as Omu implies, are the architects of Nigeria’s incoherent, 
fragmented, and divisive politics. Yet, journalists and media researchers seemed to 
always see political society as the predator, and the press and the people together as 
victims of an autocratic state. While this may be true to some extent, Agbaje’s (1992) 
amorphous and all-inclusive definition of the civil society produced a distorted 
picture of who the other predators might be.  Pointedly, the elites whose undisguised 
motivation is dictated by strong hegemonic interests have held the press captive from 
the beginning, being owners. 
On the part of the press, there is a pervasive assumption in which media are 
portrayed as if they speak for all and to all.  Most elite, including journalists and 
researchers, fall victim of this assumption: they imagine that since the press speaks 
to them, it must speak to and for all.  My findings indicate that this is not always the 
case; the press in Nigeria is an elite press, and it mostly speaks to and for the elite.  
For example, Agbaje (1992) found that government and the elite form the main 
sources of news reported in the press. The urban poor, the rural areas, women, and 
other non-elite are generally marginalised “except in instances where such sources 
are seen as adjuncts to more powerful social and political interests” (Agbaje, 1992, 
pp32 -33).  This study confirms this also, even though the press continues to imagine 
that it serves the people.   
Both Adebanwi and Agbaje’s works reflect the tense relationship between the press 
and the state, in the contest for hegemonic space.  Adebanwi, for instance speaks of 
how the press “renders itself totally captive to ethno-regional and ethno-religious 
passions and calculations” (Adebanwi, 2016, p223).  This study finds agreement with 
Adebanwi’s position that “the Nigerian press mobilises “the nation” for the strategic 
interest of whatever power the various newspapers and newsmagazines serve” (2016, 
p287).  However, his work and Agbaje’s fail to specifically identify a glaring collusion 
between the media and political elites, and as such, the power that is served remains 
in the shadows, unidentified. 
The fact that the Nigerian press desires to build and affirm the grand nation is not in 
doubt; but a tendency or a desire remains nothing but a wish with weak wings if such 
desire cannot be actualised against the stronger current of elite paymasters and their 
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allies in the political society.  Press power is power held in trust, but in the case of 
Nigeria, not for the people but a small elite group.  This oligarchy is what I find that 
the two scholars did not give prominence to in their work, rather they focused on the 
institutions that that elite groups owned, controlled, and manipulated to serve their 
purposes. 
3.5.2 On Issues of Ideology 
Adebanwi correctly posits that “ideology functions only as a kind of ‘social cement’; a 
type of glue that binds people in collectively shared values and norms” (Adebanwi, 
2016, p287).  But he also states that “ideology can function […] as a tool for dividing 
people into separate communities of shared values and norms” (Adebanwi, 2016, 
p287).  His position that “ideology” when it is not uniting under the aegis of one 
grand nation, divides, may be true, but I suggest, only in limited cases that it may not 
be representative of the essence or nature of ideology, as applied to a multi-ethnic 
postcolonial state.  I propose, instead, that by its very nature, an ideology is a tool for 
uniting not separating; but ethno-regional ideologues can, and do manipulate 
ideologies to subvert the supra-ideology of a grand nation. 
While not entirely in disagreement with his and Agbaje’s positions on ideology, my 
findings raise more questions, in the light of their positions. For example, must there 
always be only one overarching ideology serving all? In the situations where there 
exist a grand-nation and ethno-nationalities in the same geographical space, can 
there be multiple ideologies in the form of a grand-national ideology side-by-side 
with ethno-national ideologies? Does the existence of one subtract from or entirely 
eliminate the other? 
Omu deals with historical roots of relationship between press and politics. Adebanwi 
and Agbaje deal with how meaning is mobilised through press narratives, and to 
what consequence. This study centres on who mobilises meaning and to some extent, 
why and to what consequences. This study goes a little further to attempt to propose 
what may be done about it.   
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Whereas they see institutions, I see a group of people, the elite, using institutions, 
including the press to defend and promote the interests of a few. And the press, 
mostly underfunded and financially dependent, is powerless, acquiescing and serving 
the narrow ethno-political interests of its ownership elite rather than the interests of 
all the people.  The result is that all of Nigeria remains poorly served and divided, as 
long as the press serves mostly the interests of one elite group over the interests of 
another elite group, to the neglect of the people in general, a salient point, which I 
believe neither Agbaje nor Adebanwi’s works directly addressed. 
3.6.0 MUTABILITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AS A THEORETICAL 
CONCEPT 
Democracy is a concept that is key to this study, since well-conducted elections are 
essential for successful democracy. According to Birch (1993), the Greeks gave the 
world the word and the concept of democracy, but they did not “provide a model” 
(p45).  For them, democracy was vaguely defined as a system of governance, which 
literally means a rule by the people, through elected representatives or more directly 
(Birch, 1993).  As such, the lack of a model for proper or standard application seemed 
to have created large room and latitude for different interpretations and adaptations 
in various societies and nations. What then is democracy?   
Larry Diamond (1997) rather than define it, posits, “democracy generally emerges in 
different ‘parts’ or stages through many different paths and degrees in different 
countries” (p22). In other words, wherever democracy has been practiced, it has been 
adapted to fit or reflect the objectives of its advocates, in varying degrees.  This 
notion implies that the concept of democracy may not command a universal 
definition. As a result, several theories of democracy have been propounded to meet 
the different needs of those claiming the practice of democracy.   
3.6.1 Election and Democracy 
Katz (1997), says elections are “the defining institutions of modern democracy” (p3). 
The election process allows people to exercise their right of choice of who represents 
or governs them.   Elections are central to democracy, and as Adejumobi (2000) 
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submits, they “constitute perhaps the most important element in the conception and 
practice of liberal democracy” (p61).  Agbaje and Adejumobi (2006) further posit 
that, “in liberal democratic theory, an election is a viable mechanism for 
consummating representative government. Apart from facilitating leadership 
succession, it promotes political accountability, citizens’ participation and gives voice 
and power to the people (p26). Fawole (2005) finds agreement with these views, and 
notes that “elections in themselves… are not democracy in its full ramifications” 
(p153).  In other words, important as they are, elections alone do not make a nation 
democratic; though central to a functioning democratic state, an electoral process 
does not by itself confer a liberal democratic status on a system.  
To Diamond (1997), the spectrum of democratic practice is elastic, making it possible 
for elections to also be “illiberal, abusive, corrupt, exclusive, narrow, unresponsive,  
and unaccountable—i.e., less democratic” (p22). He then submits that for the 
democratic process to be truly meaningful, elections must be free and fair. The extent 
to which an election is free and fair is the core principle or essence of electoral and 
liberal democracy. The difference between a true liberal democracy and a mere 
electoral democracy lies in their 'freeness' and 'fairness' and as Kurfi (1983) says, 
with regards to elections as a factor, “a truly representative system of government 
absolutely depends upon the integrity of elections” (p259).   
However, the practice of liberal democracy seems to be fading across the world and 
as Diamond (1996) notes, “Liberal democracy has stopped expanding in the world, 
and so has political freedom, more generally” (p31).  Ake (2000) as cited by Agbaje 
and Adejumobi, (2006), argues further that liberal democracy is in crisis in many 
countries, developed and developing. Elections in today’s context “are a perversion of 
democracy because they connote popular but not delegated power” (p27). 
Diamond (1996), notes that, though there has been a rise in variations of electoral 
democracy, competition and participation have not been meaningful because of the 
low levels “of civil freedom” (p21).  Even in the United States of America, former 
President, Jimmy Carter, said in a television interview, “we've become now an 
oligarchy instead of a democracy. And I think that's been the worst damage to the 
basic moral and ethical standards of the American political system that I've ever seen 
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in my life” (Winfrey, 2015).  President Carter was indeed reflecting a position that 
had been validated by research only a year earlier.  
Gilens and Page (2014), two researchers from Princeton University and 
Northwestern University, in an analytical research found  
substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for 
theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian 
Electoral Democracy (p565).   
They posit that in America, “the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal 
sense of actually determining policy outcomes” (Gilens and Page, 2014, p564).  In 
their opinion, “Economic elites and organized groups representing business interests 
have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based 
interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence” (Gilens 
and Page, 2014, p565). 
What the foregoing suggests strongly is that democracy has no real roots anywhere; 
no one can claim exclusive interpretation of what it is like to be democratic, not even 
in the United States anymore – it manifests in the colour of choice of the leaders of 
wherever it is practised. In Africa, for example, it is defined by the singular event of 
periodic elections, which makes it an event rather than a process. And once the event 
is concluded, things return to normal – an elected autocracy without accountability 
to the people. 
3.6.2 Failure of Electoral Democracy in Africa 
In the African context, elections have become what Adejumobi (2000) called “a 
shadow of democracy” (cited in Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006, p27). For Ake (1993), 
“the familiar political assumptions and political arrangements of liberal democracy 
make little sense in Africa” (p243).  There is adoption of some forms of electoral 
democratic processes, but hardly the spirit or substance of genuine liberal 
democracy.  According to Ake (1993), what has been foisted on Africans in the name 
of democracy is  
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a version of liberal democracy reduced to the crude simplicity of 
multi-party elections… (and) voting that never amounts to choosing, 
freedom which is potently spurious, and political equality which 
disguises higher unequal power relations (cited in Fawole, 2005, 
p149). 
Most elections that take place in African countries are “riddled with tension, 
conflicts, crises and fraud such that it is difficult to use them as a barometer of the 
people’s choice” (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006, p27).  This is so because 
yesterday’s icons who led civil society in the struggles for democratic 
renewal have been transformed into the images of those against whom 
they fought. They have assumed dictatorial postures; they manipulate 
elections and tend towards sit-tight regimes (p27) 
 
As Ake (1993) notes, single member constituencies taken for granted in liberal 
democracy “are hardly suitable for societies that are still federations of ethnic groups 
and nationalities” (p243). Africa, and indeed Nigeria, has made attempts at 
practising liberal democracy. Sandbrook (1988) notes that, Nigeria's attempts at 
practising liberal democracy in the first two republics (1960 and 1979) were a failure.  
However, Diamond (1983) suggests,  
the failure…must be understood in light of the distinctive interaction 
among ethnicity, in an ethnically plural and modernizing society; class 
action, in a dependent and highly underdeveloped economy; and 
political competition, in a democratic polity in which elite competition 
required mass mobilization (p460).  
3.6.3 Pseudo-Democracy: Half Full and Half Empty 
Some scholars have suggested that what is practiced in some parts of Africa is not 
electoral or liberal democracy, but pseudo-democracy (Sandbrook, 2000; Diamond, 
1996; Amenta et al., 2012).  As the name implies, pseudo-democracy is a half-full, 
half-empty type of democracy, though the people that practise it, paint the picture 
that it is the real thing.  Sandbrook (2000), defines pseudo-democracy as “the sort of 
political regime that occupies the hazy terrain between genuine representative or 
multiparty democracy, on the one hand, and authoritarianism, on the other” (p25). 
In pseudo-democracy, there is nothing like fairness in the electoral process as the 
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ruling party manipulates the electoral process to make the outcome as they had 
designed it – in their favour.  Pseudo-democracy kills the real essence and spirit of 
democratic representation. 
Diamond (1996), says pseudo-democracy falls between ‘electoral’ and ‘liberal’ 
democracy.  According to him, pseudo-democracy “allow(s) for considerable 
restriction of citizenship rights” (p25). Examples of what may constitute the practice 
of pseudo-democracy abound all over the African political space. There was the case 
of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt; he led Egypt for several years as an ex-military leader 
who was kept in power by the military, under the guise of a populist electoral system, 
which was nothing but a façade.   Other examples include Equatorial Guinea under 
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo; Angola, under José Eduardo dos Santos; 
Uganda, under Yoweri Museveni; Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe, and Cameroun 
under Paul Biya (Joseph, 2008; Joseph, 2014). Between 1996 and 1997, Nigeria’s 
military ruler, General Sani Abacha tried to transmute from a ruler in military 
uniform into a civilian dictator, but he died in office while still in the process of self 
and systems transformation (Agbaje, Akande and Ojo, 2009).  
According to Amenta et. al., (2012), in pseudo-democracy, “the mass of the people is 
effectively excluded from power and influence despite the formal exercise of vote” 
(p127) and Diamond (1996) says, pseudo-democracies “have legal opposition parties 
and perhaps many other constitutional features of electoral democracy, but fail to 
meet one of its crucial requirements: a sufficiently fair arena of contestation to allow 
the ruling party to be turned out of power” (p25). In a democratic continuum, 
pseudo-democracies “fall well below the standard of liberal democracy, but they vary 
significantly in their repressiveness and in their proximity to the threshold of 
electoral democracy” (Diamond, 1997, p18).  As democracy evolves in a number of 
African states “where former one-party dictators engineered their re-election under 
pseudo-democratic conditions, these democratic fragments are pressing out the 
boundaries of what is politically possible, and may eventually generate 
breakthroughs to electoral democracy” (Diamond, 1996, p25). 
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3.7.0 LIBERTARIAN PRESS UNDER AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
Though most governments in Nigeria are authoritarian, for the most part, Nigerian 
press conceived its role in the mode and tradition of Libertarian System, asserting 
“the right to publish anything…without fear of censorship or constraints… completely 
free from government control” (Firdaus, 2012, pp6-7). The refusal to align, extracted 
a heavy toll on the newspaper press in particular. According to Siebert et. al. (1956), 
the underlying purpose of the Libertarian press model is “to help discover truth, to 
assist in the process of solving political and social problems by presenting all manner 
of evidence and opinions as the basis for decisions. The essential characteristic of 
this process was its freedom from government controls or domination” (p51). In its 
classical tradition, the press  
serves as watchdog of the government, particularly in the absence of a 
viable political opposition, under the various military governments. 
One significant requirement of the Libertarian model is that the press 
serves as a check on government, a watchdog of society (Obijiofor and 
Hanusch, 2011, p15). 
Firdaus (2012) also says that, “freedom of expression is a highly valued principle that 
allows the media to gather and disseminate information without interference of 
censorship, or contamination of propaganda, from the government” (p7). 
3.7.1 Consensus without Conflict or Opposition 
Conflict and consensus are essential elements in democratic politics, and the press 
provides a platform where opposing views can find expressions.  Diamond (1982) 
notes that, “democratic politics embraces, inevitably and inescapably, an uneasy 
tension between conflict and consensus” (p629). Since liberal democracy by 
necessity involves a regular competition for power and position, it will be fair to 
assert that democracy cannot exist without some sort of conflict, and as Ake (1973) 
posits, “politics entails conflict of claims, of values, of interest, and of goals; if there is 
no conflict there can be no politics” (p352).  However, without the press serving as a 
public square where differing voices can be articulated, resolution would be near 
impossible. Military rulers in most parts did not understand this peculiar role of the 
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press; their goal was to use autocracy in the “containment of political conflict within 
certain boundaries of behavioural restraint…” (Diamond, 1982, p629).  Five years 
after the bloody Civil War in Nigeria (July 1967 to January 1970), the military 
government began the process of terminating parliamentary democracy, a colonial 
legacy, the practice of which they considered as being responsible for the perennial 
political violence that led to the War.  In 1975, Nigeria’s Military Head of State, 
General Murtala Mohammed, charged a new Constitution Drafting Committee to pay 
special attention to federalism, an executive presidency, a free and fair electoral 
system, and, a party system that would be national in scope and “discourage 
institutionalized opposition to the government in power, and, instead develop a 
consensus politics”. (Daily Times October 19, 1975)  It was obvious that the military 
thought that a nation could have consensus without conflict or opposition.  They also 
believed that the American Presidential system would provide such an opposition 
free consensus in Nigeria. 
3.7.2 A Press with a Mission  
The function of the media is “to inform, to discuss, to mirror, to bind, to campaign, to 
challenge, to entertain and to judge – these are the important functions of the media 
in any free country” (Seaton and Curran, 2010, p357).  The Nigerian Press was 
formed in the furnace of libertarian press model but for most of its existence it has 
operated under an autocratic and authoritarian political system. Over time, 
journalists and publishers have basically followed the crusading tradition of Rev. 
Henry Townsend, the crusading founding father of Nigerian journalism (Omu, 1978).  
Journalists “used their newspapers to articulate anti-colonial positions and mobilise 
the people and public opinion against the colonial authority” (Oso, Odunlami and 
Adaja, 2011, p3).  
Politicians by nature tend to want to exploit and use press power to achieve group 
and individual ends. According to Abati (1999), the role of the Nigerian press as the 
“epicentre of national politics” began in the 1950s (p70). Thus, the success or failure 
of the Nigerian nation-state as a united and equitable nation may be the reflection of 
how effective or ineffective the press has been in midwifing fraternal relationships 
among disparate communities within the imagined entity.  In Africa, according to 
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Nyamnjoh (2005), “there are varying degrees of certainty about the extent to which 
mass media influence audiences” (p1). However, McQuail (2010) sees the press as 
“both barometer of influence and lever of power…always in a complex relationship 
with sources of power and the political system” (p523).  
The high tension and challenge therefore was for the press to prove itself “an agency 
of information and debate which facilitate[s] the functioning of democracy” (Curran, 
2002, p225). The first newspaper published in Nigeria in 1859 proved that a 
newspaper could extend itself to lead in a community’s political emancipation and 
transformation. The Rev. Henry Townsend, a British Missionary, published Iwe 
Irohin successfully for seven years. Historian Saburi Biobaku had unique “access to 
the bound numbers of the paper’s issues from January 1860 to October 1867” (The 
Media in Democracy - Africa Leadership, 1991, p15).  Biobaku (2000) outlined the 
profound effect of Townsend and his bi-lingual paper in transforming and shaping 
the history of the pre-colonial Egba people (p67), the immediate community in which 
Townsend published.  
A nation’s structural cohesion comes through social communication and this affects 
systems, institutions and social cultural interactions (Schlesinger, 2000). There is 
little doubt that the press has been an important mobilising institution in the 
unfolding of democratic history of Nigeria.  Although Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
posit that political systems and media systems in a given environment, are not static 
but homogeneous, possessing similar philosophical cores, the Nigerian system has 
not exactly followed that path.  In Nigeria, there are two distinct press systems: the 
one established and controlled by governments, and the private press.  The 
government-controlled media functions in tandem with Hallin and Mancini’s 
proposition of a common core philosophical position. The private press has always 
tried to function outside the immediate orbit of governments. For that reason, the 
relationship between political systems and media systems must be seen in co-
evolutionary terms.  
According to Nyamnjoh (2005), there is an assumption that “the press not only 
reflect but also shapes society” (p20). Because of its significant role in the process of 
shaping public opinion, journalism served as the arrowhead in the nationalist’s cause 
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(Hoffman et al., 2007). There was therefore a drive by political elites and military 
rulers to own or control the press. The rush to own, or control the press also 
confirms, in an ironic way, the belief by politicians and military rulers alike, in the 
power and influence of the press – to mobilise the electorate or to disrupt 
governance, if it so chooses.  
3.7.3 Between Autocratic Military Control and Libertarian Press  
Cumulatively, the military in successive governments ruled Nigeria for nearly 30 
years (1966-1979; 1983-1999), out of 39 years (1960-1999).  They placed a high 
priority on the control of the media, particularly the newspaper-press.  Regime after 
regime, the military enacted draconian decrees (laws) to take over existing media 
houses or to control those they could not directly own. According to Olayiwola 
(1991), military regimes in Nigeria seem to be of the mind that “uncontrolled 
newspapers constitute a danger to government” (p36).   As a result, press-military 
relationship was uneasy, at the best of times, and danger-filled most of the time.  
As soon as Generals Mohammed and Obasanjo unseated General Gowon in the third 
successful military coup, the new regime straight away acquired, by fiat, 60 per cent 
of the shares in the most widely circulated Daily Times and full ownership of the 
North-based and dominated New Nigerian on August 31, 1975. Not too long after, 
the regime promulgated the Public Officers Protection Against False Accusations 
Decree Number 11 of 1976 with retroactive effect from 29 July 1975, purposely to gag 
the press. The fourth military government of General Muhammadu Buhari (1983-
1985), which overthrew an elected Second Republic government in 1983, also 
enacted stringent laws against the media (Diamond, 1991). An example was the 
Decree Number 4 of 1984 (Alimi, 2011), which most media practitioners considered 
particularly obnoxious (Olayiwola, 1991). The law sent many media men and women 
to jail.  General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew General Buhari, and he abrogated 
Decree Number 4, but introduced his own decrees; and introduced other measures 
like intermittent closures of numerous media houses for prolonged periods to keep 
the press controlled (Olayiwola, 1991). These laws, however, were firmly resisted; 
rather than stop criticism of government, they provoked louder press commentaries 
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on many of the wrongdoings under the military. The press refused to be gagged, in 
spite of the powers that tried to stop them from doing their job.  
3.7.4 The Authoritarian Press 
Military regimes, which, by nature usurp power through force, usually maintain 
control through intimidation to mute opposition voices and suppress views they 
considered inimical to government’s set objectives.  At the same time, they relied on 
propaganda and the mobilising power of the press to help establish legitimacy, and 
promote consensus and national unity.  Thus, virtually all the military regimes 
instituted and enforced an Authoritarian Press System, “characterized by media 
subordination to government” (Firdaus, 2012, p6). 
Under Authoritarian Press Systems, the press are subjected to “the support and 
advance” of “the policies of the government in power” (Siebert et. al, 1956, p18). 
Under the military, journalists could not publish whatever was deemed to have 
capacity to undermine the government in any way or form (Firdaus, 2012). The 
various military governments controlled the press through various means: by 
decrees, forms of regulations, denial of patronage, and through violence (closures, 
arrests, or even assassinations). “In the authoritarian theory, the press was used to 
inform people what their rulers felt they should know and the policies the rulers 
wanted the people to support” (Obijiofor and Hanusch, 2011, p15). 
Authoritarian Press Systems normally operate under an autocratic political system in 
which media is “usually owned by a ruling dictator, or party, or powerful private 
individuals” (Firdaus, 2012, p6). In the case of Nigeria, under the military, federal or 
state governments owned most newspaper press, and governments owned all 
electronic forms of communication.  Although radio and television broadcasting were 
deregulated in 1993, federal and state governments continued to own and control 
most electronic media organisations across the nation. However, it should be noted 
that Authoritarian Press Systems, as Firdaus (2012) pointed out, “exist not only 
under repressive and dictatorial governments, but to a certain extent, in more 
democratic societies as well. Even when a government officially subscribes to a 
different press model, elements of the authoritarian system may exist since it is in 
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the state’s interest to maintain control over the press” (p6). In other words, to 
identify an authoritarian system, one would need to scale over the rhetoric of what 
governments professed to the reality of experience. Most Nigerian governments, 
military and non-military, have been essentially authoritarian in their relationships 
with the press. 
3.7.5 Media Effects 
According to McCombs and Gilbert (1986), there is considerable research evidence 
that “has accumulated since 1972 that journalists play a key role in shaping our 
picture of the world as they go about their daily task of selecting and reporting the 
news” (p3).  The news, they assert, impacts many facets of our daily lives! [from] how 
we dress for work… [to] our concerns about the issues of the day, all are influenced 
by the daily news” (McCombs and Gilbert, 1986, p1).  Riding upon the forgoing, the 
goal of the vast majority of media research, according to Rubin, is the attempt to 
measure or “explain the impact of mass communication” (McCombs and Gilbert, 
1986, p281).  However, some researchers are cautious about assigning roles such as a 
blanket effect on the audience solely to the media.  However, McCombs and Gilbert 
(1986) make the salient point: “The most enduring and sustained line of scholarly 
research on mass communication traces the influence of the news media on voter 
behaviour (p1). This assertion acknowledges that there is some form of impact, 
whether or not such impact is limited or mediated “by a host of social and 
psychological factors” (Rubin, 1986, p281). 
Consequently, McCombs and Gilbert (1986) believe that the news media are 
powerful; journalism, they believe, routinely “provides a structured account of the 
environment, a background, and setting in which a few objects and selected 
attributes are highlighted” (p3).  Furthermore, Schudson, who shares the view that 
the news media are powerful, suggests that news media power is twofold: “in its 
power to declare things to be true, [and] in its power to provide the form in which the 
declaration appears” (cited in McCombs and Gilbert, 1986, p3).  This ability of the 
news media to structure audience cognition and organise the world for us, is labelled 
the agenda-setting functions of mass communication.  It is “the creation of 
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awareness and arousal of public concerns”, and Combs and Gilbert (1986) consider 
this to be the most important effect of the mass media (p413).  They further explain: 
Through their routine structuring of social and political reality, the 
news media influence the agenda of public issues around which 
political campaigns and voters’ decision[s] are organised…  
Newspapers clearly state the journalistic salience of an item through 
its page placement, headline, and length (McCombs and Gilbert, 1986, 
p413). 
While none may argue against these evidence-based positions advanced by 
McCombs and Gilbert, the truth is that agenda setting goes beyond page placement 
and headlines; the essence of the theory resides in the meaning propositions that 
press agendas set forth through narratives. 
3.7.5.1 The Press: Setting Agendas in Narratives  
What stories the press tells us about ourselves and about others are important.  
These narratives inform our concepts and sense of self and imagining of other 
identities, be they community, ethno-regional or national. Aimufua (2007) set out to 
investigate how “the press promote and reinforce a hybrid of cultures and interests 
without necessarily promoting disintegration within a multicultural state like Nigeria 
and consequently promote a Nigerian national identity…” (pp3-4).  Implicit in 
Aimufua’s objective is that the press does promote and reinforce hybridity of cultures 
and interests, more or less agreeing with McCombs and Gilbert that the press 
routinely structures reality.  Perhaps more than other forms of narratives, media 
narratives, but more specifically, newspaper-press narratives, were the bases for the 
construction of identities or images of self and national mythologies – the basis for 
unity or disunity in a multi-ethnic, postcolonial nation-state.  Although the advent of 
social media has severely curtailed the power, influence and relevance of the 
traditional hard copy press, as we knew it, social media have not uprooted the seeds 
planted in the years and decades of sole dominance of the press in social-political 
affairs of the nation.  As Aimufua notes, “…one of the criticisms against the Nigerian 
press is that because it promotes sectionalism or nationality interests, it destroys any 
sense of national identity in the different nationality groups within the Nigerian 
state” (pp301 – 302). 
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Adebanwi (2002, 2016) also undertook a similar, but more comprehensive, 
investigation on the same phenomenon of press narratives, and wonders: 
How do the competing narratives of the multiple nations within the 
grand nation clash and contend with one another? How is meaning 
mobilized to sustain or contain the relations of power and domination 
within the grand narrative? How are different narratives constructed 
and elaborated in the struggles and tensions over single nationhood? 
What implications do these narratives have for relations among the 
ethnic nationalities (constructed as nations) within contemporary 
postcolonial polities? (Adebanwi, 2016, p6)   
These questions among others form the starting plate for Adebanwi’s quest.  The 
temptation, as it is often the case, is to be satisfied with what he called a “single 
nation” narrative.  In order to avoid this common trap, he set out a more authentic 
approach, to examine and analyse all narrative strands in a nation’s narrative 
highway.  He admits that there is a “constant divisive narratives that present, defend, 
and contest the diverse and sometimes contradictory interests of Nigeria’s many 
ethno-regional, ethnic nationalist, or ethno-religious groups…” (Adebanwi, 2016, 
p5). But he also admits that there is an underlining assumption (in the press) that 
the Nigerian nation-state, which he termed “Nigerian grand nation…surpasses or 
subsumes the many nations forced to live together within the Nigerian federation” 
(Adebanwi, 2016, p5).   
Beyond and in spite of the constant divisive narratives, therefore, it is Adebanwi’s 
position that “the Nigerian press has influenced—both positively and negatively—the 
pattern of interaction among the disparate ethnic nationalities in Nigeria” 
(Adebanwi, 2016, p20).  As such, he argues that it is not just about a single or unified 
narrative, (nor for that matter is it about disembodied voices) but one grand 
narrative that, though superseding other narratives, makes allowance for those other 
voices, as it were, to be heard in a mélange, captured “as a grand narrative in which 
meaning discursively defines the relations of power” (Adebanwi, 2016, p27).  His 
main objective is to link “narratives and nation in the African postcolonial context in 
order to elucidate the mobilization of meaning in the service and disservice of power 
within a grand narrative” (Adebanwi, 2016, p27). What Adebanwi advocates is the 
opening of all doors, and windows if need be, to admit in all shades of narration in 
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evidence, rather than a single-nation narrative that is meant to placate and promote 
the notion of a non-existent ‘unity’ that does not really unite.  This ground-breaking 
approach made an allowance for “voices of marginal [minority] groups” and “the 
transfer of marginal discourses to the mainstream” to produce, “a cultural politics of 
difference, struggles around difference, and the reproduction of new identities” 
(Adebanwi, 2016, p279). It is this power to produce or reproduce meaning and 
identities that gives the press its allure for politicians. 
3.7.6 Democracy, the Press, and Agenda Setting  
Politicians, as well as military rulers, arising from different motivations, believe in 
the power of the press. The military, which ruled Nigeria for three-quarters of the 
time in its first 40 years, was generally nervous about the influence of the press. On 
the other hand, the politicians and elite alike eagerly embraced the press as a 
powerful tool to mobilise people and influence policies. As a result, ownership or 
control of the press was usually quite high on the agenda of military juntas at taking 
power.  And from the early days of journalism in Nigeria, front line Nigerian 
politicians and governments, whether colonial, civilian or military, believed in the 
power of the press. Ownership of the press became an unwritten requirement for 
high-level entry into politics, for mobilisation, and unmitigated influence.  
Inadvertently, this esteem of the press became an eloquent testimony to the power of 
the press as a noteworthy institution of influence spreading.  The list over time is 
long: Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, M.K.O. Abiola, 
Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, Nda Sam-Isaiah, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Orji Uzor Kalu, etc., 
at various times, to own a daily newspaper as a mouthpiece was a basic political 
necessity.  These military and civilian leaders saw in the press an unusual power to 
set agenda and influence policy and public discourse.  This behaviour has been 
validated since as far back as 1966, when Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang (1966) 
declare that: 
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The mass media force attention to certain issues.  They build up public 
images of political figures. They are constantly presenting objects 
suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know 
about, have feelings about… The information in the mass media 
becomes the only contact many have with politics (cited in McCombs 
and Shaw, 1972, p177). 
Okigbo (1987) defines agenda setting as “a media-effects theory that seeks to explain 
the impact of the media on audiences cognition” (p23).  The concept of agenda 
setting was first proposed when in a study by McCombs and Shaw (1972), they 
discovered “a very strong relationship between the emphasis placed on different 
campaign issues by the media [reflecting to a considerable degree the emphasis by 
candidates]” (p181). The theory deals with “mass media’s ability to influence the 
perception of its audience and what they consider the most important issue of the 
day” (Nwokeafor and Okunoye, 2013, p8).  In the view of Lang and Lang as cited by 
McCombs and Shaw (1972), campaign promises, reported in newspaper stories, 
invariably become “much of the information upon which a voting decision has to be 
made. Most of what people know comes to them from the mass media…” (p177).  
Prior to 1960, the newspaper was the main mass medium source of information; 
radio, the other medium, was yet to command a significant audience footprint. 
Politicians and their parties were dominant features in the news during the election 
campaigns. According to Nwokeafor and Okunoye (2013), newspapers front-pages 
were understandably popular with politicians; they reported their statements and 
actions as well as published their photos. 
In this period, the journalist moved from an earlier position of an independent 
professional to that of a subordinated affiliate of the politician, who founded and 
funded enterprises.  As it was the case in Britain, at a point in time, when “journalists 
sought to be, and frequently were, the confidants of politicians, cabinet ministers, 
and even prime ministers” (Boyce, 2013, p97), Nigerian journalists followed the 
same path under civilian as well as military governments. Also similar to the British 
experience, press power began to be equated with partisan political power: 
newspaper influence grew – an indispensible platform for mobilisation and a voice 
like no other (Boyce, 2013).  
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3.8.0 THE SEARCH FOR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The objective of this section is to consider democratic models and begin the proposal 
of a model that may serve as a fit for a conflict-prone pluralistic political 
environment with a role for the press. As noted earlier, in section 3.6.0 of this 
chapter, the concept of democracy defies easy definition, both in theory and 
application; there are divergences between and within models.  A nation is most 
served when it defines and designs her democracy to meet her own peculiar needs.  It 
is important to note that no off-the-shelf model can form a single, tidy stand-alone, 
ready-to-use framework by itself. Usually, a new framework is a combination of 
conceptual frames all within an overall democratic scheme that is intentionally 
designed to meet certain objectives, and then applied to a given situation. The focus 
of this section therefore is not on conflict; it is on consensus, and how the press can 
provide a basis to manage and promote a non-paternalistic consensus, based on 
mutual respects so that everyone can feel belonged.  As a result, even though the 
emphasis of Mouffe’s work is on the tension created by conflictual relationships in 
politics, this work pushes to find ways to negotiate those conflictual tensions in the 
village square of the press to create a sense of belonging for all.  
3.8.1 A Post-Colonial Model for a Post-Colonial State 
Electoral and participatory models of democracy are conflict prone, especially in 
postcolonial nations, which are also tension-filled. What the Nigerian military failed 
to realise in their search for an acceptable model, (see section 3.5.3) was that it was 
not possible to legislate national unity, which seemed to have been their core 
motivation for changing from the British parliamentary system of government to the 
American presidential system.  The military failed to realise that external uniformity 
is not necessarily the same thing as internalised organic union or unity.  It is 
important to understand that, “The growth of various religious, moral and ethnic 
fundamentalisms is…the direct consequence of the democratic deficit which 
characterizes most liberal-democratic societies” (Mouffe, 2009, p96). Unity that is 
organic requires certain conditions to flourish and those conditions must be created 
to facilitate it.  The conceptual error in the military’s approach to midwifing 
democracy is in their expectation that there could be a pluralistic, multi-ethnic 
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community where there would be no opposition voices.  The military saw things in 
black and white; they expected people to be reasonable, and were for the most part 
impatient and uncomfortable with the inherently obtuse nature of politics in a post-
colonial state. 
3.8.2 Forging and Forcing National Unity  
In 1975, the Nigerian Military Government, under the leadership of General Murtala 
Mohammed decided to replace parliamentary democracy, which the military 
regarded as a form of opposition politics that breeds conflicts and violence with an 
American presidential system. General Olusegun Obasanjo, who was then 
Mohammed’s deputy, justified the fundamental shift:  
In most Nigerian languages, the word for opposition is the same word 
for ‘enemy’. And what do you do with an enemy?   Of course, you crush 
him.  And if you have to crush your enemy you do not spare anything.  
The opposition too, sees itself as being on nothing but on [a] warpath, 
and taking the position of being at war against the government.  I 
think these are some of the ills of past constitution that we should try 
and remove  (Daily Times 27 Oct. 1975).   
The Nigerian military was generally of the persuasion that for national peace and 
unity to exist in a democratic Nigeria, conflict and opposition in politics must be 
rooted out at all costs.  Hence, as Orji (2010) notes, the public sphere in multi-ethnic 
societies like Nigeria is “an arena of conflicts where cultural and ideological contests 
or negotiations among a variety of groups take place” (p165). Yet, what the Nigerian 
military rulers aspired towards in their search for a suitable democratic model was, 
perhaps, a model with an aversion for confrontations and conflicts; what they 
created inadvertently was one with a propensity for conflict, intolerant of the ‘other’, 
and prone to violent confrontations.  According to Mouffe, “Stability and order were 
more likely to result from compromise among interests than from mobilizing people 
towards an illusory consensus on the common good" (Mouffe, 2009, p82). 
The failure of leadership to confront issues of conflicts with open minds has made it 
hard to hold one another accountable.  This rigid approach to statecraft has given 
birth to a blame-filled culture of fault finding in others. 
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3.8.3 Aggregative and Deliberative Models:  Between Promise and 
Reality 
Warren (2012) produced a list of democratic theories, which contained participatory 
models, including aggregative, agonistic, and deliberative.  These models from 
Warren’s list are of unique relevance and suited for the purposes of my research as 
perhaps no other theories are, because of their approach to conflict and tension in 
democratic states. According to Kies (2010), “the aggregative model of democracy is 
presented as a process of aggregation of citizens’ preferences in choosing political 
officials and policies” (p27). This implies a form of election by which the citizens 
choices are “considered as a given element and are valued” (Kies, 2010, p27).  On 
deliberative democracy, John Rawls (1997) posits that, “the definitive idea for a 
deliberative democracy is the idea of deliberation itself” (p772). He further explains: 
when citizens deliberate, they exchange views and debate their 
supporting reasons concerning public political questions. They 
suppose that their political opinions may be revised by discussion with 
other citizens; and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed 
outcome of their existing private or non-political interests (p772).   
Contrasting the aggregative and the deliberative model, Guttmann and Thompson 
(2004) say that while the deliberative model  
considers the reasons that citizens and their representatives give for 
their expressed preferences, [the aggregative model] takes the 
preferences as given [and] requires no justification for the preferences 
themselves, but seeks only to combine them in various ways that are 
efficient and fair (p13).   
Mouffe (2009) also contrasts the models: “the aggregative model sees political actors 
as being moved by the pursuit of their interests, and, the deliberative one stresses the 
role of reason and moral considerations” (p8). But Kies (2010) posits that the 
deliberative is more suitable “solving the conflicts and disagreements that are 
increasingly likely to arise in our plural/complex societies” (p29).  While Kies has a 
point, it needs to be said that not all deliberative models have made provisions for 
conflict beyond theoretical propositions. Erman contrasts the two deliberative 
models of Habermas and Mouffe and advances the notion that whereas Mouffe’s 
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agonism made provision for conflict, Habermas’ concept does not.  This distinction is 
important because, conflict, as Mouffe notes, is the core of politics, and Erman 
agrees.   Habermas’ focus on consensus ignores the central role of ethical conflict in 
politics  (Erman, 2009, p1039). 
According to Erman (2009), Chantal Mouffe takes the position that social consensus 
is not just a utopian idea, but that it is a dangerous idea, for it promises what it 
cannot deliver.  She believes that in politics, ethical conflicts are fundamentally 
irreconcilable (p1040).  Mouffe criticises advocates of the aggregative and 
deliberative models; they fail to consider the fact that people are emotional and full 
of passion for what they hold dear. Mouffe’s position is that the objective goal “of 
democratic politics is to transform antagonism into agonism.” She defined 
antagonism as the “struggle between enemies”, and agonism as the “struggle 
between adversaries” (Mouffe, 2009, pp102-103). 
Antagonism in politics is not possible without the full cooperation of the media; 
likewise agonism – either way, the press and media hold the keys to making politics 
more a collaborative work rather than a winner-takes-all game. 
3.8.4 Chantal Mouffe’s Agonistic Pluralism 
Agonism as a general concept exists in a variety of disciplines outside politics. 
Deborah Tannen (2002) locates its conceptual application in various other areas, 
including journalism, law, medicine and the academe. Tannen (2012) who extracts 
her own version of the concept from Walter Ong’s definition as a “programmed 
contentiousness” or “ceremonial combat” (2012, p215), views agonism as ritualised 
opposition, almost similar to a debate in which contestants are assigned opposing 
positions. In the academic sphere, Tannen (2012) posits that most arguments do not 
focus “attention on the greatest gain”, and therefore are unable to “move beyond the 
critique in its narrow sense” (p220).  She depicted the effects of destructive academic 
argument, which, she said, “is not the best path to truth and knowledge [but] 
corrosive” (Tannen, 2012, p220).  Robin (2004) also contends that there is a 
metaphoric bloodletting that accompanies academic disputes reflecting a “subculture 
trapped and disfigured by compulsive contentious disorders” (p22). He calls it a 
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perversion of academic discourse, the result of an argument culture, “in which an 
attack-dog-criticism appears to garner greater reward than civil discussion” (Robin, 
2004, p22). Robin cites Tannen stating that much of academic discourse is driven by,  
ideological assumption that intellectual inquiries is a metaphorical 
battle [and that] the best way to demonstrate intellectual prowess is by 
aggressive and unrelenting litigation and a scorched-earth mentality 
which disregards all issues and future well-being… all in the quest for 
victory (cited in Robin, 2004, p22).  
In politics, Mouffe suggests that political agonism ought to be a contest of 
adversaries not a fight to the death of political antagonists.  She also states that 
agonism should be embraced because when people see themselves as agonists 
(adversaries) rather than antagonists (enemies); it reduces the likelihood of elections 
being violent.  She adds: 
…too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation 
lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, 
the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around 
issues, which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an 
explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility 
(Mouffe, 2000, pp16-17). 
In a conflict prone nation-state like the Nigerian state, where politics is in a state of 
perpetual antagonism amongst ethnic nationalities, agonistic pluralism holds out a 
certain attraction, if not yet a promise.  On a normal political day, Nigerian politics is 
served with an admixture of vexing religious, the amoral and the secular in 
disproportionate measures without any common basis.  And worse still, common 
aggregative democratic models advocate forms of winner-takes-all politics but make 
little provision for conflicts that result therefrom (Erman, 2009).  According to 
Chantal Mouffe, passion plays a “central role in the creation of collective political 
identities”, and she argues that, rather than push people's deep emotional 
attachments aside, they should be allowed to express them (Mouffe, 2009, p8).  Her 
agonistic approach recognises divergences and conflicts, but insists that conflicts 
should not necessarily lead to a ‘clash of civilizations’.  
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3.8.5 Agonistic Pluralism in Africa 
Although Mouffe writes mostly within the context of the European experience and 
study, she did identify how agonism may be applicable within the African context. 
She correctly identifies the key issues in African politics: 
 Conditions in many African countries are the consequence of the 
inadequate political system that was bequeathed to them by their 
former colonizers  
 Independence left them not as stable national states, but as a 
patchwork of ethnic fiefdoms 
 They are burdened with parliaments based on those of the former 
colonial power 
 With so many ethnicities, languages, customs and cultures, multi-
party democracy has led to fragmentation and bitterly divided 
politics. (Mouffe, 2009, p103) 
By nature and experience, the African’s fierce passion and loyalty toward his or her 
village or ethnic group makes it clear that merely aggregative ‘rational’ liberal 
democracy, in which the winner takes all, does little to capture the African heart.  
Mouffe suggests that the best way to avoid frequent political meltdown is by the  
establishment of a multipolar institutional framework that would 
create the conditions for conflicts to manifest themselves as agonistic 
confrontations between adversaries, instead of taking the form of 
antagonistic struggles between enemies (Mouffe, 2013, p41). 
3.8.6 The Press, Face-Powder Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism  
The advocacy for a system of democracy that suits the African temperament and 
society, and more perfectly meets their political need is reflected in Nyamnjoh’s 
proposal that, “face-powder democracy must give way to a real democratic culture 
where ordinary Africans can do more than vote, and where democracy means more 
than the occasional election of leaders who excel in callous indifference to the 
predicaments of their people” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p24).  For Claude Ake (1993), “in 
order for African democracy to be relevant and sustainable it will have to be radically 
different from liberal democracy” (p241). Ake also posits that, “democracy has to be 
recreated in the context of the given realities and in political arrangements which fit 
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the cultural context, but without sacrificing its values and inherent principles” 
(p244). 
According to Nyamnjoh (2005), the success of democracy is largely dependent on the 
recognition of the fact that: 
most Africans are primarily patriotic to their home village, to which 
state and country in the modern sense are only secondary. It is in 
acknowledging and providing for the reality of individuals who 
straddle different forms of identity and belonging, and who are willing 
or forced to be both 'citizens' and 'subjects', that democracy stands its 
greatest chance in Africa (p26). 
Mouffe presents the agonistic model of democracy as a suitable alternative for a 
pluralist society.  As noted earlier, it is her view that “Antagonism is struggle between 
enemies, while agonism is struggle between adversaries” (Mouffe, 2000, p16).  
Balaton-Chrimes (2015) says that, “agonistic politics seeks to avoid the hegemonic 
and incontestable domination of the will or interests of one group over others” 
(p143). Mouffe posits that, in democratic politics, there are indeed opponents, but 
rather than see or treat these opponents as enemies, they should be seen and treated 
as adversaries and she went further to say that,  
an important difference with the model of “deliberative democracy”, is 
that for “agonistic pluralism”, the prime task of democratic politics is 
not to eliminate passions from the sphere of the public, in order to 
render a rational consensus possible, but to mobilize those passions 
towards democratic designs (Mouffe, 2000, p16).  
With reference to the peculiar nature of the African society, Balaton-Chrimes (2015) 
says that,  
in communities of significant diversity, consensus is neither possible 
nor desirable. What is required in these contexts is sufficient space for 
dissensus, but sufficient limits to keep conflict on the side of agonism 
(managed disagreement), rather than antagonism or violence (p143).  
Also, in multi-ethnic societies such as are typical in most African nation-states, 
agonistic inter-ethnic politics “requires a threshold level of interpersonal and inter-
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group respect in interactions” and it “recognises and allows for the fact that different 
ethnic groups may have irreconcilably different or conflicting interests” (Balaton-
Chrimes, 2015, pp143-144). 
In agonism, politics is likened to a sport in which the press provides the village 
square for engagement and interaction, ensuring that politics is indeed viewed with a 
passion but not a battle to the death of enemies. Sports is supposed to be fair to all, 
the press should treat the various sides with fairness. For elections to be fair, the 
press should be unbiased in their reportage and should give different competing 
sides the platform to tell the electorates about their vision.  According to Nyamnjoh 
(2005),  
the politics of belonging is thus central to understanding democracy in 
Africa and the role of the media in promoting it. The predicament 
faced by the media in this regard emphasises the need for more 
domesticated understandings of democracy as mediated by the quest 
for conviviality between individual and community interests (p3). 
3.9.0 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, being the conceptual chapter of the study, it was necessary to first 
explore and establish the philosophical and ontological contexts of the study in order 
not to embark on a wild goose chase, but to provide an appropriate context, beyond 
mere theoretical pursuits.  Colonial addiction is a reality in new nation-states 
immersed in postcoloniality; the academia is not immune to postcolonial propensity 
for mimicry.  In the chapter, I suggested that the same scale of measurement cannot 
be applied in two situations with dissimilar realities, backgrounds, and experiences.  
For this reason, application of theories cannot be done indiscriminately, but 
contextually with situational sensitivity. 
In the chapter, I reviewed various conceptual thinking on press, nations, and the 
politics of belonging and electoral democracy.  I also examined the uses of ethnicity 
by the elite, first as an ideology, and then as a strategic inter-ethnic negotiation tool, 
with the press serving as an elevation platform. Looking at the particular case of 
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Nigeria, matters of equity, if not equality, are central to understanding its 
contentious electoral politics that determine who belongs and who does not.  
After over half a century of modern political experimentations in Africa, it is obvious 
that the ‘winner-takes-all’ approach to democracy may not work. The African mind’s 
propensity for inclusiveness and fairness has failed to fully appreciate the demands 
of liberal Western models of democracy. Unfortunately, even the African press has 
played a significant role in helping to propagate versions of unworkable democratic 
models. The innate sense of the African is that governing must be inclusive. All 
voices must not only be heard, but all hands must be allowed to participate, 
particularly in a situation where, as in most African states, there is a shortage of 
talented minds, and made worse even as a divided people. 
CHAPTER 4 
 
146 
CHAPTER 4 
4.1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains and justifies the overall research design and methods 
employed to drive the process of data collection, organisation, and analysis. The 
chapter also discusses mixed methods of elite semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
and content analysis, which were my preferred methods for this study.  To provide a 
background to these choices, it is important to foreground the choices with a 
philosophical paradigm and in particular, the peculiarities of the African research 
cosmos.  In this respect, the chapter is divided into seven sections as follows: 1) The 
Paradigm: philosophical perspective; 2) Contextualising methodology in African 
Enquiry; 3) The Study Design; 4) Sampling Concepts and Procedure; 5) Newspapers 
as Data Generating Documents; 6) Interviews as a Method; 7) Conclusion.  
4.2.0 THE PARADIGM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 
The study design structure underscores the basic research paradigm from a 
philosophical perspective in order to contextualise the study. According to Denzin 
and Lincoln (2011), paradigms “are human constructions.  They define the world 
view of the researcher” (p91) by providing a philosophical foundation almost entirely 
from the researcher’s perspective. The implication of this is apparent: if a paradigm 
is a construct, and a construct is relative, what factors determine the extent of its 
relative application? And how do these factors limit or expand the effect of the 
nation-state in the construct of identities, whether national or ethnic?  
In this respect, every nation’s press is directly influenced by political, social, 
economic, and cultural factors.  In the case of Nigeria, these factors, according to 
Ajibade (2010), “have shaped the ‘character’ of the Nigerian press since 1859, when 
the first newspaper, Iwe Irohin, was established” (p248).  Though affected and 
‘shaped’ by numerous factors, external and internal, the newspaper-press also 
maintains a prime position as reporter, reflector and the most pervasive platform for 
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the generation and dissemination of knowledge among the elite class.  As a result, it 
remains central to a researcher’s quest on the ways people learn and know.  
4.2.1 Research Methodology Taxonomy 
From an epistemological point of view, Gerianne Merrigan and Carole Huston 
(2009), in their work, referenced the views of Charles S. Peirce to explain four basic 
ways people acquire and accept what they know. These are tenacity, authority, a 
priori, and the method of science. Merrigan and Huston (2009) provide an insight, 
in that knowledge through the method of science, unlike other approaches, “requires 
establishing standards by which any claim can be tested for its reasonableness” (p7).  
Also, in the opinion of Arksey and Knight (1999), the means and methods of testing 
knowledge validity and reasonableness have led to scores of debates, particularly 
over the relationship between what is scientific and what is regarded to be less so; 
renewing interest in not just epistemology of the work but also in the methodological 
approach.  
As a way of studying social realities, research methodology provides the researcher 
with a framework or a blueprint to serve as a road map and helps the reader to see 
and understand the totality of the study. A research is only as valid (and as valuable) 
as the methodology upon which it is based. According to Aborishade (1997), 
methodology provides the basis for establishing a study’s validity. Beyond 
establishing validity, Murray (2008), posits that methodology not only provides the 
reader with the framework but it provides a basis so that a “judgement can be made 
as to how appropriate they are, given the objectives of the research” (p148).  
In the particular instance of the press or media studies, a methodological approach 
has to be empirical.  A non-empirical approach will not provide the essential element 
of experience, for as Murray (2008), has stated, empiricism in research assumes that 
knowledge originates in experience; it is concerned with a world that is knowable 
and potentially measurable. Therefore, the heart of empirical research is situated “in 
the collection of data through experimentation or fieldwork” and the subsequent 
analysis of the freshly generated data (p149).  
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However, “there exist different ideas about the extent to which empirical research 
can tell us anything meaningful and about how it might do this” (Mason, 2002, p3).  
Irrespective of whether the process is qualitative or quantitative, acquisition of 
knowledge or truth through research is highly dependent on the attention the 
researcher pays to the environment. The questions then, are what is the role of the 
environment among the other factors of influence? How does a researcher construct 
a realistic framework without sacrificing the integrity and validity of the quest 
because of the interference of environmental factors?  
4.3.0 METHODOLOGICAL APPLICATION IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT 
Every research environment is different.  While certain aspects of research concepts 
and principles may be constant, they both require certain levels of contextualisation 
in order to make meaningful contributions to knowledge, particularly in unique 
situations like Africa’s. From this perspective, the complex socio-political 
environment in Nigeria and most of Africa is unlike any other in Western societies, 
where the tools for scientific research were invented; and from where they were 
adopted with little adaptation, if any.  
4.3.1 Record Keeping, Data Preservation Culture 
 A common reality about research in Africa is the acute lack of record keeping culture 
and particularly of archival records.  Most archives are poorly organised, and 
documents unsystematically classified, while documents like newspapers are piled or 
scattered in no particular order.  At two research centres affiliated to two leading 
Nigerian universities, one in the North, the other in the South West, the process of 
retrieving their mostly unorganised piles of newspapers is a far cry from the British 
Library, London where the processes are not only digitalised, but uncomplicated and 
stress-free.  At the British Library, I could easily locate whole editions – news, 
features, adverts, and all – of many Nigerian newspapers of 60 years ago and 
beyond, in microfilm formats; I could have pages of selected editions photo-copied in 
the library or have PDF copies sent directly to my email address.  In Nigeria, locating 
one relevant edition, which might have been incomplete, was equal to a full day’s 
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work. I put in a lot of effort and spent a great deal of time, and resources travelling 
between different archives and newspaper libraries; in one newspaper house, they 
did not even have complete copies of their own past editions.  
4.3.2 The Researcher’s Positionality  
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the adoption of methodological approaches 
in research is inescapably intertwined with the issue of positionality. Positionality of 
the researcher includes his or her “financial status, institutional and educational 
affiliation, race and personal values of the researcher among others” (Eshun, Zakaria 
and Segbefia, 2015, p8).  According to Admire Chereni, cited in Eshun, Zakaria and 
Segbefia (2015), the debates on positionality are not different from the notions of 
researchers as being either emic or etic. While an emic researcher refers to who has 
gained a personal and first-hand experience of a society, the etic researcher denotes 
the researcher who lacks the lived experience of the culture and society under study. 
When measured against these concepts, my positionality as a researcher would tend 
more on the side of an emic researcher.  
Because one of the methods was elite interviews with highly placed individuals, it 
would usually be very difficult to get many of them to sit down for 30 minutes to two 
hours of interviews. But because of the level of my previous relationships and 
connections with many of the interview participants, I was granted ease of access, 
and the atmosphere of most of the interviews was quite relaxed.  One offered me 
dinner, which I declined; another offered me breakfast, which I accepted, having left 
home very early to catch a morning flight in order to meet a 9:00 am appointment.  
Though I had this level of access, I was still faced with quite a few obstacles: I chased 
after four of them relentlessly; with two of them I never was able to get an 
appointment; for the other two I travelled to distant cities only to be informed that 
the appointments had been cancelled; I was able to reschedule one of them for a 
future date, the other never agreed to reschedule.  With the serving vice president, 
and the former military president, they were extremely busy, and understandably so. 
I had to re-schedule my appointments, after waiting for a considerable period. In the 
end, I logged in several hours on road and air trips across Nigeria, and I dare say that 
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this level of access would have been extremely difficult for someone who lacked 
extensive and long-term personal contacts.  
4.4.0 DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
What became clear to me in the earlier stage of the study was that in order to capture 
the dynamic political cosmos defined by the tensions of ethnic relations (usually 
accentuated at election periods), certain methods may limit the scope of enquiry and, 
therefore, the robustness of research outcomes.  For an example, as Thies (2002) and 
Murray (2008) have observed, the demands of quantitative protocols of 
operationalising certain concepts according to fixed sets of rules that assign a 
meaningful numeric representation to the phenomenon of identity politics may be 
difficult, if not impossible, for such a work as mine. 
Overall, a research design should drive the process of data collection, data 
organisation, and data analysis to produce the best result.  This led me to conclude 
that qualitative methods offered me freedom and flexibility to, according to Thies 
(2002), examine the presence or absence of certain attributes in my area of interest. 
Thies also notes that the method is more amenable to labelling by words rather than 
numbers, thus allowing the measurement of the degree to which certain attributes 
are present. 
From an empirical standpoint, the investigation, occasioned by my research 
questions, I have endeavoured to design a study that is open-ended and emergent. 
One of my primary assumptions from a design point of view, therefore, is that the 
narratives of (certain kinds or groups of) people are important; that their experiences 
and understanding possess the capacity to shed light on key questions posed by my 
research. In a typical qualitative approach, the researcher primarily adopts a 
constructivist perspective, which Creswell (2003) explains as, 
the multiple meanings of individual experiences, meanings socially 
and historically constructed, with an intent of developing a theory or 
pattern… The researcher collects open-ended, emerging data with the 
primary intent of developing themes from the data (p18). 
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This approach allows room for innovation, which enables the researcher work more 
within a somewhat flexible framework, within defined procedural boundaries.  
Creswell also notes that qualitative research is useful in so far as it is exploratory, 
particularly when a concept needs to be better understood, and when the important 
variables are not easy to discern for thorough examination by other forms of enquiry 
(Creswell, 2003).  It is obvious from the foregoing that the qualitative research 
approach would be more suited for my research requirements.  For one, this 
approach supports the narratives route, particularly the narratives of those who 
matter to the subject or theme of my enquiry.  In order to achieve objectives of the 
study, therefore, I employed qualitative research procedures, using examination of 
public documents in the form of newspapers, and in-depth semi-structured 
interviews as two (2) complementary methods for the research.  
4.4.1 Data Collection Methods 
The data collection methods that I have adopted for this research are in-depth semi-
structured elite interviews and content analysis. After a review of my research 
questions, I found these as the most applicable methods that would allow me achieve 
the objective of the research.  
It is important to note that research literature has made a clear distinction between 
methods and methodology. While methodology has a philosophical connotation, 
often referring to the paradigm or worldview that underpins the research, the term 
method conveys, principally, the tools or techniques of data collection. Denzin and 
Lincoln (1994) hold the view that “all methods are flawed” (p15) and in any case, only 
partially objective accounts of the world can be produced.  This, they argue, perhaps 
accounts for an increased use of qualitative techniques in order to be able to verify 
the validity. 
Marshall and Rossman (2010) list four methods as the typical methods most often 
relied upon for data collection by qualitative researchers, labelling them as core to 
qualitative enquiry.  These include in-depth interviews, document review, 
participation in the setting and direct observation. On interviews, the two 
researchers note: “qualitative researchers rely extensively on in-depth interviews” 
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because the method “allows a researcher to uncover and describe the participants’ 
perspective on events” (Marshall and Rossman, 2010, p146).    
Archival data may be used to further supplement other qualitative data gathering 
methods. Documents review allows the researcher to establish history and context 
around the object of research.  According to Marshall and Rossman (2006), 
“Researchers supplement participant observation, interviewing, and observation 
with gathering and analyzing documents produced in the course of everyday events 
or constructed specifically for the research at hand” (p107). As a method, document 
review is unobtrusive.  
4.4.2 The Research Questions Revisited 
 Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct Nigeria’s 
political culture and national identity? 
 Did press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflect or affect 
the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”? 
 Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership 
or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism?  
 Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation building, 
and national unity, and the practice of democracy and federalism?  
4.4.3 The Concept of Mixed Methods 
As earlier stated, this research is based on a mixture of methods approach for data 
collection and analysis. Methodological triangulation, also sometimes referred to as 
mixed methods, is the use of a research design that draws on a “variety of methods to 
collect and interpret data” (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p23).  Bogdan and Biklen 
(2006) describe triangulation as a procedure used to ensure validity of data through 
the use of two or more sources. Further justifying the necessity, Denzin (1978) states, 
“no single method can ever completely capture all the relevant features of that 
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reality” (p15).  Atkinson et al. (2007) agree with Denzin, declaring triangulation as a 
research imperative, “checking everything so that evidence does not rely on a single 
voice, so that data can become embedded in their contexts, so that data can be 
compared” (p35). 
The concept, according to Paulette Rothbauer (2008), originates “from navigational 
and land surveying techniques that determine a single point in space with the 
convergence of measurements… Triangulation is most commonly used in data 
collection and analysis techniques” (p892). Denzin (1978; 2006) identified four types 
of triangulation to include, data, investigation, theory, and methodological, which 
involves more than one method to gather data.   
Mixing methods brings better understanding to the research problem, biases 
inherent in one method are neutralised by the biases of another, and “results from 
one can help develop or inform the other” (p16). Furthermore, the use of multiple 
methods raises the researcher “above the personalistic biases that stem from single 
methodologies. By combining methods…in the same study, observers can partially 
overcome the deficiencies that flow from one investigator and/or one method” 
(Denzin, 1978, p294).  
To accentuate the point, Newman and Benz (1998) called triangulation “a reliability 
check” and noted that more sources give a more “complete perception of the 
phenomenon” (p52). It must be stated though that triangulation is not an end in 
itself; it serves the two main purposes of validation and completeness (Arksey and 
Knight, 1999). 
Bearing the above in mind, one must point out that the mixture was not haphazard, 
but purposeful.  The two methods are the elite interviews with acknowledged experts, 
and content analysis of newspapers. It is important to note that each research 
method has its individual strengths and limitations, hence the necessity to use both 
methods to draw the strength in each in order to minimise their limitations.  The 
interviews according to Tim May (2011) serve the purpose of obtaining and relying 
“on people’s account[s] of their actions as representing something beyond the 
interview situation….” (p158). However, content analysis helps to give context: “thus 
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a fuller understanding can be achieved only by witnessing the context of the event or 
circumstances to which people refer” (May, 2011, p158).   
The elite/expert participants in the interviews have been central, not marginal 
participants, in the course of designing the Nigeria we now have – as military rulers, 
as press leaders and as academics who study the nation. On the choice of what parts 
of the newspapers to analyse, I chose the front pages and editorials.  This choice was 
informed by the knowledge that the elites are avid readers of front-page news reports 
and editorials of papers, being by inclination more concerned with current and 
topical issues in the news (Johansson, 2007). It was therefore appropriate that the 
choice of secondary method was content analysing front pages and editorials of 
newspapers.  This selection was also intrinsically linked with the language of the 
publications. There was not even a contest on this point: whereas in a place like India 
there are indigenous languages press, in Nigeria, they are very marginal and they do 
not speak to or for the elite.  The English language remains the language of the elite; 
it allows communication across ethnic boundaries, unlike no other language in 
Nigeria.  Publications in indigenous languages in Nigeria are almost non-existent. 
4.4.4 The Elites Call Leadership to Take Responsibility for Nigeria 
One of the few points of complete unanimity in this study is the agreement by all that 
political elites ethnicised politics, and that they also politicised religion and the 
press; used them as mobilising tools, or offensive weapons, even.   Ethnicisation of 
politics and religion has remained an attractive route to power because it is easy 
when used in a double combination with the press to gain political relevance.  The 
press is a critical tool in the kit; it provided visibility and bestowed unearned prestige 
as a result of the status conferral power.  Adesina speaks of “massive exploitation of 
the media”; Pate speaks of the elite exploitation of the ethnic card, not only in the 
inter-ethnic or regional fights, but also in the intra-ethnic elite battles. And ethnicity 
delivers: “Oh yes!” says Osinbajo, “I think political elites have [found] it’s the easiest 
way to rally the troops, appealing to those kinds of sentiments.” 
The interview respondents surprisingly and, again, in unanimity, placed the blame of 
Nigeria’s comatose political situation at the doorsteps of the nation’s leadership elite. 
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Surprising because the interviewees are all part of the leadership elite group that 
they hold responsible.  Says Babangida, “The political elites capitalised on their 
leadership a lot, to try and create friction amongst some ethnic groups, thus fostering 
ethnicisation”.  Somehow, the elites feel quite justified to blame others while 
exonerating individual selves from the near wholesale failure of the Nigerian system.  
4.4.5 Reflectivity, Data Validity, and Reliability 
Most Nigerian federal elections are fought and won with obvious strong ethnic 
exclusionist or inclusionist overtones, if not agitations. In my design framework, I 
have chosen to do content analysis of newspapers during key federal election periods, 
from across the time spectrum of over 50 years (1959-2011). In order to ensure data 
validity, it is important to understand my own journey and interest in the work. 
Prejudices, preferences, and predispositions create selection problems for all 
researchers. In particular, according to Thies (2002), qualitative researchers are 
forced to “constantly defend their data against claims of bias” (p369).   
Therefore, before I discuss my design approaches further, it is important to 
acknowledge my own interests and background including my values and biases, for 
indeed as Creswell (2003) has observed, reflexivity typifies qualitative research 
today, because, the personal-self is no longer separable from the researcher-self.  
Steedman, as cited in Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg (2009), has also advanced the 
notion that knowledge can no longer be separated from the knower. Alvesson and 
Sköldberg also suggest that social reality is not merely represented by the researcher; 
it is constructed. And usually, the construct would have direct input by the 
researcher, and the result, a melange of what the researcher observed in the field of 
study, past experiences, and his or her point of view.  Creswell borrowed Mertens’ 
views in stating that  
The qualitative researcher systematically reflects on who he or she is 
in the inquiry and is sensitive to his or her personal biography and 
how it shapes the study… It also represents honesty and openness to 
research, acknowledging that all inquiry is laden with values (Mertens, 
2003 cited in Creswell, 2003, p182). 
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This said, my own journey informed my interest in the research topic. I have been in 
active media-related business for about 40 years; as such I can lay claim to some 
measure of knowledge and expertise in the field.  At different times in my media 
career, I have served as policy adviser at the Ministry of Information and Culture; as 
special adviser to the vice president, under a military government; as a public 
communications specialist to private and public-sector organisations; as a reporter 
and writer in noted media houses, and as commentator on public affairs on radio and 
television programmes.  
4.4.6 Research Motivation 
In all these roles I have often wondered, given the power attributed to the media, 
why unity has eluded Nigeria as a nation, and why a sense of belonging has equally 
eluded most Nigerians as members of the nation-state.  Why has the media not been 
able to deploy its power of influence to help forge a sense of oneness, and make 
everyone feel part of the larger nation? Nigeria’s ethnic identity crisis has led to 
scores of bloody communal conflicts leading to deaths in millions over the lifespan of 
the nation.  
This topic is also of particular interest because I belong to a minority ethnic group in 
the mid-southern part of Nigeria.  Given the domination of the majority tribes and 
the general discriminative treatment meted out to minority ethnic groups, I often 
wondered if the press were not presumably complicit, but did more to foster national 
unity, people like me would not feel so stateless.  I feel that if in a nation, everyone 
has a common sense of identity and belonging without necessarily losing ethnic 
identities, the nation-state will fare better than it does right now under the current 
acrimonious conflict-prone situation.  
The preceding paragraphs convey my motivation for the research; but it is my life as 
a media professional with four decades of experience that granted me access to 
people and places that ordinarily would have been far beyond me.  In the process of 
selection of newspapers and interviewees, and election dates, I leaned extensively on 
my experience in the media, my knowledge and contacts gained from years of 
position and presence in public office.  Relationships formed across the country 
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helped me know who to select, and granted me the access to many of them. In 
selecting the interviewees, therefore, I had to ensure, as much as possible, regional 
and ethnic representation.  Of the 22 interviewees, six persons each are from the 
North and West and five persons each from the East and the Mid West. This brings 
me to the issue of sampling. 
4.5.0 SAMPLING CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURE 
The very nature of this study imposes three areas of selection decisions on me:  1) 
which election years to include; 2) which editions of newspapers in those election 
periods to include; and 3) who to interview as subjects to fulfil the demands of a 
typical phenomenological enquiry. This section explains the selection approaches of 
election years, newspapers, interview participants, their backgrounds, and ethnic 
spread or geographical location. The sampling method used for the selection of 
interview subject, years and elections to research, and which newspapers to include 
in the content analysis was done through purposive sampling or what Aborisade calls 
judgement sampling.  According to him, a researcher carefully considers and 
“chooses his sample under the consideration of typical cases which are most likely to 
provide him with requisite data or information” (Aborisade, 1997, p90). 
Researchers use sampling procedures, usually designed to generate a respectable 
representative sample size from a larger group, to provide answers to research 
questions.  Such a select sample must, as closely as possible, represent the larger 
group within a population size. According to Teddlie and Yu (2007), there are two 
types of sampling procedures in the social and behavioural sciences – these are 
probability and non-probability procedures. Probability sampling aims to accurately 
achieve representation of a specified population, which is the degree to which the 
sample represents the entire population. 
A non-probability sampling on the other hand, is a technique in which each unit in a 
population does not have a specifiable probability of being selected. In other words, 
in non-probability sampling, the researcher does not select his or her units from the 
population in a mathematically random way. As a result, non-probability sampling 
typically produce samples that are not necessarily exact representations of the 
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population. This also means that the ability to generalise from them is limited 
(Teddlie and Yu, 2007).   
One advantage of sampling procedure, according to Mason (2002), is that it allows 
the researcher to manipulate “analysis, theory and sampling activities to much 
greater extent than in statistical sampling” (pp136-137).  That said, however, non-
probability techniques, sometimes referred to as purposive sampling, is not a 
procedural carte blanche to choose any group or persons as the researcher pleases. 
Rather, such freedom of choice must align to a transparent process. Silverman 
(2013) insists, purposive sampling demands that we think critically about the 
parameters of the population we are studying and choose our sample case carefully 
on this basis” (p148). Corroborating this view, Denzin and Lincoln (2011), stated that 
purposive sampling is not arbitrary, in other words, the researcher is still confined  to 
“seek out groups, settings and individuals where the processes being studied are 
most likely to occur” (cited in Silverman, 2013, p148).  Bearing this in mind, 
therefore, a non-probability or purposive sampling technique best serves the purpose 
of my study.  
This technique (also sometimes referred to as qualitative sampling because it is 
widely used among researchers doing qualitative studies) has a number of variations. 
These include haphazard or convenience sampling, quota sampling, snowball 
sampling, and purposive sampling. When compared with other types, purposive 
sampling is the generally more acceptable kind of sampling for qualitative research. 
It uses the judgment of an expert in the selection with specific purpose in mind. 
According to Teddlie and Yu (2007), purposive sampling is used most often when a 
difficult-to-reach population is involved.   However, the technique is not random or 
haphazard; it is purposeful and intentional, used to select units (individuals, groups 
of individuals, institutions) based on specific purposes associated with answering a 
research study’s questions (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003).   As Maxwell (1997) put 
it, purposive sampling type has been found to be very useful when “particular 
settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important information 
they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices” (p87).  It is for the 
above reasons that I used purposive sampling to select elite participants in the 
interviews as active experts in the field. 
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Figure 4.1: FEDERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA 1959-2015 (Elections years covered in this study are shaded) 
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4.5.1 Selections of Federal Elections 
There are nine federal elections in Nigeria’s history between 1959 and 2011; of these, 
six elections are used in this study. The selected elections were designed to contrast 
in two distinct categories of three elections each.  The two classifications are 
transition and consolidation elections.  This was necessary in order to investigate the 
role of the press and the promotion of ethnically slanted narratives in reporting and 
commentary of newspapers, particularly at election periods.  
Table 4.1 Election Types 
TRANSITION ELECTIONS CONSOLIDATION ELECTIONS 
1959 1964/1965 
1979 1983 
1999 2011 
 
A transition election is an election where power is transferred from one type of 
government to another, whereas a consolidation election is one in which a ruling 
party vies to retain its position and hold on to power. Researchers (Agbaje and 
Adejumobi, 2006; Orji and Uzodi, 2012) have found that a transition election, as 
against a consolidation election, has greater possibility of being peaceful, though not 
always, when violence is used to measure the relative peace between parties and their 
ethnic dispositions. According to Mackenzie and Robinson (1960), available records 
show that “transition elections are relatively more peaceful than the consolidation 
elections” (cited in Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p17).  All other factors considered, it was 
therefore not totally surprising that the 1959, 1979, and 1999 elections, relatively 
speaking, were “devoid of large-scale violence” (Mackenzie and Robinson 1960 cited 
in Orji and Uzodi, 2012, p17). When contrasted with transition elections, Orji and 
Uzodi (2012) note that in consolidation elections, ruling parties tend to exhibit 
deliberate attempts to contrive and monopolise electoral space and manipulate 
election results, noting that politicians 
engineer grand electoral fraud, as well as hatch deliberate plots to 
move the process in their favour. This pattern is reflected in ‘simulated 
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landslide’ victories recorded by the ruling parties in the 1964/65, 1983, 
2003, and 2007 elections (p19).  
It is important to note that all the election years cited in the preceding quote were 
consolidation elections. Consolidation elections,   
are more complicated to manage in Nigeria. This is because the 
interests and forces with a stake in the consolidation process are more 
diverse, with some of them controlling the election machinery (Agbaje 
and Adejumobi, 2006, p37). 
Consistent with this proposition is that the (ethnic motivated) violence, which 
erupted following the consolidation elections of 1964/65 paved the way for the first 
military coup.  The coup was so bloody and divisive that it eventually led to a 30-
month civil war.  Also, the winning party in the 1983 elections lasted for only three 
months in office before it was overthrown by the fourth successful military coup. And 
it is on record that the violence that followed the 2011 consolidation election was the 
bloodiest in the history of election violence in Nigeria. Thus, for this study, 1959 is 
contrasted with 1964/65; 1979 is contrasted with 1983; and 1999 with 2011 in order 
to measure and investigate dynamics of ethnically charged narratives during the 
election year.  
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Table 4.2: Election Dates and Research Periods 
TRANSITION ELECTIONS CONSOLIDATION ELECTIONS 
ELECTION DATE RESEARCH PERIOD ELECTION DATE RESEARCH PERIOD 
 
December 12, 
1959 
 
 
November 18 - 
December 20 
December 30, 
1964 -  
March 18, 1965 
December 10, 
1964 - January 6, 
1965 
 
February 25, 1965 
– March 26, 1965 
August 11, 1979 
July 20 – Aug 18 August 6, 1983 July 16 -  August 
13, 1983 
February 27, 
1999 February 6 - 
March 5 
April 16, 2011 March 25 –  April 
24, 2011 
Period: 4 weeks (3 weeks before and 1 (one) week after the election). 
Pages: Only Front Pages and Editorial Pages. 
 
4.5.2 The Case for 2011 Federal Election 
After due consideration, I chose not to pair 1999 with 2003, or even 2007 as the 
matching consolidation election year; instead I chose 2011.  Here is the argument 
behind the choice: Among other reasons, as at 2003, the democratic experiment was 
still quite nascent. There were very few tested, bigwig politicians with any modicum 
of experience and pedigree, as in the previous elections. The few and a growing 
league of retired military officers with deep pockets, all beat the path into one 
political party – the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). The other parties were 
regional, fragmented, weak, and uncoordinated; the political terrain was thus 
dominated by the PDP.  With all serious contenders for power all under its political 
roof and control, the need to recourse to ethnic politics was notably curtailed.  The 
deep pockets of hugely self-centred personalities aligned to regional or ethnic 
positions became the drivers in the political arena rather than issues of any national 
significance.  As a result, open inter-ethnic and inter-party power struggles were 
appreciably reduced. Appeals to ethnic sentiments were replaced by moneybag 
politics of cash-and-carry where power or office was allotted to the highest bidder.  
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The same scenario played out in 2007; however by 2011, the floor of the house of the 
PDP, bedevilled with political heavyweights, had caved in; opposition’s voice had 
become stronger, louder, and more vociferous.  The old inter-ethnic and inter-
regional politics had been firmed up, and Nigeria’s ethnic politicians were back in the 
trenches of battle for hegemonic relevance power. 
4.6.0 NEWSPAPERS SELECTION AS DATA GENERATING DOCUMENTS 
In his work on nations’ formation, Anderson (2006) presents a case for the role of 
the press in nation-state formation. According to him, two forms of imagining (the 
novel and the newspaper), “provided the technical means for 're-presenting' the kind 
of imagined community that is the nation” (p25).  Anderson further notes that in 
nation-states made up of multiple ethnic nationalities, print-languages provided “the 
bases for national consciousness…they created unified fields of exchange and 
communication…among speakers of the huge variety of (languages)…” (Anderson, 
2006, p44). 
And since language is a fundamental characteristic of a nation in formation, 
Anderson (2006) views the press as a veritable vehicle that brings cohesion to 
cultural narratives and historic myths to help legitimise the imagined nation into 
reality. He puts it this way: “Print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which… 
helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation” 
(p44).   
In Nigeria, the newspaper was the dominant mass media form from pre-colonial 
period up until early 1990s when the broadcast sector was deregulated and exclusive 
state ownership of radio and television was finally abrogated.  Thus, the newspaper 
and the English language combined to provide the essential socialising platform: the 
vehicular instrument for constructing the new nation-state’s structures and ethos.  
However, as the English language strove to unite the nation under one tongue 
through the media and the classroom, indigenous languages, particularly the three 
major ones of the Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba ethnic groups, provided the basis for 
continuous strong contentions among ethnocentric identities. 
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In this regard, the choice of newspaper as one of the two sources generating data for 
investigation is self-evident being central to the topic and themes. According to 
Chaffee and Kanihan (1997) “the newspaper is… a major source of political 
information about issues and parties…” (p423) and noting that newspaper reading 
and attention are two strongest predictors of party-issue differences.  Chaffee and 
Kanihan (1997) cited some research studies to back their claim:  
One survey during the 1992 campaign, for example, found that 
newspaper reading and attention were the two strongest predictors of 
party-issue differences, in an analysis that included television news 
and advertising, viewing of debates and party conventions, radio news, 
and news magazine reading (p423).  
Similar results were found in campaign surveys in 1976 and 1980 (Chaffee and Tims, 
1982; Patterson, 1980 cited in Chaffee and Kanihan, 1997, p423). 
4.6.1 Negating Bias in the Selection of Newspapers  
Bias and selectivity are “problems for both quantitative and qualitative researchers to 
consider” (Thies, 2002, p369). In particular, qualitative researchers must “constantly 
defend their data against claims of selectivity and bias” (Thies, 2002, p369). On the 
choice of particular newspaper publications, I have depended on my four decades in 
media practice and specific knowledge of the newspaper industry to choose papers 
regarded as leading papers in any particular year of choice. Even then, I have been 
careful to select leading (national and regional or ethnic) newspapers in the period of 
the various elections.  Also, since this study is more or less tangentially an elite-
oriented discourse, the newspaper becomes even more an obvious choice for the 
study.  According to Olayiwola (1991), “…the political affiliation of media ownership 
determined, to a large extent”, their ‘editorial direction’ and “in their coverage of 
political parties and the campaigns” (p43). 
The newspapers selected spread fairly across the nation, overlapping with a spread in 
the selection of the interviewees; and covering major ethnic representation - Igbo – 
Eastern Nigeria; Yoruba – Western Nigeria; Hausa/Fulani – Northern Nigeria; and 
Southern minorities, who tend to dominate media ownership.  On ownership and 
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operation, there are government, as well as private newspapers. Of the nine papers in 
the study, three – the Nigerian Citizen, the New Nigerian and the Daily Times – 
were owned by governments.  The Citizen and the New Nigerian were established 
and funded by a regional government while the Daily Times which was established 
as a private paper in 1926 by a team of British and Nigerian businessmen, was on the 
newsstand for 50 years before it was forcibly taken over by the Federal Military 
Government in 1976.  
The newspapers selected reflect regional representation as follows: 
 Western Region/Yoruba Ethnic Group:- The Tribune and The Punch are 
both private newspapers. While the motivation for establishing the Tribune was 
purely political, the motivation for the Punch was ostensibly business, but the 
paper has not shied away from taking positions in the interest of the South West 
Region.  The Western Region is the home of most newspapers in Nigeria, and 
most of the newspaper market is in the region, commanding over 65-70 per cent 
of the market.  
 Northern Region/Hausa and Fulani Ethnic Group:- The Nigerian Citizen 
(Northern Government); New Nigerian (Northern/Federal Government); Daily 
Trust (Private, but strongly represents and defends “Northern interests”). Until 
the last 15 years, Northern states or regional governments funded most dominant 
Northern regional newspapers. Since then, privately owned newspapers like the 
Daily Trust and Leadership have dominated the market. 
 Eastern Region/Igbo Ethnic Group:- West African Pilot (Private). The East 
has produced great journalists but not many national journalism institutions 
since the Civil War. And virtually all the papers from the region have been 
established for political objectives, and published outside the region.  
 National Papers with Minorities Ethnic Ownership Interests:- ThisDay 
and the Guardian are both private newspapers. The motivation for establishing 
ThisDay was perhaps for business and political influence trading, whilst 
apparently the motivation for the Guardian was business. 
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Table 4.3: Newspaper Selection by Years 
YEAR NEWSPAPERS ELECTION TYPE 
1959 
The Nigerian Tribune 
The West African Pilot Transition 
1964 The Nigerian Citizen The West African Pilot Consolidation 
1979 The New Nigerian The Daily Times Transition 
1983 The New Nigerian The Daily Times Consolidation 
1999 The Guardian The Punch Transition 
2011 ThisDay The Daily Trust Consolidation 
 
The life span of newspapers in Nigeria is rather short.  Even when they last, they 
wane in influence and reach rather quickly with time and political seasons.  Of the 
nine papers, three are now defunct; two exist in names only, caricatures of their 
former reach and influence. Of the rest, the Daily Trust at barely 15 years old in the 
market is the most recent with a success story commercially.  As a result, it was 
difficult to find newspapers that would span the entire period of the study. On the 
positive side, this freed me to select two newspapers for each election period that I 
consider the leading papers for the period. I had initially included the Tribune in all 
the six election years, being the only newspaper that spans the period, but I soon 
discovered that it did not add any significant value to the quality of investigation 
result. 
4.6.2 Method of Newspaper Analysis 
The primary data for this study are collected from front-page news reports, 
editorials, and commentaries in the three weeks preceding the elections and one 
week immediately following. 
4.6.2.1 Generating Data from Newspapers for the Research Content 
Analysis 
From the foregoing, I decided to use Content Analysis of selected newspapers as my 
other data gathering and analysis method. The method is “used to study a broad 
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range of ‘texts’ from transcripts” (including) “content of newspapers and magazines” 
(Macnamara, 2003, p1). It differs from other methods, say, surveys, in that it is more 
manageable; it can be conducted on a regular basis for an assigned period, whereas 
large scale audience research can be expensive in terms of resources and time 
allocation.  
4.6.2.2 Choice of Content Analysis 
There are several types of content analysis techniques, but “studies comparing 
different techniques have generally found that results are nearly identical” 
(Windhauser and Stempel, 1979, p148).  Laswell et al. (1942) also “found that 
varying coding and context units had only a moderate effect on results” (cited in 
Windhauser and Stempel, 1979, p148).  Content analysis as a method is flexible, 
capable of being employed within a qualitative as well as quantitative environment.   
According to Macnamara (2003), “the ultimate goal of analysing media content is to 
understand their deeper meanings and likely interpretations by audiences” (p5).  
Whereas quantitative content analysis may readily conform to the scientific method 
and produce reliable findings, qualitative content analysis is difficult and may be 
impossible to do with scientific reliability. However, the latter relies on the ability of 
the researcher to understand and interpret texts; it examines the relationship 
between the text and its audience, paying particular attention to meaning and 
context (Macnamara, 2003).  
In the particular area of contemporary media studies, Larsen (1991) posits that  
“qualitative content analysis continues to play major role… less as an end in itself but 
as a constituent of other qualitative procedures” (p133).  For Macnamara (2003), an 
advantage that media content analysis has, as a specialised sub-set, is that it is “a 
non-intrusive research method that allows examination of a wide range of data over 
an extensive period to identify popular discourses and their likely meanings” (p6). 
However, for Kerlinger (1973), content analysis provides a “method of studying and 
analysing communications in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner to 
measure variables” (p525).  It is Kerlinger’s opinion that most of content analysis has 
been used simply “to determine the relative emphasis or frequency of various 
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communication phenomena” (Kerlinger, 1973, p525). The implication of this is that 
the method is much more robust than that. 
4.7.0 INTERVIEWS AS A METHOD 
One research method is not fundamentally superior to another, according to Arksey 
and Knight (1999). Rather, a method exists to best serve the purpose of the research.   
Interview formats vary as mentioned earlier, there are three common or frequently 
used formats: the structured, semi-structured, or unstructured.  Of these, the 
structured interview is not commonly used for qualitative research because of what 
Merrigan and Huston (2009) referred to as having strict “protocols or schedules that 
dictate what questions to ask when” (p113). The less formal formats of unstructured 
and the semi-structured interviews, on the other hand, are more frequently used for 
qualitative data gathering. They are more malleable in helping to provide a full 
picture of an interviewee’s views or experiences.  
Of the two techniques, the semi-structured format is located midpoint between the 
structured and the unstructured formats; it is less formal than the structured 
technique but not as much an unbound format as the unstructured. Its diverse 
applicability, perhaps, explains its wide acceptance as a qualitative data gathering 
method, according to Arksey and Knight (1999).  The semi-structured format allows 
for measured interaction with interviewees and when well deployed, requires 
“respondents to reflect on an experience or a concept (that) focuses on the 
participants’ understanding or meaning of a particular concept or experience” 
(Merrigan and Huston, 2009, p114). 
4.7.1 In-depth Interviews 
In applying the semi-structured format, my approach had to be in-depth interview, 
which is useful when a researcher wants detailed information about the respondent’s 
views, or needs to explore issues in depth. My interview participants fit into the 
group which Boyce and Neale (2006) identified as those that may not be comfortable 
talking in a group setting, or when a researcher is desirous of distinguishing 
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individual opinion, which was the case in my work, in order to highlight ethnic or 
regional predispositions, if any. 
As such, in-depth interviews may be used to provide context to other data (from 
other methods), to offer a more complete picture of the phenomenon of 
investigation.   According to Boyce and Neale (2006), the in-depth interviews 
 provide much more detailed information than what is available 
through other data collection methods, such as surveys. They also may 
provide a more relaxed atmosphere in which to collect information— 
people may feel more comfortable having a conversation with you 
about their program as opposed to filling out a survey (p3).  
Considering the above and the high level calibre of interview subjects, interviews 
provided a much more robust and productive instrument for data gathering, while 
one is mindful of its short-comings as a method. 
4.7.2.1 Selecting Participants 
According to Lindlof (1995), interviews are important if a researcher needs to 
understand a social actor’s perspective on an event. As such, only persons whose 
experiences are central to the research problem in some form or another may be 
interviewed. Merrigan and Huston (2009) believe that the objective of face-to-face 
interviews is to probe interviewees for information about themselves and others or 
events relevant to the essence of the study.  In principle, therefore, a researcher 
should recruit interview participants for their expert views or because 
they represent a certain status or category or because of the critical 
events in which they participated. The researcher expects the special 
nature of what they have experienced to result in a special articulation: 
words that can be expressed only by someone who has ‘been there’ 
(Lindlof, 1995, p167). 
For my purpose, therefore, and in line with my operationalisation of the topic, I 
selected my participants based on three broad categories of (a) press leaders, (b) key 
players and leaders in politics and governance, and (c) academicians in the field of 
media/communication, ethnic studies or politics.  In all, I interviewed 22 subjects – 
eight political leaders, eight press leaders, and six academicians.  
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In choosing participants, I had to consider those “that best represent the diverse 
stakeholders and opinions of those stakeholders” (Boyce and Neale, 2006, p7). My 
interview subjects include the serving vice president, three former heads of 
government, among the politicians; a former Minister of Information, two 
press/media advisers to the current and immediate past presidents, current and 
former owners and/or C.E.Os. of press or media houses, among the press leaders, 
and noted academics who are acknowledged experts in their disciplines.  
In the period of this study (1959 to 2011), Nigeria had 14 heads of state or presidents 
(Obasanjo ruled twice as military head of state and as elected civilian president). Of 
these 8 are alive, of which 3 stand out as leaders who have managed transition or 
consolidation elections, and two of them have participated in elections as candidates.  
I interviewed all three – Obasanjo, Babangida, and Abubakar for the study. 1) 
General Obasanjo ruled Nigeria as both an unelected military head and as a 
democratically elected president.  He managed the first military to civilian transition 
of power in 1979, participated as a presidential candidate in the military to civilian 
transition elections of 1999, and won the second term re-election, in the 
consolidation election of 2003.  He also successfully transferred power to a successor 
in 2007.  2) General Abubakar successfully managed the 1999 transition elections 
and, 3) General Babangida made several attempts at transfer of power to civilian 
governments in the early 1990s, and he failed (Table 4.4 and Appendix 2 contain the 
list, short profiles, areas of interest, and geographical or ethnic representations of all 
the interview subjects). 
Table 4.4: Interviewees, Region, and Positions Held 
 INTERVIEWEES REGIONS POSITIONS HELD 
1 Abdulsalami Abubakar  North Former Military Head of 
State 
2 Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo North Former Senior Special 
Adviser to Vice-President. 
Former CEO of Media House. 
Former aspirant to a 
governorship position in his 
home state of Kogi.  An 
Academic  
3 Ibrahim Babangida  North Former Military Head of 
State. Ruled Nigeria for 
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 INTERVIEWEES REGIONS POSITIONS HELD 
eight years 
4 T.Y Danjuma  North Former Military Leader 
 5 Umaru Pate North Academic. Media Studies. 
Dean Department of Mass 
Communication Bayero 
University 
6 Mohammed Haruna  North Former CEO of Media Houses 
Former Chief Press 
Secretary to a Military Head 
of State 
7 Anya O. Anya  East Academic.  Business Leader. 
Ethno-Cultural Leader 
8 Dr. P. Dele Cole  East Former CEO of Media House. 
Former Nigerian Ambassador 
to Brazil 
9 Mr John Irem  East Media/Politics. Elections 
Specialist 
10 Prof. Okwudiba Nnoli  East Academic. Political Scientist 
11 Prof. Pat Utomi East Academic. Former 
Presidential Aspirant. Social 
Activist 
 
12 
 
Prof. Emevwo Biakolo  
South South Academic. Media Studies. 
Faculty. Ex-Dean, School of 
Media and Communication 
13 Prof. Abubakar Momoh  South South Academic. Political 
Scientist. Director, National 
Electoral Institute. 
14 Prince Tony Momoh  South South Former Federal Minister of 
Information.  Former 
Political Party Chairman. 
Politician. 
15 Prof Eghosa Osaghae South South Academic. Political Scientist 
Vice Chancellor Igbenedion 
University, Okada, Edo State 
16 Mr Odia Ofeimun  South South Writer.  Political Activist. 
Politician. 
17 Dr. Reuben Abati  West Immediate past Special 
Adviser to the President. 
Former Chairman, Editorial 
Board, the Guardian 
Newspapers 
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 INTERVIEWEES REGIONS POSITIONS HELD 
18 Mr Femi Adesina West Current Special Adviser to 
the President. Former 
President of the Nigerian 
Guild of Editors 
19 Prof. Adigun Agbaje  West Academic. Political 
Scientist. Former Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor, Academic, 
University of Ibadan 
 
20 
 
Dr. Christopher Kolade  
West Former Nigerian High 
Commissioner to the U.K. 
Business Leader Academic.  
21 General Olusegun 
Obasanjo 
West Former Elected President 
Former Military Head of 
State  
22 Professor Yemi Osinbajo  West Vice-President,  Academic, 
Lawyer  
 
4.7.3 Methods of Analysis 
In line with the research questions, I have used a cluster of themes rather than a 
chronological approach in analysis. Subsequently, this approach allows the 
exploration of factors that are interrelated, and vital to finding answers to the 
questions the research is raising. In the long run, I expect it will aid analysis and 
report writing. 
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4.8.0 CONCLUSION 
The main thrust of this chapter has been the presentation of the study design and 
justification for methods employed to drive data collection. And beginning with a 
philosophical framework, the chapter explains that consequent upon colonialism the 
old African paradigm gave way to a hybrid of a new worldview – neither fully 
Western nor purely traditional African.  To design a study in such an environment 
requires an appreciation for the demand of the evolving situation, outside the 
strictures imposed by universalised Western research philosophies, and 
methodologies. Understanding these requirements, therefore, was central to the 
sampling procedures adopted and the choice of methods for data collection.  
The chapter discusses the combination of two methods, which, I considered to be 
relevant and most suited to deliver on the research objectives. The first is in-depth 
elite interviews of key players in politics, academia, and the press. Interview subjects 
include the current Nigerian vice-president, three former heads of government under 
military regimes; noted politicians; owners, and former managing directors of 
newspaper houses and notable journalists; and academics in politics and media 
studies. The second method of choice is content analysis of selected newspaper 
publications around election periods of the selected election years of study. 
The chapter also explains the sampling/selection procedure of newspapers, and 
justifies the approach in terms of participants, their backgrounds, ethnic spread, or 
geographical location.  This approach should, in the subsequent chapters, ease data 
organisation and data analysis to which the aim is to produce the best outcomes. 
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S E C T I O N  3  
Mixed-Method Approach 
This section contains two Chapters, 5 and 6.  My objective in using the two methods, 
as it is usual in a mixed-method study, is for the data collected to play 
complementary roles and validate. The in-depth elite interviews serve as my main 
method and source of data that explains the variables in the research questions.  In 
contemporary media studies, Larsen (1999) posits “content analysis continues to 
play (a) major role… less as an end in itself but as a constituent of other qualitative 
procedures” (p133).  The intention, therefore, is not to use the quantitative data 
obtained here to directly answer my research questions. Rather, I have used the 
findings in content analysis to provide further explanation, give contexts, and 
validate or dispute the research objectives. It is important to note that because of the 
particular manner, in which the research questions were framed, with multiple 
variables in each question, the quantitative data can only be used to provide further 
explanation and to validate the findings produced by the in-depth interviews. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5.1.0 INTERVIEW DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the analysed data. As stated in Chapter 4, this study follows a 
mixed-method design, using the two methods of in-depth elite interviews and 
content analysis. In this chapter, I present the qualitative part of the data, obtained 
through in-depth interviews.   The specific objectives of this chapter are to analyse 
the collected data, develop themes, and display data results, all in preparation for the 
interpretation and discussion of the data result in Chapter 7. It is important to state 
early in this chapter that the approach adopted for analysis is sequential – that is, a 
separation of my management of data from their interpretations and discussion. As 
such, this chapter will deal with only the management of data to arrive at analysed 
results. The interpretation and discussion of data leading to the production of a 
report, will be treated in Chapter 7 solely devoted to that purpose, using the data 
results, themes, and key concepts derived from this chapter and Chapter 6, which is 
the chapter dealing with the newspaper content analysis. 
5.1.1 The Nature of Data Analysis 
The volume of data collected from semi-structured, in-depth interviews can be 
daunting after transcription. According to Marshall and Rossman (2010), “Data 
analysis is the process of bringing order, structure, and interpretation to the mass of 
collected data…. (It) is a search for general statement(s) about relationships [among 
categories of data]…” (p207) And Silverman and Marvasti, (2008), citing Coffey and 
Atkinson (1996), posit that data analysis is a  
pervasive activity throughout the life of a research project. Analysis is 
not simply one of the later stages of research to be followed by an 
equally separate phase of writing up results (p190).   
Miles and Huberman (1994) propose three approaches to qualitative data analysis as 
interpretive, social anthropology, and collaborative social research.  Of these three, 
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the one most appropriate to this work is the interpretive. According to Marshall and 
Rossman (2006)  
The interpretive act …is the process of bringing meaning to raw, 
inexpressive data… [through] rich description of ordinary events. Raw 
data have no inherent meaning; the interpretive act brings meaning to 
those data and displays that meaning to the reader through the written 
report (p157). 
The nature of qualitative data demands that in order for the collected data to bring 
anticipated value and result, such data must be made manageable for ease of 
interpretation.  In addition, massive data in themselves may cause a loss of essence if 
there is no interaction between the data and the researcher. As a result, the 
interpretive approach allows the researcher to obtain value from data in a most 
practical way by bringing to reflect the totality of the researcher’s experience to the 
process.  The researcher must, therefore, find a way of conceptualising and making 
sense of the large volumes of data.   
5.1.2 Positionality 
The researcher’s positionality affects field data collection, as was noted in Chapter 4.  
In Africa, in particular, “positionality is often an aggregation of factors such as 
economic status, educational level, age, gender, marital status and ethnicity (Eshun, 
Zakaria and Segbefia, 2015, pp8-9).  The effects or influence of these factors are not 
limited to field work, but also the way he or she relates with and interacts with the 
collected data for interpretation.  In this light, the researcher is not detached from 
the object of study. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), “Researchers have 
their own understanding, their own convictions, (and) their own conceptual 
orientations; they, too, are members of a particular culture at a specific historical 
moment” (p8).  Positionality makes it imperative that the researcher is aware of his 
or her own biases and standpoints, aside from the study’s limitation and 
delimitations discussed in Chapter 1.  
Conducting and analysing interviews, therefore, becomes an act of collaboration on 
the part of both the researcher and the interview participants, and not just a function 
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of one party (the interviewer) in isolation of the other (the respondent) (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  As a result, it is difficult to draw a clear line between received 
external data and data as internalised and adapted by the researcher, who structures 
the study in the processes of reduction, selection or coding (Miles and Huberman, 
1994).  From the foregoing, qualitative data create analytical problems for the 
researcher, who is forced by the peculiar landscape of each research to design his or 
her analytical procedures. 
5.1.3 Ethical issues in Data Collection   
There are two broad types of data: primary and secondary data.  Data in collection 
for the first time are primary data while those that may have been previously 
collected and analysed by (an)other researcher(s) would be regarded as secondary 
data.  In this respect, data from both categories of my methods – from in-depth 
interviews and archived newspapers – qualify as primary. Cameron Thies (2002) 
considers primary as those “sources that are as close to the event in time and places 
as possible” (p356). Primary data sources include transcripts of interviews conducted 
for the purpose, chronicles, memoirs, diaries, memos, letters, newspapers, and 
official government documents (Thies, 2002).  Locating and obtaining primary data 
sources usually poses an ethical problem for most researchers.  However, data 
collection through interviews and content analysis of newspapers did not pose any 
ethical issues to either me, or the participants in my interviews.  I took the trouble to 
understand what constitutes ethical violation on the part of the researcher from the 
University guidelines on ethical research. I committed myself to uphold the 
requirements of the guidelines, and signed off on the ethics forms before I embarked 
on field research. The nature of my research did not pose a threat or harm to any 
person or animals. 
For my content analysis data, discussed in the next chapter, I collected half of my 
newspaper data (1959, 1964/65, 1979, and part of 1983) from the British Library in 
London, after due process of necessary permissions, being a registered member of 
the library. The library staff were quite helpful.   The rest of the newspaper materials 
(part of 1983, 1999, and 2011) were collected in Nigeria, through the national 
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archives at the University of Ibadan, and some directly from the libraries of the 
newspapers that I could not get from the national archives.  
The interviewees were quite willing to participate; indeed many commended the 
research initiative and the topic of research; they thought it was an area in need of 
much scholarly searchlight; some thought that the outcome would potentially prove 
helpful to Nigeria.  To avoid putting any form of pressure on the potential 
participants, I wrote to all of them before I left the UK for my field trip to Nigeria.  
My supervisor also endorsed a separate letter to all of them.  I followed up with 
telephone calls once I arrived in Lagos to book and confirm dates of interviews.  One 
or two responded in writing agreeing to the interview(s), and many in the subsequent 
telephone follow-ups.  Along with the letters, I also forwarded a list of likely 
questions, 14 in all, so they would all be aware of the nature of the information I was 
seeking; nothing I did took them by surprise.  They understood why the information 
was being sought and for what purpose it would be utilised.   
During the interview sessions, I obtained verbal consent before recording, and none 
of them objected being recorded.  At no point did I offer any incentive to any of the 
participants, rather, they offered voluntarily to refer me to other possible 
participants, acknowledging the importance of the subject matter of the research.  At 
least three of the academicians, two of the political leaders and one press leader 
offered me books or pamphlets they thought would be useful in my work.  It is my 
belief that the data collection period did not cause any form of harassment or anxiety 
to any of them.  A few invited me back for more detailed discussions on the state of 
Nigeria, after my work, including a former head of the country. 
There is, however, the issue of non-inclusion of female participants among the 
interviewees; but not for lack of effort. To begin with, there are demographically far 
fewer women in leadership positions in press and politics. But I made efforts to reach 
at least two of them: notably Senator (Mrs) Chris Anyanwu, a former journalist and 
magazine publisher, and Ms Comfort Obi, also a publisher.  I made several attempts 
to reach Mrs Anyanwu, who was quite agreeable to be interviewed; understandably, 
she was not able to accommodate the request in her very busy senate seat re-election 
campaign period. Ms Obi, on the other hand, had to unavoidably postpone each 
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interview she had agreed to; June 5th, 10th, 14th, 23rd, and 26th. My first contact with 
her was on the 4th of June and we actually met to fix the interview for the day after.  
She later explained that she was involved with monitoring the Police Service 
Commission, of which she is a member, conduct interviews for the recruitment of 
10,000 new police officers. Her involvement meant that she had to travel frequently, 
sometimes at short notices, between Abuja, Enugu, and Lagos.  
5.1.4 The Interviews as a Primary Data Source 
As noted in Chapter 4, the interview is a resource for “understanding how individuals 
make sense of their social world and act within it” (May, 2011, p157).  The main 
objective of interviews is to generate data from people on a specific topic or a range 
of topics.  The product of a good interview is “data in the form of words –… language 
in the form of extended text…[based on interviews] carried out in close proximity to 
a local setting for sustained period of time” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p9). This 
foists certain freedoms as well as constraints on the researcher: he must use his 
knowledge and understanding to extract data from long-winded discussions.  
Done sensibly and sensitively, interviews yield a large quantity of high quality data, 
yielding “rich insights into people’s biographies, experiences, opinions, values 
aspirations, attitudes, and feelings” (May, 2011, p131), a form of strength, no doubt. 
But buried inside the strength lies a subsequent weakness in that “in-depth 
qualitative interviewing with a large number of people is both expensive and time 
consuming”, to analyse (May, 2011, p158). My experience was the high likelihood for 
a “good interviewer” to overrun because the interviewer is enjoying the discussion 
and had failed to keep the discussion within the limits of the scope of the study. 
Mindful of the above, a good interview must still produce hardy data. The actual 
interview engagement, therefore, must be structured to allow interviewees to answer 
robustly “than the standardised interview permits, and it provide(s) a greater 
structure for comparability over that of the focused interview” (May, 2002, p135).  
This fact makes it imperative for the researcher to possess a control skill that allows 
him to extract the most within a self-imposed limited time period, being aware that a 
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larger volume of data requires a huge amount of time in order to make sense out of 
such large volumes. 
The researcher must therefore provide for a study-specific designed scheme or 
technique for processing large volumes of textual materials into forms of acceptable 
data.  According to Miles and Huberman (1994), “(d)ata [from interviews] are not 
usually immediately accessible for analysis, but require processing” (p9).  Such 
processing includes transcribing and correction before developing themes. 
5.2.0 DESIGNING TOOLS TO MANAGE TEXTUAL DATA 
With regards to designing analytical tools, it is important to restate that there are 
what Robert Walker (1985) called, “Fundamental differences between the natural 
and social worlds (that) rule out the possibility of using the techniques of natural 
science to study social science phenomena” (p11). In designing analytical process, 
therefore it was crucial that one was guided by the knowledge of these differences.  
Walker further stated that it is inappropriate to ape natural science methods.  Citing 
J. Hughes (1976), he concluded that the experiences of men and women “are not 
particles acted upon by exogenous forces; they are purposeful, goal seeking, feeling, 
meaning attributing and meaning responding creatures” (Walker, 1985, p12). Some 
qualitative researchers have often allowed themselves to get carried away with trying 
to tick all the boxes of natural science in doing their research, and thus overextend 
themselves and still possess a jaundiced result. 
5.2.1 Data Analysis Activity Flow 
Data analysis is a process that pervades the entire research process from data 
selection and up to the final analysis and drawing of conclusions.  Nevertheless, there 
are specific activity flows that guide analysis in order for it not to become muddled 
up in a clueless dead end. 
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5.2.1.1 Procedures: A theme-based approach to qualitative data 
analysis 
The central objectives of data management are to re-order large text in order to make 
the facts, as they relate to the study, accessible; an additional objective is to reduce 
large volume of text in order to use them to answer the essential research questions.  
In my case, I chose a theme-based approach for the interview text analysis, and a 
case-based approach for the content analysis in the next chapter.  Using different 
approaches allowed me make the most of the data generated through each research 
method.  
The theme-based approach made it possible for me to reduce large data through 
summaries and syntheses and manage data in a competent way. My data went 
through several stages of processing in order to bring over five hundred pages of 
transcribed interviews text to a manageable size for interpretation, discussion, and 
report writing.  
5.2.1.2 Organising Data: Transcribing and Editing  
This is the first step in converting audio files to text; for me it was certainly one of the 
most expensive parts of the work, in terms of time and efforts required for a rather 
boring process of transcribing all of 22 long interview sessions, averaging 60-90 
minutes. This was all the more so that I chose to transcribe everything instead of only 
particular aspects of the interviews. Correcting, editing, and general cleaning up of 
textual data followed the process of transcription.  The general process includes 
“proof reading of data to correct errors and to allow for consistency” (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, p347). 
5.2.1.3 Data Reduction Themes-based Approach  
In order to achieve a desirable degree of data reduction through condensing and 
abstraction of transcripts to manageable and usable forms, I had to listen repeatedly 
to the interview audios, read through transcribed text several times, and spend a 
great deal of time to ponder on them. Qualitative data involves “sorting and sifting 
through interviews texts to identify relationships, differences, patterns, distinctions 
and themes between sub-groups” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p9).   
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Reading and thinking through generated data while bearing in mind the overall 
research objectives helped to produce the initial broad scope and theme mapping. 
According to Marshall and Rossman (2010), “This process entails uncovering 
patterns, themes and categories” (p215).  I followed through by operationalising the 
research topic in relation to the research questions, using the “research questions 
and the related literature…[to provide] guidelines for data analysis”  (Marshall and 
Rossman, 2006, p209).   
This process allowed me to arrive at broad, but key concepts that were important to 
the eventual results. Words and concepts like: The Press, Elections, Politics, 
Belonging, and Nigeria, informed the first basic units of my analysis.  I then 
clustered the words and phrases with similar meanings or intents to form themes, as 
guided by the research and interview questions.  This grouping of words and phrases 
to form themes is sometimes referred to as closed coding; it allowed me use the 
research questions and objectives in more specific ways – as driving tools for 
interrogating the interview responses to search out commonalities, differences, and 
patterns.  
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Key Words, Phrases, and Derivatives from the Topic, Research Questions, and Research 
Objectives 
Table 5.1: Key Words and Phrases from the Interviews 
BELONGING ELITE LEADERSHIP NATIONAL IDENTITY POLITICS OF 
BELONGING 
British 
Colonialism 
Ethnicity Nation-Building Post-Colonialism 
Democracy Ethnicisation (of 
politics) 
National Unity Press (Role of)  
Electoral 
Democracy  
Ideology Nationalism Press Reportage 
Elite Politics Values Nation-State Press Ownership 
Electoral 
Violence 
Identity Politics Nigeria Regionalism/ 
Unity 
Federalism Military Political Culture Regional Politics 
Federal Elections Minority (Politics) Press’ Effect/ 
Influence 
Unitary System 
 
As can be easily observed from the above, these key words, and their derivatives are 
not only reflective of the research topic, objectives, and questions, they are also 
exhaustive.  The final phase was coming up with acceptable themes that reflect the 
objectives of the study through clustering of these words around the five key words 
that came out of operationalising the topic, viz: The Press, Elections, Politics, 
Belonging, and Nigeria.  The results are the sub-themes below around which the 
data of the interview responses will be discussed: 
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Table 5.2: Themes and Sub Themes 
THEME SUB-THEME 
Introduction a. Colonialism (Pre/Post-Colonial Politics) 
b. Ideology/Values 
1. Nigerian Nation-
state 
a. The Nigerian Nation State and the Press  
b. Elections and National Unity: lines of tension in 
the press 
c. Regionalism & Regional cohesion 
2. Press a. Role/Influence/Effect of  
b. Ownership & Control of 
c. Elections Reportage & Commentary  
3. Politics a. Political Culture & Ethnicisation (of Politics) 
b. Elite, Elite Politics & Military 
c. Federalism vs. Unitary System 
d. Electoral Democracy & Federal Elections 
4. Belonging 1. Identity Politics & Politics of Belonging  
2. Ethnicity & Minority Politics 
 
5.3.0 CATEGORISATION OF PARTICIPANTS AND DISPLAY 
The selection of a number of “people with specific characteristics, behaviour or 
experience” (Walker, 1985, p30) as discussed in the last chapter is done “to facilitate 
broad comparisons between certain groups that the researcher thinks are important” 
(Walker, 1985, p30).  This is also done to facilitate analysis, in the long run.  In the 
case of this research, the participants are clustered into three composite sub-groups 
ensuring that each group is relatively homogeneous in some ways and yet diverse in 
others.  With regard to occupation and life experiences as well as track records, each 
group is somewhat homogeneous. However, to provide geographical spread, in order 
for the various parts of the country to be represented, they were diverse.   
I conducted a total of 22 in-depth interviews. The interview participants are notable 
leaders; nearly all are household names in Nigeria.  I had set out to conduct at least 
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15 interviews and a maximum of 25.  Because the prospective participants were 
mostly very busy people, I was not sure I would get all of them within the time limit 
that I had for the fieldwork.  But the response to the request for the interviews was 
far more positive than I had anticipated. I was able to get most of the people on my 
initial list, and more. I categorised the 22 leaders into three broad categories: the 
press, academics, and political spheres.  
5.3.1 Data Presentation 
Categorisation and clustering of participants also assists with the display of interview 
data. Finding ways in which data are presented and displayed was a challenge; and 
because my form of data was qualitative and textual, not involving matrices, 
frequency counts, etc., displaying them posed a bit of a challenge.  What I chose to do 
was to use the four research questions to compress interview responses into 
manageable answers that allowed the display in short text forms in which one does 
not lose the essence.  However, in interpretation and discussion of findings, I 
exhaustively used additional data from the interview to develop and categorise 
themes arising from the questions. I also used the three categories of respondents to 
cluster their answers in order to permit and generate easy comparisons in their 
responses. 
5.3.1.1 Political Leadership 
There are eight persons in the Political Leaders category, which includes former 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, former Heads of State General Ibrahim Babangida 
and General Abdulsalami Abubakar, General T.Y. Danjuma, Professor Anya. O. 
Anya, Professor Pat Utomi, Mr. Odia Ofeimun, and current Vice President, Professor 
Yemi Osinbajo. 
5.3.1.2 Academic Leadership 
The Academic Leaders category had the following six persons: Professors Abubakar 
Momoh, Adigun Agbaje, Eghosa Osaghae, Umaru Pate, Okwudiba Nnoli, and 
Emevwo Biakolo.  
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5.3.1.3 Press Leadership 
The Press Leaders category contained another eight persons.  The group has Dr. 
Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo, Mal. Mohammed Haruna, Dr. Patrick Dele Cole, Mr. John 
Irem, Prince Tony Momoh, Dr. Reuben Abati, Dr. Christopher Kolade, and Mr. Femi 
Adesina, the current Presidential Spokesman.   
5.3.2 Intersectionality of Interviewees 
The categorisations in the last section hold true for each of the participants, but it is 
important to highlight the fact that they are also active or have been quite active in 
other areas of our national life. For example, 14 of the 22 participants have been 
high-level public servants in the course of their careers, i.e. Femi Adesina, 
Mohammed Haruna, and Reuben Abati; even though they are known all over the 
country as media leaders, they have been presidential spokespersons for different 
governments, military as well as civilian.  Prince Tony Momoh, a quintessential 
newspaper editor and manager, has served as Federal Information Minister and also 
as a political party chairman. Dr. Christopher Kolade and Dr. Patrick Dele Cole have 
served as the nation’s ambassadors to Great Britain and Brazil respectively; these are 
just a few examples. 
Table 5.3: Function/Role Dynamics 
S/N OF 22 OFFICE HELD OR FUNCTIONED IN 
1 14 of 22 Public Servants 
2 11 of 22 Academics 
3 10 of 22 Leadership Position in Media 
4 9 of 22 Leadership in Party Politics 
5 5 of 22 Sought Elective Political Office 
6 4 of 22 Highly Placed Military Leaders 
7 4 of 22 Heads of Government/President/Vice 
 
The analysis of the interviews is presented in this section. The data is presented 
qualitatively and applied to each of the research questions in order to bring out the 
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findings. Four research questions were formulated for this study and all the 22 
interviewees were asked relevant variables that would answer the research questions. 
Nvivo-11 was used to analyse the interviews.   
5.4.0 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND FINDINGS 
The first research question examines whether reporting and commentary of the press 
during both transitional and consolidation elections helped to define and construct 
Nigeria’s political culture and national identity. The findings and their 
interpretations are presented after the excerpts.  The quotes in the response column 
below are direct (edited) quotes of the interview participants; they are not 
paraphrased summaries. In the key concept column, I tried to extract the driving 
theme or keynote in the discourse. 
5.4.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct 
Nigeria’s political culture and national identity? 
5.4.1.1 Political Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSES KEY CONCEPTS 
Abdulsalami 
Abubakar 
In a way, reporting and commentary have tried 
to describe the political culture, but portrayed 
ethnicity. In Nigeria, we have both the 
government press and the private press, so it 
depends on which side the reporter is but 
definitely it played a role in bringing out 
ethnicity in the country. 
Reportage portrayed ethnicity. 
Ownership: Government vs. 
Private 
Anya O. 
Anya 
It is an issue of value because, if the national 
identity is as it were, defined by the values that 
you share and accept, and those values actually 
will influence and affect how the press will 
handle issues, it becomes a roadmap for even 
the press. 
Absence of values is a problem. 
Values are road maps. 
Ibrahim 
Babangida 
The press has helped, in no small measure, both 
under colonial regime, after independence, and 
during the War; the press helped a lot in trying 
to get this country to remain as one. By and 
large, on the whole concept of Nigerian 
The Press has helped to unite 
Nigeria and provide knowledge. 
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PARTICIPANT RESPONSES KEY CONCEPTS 
nationhood, credit will go to the press for 
enlightening the people. 
T.Y. 
Danjuma 
Now, the press is a mirror of the society, 
whereas in the colonial days, it was the official 
opposition to the colonial authority, it spoke in 
many languages, but the target was always the 
colonial administration. 
The Press mirrors the society. 
Olusegun 
Obasanjo 
The press was one of the main instruments used 
by our fathers who fought for independence; the 
press was one of the main tools or main 
weapons, so the Nigerian press, therefore, had 
developed an anti-government culture, seeing 
government in a particular type of light. So we 
had the press that had developed the culture of 
antagonism. When the government became our 
own, we had two type of press: the antagonistic 
and the subservient. 
An instrument of self-
liberation. 
Learned to be antagonistic from 
colonial period. 
Odia 
Ofeimun 
In a lot of ways, I will say yes, the press helped 
to define and construct Nigeria’s political 
culture and national identity. Whether you 
begin from 1859 or any of the days thereafter, 
you would have to consider that the elites; 
those who read newspapers, were actually 
prime movers in the system. And that the ideas 
they shared within themselves were usually very 
well reflected in the newspapers they read. 
The Press defined and 
constructed culture and 
identity. 
An elite medium.  
Yemi 
Osinbajo 
I look at the press and what I have seen is that, 
it presents itself as a platform for several ideas. 
It is almost a parliament of sorts and that has 
allowed for a free enough exchange of ideas, 
but then there were also situations where you 
found that the press, especially in the early 
days, took clearly ethnic positions. In fact, 
several, after a while, began to promote ethnic 
positions along the lines of the thinking of the 
political parties or the ideology of the party. 
A parliament, an ideas forum.  
Promoted ethnic positions. 
Reflected ideologies of political 
owners. 
Pat Utomi In many ways, it is impossible to think of the 
narrative of any election season without the role 
of the press, but as traditional studies of media 
show clearly, sometimes the influence of the 
press can be exaggerated and there are so many 
intermediating factors and all that, but you 
cannot rule out the fact that, the press, in their 
reporting, were highly critical in setting the 
agenda in images. 
Its role is crucial during 
election seasons. 
Sets agenda. 
5.4.1.2 Academic Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPT 
Abubakar Well, it is hard to tell, the press in the country The press has been 
CHAPTER 5 
 
189 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPT 
Momoh  
 
has been very professional but have also been 
very political and ideological. The 
professionalism of the press is intercepted, 
framed, or coloured by ideology and politics in 
such a way that, no matter what the bend of the 
press is, some of those ethical issues that border 
on code of ethics and practice are often not 
maintained to the letter, you often see a bend. 
professional, political, and 
ideological. 
Not ethical enough.  
Emevwo 
Biakolo 
I will suggest that the press, being one of a range 
of cultural institutions, certainly can be seen as 
participating in defining the nature of political 
culture, political sensibilities, and political 
mindsets. 
Helps to define political 
culture. 
Eghosa 
Osaghae 
Well, in a variety of ways. But I think, most 
interestingly, that it has done so in a 
paradoxical, if not contradictory way. I would 
say yes, the press is there to promote ethnicity 
and regionalism questions as central to election 
success. 
Influence of the press has been 
paradoxical and contradictory.  
Okwudiba 
Nnoli 
Yes, the press reporting did. Initially, the 
reporting didn’t have any ethnic bias until 1951, 
when the political situation developed between 
Awolowo and Azikiwe and from my own point of 
view, Awolowo was looking for political space, 
which at that time was dominated by Zik… the 
only way that he could find a space was to use 
the ethnic question as he couldn’t use the class 
or anti-colonialism question. 
Political elite used the ethnic 
question to find relevance (with 
the aid of the press). 
Umaru 
Pate 
Yes! You cannot divorce the happenings on the 
political scene from the performance of the 
media. Coming from that perspective and also 
looking at the performance of the media, 
definitely the various fault lines that we talk 
about in Nigeria are clearly captured and 
reflected in the Nigerian media system. 
Politics and media are linked. 
(But media may be a reflector). 
Adigun 
Agbaje 
 
I will say it has been a two-way relationship but 
the reporting and commentary of the press have 
helped to define, and construct Nigeria’s 
political culture and national identity. 
Influence is both ways. It’s a 
symbiotic relationship.  
5.4.1.3  Press Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPT 
Reuben 
Abati 
 
Certainly yes, if you look at the history of the 
Nigerian press since 1859, we have been lucky to 
have a press that is a crusading one, a press that 
sees itself as a champion of the interest of the 
downtrodden, of the voiceless, a press that 
considers itself committed to truth for the 
advancement of the people’s interests. 
A crusading press. Committed 
champion of the voiceless 
masses’ interests.  
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Femi 
Adesina 
 
Yes, I think there is every reason to agree that 
the reporting of the press helped to construct 
that culture, whatever that culture is. Because 
it’s also quite debatable whether we have the 
kind of what you can call a political culture. The 
reporting by the press has helped in a great deal 
to construct it. 
Press has helped to construct a 
political culture. (But culture 
must be defined). 
Mohammed 
Haruna 
 
Yes! Of course it did, because the whole essence 
of reporting is like the mirror. Initially people 
were more like Nigeria first, then my ethnic 
identity next. That was how Zik’s NCNC, for 
instance, was started as a Pan-African thing and 
Zik inspired a lot of politicians that came along; 
that’s why you could have a Hausa man become 
a mayor in Enugu, so you had all that, initially. 
But of course with time, as independence came 
with the competition for power, people began to 
withdraw into their shells and the press began to 
reflect that. 
Yes. But it changed with the 
changing political structures 
and circumstances. 
John Irem 
 
I will quickly say yes, it did. The Nigerian press 
as it were, was born in adversity and (hence) it 
had its major focus on agitation. It was an 
instrument for agitation by the nationalists, and 
so the Nigerian press had always seen the 
situation as a ‘we’ versus ‘them’ one. 
The Press was born in adversity 
and has maintained its 
adversarial roots. 
Christopher 
Kolade 
 
The reporting and commentary of the press 
certainly had a big influence on the shape that 
things took for some important reasons. 
A big influence on how Nigeria 
turned out. 
Onukaba 
Adinoyi-Ojo 
 
Yes. I believe so, but of course it has to be 
qualified. The press has not directly helped to 
fashion a national identity, but it has reflected 
the views of an ownership and the ownership is 
often concerned with group interest. That group 
could be ethnic, political, religious, business, or 
economic. The first level of identity is often a 
group, in most times, ethnic groups, and then 
other groups before the nation. 
Yes. But it was mainly 
concerned with (elite) 
ownership and group interests. 
Tony 
Momoh 
 
Very minimally. We had well organised parties in 
the Regions, the Action Group in the Western 
Region, the NCNC in the Eastern Region, NPC in 
the Northern Region, and these political leaders 
had a lot of following, and the parties were very 
well organised and the impact of ethnicity was 
very visible. The political leaders themselves 
were very strong and because of the low level of 
literacy that time, their word of mouth, like the 
town criers, had more impacts than newspapers. 
Role and influence of the press 
has been very minimal. 
(Elite leadership had direct 
contact with the grassroots). 
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P.D. Cole 
 
Yes, I would think so…truthfully, yes, we have a 
nation, but we are different peoples, and we 
want to preserve that identity; the press has 
been able to drive both ideologies, but not to 
the level of extreme where one is ousting the 
other. I do not believe that we have a press for 
example that would favour a particular small 
identity over the national identity if the 
question is posed in terms of “what should we 
do?” But once you begin to think in terms of 
these two antipodes, then you’ve already 
introduced tension within the system and it is 
that tension and how to manage it, that is the 
job of the politicians and of the press. 
Yes, and the press has helped 
to manage the tension of two 
ideological antipodes well 
enough to preserve both 
ideologies that must coexist for 
the nation to survive. 
5.4.1.4 Findings on Research Question 1 
The views given across the three groups (with varying emphasis on different touch 
points) indicate that the press has helped to define and construct Nigeria’s political 
culture and national identity. In other words, Nigeria has a political culture; it is just 
that it may not be the helpful type. Prince Tony Momoh, however, believes that effect 
of reportage and commentary, if any, was minimal. Other interviewees, irrespective 
of their positions or ethnic statuses, agreed that the press reflects Nigeria’s political 
culture, if any; but that it has also managed to navigate the careful balance between 
the ethnic or regional identity and the national identity.  
Certain trends emerged from what was said: The first was that the promise of 
independence played a part by changing the ideological focus of the press from 
national to regional. Secondly, at independence, the focus changed again to 
ownership and group interests.  But through all the changes, the press has managed 
a balanced tension between these interests and that of the nation. Thus, though 
lacking in what can be termed some central national values to which all must 
subscribe, the press has provided a platform for exchange of regional ideas or 
interests, within the boundaries of an ill-defined national political culture and 
identity.  The outcomes of these views answer the first research question. 
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5.4.2  THE SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The second research question focused on the self-identities of the component ethnic 
groups that make up the nation.  It was posed to examine whether the press 
reportage and commentary at federal election season reflects or affects the identities 
of the constituent ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”. The responses given 
and their interpretations are presented below.  
Did press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflect or 
affect the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the 
search to belong”? 
5.4.2.1 Political Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSES KEY CONCEPTS 
Abdulsalami 
Abubakar 
In some instances, I would say press reportage 
and commentary do more damage than 
unifying because they bring our ethnicity and 
tribal differences to the forefront and also 
bring a split in the country, so to speak. I 
don’t think Nigeria is a nation yet; we are 
collections of different ethnic-nationalities. 
Yes. The press has highlighted 
cleavages, what divides us, to 
the detriment of what unites the 
nation. 
Anya O. 
Anya 
The press did not have its own voice, they 
responded to what was happening and 
reported what was happening, and basically, 
much of our elections have tended to be 
driven by sectional interests which was 
reflected in the press. 
Yes.The press only reflected the 
reality of a divided nation to the 
nation. 
Yemi 
Osinbajo 
I think generally, there is very little effort not 
to ethnicise partisan politics, and sometimes, 
it’s clear what the ethnic message is. It 
happens all the time and I think it’s true. 
Again the press today is one that has many 
platforms and ownership issues still manage to 
project some ethnic biases; also, the major 
players are given a platform to ethnicise 
politics, so yes, the press reportage reflects or 
affects this self-identity that we are talking 
about. 
Yes.The press did not fight the 
inclination to be partisan or 
ethnicise. 
Pat Utomi Many times, the impression can be that the 
press has shaped this narrative, whereas the 
press is basically a reflection of the narrative 
that has been constructed by political actors. 
Yes, but the press does not shape 
the narratives, it only reflects 
existing ones. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
193 
5.4.2.2 Academic Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPTS 
Abubakar 
Momoh  
 
Yes the press has. They cut across, in some 
they turn out as ethnic, in others, as regional. 
Because you see, the six geopolitical zone 
thing comes out as religion and all that. So it’s 
a multifaceted, intersectional way of viewing 
identity politics, it expresses itself in various 
forms and ways and ethnicity is just one of 
them. 
Yes. The press reflects the 
intersectional and multiple 
faces of identity politics.  
Emevwo 
Biakolo 
I have to say certainly, press reportage 
reflected self-identity, particularly the earlier 
elections. From the first one in ‘59 right until 
about ’79, if you look at the nature of the 
press for instance and its structure in terms of 
ownership and in terms of the kind of press we 
had in those days, you would see that to some 
extent, though I don’t know how considerable 
an extent. 
Yes, but mainly from an 
ownership and a structural 
perspectives.  
Eghosa 
Osaghae 
Yes! They are slanted reports. A great number 
of the press is partisan. But when you consider 
the regional, the ethnic, the state lenses from 
which issues are reported or even analysed, 
one can say that the press has contributed to 
the issue of ethnicity. Sometimes when push 
has come to shove, they don’t have 
pretentions at all. 
Yes. The press, because it is 
partisan, had little choice but 
to reflect its essence.  
Okwudiba 
Nnoli 
Yes, in Nigeria, right from the struggle for the 
constitution, began the question of who is 
going to be the leader of the country and if 
our choice does not emerge, then let’s have a 
regional arrangement so that we can look after 
ourselves, so that was when the press really 
changed gear. 
Yes. It only reflected the 
structural changes in the 
nation. 
Umaru Pate Yes! Our elections are certainly some kind of 
precipitating factors to conflicts and the press, 
unfortunately, played along the same line. If 
you care to do some content analysis on how 
the media behaved during elections, mostly 
the media focused on petty issues, on 
personalities, on the same common faults of 
ideology, of religion and so on. 
Yes.Not robust enough in depth 
of thought. Too preoccupied 
with low-end narratives. 
Adigun 
Agbaje 
 
Yes, it reflected self-identity because the so-
called federal arrangement actually arose from 
regional considerations. 
Yes. But it only tows the 
federal structural 
arrangements. 
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5.4.2.3 Press Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPTS 
Reuben 
Abati 
 
Well in the 1959 and 1964 elections, certainly 
yes, because by then, there was a lot of 
competition among the Regions. There was 
also competition within the Regions, and so 
people set up newspapers to serve their own 
political interests and even columnists became 
very partisan. 
Yes. Partisanship in the press 
only mirrored inter- regional 
competition. 
Femi 
Adesina 
 
This is coming at a very good time, with the 
2015 elections still recent, all the features in 
the country were reflected in how that 
election was reported and conducted. You will 
see that the press also stood on different 
sides, depending on ownership and depending 
on other influences.  So, I will say the press 
and the reportage of the elections, 
particularly those last ones, left a lot more to 
be desired in Nigeria. There definitely was a 
play up of those fault lines. 
Yes. The position of the press 
was determined by ownership, 
“other influences”, and partisan 
politics. 
Mohammed 
Haruna 
 
I will say the manner in which the first post-
independence elections were reported 
portrayed a lot of ethnicity and regionalism. 
Yes, the press portrayed 
ethnicity and regionalism.  
John Irem 
 
Of course press reportage affected self-
identity, and that has been the trend over the 
years. When it is not election season, there is 
a little bit of fairness, a little bit of balance in 
the reportage, but whenever it is time for 
elections or it’s getting to the time of 
elections, the slant can easily be discerned. 
Yes. Partisanship is more strongly 
discernible during election years. 
Christopher 
Kolade 
 
Yes! You see the press reportage had to start 
from somewhere and even today, we can see 
that the press can have its own position. From 
the beginning, we should remember that the 
press was not an autonomous institution; 
people who had certain interests built it up 
and because they had those interests, the 
manifestation of the press to start with, had to 
reflect the fact that these were institutions 
that were being established by people with 
peculiar interests. 
Yes, but ownership interest was 
at play. (The Press had little 
choice). 
Onukaba 
Adinoyi-Ojo 
 
I will say to a large extent yes, because if you 
look at press ownership now, there are very 
powerful political actors who own press 
organisations. They use those press to advance 
their own interests and perhaps advance the 
interest of the groups to which they belong. 
Yes. But powerful political 
interests also owned the press. 
Tony 
Momoh 
 
I think the effect of what we as media men 
and women report is exaggerated. If you look 
at all that, one can say that to the extent 
that, there is that large extension of media, 
No. The effect is exaggerated.  If 
any, it is minimal. 
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then there is that impact, but if you look at 
reportage with respect of newspaper, I can say 
it’s minimal, it is exaggerated.  
P.D. Cole 
 
No I don’t think so. I think that the politicians 
use ethnic identities as a sort of a road to 
power, not in opposition. In other words, not 
up till the Civil War did the sentiments that 
being from one part of the country itself is an 
existential threat to that part by the way in 
which the other parts regarded that part 
(come to the fore); that was what the Civil 
War was about. 
No. Politicians, not the press, are 
the ones who use ethnic 
identities as a road to power. 
 
5.4.2.4 Findings on Research Question 2 
The responses given here show that press reportage and commentary at federal 
election seasons reflected or affected the self-identity of the components ethnic-
nationalities in “the search to belong” in Nigeria. However, the opinions of the two 
former highly placed newspaper managers, Prince Tony Momoh and Dr. P. Dele 
Cole, were different from the rest (Momoh was the Editor, and Dr. Dele Cole, 
MD/CEO, of the highly influential Daily Times newspaper, in its heydays). Cole did 
not think the press reportage and commentary reflected or affected the issue of self-
identity among the ethnic nationalities; Momoh believed if such a thing ever 
occurred, it was exaggerated and the impact minimal. Apart from the contrary views 
held by the two press leaders, most of the leaders across the three groups believed 
that press reportage and commentary at federal election seasons reflect or affect the 
self-identity of the component ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”. Despite 
the mostly across the board agreement, they each gave different reasons why election 
reportage mirrors ethnic cleavages and identities. 
5.4.3 THE THIRD RESEARCH QUESTION 
The third research question examined whether the political elite fostered 
ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to 
promote ethnicity or regionalism. Opinions of interviewees are presented.  
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Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their 
leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or 
regionalism? 
5.4.3.1 Political Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPTS 
Abdulsalami 
Abubakar 
When you are conducting election(s) in the 
state, you find ethnicity comes more into play. 
Nigeria is a conglomeration of tribes in all the 
states. Anywhere you go, you will find the 
dominant tribe in the state and the minority, 
but ethnicity is less evident in the federal for 
somebody who is looking for (the) presidency, 
of course he dares not play the ethnicity card, 
because he is seen to be the symbol of Nigeria. 
The ethnic card is not relevant at 
the federal level; only at the 
state levels.  
Anya O. 
Anya 
I would say yes and the reason is simple. The 
quality of what you call the political elites in 
Nigeria has been unfortunate, it has not been 
our best educated, it has not been our best 
achievers, it has not been our hardest thinkers 
that have populated the political elites.  
Yes, because the quality of elite 
is poorly sourced. 
Ibrahim 
Babangida 
Yes! I will say so, because the political elites 
capitalised on their leadership a lot, to try and 
create friction amongst some ethnic groups, 
thus fostering ethnicisation.  
Yes.  The elite create frictions 
that foster ethnicsation 
T.Y. 
Danjuma 
Surprisingly, the dialogue among the political 
elite in the colonial days was good and at that 
time, religion, which is one of the crosses that 
this country will continue to bear, was not as 
virulent as it is today. But partisan politics 
began and the press also joined in tribal views. 
The political elite fostered this ethnicisation.  
Yes, but it was not so at the 
beginning. The press was a joiner 
to the elite’s project. 
Olusegun 
Obasanjo 
They did! To the Tribune for instance, there 
was nothing that Awolowo could do that could 
be wrong and there was nothing that Sardauna 
could do that could be right, Gaskiya Ta fi 
Kwabo was to project and propel Sardauna and 
the North and nothing good could come from 
the South.  
Yes. The press was a tool of the 
elite to fight political battles, in 
ethnic frames. 
Odia 
Ofeimun 
Yes, the political elite fostered ethnicisation 
of politics. I mean once you became the leader 
of the Western Region, and you could not 
break into other Regions to determine policy, 
you had to defend your own. Zik owned a 
newspaper, Awolowo learned from Zik how to 
own a newspaper, but once he owned his 
newspaper, he could bring up issues of 
competence and the rest of it.  
Yes. The press was a partisan 
tool in the hands of political 
elite. 
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Yemi 
Osinbajo 
Oh yes! I think political elites certainly have, 
it’s the easiest way to rally the troops, 
appealing to those kinds of sentiments.  
Yes. The elite used the press to 
rally troops. 
Pat Utomi Absolutely! That’s the position I hold; in fact, 
most media were set up to project the 
political ambitions of particular elite and the 
elite used something that the British gave us, 
‘divide and rule’, and so deliberately polarised 
the polity using media.  
Yes. The press was set up to 
project elite’s political goals. 
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5.4.3.2 Academic Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPTS 
Abubakar 
Momoh  
Yes, to a large extent.   
Emevwo 
Biakolo 
Even though the federal and state 
governments owned these organs, the fact 
that the audience and the readership came 
from certain geographies, and therefore 
certain ethnic configurations, made the press 
tend to play to the tune of the audience. 
Yes. Location of operations and 
audience also influence roles 
played by the press. 
Eghosa 
Osaghae 
The decision of who occupies a political office 
is usually taken from an ethnic point of view 
rather than a political party point of view. 
Political parties don’t have the kind of hold 
that the more generic ethnic and regional 
organisations have. If you wanted to be 
relevant, you first had to become an integral 
part of ethnic-based movements like the 
Arewa, Oodua and the likes. 
Ethnicity is a political currency; 
it buys relevance.  
Okwudiba 
Nnoli 
Yes. Awolowo was able to gain leadership in 
the West; even though Zik got elected in the 
West, he was prevented from being the leader 
of opposition in the West, so he was now 
forced to go to the East and become Premier 
and it was just a complete mess as far as 
ethnicity was concerned, and it was fuelled by 
the press. 
Yes. The first generation 
politicians planted the seed of 
ethnicity in politics. 
Umaru Pate Yes! And not only that, they also exploited the 
press for their own intra-elite clashes and 
fights. It became a tussle between the elites 
of the different regions of the country at that 
time and that led to the first military coup.  
Yes. The political elite exploited 
ethnicity using the press. 
Adigun 
Agbaje 
 
Yes. I would say definitely yes, the fact that both the 
leadership and key press ownership converged was 
quite toxic to Nigeria’s early political history. They 
were owners, publishers, and they converted to 
manage the media empires [which] were tied 
towards their political fortunes 
Yes. Press ownership and 
political leadership convergence 
was toxic to early history 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
199 
5.4.3.3 Press Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPTS 
Reuben 
Abati 
 
Newspaper is an instrument of power and 
because it’s an instrument of power, you 
cannot delink it from politics. When a man 
sets up a newspaper, he has his own agenda, it 
was the case that during the First Republic, 
those newspapers were almost directly linked 
to political parties and because they were 
linked to political parties, their owners had no 
qualms about using those newspapers to 
pursue their political interests.   
Yes, but the newspaper is an 
instrument of power; it must 
serve elite’s ownership and 
political interests. 
Femi 
Adesina 
 
The political elites exploited their press 
ownership positions very massively because 
they believe you must first seize your own 
immediate background and environment and 
then, from there you can launch out. In fact, 
it’s a dictum. The more you can ethnicise 
politics, the better for you.  
Yes. The elite exploited the press 
to drive ethnic-based  political 
agendas. 
Mohammed 
Haruna 
 
Oh! They absolutely did. There is no doubt 
about that. The political elites realised that 
the colonialists had decided to leave, so they 
used the easiest instrument to us – the 
primordial one! They did this because it’s a lot 
of hard work to convince somebody who is not 
from your ethnic group, or of the same faith.   
Yes. Primordial ethnic route to 
political was the easiest.  
John Irem 
 
Yes, and to their own advantage. In most 
cases, Nigeria has witnessed this promotion of 
some primordial interests, by the political 
elites, especially where the candidates realise 
that, they may not be popular enough to 
rationally emerge as winning candidates. So 
they retreat to either ethnic or religious 
inclinations to whip up sentiments and then, 
ride on the crests of those sentiments to be 
able to get endorsed.  
Yes. Whipping up ethnic 
sentiments served as an easy 
route to political power. 
Christopher 
Kolade 
 
Yes, the political elite definitely did. And it 
arose from the fact that trying to come away 
from colonial governance, they felt that they 
had to have strong platforms on which they 
could hopefully achieve what they were trying 
to do, therefore it was natural for them to try 
to first build their own base within their ethnic 
grouping.  
Yes. It was natural for them to 
build from their own ethnic bases 
first. 
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Onukaba 
Adinoyi-Ojo 
 
They tend to, they used to. Ethnicity becomes 
a refuge that some of the political elites run 
into, especially when they have cases to 
answer. They tend to rally people around 
them. Ethnicity becomes a ready refuge at the 
time of crisis. But, the grip of ethnicity is 
loosening. Right now, you hardly see ethnicity 
being advanced or promoted by the Nigerian 
press.  
Yes, but that was in the past. It 
is no longer the.. case. 
Tony 
Momoh 
 
In fact, they caused it (not to foster), they 
caused it, the political elite caused it. And 
they were the owners of most newspapers. 
And newspapers brought their own form of 
ethnicisation and control.  
Yes. The eliteethnicised politics 
through their press ownership.  
P.D. Cole 
 
Oh yes! Absolutely! I think the template which 
the politicians used in Nigeria is the same that 
they’ve always used, other people have also 
used, but basically, a person who wants to 
become a political leader believes that he has 
to own a press or sets about trying to influence 
it or manage it or whatever.  
Yes. A proven template using 
ownership to control the press 
for political goals.   
 
5.4.3.4 Findings on Research Question 3 
When it comes to the issue of whether the political elite fostered ethnicisation of 
politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to promote 
ethnicity or regionalism, most of the interviewees were in agreement that political 
elite actually fostered ethnicisation during the nation’s elections, but they advanced 
different arguments for why this is the case. However, former Head of State, General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar, Eghosa Osaghae, and Adigun Agbaje neither agreed nor 
disagreed. Abubakar felt that the issue of ethnicisation was only possible at the state 
level and not federal. Osaghae saw ethnicisation as a basic political currency required 
at the entry point. Agbaje took the same neutral position. Apart from the three 
neutral positions, all other interviewees believed that political elite foster 
ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership or press ownership positions to 
promote ethnicity or regionalism. 
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5.4.4 THE FOURTH RESEARCH QUESTION 
The last research question follows below. The question investigated the effect of the 
press, whether beneficial or harmful, to the notion of nation-building and national 
unity, and the practice of democracy, and federalism. The interviewees provided the 
answers below: 
Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation-
building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy, and 
federalism? 
5.4.4.1 Political Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPTS 
Abdulsalami 
Abubakar 
I think the press, under the circumstances, is 
doing what they can, but more could be done, 
more balanced reporting, more balanced 
educating, in order to have a true democracy 
that will add to this country and to practice 
true federalism that will stop all these 
agitations we have today.  
The press is doing its best to 
preserve democracy.  
Anya O. 
Anya 
Generally yes, you cannot ignore the role of 
the press, as it has been beneficial to nation-
building and national unity. I mean the mere 
fact that the world is now a global village, 
much of the external values are influencing 
our press, and to that extent, we are having 
the benefits of modernity through the press.  
The role of the press has been 
beneficial to nation building and 
unity. 
Ibrahim 
Babangida 
It all depends on how one looks at it, on 
whether the press has helped to unite or 
create more division, particularly in the 
practice of democracy. I think you can easily 
align the press now, you can pick up any 
newspaper today, and when you read it, you 
know where it stands, its position.  
Sometimes it is beneficial, 
sometimes it is not. 
T.Y. 
Danjuma 
Yes. All in all, the effect of the press has been 
beneficial, but it is the duty of the press to 
apply caution and self-censorship when it 
comes to the image of the nation to the 
outside world.  
Yes, the effect of the press has 
been beneficial. 
Odia 
Ofeimun 
On nation building, you can say to a very large 
extent, the press nationalised Nigerian 
opinion. In a lot of ways, they succeeded, even 
when they were based on disagreements, 
national opinion engaged every area of 
Nigerian life.  
Yes, it has been beneficial for 
nation building. 
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Yemi 
Osinbajo 
I think the press has been helpful to nation-
building on the balance. You know obviously, 
where the press may have failed is in 
encouraging or reinforcing the stereotypes 
that have kept us down, namely the 
ethnicisation and all of those kinds of things. 
On national unity, if there is ethnicisation and 
it’s not reflected in a positive way, it’s meant 
to cause disunity amongst the people and the 
press presents the platform for it, if it doesn’t 
overtly support their point of view. 
Yes it has been helpful to nation-
building. But it has failed in 
encouraging ethnicised 
stereotypes. 
Pat Utomi I think the press has generally been beneficial 
to the democratic process. In trying to advise, 
you could say that they could do more by 
raising issues and not frivolities, which have 
dominated our public space, in that sense the 
value of the democratic process has been 
watered down.  
Yes. It has been beneficial to 
democratic process. 
 
5.4.4.2 Academic Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPTS 
Abubakar 
Momoh  
In fairness, the press in this country has always 
been critical about military rule and they never run 
away from that responsibility. But also, I am saying 
that the press was not homogenous, but heavily 
divided - different press houses and journalists took 
differing perspectives on nation building, national 
unity, federalism and democracy. There was 
nobody who outrightly said that military rule must 
remain in perpetuity, but you found journalists who 
were writing and defending military leaders.  
The press has represented 
various shades of views. 
Emevwo 
Biakolo 
I don’t think it was beneficial to national unity.  No. It has not been 
beneficial. 
Eghosa 
Osaghae 
Yes and no. This is because the press has always 
functioned like some kind of political party, 
representing constituencies of interests, whether 
ethnic or not. 
Beneficial in some ways and 
harmful in others. 
Okwudiba 
Nnoli 
The press has contributed to increase centrifugal 
forces in the society like every other political 
element because of the system. It is a systemic 
thing; you cannot single out only the press, because 
the politicians are also there. 
Harmful in some ways, but 
the press is not alone. 
Umaru Pate It is both ways. Beneficial in some ways and 
harmful in others. 
Adigun 
Agbaje 
I think it was beneficial, but the problem I see is 
that we still have not seen practise of democracy, 
It has been beneficial, but 
it’s a work-in-progress. 
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 and we still have not seen what to call nation 
building actually coming to significant profile. But 
it is ongoing; it is always a work-in-progress, and to 
that extent, I will say that generally, the press has 
been beneficial.  
 
5.4.4.3 Press Leaders 
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE KEY CONCEPTS 
Reuben 
Abati 
 
There are people who still believe what they 
read in the newspapers, and who are 
influenced by those things. The dangerous 
thing is that, those people that were 
influenced are people in positions of authority, 
policy makers, and they are conscientised to 
see Nigeria first from their own ethnic prism.  
The press has been harmful in 
influence. 
Femi 
Adesina 
 
On the notion of nation-building and national 
unity, I will say it is mixed in Nigeria. It’s easy 
to accuse the press and rightly so, of 
pandering to some primordial loyalties. But 
then, when it also comes to Nigeria, the press 
stands up to be counted in this country. So 
that’s why I said it’s a mixed fad. I will say the 
press oscillates between the primordial and 
nationalistic loyalties.  
It’s a mixed bag: between 
harmful and beneficial; between 
the primordial and nationalistic 
loyalties.  
Mohammed 
Haruna 
 
The effect of the press was less beneficial to 
the notion of nation-building. On national 
unity, they were reflecting the divisiveness 
and even reinforcing it, and it follows that 
since they were doing that, they didn’t help 
much. Of course, they helped a lot to get the 
power, to get the colonialists to go, but once 
they left, the primordial issues became 
dominant and they reinforced and played them 
up.  
Not altogether beneficial. 
John Irem 
 
On the notion of nation-building, I will say yes 
and no. Yes, in the sense that, for the press, 
which the nationalists used to sensitise and 
mobilise the people against colonial 
authorities, their struggle would have been in 
vain. On the downside, in 1959/1964, some 
people might believe that the best candidate 
never really won, but once elections are 
conducted, lost, and won, the focus should 
shift to governance, and not politics. You 
discover that the press was still focusing on 
some ethnic kind of politics, even after 1959.  
Yes and no. More on the ‘no’ side 
Christopher 
Kolade 
If I were to answer that question with one 
first, I would say beneficial. Beneficial 
Yes, but it could have done 
more. 
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 because, every time you allow discussion and 
interaction in an open arena, the ultimate 
result is an airing of positions, but in terms of 
democracy and federalism, my major 
perception of the press is that the press has 
missed many golden opportunities that they 
had, to strengthen democracy and federalism.   
Onukaba 
Adinoyi-Ojo 
 
On the notion of nation-building and national 
unity, I think the Nigerian press generally has 
been very nationalistic. On democracy and 
federalism, I think the press has been 
beneficial. And in cases where they have not 
done so, it is not because they don’t want to 
do it or that they don’t see it as their role; it 
is because they don’t have the capacity to.  
Mostly beneficial. Where they 
have fallen short, it has been 
because they lack capacity. 
Tony 
Momoh 
 
On the notion of nation-building and national 
unity, I will say, harmful, very harmful!  
Harmful. Very harmful 
P.D. Cole 
 
On the notion of nation-building and national 
unity, it is dangerous to even consider the 
press as a unipolar institution. I think that 
even in the worst excesses of regional 
nationalism or ethnic nationalism, the press 
has never been unwilling to see a larger 
picture. To that extent, the press has been a 
major supporter in the creation of the Nigerian 
enterprise. The nature of the press is to be 
controversial; it is to raise uncomfortable 
issues.  
Beneficial. The press is not a 
unipolar body, but it supports the 
national project.  
 
5.4.4.4 Findings on Research Question 4 
On whether the effect of the press was beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation-
building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy and federalism, the views 
were mixed. The political leaders are of the view that on nation-building, the press 
has been beneficial; but on national unity, the press has been harmful. The academic 
leaders expressed the mixed bag view differently; they say the problem is rooted in 
the system, as encapsulated by the view of Okwudiba Nnoli: the press is not a lone 
ranger; it acts in concert with other member-institutions of the society.  It is the 
system that will determine the effect of the press.  Picking up from there, the Press 
Leaders group also present a mixed bag of press effect, but Dr. Cole thinks it is 
dangerous to consider the press as a unipolar institution; even when it raises 
CHAPTER 5 
 
205 
uncomfortable questions, for it is in the nature of the press to do so…those 
uncomfortable questions eventually serve the overall national interest. 
5.5.0 CONCLUSION 
The focus of this chapter has been the presentation of the results and analysis of 
fieldwork data obtained in Nigeria.  The data was acquired through in-depth elite 
interviews of 22 subjects divided for ease of analysis into three categories of press 
leaders, political leaders, and academics. Their general position is, while 
acknowledging that the press has done much to unite the nation, it could have done 
more, even while also noting the limiting influence of ownership. This chapter also 
looked at the issues of positionality of the researcher, particularly as it applies in an 
interview situation.  From these results, specific themes were derived for discussion 
in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6.1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the press coverage of six selected presidential elections in 
Nigeria between 1959 and 2011. As explained in Chapter One, content analysis was 
employed to gather the data, which are analysed in this chapter to establish the 
nature and patterns of press coverage over the six selected election periods.  The goal 
of this approach is to avoid confusion of data, which sometimes happens when 
demand is made on two different data obtaining methods to provide answers to one 
research question.  Such confusion occurs, not because the conflicting answers are 
wrong in themselves, but because of the multiplicity of variables in the research 
questions, which may be difficult for a quantitative method to capture. According to 
Fred Kerlinger (1973), content analysis provides a “method of studying and analyzing 
communications in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner to measure 
variables” (p525).  
Archival documents like newspapers provide insights into the construction of 
histories and identities; reliance on elite interviews alone will not have given the 
breadth as well as depth required to fully investigate the subject matter of this 
research, which the use of both methods now provides, complimenting each other.  
6.1.1 Content Analysing the Press: The Process  
The data analysed in this chapter were gathered from nine newspapers through 
content analysis method. The analysed newspaper contents were four weeks of front 
page news stories and editorial opinions of the papers during the federal election 
periods of 1959, 1964/1965, 1979, 1983, 1999, and 2011.  As explained in Chapters 
One and Four, election seasons usually provide a robust period for powerful and 
public inter-ethnic exchanges, particularly in the press. One of the advantages of 
media content analysis, a specialised sub-set of content analysis, is that it “allows 
examination of a wide range of data over an extensive period to identify popular 
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discourses and their likely meanings” (Macnamara 2003, p6). The six selected 
elections were categorised into two types – transition elections and consolidation 
elections, with each category containing three elections.   
This approach generated a lot of newspaper data because of the number of papers 
and weeks of tracking, which is four weeks for each election period - three weeks 
before and one week after each election. This was done to capture the most intense 
periods of the elections and the immediate week following the voting which includes 
the announcement of the election results.  I also thought that the four-week period 
would provide adequate data – not too much and not too little, taking into account 
that one of the papers was published only twice a week. In the end, a total of 606 
newspaper editions were content analysed, with each newspaper contributing about 
67 editions. In these editions, only political stories relating to the pending elections, 
on the front page, and editorials about the same, were content analysed.  A total of 1, 
243 political stories on the front page and political-based editorials were found and 
analysed. The part of the data that was found relevant was taken from the coding 
instrument and applied to the research objective, and broadly to questions. 
6.2.0 CODING TRAINING, PROCESS, AND PROCEDURE  
The coding process started with my preparation of a codebook consisting of 18 
categories. On a review of the code categories with my supervisors, the original list 
was significantly reduced to a third, when it became apparent that most of the 
categories would not be relevant to the essence of the study. (Please see Appendix 6 
for the final code guide).  Because of my limitation in statistical issues in general and 
in the use of the SPSS statistical software in particular, I engaged the assistance of a 
friend, a fellow lecturer, who guided me and also assisted me to train two assistants 
in the process of using the coding guide and a code sheet designed for the purpose of 
capturing the necessary data.  Because of the extensive nature of the study and the 
voluminous data generated from the newspapers, it was necessary to use the two 
assistants for manual coding to generate an initial database that was subsequently 
computer analysed.   
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However, in order to ascertain the level of agreement between the trained coding 
assistants, I conducted an inter-coder reliability test using Cohen's kappa, with the 
assistance of my lecturer friend. The result was that the kappa coefficient showed the 
coders achieved a high level of agreement.  For analysis, the generated codes were 
then transferred into SPSS. The frequency and cross tabulation analyses were done 
at univariate and bivariate levels.  The data is presented quantitatively, with 
illustrations like charts/graphs and tables.  
6.2.1 The Newspapers 
The nine newspapers used in this study are Daily Times (Est. 1926), now mostly an 
online paper and a shadow of its former glory; the West African Pilot (Est. 1937) 
defunct in 1967; the Nigerian Tribune (Est. 1949) still operating as a private paper; 
the Nigerian Citizen (Est. 1948) defunct in 1966; the New Nigerian (Est. 1966), now 
a shadow of its former self; The Punch (Est. 1971), the most highly circulated paper 
in Nigeria today; the Guardian (Est. 1983), still a strong and authoritative voice; 
ThisDay (Est. 1995), an influential paper; the Daily Trust (Est. 1998) a privately 
owned but strong Northern voice, in the tradition of the New Nigerian, though it is 
trying to recast itself as a national paper. See appendix for further details. 
6.2.2 Coverage Analysis 
Firstly, it is important to bear in mind, as earlier noted, that though the study period 
for each of the election years covered only a four week period around each election, 
the 1964/65 election proved an exception to this. The election period that year was 
inconclusive; it was postponed and later concluded in March 1965.  As a result, 
ethnic issues and other election debates on the pages of the newspapers dragged on 
for a period of over four months, during which verbal and physical violence were 
freely traded.  The 2011 election was also different in that most of the violence took 
place after the election; usually, election violence was used as a weapon of 
intimidation, but in the case of 2011, there were violent reprisal attacks against those 
who won by those disappointed with the election results.  So much of the reporting of 
the subsequent crisis, was not captured in this study. Secondly, it is important to 
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note, as highlighted in Chapter Four, that different newspapers were used for 
different periods of the elections. Comparison across the over 50-year period of the 
study was made with this in mind, noting that the study is on the press in Nigeria 
and not on particular newspapers. Since the 1950s, of all Nigerian newspapers, only 
the Nigerian Tribune has lasted through to today, the period of the study, inclusive.  
Thirdly, in making the analysis, I used my knowledge of the press industry and 
politics as a backdrop to interpret notable trends and findings.  
6.3.0 PRESENTATIONS 
In these presentations, content analysis findings are first presented in table and 
figure illustrative formats to give an across the six-year holistic picture of each issue 
category being examined in the election year in focus.  This approach provides an 
immediate comparative visual positioning of issues year by election year.  It also 
provides for an independent interrogation of each election by year; allowing trends 
and patterns to be detectable for observation, and room for ease of analysis before 
conclusions are reached.  
6.4.0 CATEGORY 1: NEWS AND EDITORIAL COVERAGE 
Table 6.1: Frequency of News Coverage 
  Frequency 
News stories 86.70% (1987) 
Editorials 13.30% (305) 
Total  100% (2292) 
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1987 
 
Figure. 6.1: Frequency of News Coverage 
 
Table 6.1 above presents the editorial items published on the front page and editorial 
by the newspapers used for this study. The table shows that the newspapers 
published a total of 2,292 of news reports on the front pages and editorials. 
Expectedly, most of the stories published were news (86.70%) while the remaining 
items were editorials (13.30%).  
Table 6.2: Editorial Items, Front-page News Stories, and Editorials 
EDITORIAL ITEMS FRONT-PAGE NEWS STORIES EDITORIALS 
Political % 56% (1103) 46% (140) 
Non-political % 44% (884) 54%(165) 
Total Number 100%  (1987) 100% (305) 
 
1987 
 
 
305 
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Figure 6.2: Editorial Items 
 
In Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 above, the breakdown of the front page stories and 
editorials into political and non-political also shows that of the front page stories 
published by the newspapers in the periods under review, more than half of them 
were political (56%). Similarly, more than half of the editorials published, which 
constitute the majority, were non-political (54%).  
 
Table 6.3: Breakdown of the Published Stories by Years 
EDITORIAL ITEMS 1959 1964/65 1979 1983 1999 2011 
Front Page News 
90.30% 
(602) 
88.80% 
(556) 
92.8% 
(168) 
84.5%  
(272) 
88.1% 
(282) 
62.5% 
(110) 
Editorials 
9.7% 
(65) 
11.2% 
 (70) 
7.2% 
(13) 
15.5%  
(50) 
11.9% 
(38) 
37.5% 
(66) 
Total 
100% 
(667) 
100% 
(626) 
100% 
(181) 
100% 
(322) 
100% 
(320) 
100% 
(176) 
 
1103 884 140 
165 
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Figure 6.3: Published Stories by Years 
 
Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3 show the breakdown by year, of editorials and news stories 
published by the newspapers in election years under investigation. As the table 
shows, the newspapers published more stories on their front page in 1959 and 1979 
than other election years.  Similarly, by ratio of news to editorial, the 1983 and 2011 
election years posted higher percentage values than the other election years.  
6.5.0 CATEGORY 2.  GENRE/TYPE (FRONT PAGE POLITICAL NEWS 
STORIES AND POLITICALLY RELATED EDITORIALS) 
Table 6.4. Genre/Type: An Across the Six Election Years Perspective 
GENRE  1959 1964/65 1979 1983 1999 2011 
News 91.70% 86.60% 90.30% 74.20% 85.40% 84.20% 
Editorial 8.30% 13.40% 9.70% 25.80% 14.60% 15.80% 
Total  
100%  
(347) 
100%  
(322) 
100%  
(248) 
100%  
(97) 
100%  
(128) 
100%  
(101) 
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6.5.1 Findings 
Noticeable, particularly in the 1983, 1999 and 2011 election years, is the fluctuating 
but steady drop in the number of front-page election news stories and editorials – 
128 and 101, compared with the first three elections of the study, for example. There 
is about a five percentage point rise, and fall in the number of politically related news 
stories and editorial items in the transitional elections of 1959 and consolidation 
elections of 1964/65.  By 1979, editorials accounted for one in about ten news stories.  
But by 1983, the spike was significant, the highest in the study.  The year also 
recorded the lowest published news stories and editorials.  
6.5.2 Comments 
Compared with 1979 (9.7%) the use of editorials spiked considerably by 1983 to one 
editorial in every four news stories.  You might call this abuse of ownership positions 
of the government papers analysed for this period.  In 1983, the NPN government 
was desperate to continue in power, so every organ was deployed to convince the 
electorate to choose the party over others. Also of note is the steady drop in the 
number of published news stories from 1959 and 1983, the lowest being 1983. 
Figure 6.4: Genre/Type 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
214 
One notable trend across the election years from 1959 to 2011 is the decline in the 
number of news stories, the sharpest drop being in 1983 already partly explained in 
the comment above.  Newspaper-press was gradually losing grip as the sole source of 
news for the elite.  The electronic media firmly under the governments’ control were 
now attracting audiences.  As expected, most stories on the elections are reported via 
the news genre, rather than editorials, which accounts for a fraction of election news 
contents over the period, except for 1983 when there was a significantly upward 
spike. 
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6.6.0 CATEGORY 3: ILLUSTRATION OF FRONTPAGE NEWS REPORTS 
(Use of Photos and Cartoons to highlight or enhance a story, or as standalones) 
Table 6.5: Illustration of Front page News Reports by Election Year 
ILLUSTRATION  1959 1964/65 1979 1983 1999 2011 
No Illustration  84.20% 75.20% 71.80% 67.00% 79.70% 67.30% 
Black & White 
Photo 
15.80% 24.80% 28.20% 33.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Colour Photo 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.30% 32.70% 
Total  
100%  
(329) 
100%  
(322) 
100%  
(248) 
100%  
(97) 
100%  
(128) 
100%  
(101) 
6.6.1 Findings 
The 1959 and 1964/65 election period witnessed a rise in the number of photos and 
illustrations between the two election years. Understandably, there was no colour 
photography for newspapers yet in this time period in Nigeria. In 1999, colour 
photography is used for the first time in elections coverage, having been introduced 
about seven years earlier.  Black and white photos are still used on the inside pages of 
most newspapers.  The total number of news stories on elections continues to drop.  
In the 1959 and 1964/65 election period, there was a reduction of the relatively high 
dependence on mainly textual display of content. 
6.6.2 Comments 
A point to note is that the reading public was mostly the urban elite with a lot of time 
to spare as radio and television were not yet popular news and information sources. 
Newspaper texts were characteristically long-winded. Until 1983, there was a steady 
rise in the number of illustrations and photos; this was clearly before the advent of 
coloured photography in newspapers. Then followed a noticeable, over 38% drop in 
the use of illustrations between 1983 and 1999, accounted for by several factors. 
Some of these include the higher cost of colour production, the newsprint crisis and 
rising cost of newspaper production, which caused a cut down in the number of 
copies in circulation and the number of pages printed. 
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Figure 6.5: Illustration of Front page News Reports by Election Year 
 
A singular noticeable trend through the study is the rise in the use of photos and 
illustrations in front pages. In early elections and up until 1983, black and white 
photos accompanied stories. But as photography technology advanced, newspapers 
started telling election stories in coloured photographs from 1999.  
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6.7.0 CATEGORY 4:  DIRECTION OF REPORTS AND EDITORIALS 
(Direction is derived from tone and language used in news stories and editorials. 
Positive stories are hyped stories about the party or candidate; negative stories are 
usually mostly about the candidate or the opposing party; and neutral stories are 
balanced independent reporting by the press; they also include a dose of government 
press releases on the elections, announcements, and public enlightenment stories.) 
Table 6.6: News stories and Editorial Direction: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011 
DIRECTION  1959 1964/65 1979 1983 1999 2011 
Positive  41.60% 3.30% 33.10% 21.60% 10.00% 12.00% 
Negative  55.90% 82.70% 58.50% 72.20% 61.70% 68.50% 
Neutral  2.40% 14.00% 8.10% 6.20% 28.30% 19.50% 
Total  
100% 
(387) 
100% 
(322) 
100% 
(248) 
100% (97) 
100% 
(128) 
100%  
(101) 
6.7.1 Findings 
There is a steep drop in positive stories from 41.60% in 1959 to a mere 3.30% in 
1964.  At the same time, negative stories rose by over 27.8 percent point from 55.90% 
to 82.70%. Politically neutral stories seem almost impossible to find in 1959; the year 
had the lowest at 2.40%.  It is significant, but not surprising, that the election period 
of 1964/65, which marked the lowest point in positive stories was also alarmingly 
high in negative stories (82.70%). Given the high level of corrosive politics, it is not a 
surprise that the bloody Nigerian Civil War followed within two years. 
Comparing 1979 election period with 1983’s, the positive news stories and editorials 
decline while the negative stories climbed from 58.50% to 72.20%. Neutral stories 
remained marginal.  Through the entire six elections, 1964/65 and 1983 recorded the 
highest number of negative political stories of 82.70% and 72.20% respectively.   
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6.7.2 Comments 
In 1979, the percentage number of negative stories at 58.50% is the second lowest in 
the study; this represents a notable decline from the last election of 1964 at 82.70%.  
On the surface, the trend appears good, but it mainly demonstrated how successful 
the military were at getting the politicians to behave under the threats of arrest or the 
whole exercise cancelled. 
Compared with all other elections, neutral stories in the two years are higher than 
others. In 1999 they almost tripled the positive reports, and nearly half of negative 
stories.  Negative stories remain high for both years. 
Several suppositions can be deduced from these unusually high negative and neutral 
stories: the military government’s struggle to convince a doubting populace of its 
genuine desire to return the country to civil rule. To record only 10.00% in 1999 of 
positive stories reflects political weariness of the press and the populace after a series 
of disappointing transitions of power, and highly acrimonious and negative 
campaign periods. 
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Figure 6.6: News stories and Editorial Direction: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011 
 
Consistent with consolidation election practices, negative stories were highest in 
1964/65, 1983, and 2011. The same is also true when comparison is made within the 
paired election years; the numbers of positive reports were higher each time in the 
transition, as against a consolidation election. As the table also shows, in the 
elections in focus, the 1964/65 elections, closely followed by 2011, were perhaps the 
most divisive, and the findings pointed in that direction. A key deduction that could 
be made from these findings is that political stakes are higher during consolidation 
elections than during transition elections. 
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6.8.0 CATEGORY 5: ETHNIC REFERENCES IN THE PRESS. (Reference to 
parties’ ethnic affiliations and politicians’ ethnic background in news and 
editorials) 
Table 6.7: Ethnic Portrayal: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011  
ETHNIC PORTRAYAL  1959 1964/65 1979 1983 1999 2011 
Yoruba  18.20% 26.70% 21.00% 13.40% 17.80% 7.00% 
Hausa 22.5% 16.8% 17.3% 25.8% 5.0% 14.9% 
Igbo  20.4% 14.9% 9.7% 12.4% 8.9% 8.0% 
Minority ethnic groups 4.0% 7.5% 2.8% 4.1% 16.4% 54.3% 
None (News stories 
without ethnic slant) 35.0% 34.2% 49.2% 44.3% 51.9% 15.8% 
Total  
100% 
(387) 
100% 
(322) 
100% 
(248) 
100% (97) 
100% 
(128) 
100% 
(101) 
 
6.8.1 Findings 
Mentions of minority ethnic groups in the 1959 and 1964/65 election years were 
quite marginal. Ethnically neutral stories were higher at both elections. All three 
major tribes got near equal/even mentions in both years, with Hausa-Fulani a nudge 
ahead in 1959, and Yoruba much more mentioned in 1964/65.  
Ethnic neutral stories got the lion share in the findings during this period. This is 
driven by the high volume of informational content put out by government agencies 
and elections administrators, most of which usually make no reference to ethnic 
relations. However, from the rest of the data, one can deduce that the focal point of 
the 1959 elections was the large Hausa-Fulani ethnic group of the Northern Region. 
In 1964/65, the Yoruba of Western Region led in press mentions.  Press mentions of 
the Igbo dropped to a significant 12-percentage points lower than the Yoruba, as did 
the Hausa-Fulani who were about 10-percentage points lower.  It is important to 
note that minority ethnic groups were not in the press equation at all in 1959, and 
only moved up slightly in press mentions during the 1964/65 elections. 
CHAPTER 6 
 
221 
In the 1979 and 1983 election periods, non-mention of any ethnic group remains 
high; nearly half of all the lead news stories and editorials in 1979 were devoid of 
ethnic mentions. Almost the same could have been said of 1983 with 44.3 percentage 
point. In the rest of the stories, the Yoruba led in press mentions in 1979 while the 
Hausa-Fulani led during the following election of 1983. 
6.8.2 Comments 
The 1979 elections were contentious; the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the mainly 
Western Region-based, Yoruba-led party disputed strongly with the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN), which was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group of the North. 
The Eastern Region, which had failed in an attempted to secede from Nigeria leading 
to the Civil War, played a back fiddle in both elections.  Minority groups faired far 
less as most of them were subsumed into the bigger ethnic based parties of the North 
and West.   
The values for two of the three leading ethnic groups were lower than 10 percentage 
points in 1999, and for the first time, of the minorities notched up to 16.40%, the 
second highest among the ethnic groups. In 2011, the minority groups led in election 
related stories by a whopping 54.30%. 1999 was an unusual but significantly 
interesting election year; the value of ethnically neutral news reports peaked at 
51.9%.  There is one major reason for this: the two leading candidates of the two 
leading parties – General Olusegun Obasanjo for Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), 
and Chief Olu Falae for Alliance for Democracy (AD), were both Yoruba.  As a result, 
inter-ethnic fights were not big on the tickets.  
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Figure 6.7: Ethnic Portrayal: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011 
 
The figure shows an across the election years perspective. On the face value, the 
figure indicates that during an election period, majority of the time, it may be easy to 
reach the conclusion ethnic issues may not have been big in the scheme of things.  
The point has already been made that there was a significant number of election 
related stories pushed by government agencies on public enlightenment platforms.  
The second is that outside the front pages, there were lots of election stories in the 
inside pages including highly contentious columns.   
An additional point to note is the gradual focus of the election stories on minority 
ethnic issues over the period. 
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6.9.0 CATEGORY 6: PURPOSE OF THE STORIES  
Table 6.8: Purpose of Stories: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011  
PURPOSE OF STORIES  1959 1964/65 1979 1983 1999 2011 
Awareness/education 
Programme of Party & 
Candidate 
20.8% 18.9% 7.7% 24.7% 10.0% 5.5% 
Persuade  (Vote for my 
party or vote for me, 
don’t vote for them) 
33.7% 13.0% 54.0% 20.8% 8.6% 10.0% 
Propaganda (Use of 
unverifiable information 
on program promotion) 
10.7% 11.8% 11.7% 15.5% 41.4% 34.0% 
Castigate and bring to 
disrepute  
34.7% 56.3% 26.6% 39.0% 40.0% 50.5% 
Total  
100% 
(329 
100% 
(322) 
100% 
(248) 
100% (97) 
100% 
(128) 
100% 
(101) 
6.9.1 Findings 
Stories on persuasion dropped from 33.7% in 1959 to a mere 13% in 1964.  On the 
other hand, stories that reflect castigation and bring to disrepute rose from 34.7% in 
1959 to 56.3% in 1964/65. 
The 1964/65 was a bare-knuckle campaign, when compared with that of 1959, 
arising from the much controversial population census of 1961.  Whereas there were 
efforts to ‘persuade’ in the earlier election, but in 1964/65, the overriding need was to 
castigate and bring to disrepute.   In this, a key problem with consolidation elections 
is highlighted in these findings, where the need to retain power by all means collided 
with the drive to gain power by means fair and foul. 
Patterns from previous years are repeated in the 1979 and 1983 election years: 
Attempt to persuade is high in 1979; it is low in 1983.  The need to castigate and 
bring others to disrepute is low in 1979; it is high in 1983. 
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The number of news stories that attempt to persuade is highest in 1979 for the entire 
period of study; castigation at 26.6%, was also lowest in that same year. However, in 
the 1983 elections, awareness rose, persuasion stories dropped by over half, and 
propaganda rose again, all consistent with assumptions about consolidation 
elections.  
Whereas in 1999, a near equal effort is placed on propaganda (41.4%) and castigation 
(40%), in 2011 more effort is shifted from propaganda (34%) to castigation. Over half 
of the election news stories (50.5%) in the period were purposed to castigate and 
bring to disrepute. Awareness generating stories and news stories designed to 
persuade were scanty. 
6.9.2 Comments 
The contest for the Presidential Villa in 2011 was a fierce battle, unlike any other. The 
circumstances that paved the way for Dr. Goodluck Jonathan to enter the race were 
vigorously disputed and detested by a component of Northern elite.  There was 
therefore a huge spike in news stories that castigate, 50.5%, the second highest in the 
study.  It is not surprising therefore that there was massive violence in the weeks and 
months after the elections. 
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Figure 6.8: Purpose of Stories: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959 - 2011  
 
 
The figure presents the purpose of the stories published by the newspapers in all the 
election years. The findings implied that issues dominated the 1959 election and as 
such, persuasion and awareness/education strategy were employed more to woo 
voters.  However, in 1964/65, with 56.3%, and 2011 with 50.5%, there is an overt 
indication that the elections were fought bitterly and politicians went all out to bring 
themselves into disrepute. Overall, propaganda and castigation peaked considerably 
in the last two election years.  They were lowest during the transitional elections of 
1959 and 1979. It is noteworthy that even at the lowest point in 1979, divisive stories 
of castigation still commanded over a quarter of election stories. 
6.10.0 CATEGORY 7: OBJECTIVITY (on the part of the press, this 
includes fairness in reporting, adequately representing all the parties and shades 
of opinion as reasonably possible.)  
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Table 6.9: Objectivity of Stories: Trends Across the Six Election Periods: 1959-2011 
OBJECTIVITY  1959 1964/65 1979 1983 1999 2011 
Mostly objective  22.8% 3.0% 48.4% 10.5% 19.0% 24.2% 
Mostly subjective  74.8% 80.2% 51.6% 76.8% 79.0% 60.0% 
I can’t say 2.4% 16.8% 0.0% 12.7% 2.0% 15.8% 
Total  
100%  
(329) 
100%  
(322) 
100%  
(248) 
100%  
(97) 
100%  
(128) 
100%  
(101) 
6.10.1 Findings 
Objectivity in reporting political stories plummeted from 22.8% in 1959 to a mere 3% 
in 1964/65.  In the same period, subjectivity rose from 74.8% to 80.2%.  Objectivity 
continues to suffer during consolidation elections: i.e. 1979, the gap between 
objective and subjective stories is narrower (3.2%) than the gap depicted four years 
later in 1983 (66.3%).  As a result of military governments’ ownership interests, 
‘objective’ reports amount to nearly half of the stories in print in 1979.  However, this 
percentage share dropped significantly to a mere 10.5% by 1983.  These figures are 
also consistent with the patterns that shape differences between transition and 
consolidation elections.  The 2011 election presents a slight deviation from the norm: 
there is a rise in the number of objective stories from 1999, and subjective stories are 
actually lower than those of the previous election. 
6.10.2 Comments 
What the situation in 1959 and 1964/65 election years reflects is ownership ties 
between papers’ newsrooms and the ethnicised political parties.  During election 
seasons, all pretences to objectivity seem to be suspended. One observable trait is a 
developing trend in the dynamics of consolidation election where there exist more 
proclivities for subjectivity. 
As earlier mentioned, the two gladiators in the 1999 elections were of the same 
Yoruba ethnic group.  What differentiated them was that one was an imposition by 
the retired military oligarchy while the other was the candidate of the ethnic-based 
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party dominated by the Yoruba. The press battle before and after the poll was mostly 
centred within the one ethnic group of the Yorubas.  However in 2011, the entrance 
of a minority candidate seemed to have made the press a little more objective 
compared with earlier elections.  
Figure 6.9: Objectivity of Stories: Trends Across the Sic Election Periods: 1959 – 2011 
 
The figure presents the level of objectivity the press displayed in the coverage of the 
presidential elections in Nigeria starting from 1959. The figure indicates that across 
all the elections since 1959, the press was always mostly subjective. Objectivity 
suffered gravely in the reported stories during the 1964/65 and 1983 elections.  The 
closest it came to achieving objectivity was in 1979, and this was discussed in the 
comments above. Going by the reasons already advanced, subjective stories were 
consistently high throughout the period of study.  These findings indicate that press 
almost always took sides, which, perhaps, is related to ownership’s interests.  
6.11.0 CONCLUSION  
The focus of this chapter dealt with content analysis of data obtained from selected 
archival newspaper materials for the designated six election periods, spanning 52 
years, (1959 and 2011). The objective in using content analysis is to establish the 
nature and patterns of press coverage over the extended election periods.
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S E C T I O N  4  
Discussion 
This section is devoted to Chapters 7 and 8. 
Chapter 7 is in four parts.  Part One is a discussion of the interviews; Part Two is a 
discussion of the newspaper findings; and Part Three is a synthesis of the findings in 
Parts 1 and 2, while Part Four revisits the research objectives and the research 
questions in order to review the findings. 
Chapter 8 deals with a summary of findings, conclusion, and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE DISCUSSION 
7.1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to build on the analyses and findings of Chapters 5 
and 6 of this study to further discuss their findings, against the backdrop of the 
research objectives and the research questions. The approach is to use extracted 
themes from the findings in the two chapters to form the basis, as well as guiding 
instrument of the discussion.  The chapter is in four parts: Part One discuses findings 
from the interviews; Part Two discusses the newspaper findings; Part Three 
combines major thematic findings and some conclusions; and Part Four summarises 
the findings of the research questions. 
PART 1 
Part One of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the six broad themes of findings 
in the interview chapter (Chapter 5).  The sections are as follows: a) Contextualising 
Colonialism; b) Ideology, Values Orientation, and a Nation’s Identity, c) The 
Nigerian Nation-state and the Press; d) Elite & Elite Politics; e) Politics of Belonging: 
Intersectional Citizenships and Identity. 
7.2.O CONTEXTUALISING COLONIAL ROOTS: THE PRE-CONDITION 
FOR UNDERSTANDING POST-COLONIAL NIGERIAN STATE 
Of the numerous factors that combine to define the modern Nigerian state, none 
stands out as prominently and as often, a source of vigorous disputations, as the 
British colonial rule and as Ekeh (1975) stated, “Our post-colonial present has been 
fashioned by our colonial past. It is that colonial past that has defined for us the 
spheres of morality that have come to dominate our politics” (p111). The average 
Nigerian elite strains hindsight to credit or fault colonial governance as being 
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responsible for the design of the system that birthed the post-colonial Nigerian state 
with its merits and demerits.  
As Nigeria continues to flounder, the question will continue to form the basis for 
contentious disputations: What type of democratic structure and culture did the 
British colonial rulers establish for Nigeria, and how have these continued to define 
its sense of nationhood and of belonging? Utomi2 doubts the usefulness of what he 
termed a unicausal analysis. He is of the view that applying a single factor causal 
analysis “gets pretty shaky in these kinds of complexity”.  In other words, colonial 
rule, as a singular factor may not provide an adequate explanation for the state of 
Nigeria today.  In agreement with Diamond (1988) that Nigeria was “clumsily carved 
for colonial convenience” (p14), Utomi concedes that Britain, in her national interest 
ensured that Nigeria remained unsettled so that it would remain dependent and 
open to British influence. The strategy of finding ways to maintain a stronghold on 
former colonial outposts by the British, says Utomi, was not peculiar to Nigeria;  
when you go to Malaysia, you will see how the British divided up the 
Chinese, the Malays and the Indians…. I think that, at the heart of all 
[our problems] is leadership – We lack strong, good and decent 
leadership (Utomi, interviewed in Lagos on June 7, 2016) 
This is quite in tandem with what Joseph (2014) finds missing in the Nigerian 
equation, a “political leadership that puts nation above ethnicity, religious tolerance 
above violent crusades, a capable state above prebendal spoliation, and values-based 
governance above global parading” (p73). 
Abati3 is one of the many who share Utomi’s position. He says, “I think we’ve had 
more than 50 years of independence, it’s too late in the day for us be saying, the 
colonialists created Nigeria in a particular manner”.  “Moreover,” says Pate4, “other 
                                                    
2Prof. Pat Utomi is a former academic and a politician.  
3 Dr. Reuben Abati is a former Spokesman of President Goodluck Jonathan, former Editorial Board Chairman, 
and acclaimed syndicated newspaper columnist. 
4 Prof. Umaru Pate is Dean of Department of Mass Communication, Bayero University, Kano. 
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nations also colonised by the British have put the burden of colonialism behind them 
and moved on”. And Biakolo5, says: 
the British exploited our differences for their own interests, playing 
one group against the other to ensure their continued dominance.  
And our leaders, being so short sighted, have followed the same route 
to power through…exploitation of differences. I think our politicians 
have been more responsible for our current state than any outsider 
(Biakolo, interviewed in Lagos on May 20, 2016).  
Without disputing the import of the above views of Biakolo, Abati, Utomi, and 
others, it remains a fact that modern Nigeria is the direct recipient of a flawed but 
deeply rooted legacy of the British colonial system. Many of the interview 
respondents including Obasanjo, Adesina, Abubakar Momoh, Danjuma, Osaghae, 
Ofeimun, Nnoli, and Agbaje agree that leaders since independence share in the 
blame of how the nation has arrived where it is.   However, they also insist that 
colonial rule set the trajectory for modern Nigeria in key areas: a faulty structural 
foundation; a disruptive administrative exemplar with in-built inter-ethnic distrust; 
and a dysfunctional democratic model with an enduring template in election rigging. 
Obasanjo6 argues that anyone who desires to understand the genesis of Nigeria’s 
problems must enquire at the nation’s colonial beginnings.  Adesina7 agrees, and 
states that the nation was built on defective structures. 
Danjuma8 recalls his school days in the north when school children were forbidden to 
read newspapers from the South; the British banned the West African Pilot 
newspaper from circulation in the North. According to Danjuma,  
They were telling us that northernisation policy was good for us and 
we must not permit southerners to come and take over our civil 
                                                    
5  Prof. Emevwo Biakolo is former Dean and now Director of PhD Programme, School of Media and 
Communication, Pan-Atlantic University Lagos. 
6 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired General of the Nigerian Army, is a former Military Head of State, and two-
time elected president of Nigeria. 
7 Mr. Femi Adesina is a former Managing Director of the Sun Newspaper, former President of the Guild of Editors 
and current Presidential Spokesperson.  
8 General T. Y. Danjuma is a retired Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Armed Forces.  
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service, but they were protecting their own interests (Danjuma, 
interviewed in Lagos on May 11, 2016).   
The system destroyed existing traditional social-political structures, and substituted 
them with strange hybrids like “indirect rule” in parts of the country. Danjuma 
recalls how they contrived and created traditional rulers in places where none existed 
before.  
Osaghae 9  corroborates the point that the British created political and other 
structures to serve their purpose (citing anthropologist Raymond Apthorpe) even to 
the point of creating whole ethnic groups. One example is the traditional Tor Tiv 
kingship of the Tiv people of Benue State in the Middle Belt Region, which was an 
arbitral and sole creation of the British colonial system in the 1940s to serve their 
indirect rule system.  An ironic turn of events, according to Osaghae, was that the 
first person that was going to be made the Tor Tiv (King of the Tiv Ethnic group) 
turned out to be a Yoruba man, a retired warrant officer (from the Western Region!) 
a veteran from the Second World War. 
Still on the distortion of the nation’s geo-political structures, Ofeimun10 recalls how 
the British divided up the smaller South but left the larger North intact, thus creating 
a tripartite struggle in which the larger undivided North would dominate and be able 
to play the two Southern Regions against each other.  Says Ofeimun, “It was perfect 
British; after what they did in Asia, they only needed to apply similar policies in 
Nigeria, which, to a large extent, actually worsened the ethnic relations.” And these 
ethnic relations, according to Osaghae (2015), are “the product of the uneven 
development and rivalry which British colonial administration fostered among the 
different segments” (p25). 
Also, according to Nnoli11, the British introduced electoral fraud into the Nigerian 
electoral system. They blatantly rigged election on behalf of whomever they wanted. 
For example, he said, British District Officers were issued written instructions on 
                                                    
9 Prof. Eghosa Osaghae is Vice Chancellor of Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State. 
10 Odia Ofeimun is a writer and a politician. 
11 Prof. Okwudiba Nnoli is a retired Professor of political science. 
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how to prevent NEPU, a northern political party, and its leader, Aminu Kano from 
winning any elections in the north. NEPU’s crime was that had entered into an 
alliance with a southern political party.  Ofeimun maintains that British colonial 
rulers wrote the original codebook on electoral malpractices in Nigeria.  For an 
example, in 1959 when the major parties realised that none of the ethno-regional 
parties could form a government, they started working out alliances. But the British 
truncated the process, brazenly and openly by inviting the northern NPC party to 
form a government, against the demands of their own parliamentary roles and 
regulations.   
Abubakar Momoh12 explains why, beyond mere historical references, the rule of the 
British is still relevant today; he posits that inherited colonial state apparatus, 
legacies, as well as social structures have never been destroyed, adding,  
They’ve only mutated after they were inherited by the political elite, 
reconstituted and used against our own people, in the same way the 
colonial rulers used them. This was what led to the fall of the first 
republic, this was what led to the rise of the military, and this was 
what led to the divisions in the press along ethnic divisions and so on 
(Abubakar Momoh, interviewed in Abuja on April 18, 2016).  
Peter Ekeh (1975) shares Momoh’s point of view; he submits, “Modern African 
politics are in large measure a product of the colonial experience” as “the colonial 
experience itself has had a massive impact on modern Africa” (p93). 
The faulty foundation and decades of broken systems and flawed leadership have 
combined to exact continuous disastrous influences on Nigeria.  Colonial rule may 
not be solely responsible for the state of the nation today; however, its contributions 
are central and cannot be ignored.   
                                                    
12 Prof. Abubakar Momoh, a political scientist was the Director of Electoral Institute at INEC.  
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7.3.0 IDEOLOGY, VALUES ORIENTATION AND A NATION’S 
IDENTITY: CONSTRUCTING OF A NIGERIAN POLITICAL 
CULTURE 
Aimufua (2007) postulates that the press used, “its coverage of specific issues and 
events to foster a collective Nigerian national identity” (p1), however, construction of 
modern Nigeria, according to Agbaje13, cannot be attributed entirely to just one 
institution or group.  A significant number of the constraining issues were outside 
the control of the press.  Indeed, the construct of a nation is the work of cohorts of 
individuals, institutions, systems, and frameworks.  
Many of the interview respondents felt that the Nigerian press, at the beginning, was 
eager to construct an overarching national identity, over and above all other regional 
and ethnic considerations. But it never quite succeeded, and as Adebanwi (2016) 
notes, “on a few critical occasions, the Nigerian press renders itself totally captive to 
ethno-regional and ethno-religious passions and calculations” (p223). For example, 
during the nationalist period,  
in the period before 1947, political culture and evolving identity were 
hardly reflective of ethnic and religious and regional sentiments; that 
was because the political structure, the evolving system of that time 
did not encourage focusing on ethnic, religious or regional 
considerations (Agbaje, interviewed in Ibadan on June 1, 2016). 
Yet, the press is only a part of the broad range of cultural institutions that work 
together to establish political culture, by creating across-nation sensibilities and 
mind-sets. Its role is nonetheless critical in the formation of mind-sets for a culture 
to thrive. The element of culture – a consistent and generally agreed, or acceptable 
way of doing something – has not been firmly established due to absence of a 
mobilising ideology.  But ideologies are not plucked from the air, they are 
intentionally designed to fit a context.  
On this concept of ideology, Thompson (1984) explains that it is necessary to view it 
within the context of the general social theory, meaning there must be a healthy fit 
                                                    
13  Prof. Adigun Agbaje is a Political Scientist and former Deputy Vice-Chancellor, University of Ibadan. 
(interviewed in Ibadan on…) 
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between a society and its belief system. This approach, Thompson argues, allows full 
exploration of “the relations between action, institutions, power and domination” 
(p127). The explored relations provide clarity within the belief system of a given 
community, and such relationship dynamics could be used to examine the one 
between a nation-state and its component federating units. Again in all these 
dynamics, the role of communicative mechanism of which the press is an important 
part, is crucial.  
7.3.1 Ideological Vacuum and Absence of Value Orientation 
Crucial, then, to the issue of nation-state construction are the joint issues of ideology 
and value orientation, which together provide a sense of being, identity, and a 
guiding roadmap that define a nation’s political culture among other defining 
characteristics.  All told, the ideology of a society must derive from its value system. 
Anya14 laments Nigeria’s lack of a value-based ideological guide: 
The primary problem is the absence of a guiding value system; a 
national identity is, as it were, defined by the values that you share in 
common, and all accept.  Those values will actually influence and 
affect how the press handles issues; they become a roadmap.  But 
because there are no such agreed values, the result is that, our press 
imitate the press in Britain and in the US without regard to our 
context (Anya, interviewed in Lagos on June 14, 2016). 
The problem with borrowed values is that they lack affinity, and have no foundations 
in the belief systems of the host society. This point by Anya resonates with 
Osinbajo15, who says, “personally I think we need a big idea. I think we need 
something that unites us and brings us together and … around which we can rally” 
(Osinbajo, interviewed in Abuja on June 23, 2016). 
According to Anya, this absence of a national value orientation pulls people away 
from the centre, and towards ethnic based alternatives, and as Mamdani (2005) 
points out that, “every ethnic group in Nigeria is compelled sooner or later to seek its 
                                                    
14 Prof. Anya O. Anya is a retired professor and former Director-General of the Nigeria Economic Summit Group.  
15 Prof. Yemi Osinbajo is the nation’s Vice-President, and a former law professor  
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own ethnic home, its own native authority, its own state in the Nigerian federation” 
(p13). Further highlighting the uniqueness of the Nigerian situation Anya says:  
…societies that show diversity are not new, but they emphasize not the 
things that divide them, but the things that unite them. It means, 
despite the diversity, they start cooperating more and more and you 
get to the point where there is a greater level of cooperation, because 
there is a greater level of sharing of values than before (Anya, 
interviewed in Lagos). 
Anya understandably focuses on value system, which is the bedrock of sustaining an 
ideology. And ideology, notes Eagleton (1991), involves “questions of power”, 
explaining that it is propagated to assist in “legitimating the power of a dominant 
social group or class.” (p3) Along this line of argument, Thompson (1984) states, “To 
study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning (or signification) serves to 
sustain relations of domination” (p4).  Thompson’s definition, puts ideology in the 
services of dominant power as a tool for self-legitimation, and directly relates it to 
manipulation of power to serve mainly elite’s hegemonic interests.  In the case of 
Nigeria, the argument is that there is no unifying national ideology that serves the 
“federal” centre.  Rather, the elites have substituted the centre with ethnic 
ascendancy which, acting as centrifugal forces, suck power and relevance away to the 
federating ethnic units; the result is a lopsided federation, where the power has been 
hijacked by ethno-regional elites. 
Anya’s strong case for values tallies with Abubakar Momoh’s, who submits that the 
Nigerian press have also become captives of the elites’ regional political ideological 
positions, more or less, vindicating Eagleton’s position.  The consequence, according 
to Momoh, is that when press or media “professionalism is intercepted, framed or 
coloured by ideology and politics” that are almost exclusively regional or ethnic, 
ethical issues are often compromised, implying a subordination of professional 
standards to political influences.  
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7.3.2 Surviving on Dual Ideology 
Nigeria may be a victim of multiple ideologies in which one ideology seeks the 
subjugation of others. However, Cole16 does not see such subjugation.  To him, the 
press does not operate in ideological monotones, nor does it need to choose between 
ethnic ideology and national ideology. The Nigerian press survives on a dual 
ideology, as it should – national and ethnic – because, according to Cole, the press is 
a stabilising institution, it cannot choose one ideology above the other. Says Cole: 
The press has been able, to drive both ideologies, but not to the level of 
extreme where one is ousting the other. I think that we must always 
remember that we are a federation. Whatever forced us into that 
particular model of governance demands a combination of both – a 
national identity as well as having a particular identity, with the belief 
that the particular [ethnic] identity is not lost in the mainstream of the 
national identity (Cole, interviewed in Lagos on May 26, 2016). 
The question then is what ethos or principles guide the press, and from where does it 
derive such principles and guiding policies? An obvious answer to the posed question 
about Nigeria’s media philosophy is that it is borrowed. Adesanoye (1990) suggests 
strongly that there is need for “a serious rethinking of Nigeria’s entire 
communication philosophy” (p73). According to him, much of Western journalism 
models (on which the Nigerian model is based) are mostly concerned with the 
unusual – the outré; as such, what constitutes news in the Western world may not 
necessarily apply automatically in Nigeria. Concepts and models must fit needs. For 
Adesanoye, therefore, there ought to be a “purposeful attempt to domesticate 
journalism practice rather than ape, slavishly, the 'journalism of exception' that 
constitutes, in essence, the basis of our received journalistic practice” (p69). What 
then is the role of a national press, torn between ideological antipodes and without 
strong thought-leaders in a post-colonial state?  
                                                    
16 Dr. P. D. Cole is a politician. He is also Nigeria’s former Ambassador to Brazil,  a former Managing Director of 
the Daily Times of Nigeria.  
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7.4.0 THE PRESS AND THE NIGERIAN NATION-STATE 
What then is the role of the press in the political system of a nation?  The interview 
respondents present an array of expectations.  In Osaghae’s opinion, “enlightenment 
is key, people must be informed, they must know; what is going on is invaluable” but 
for Nnoli, it is to put emphasis on the “commonalities rather than differences 
between people of different ethnicities”.  For Pate, the press must provide national 
direction.  While Danjuma says the press’ role is to monitor and make governance 
more accountable, Obasanjo locates press’ role as sustenance of democracy in which 
the welfare, interest, and the will of the people are paramount.  And Ofeimun caps off 
the catalogue of expectations of an ideal press, and states: 
the press is to ensure that people interact at the level of opinion, so 
that they can interact at other levels. The primary duty is to make sure 
that people understand the societies in which they live. The press 
should be a presenter of self to self, where the society presents itself to 
itself by looking at representations on a daily basis (Ofeimun, 
interviewed in Lagos on May 20, 2016).  
Babangida17 acknowledges that the press has “helped in no small measure to get this 
country to remain as one” (Babangida, interviewed in Minna).  That 
notwithstanding, Utomi said, “the nature and effects of the press has been changing 
over the years, sometimes really more for bad” (Utomi, interviewed in Lagos). 
Osaghae puts the reality in context saying, “…the press in Nigeria is highly partisan 
and that already puts a ring on its supposed role whether in constructing or not 
constructing” (Osaghae, interviewed in Okada, Edo State on May 4, 2016). The 
partisan nature of the press was also reflected by Aimufua (2007) as he notes that, 
“the newspapers are tools which their owners use to promote sundry selfish 
interests…irrespective of the damages that such might cause to issues of national 
integration and unity” (p300).  
The nature of press partisanship is still so glaring that, for Babangida, one can easily 
align any newspaper with a political party even today, and “when you read it, you 
know where it stands, its position.” This ability to so easily detect the political 
leaning of a newspaper is not surprising to Osaghae, who says, “the press has always 
                                                    
17 General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida is a former Military President of Nigeria. 
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functioned like some kind of political party, representing constituencies of interests, 
whether ethnic or not.  And in that respect, according to Pate: “the various fault lines 
that we talk about in Nigeria are clearly captured and reflected in the Nigerian media 
system”. And the result is that it has “contributed to increase centrifugal forces in the 
society like every other political element because of the system” (Nnoli, interviewed 
in Enugu on May 24, 2016).  
7.4.1 Press: The Report Card 
Further interrogating Nnoli’s position, does the regular output of the press pull 
inward to unite, or outward to divide? The views are as divergent as the respondents: 
Adinoyi-Ojo18, says the Nigerian press, generally has been very nationalistic. But 
Haruna19 disagrees; he thinks that the effect of the press has not been as beneficial in 
nation building, as some claim. Abubakar20 also disagrees with Adinoyi-Ojo, and 
says:  
In some instances, I would say press reportage and commentary have 
done more damage than unifying the nation because they bring out 
our ethnic and tribal differences to the forefront, so to speak. I don’t 
think Nigeria is a nation yet; we are collections of different ethnic-
nationalities (Abubakar, interviewed in Minna on June 16, 2016). 
But Osinbajo, says,  
“Though the press may have been helpful to nation-building, on the 
balance, where the press may have failed in encouraging or reinforcing 
the stereotypes that have kept us down, namely the ethnicisation” 
(Osinbajo, interviewed in Abuja).  
 
                                                    
18 Late Dr. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo was a politician and an academic, a former Managing Director of the Daily 
Times and former government spokesman in the office of the vice President.  
19 Mallam Mohammed Haruna is a syndicated columnist, a former Managing Director of the New Nigerian 
Newspaper and former spokesman for a Military Head of State. 
20 General Abdulsalami Abubakar is a retired Army General and former Military Head of State. 
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Adebanwi (2016) says this of the Nigerian press, that they have “influenced—both 
positively and negatively—the pattern of interaction among the disparate ethnic 
nationalities in Nigeria before and since the 1914 amalgamation” (p20). 
And Cole stoutly defends the press: It is in the nature of the press, he says, to raise 
uncomfortable issues and, if necessary, to be controversial. He therefore thinks it is 
dangerous to consider the press, he says, as a unipolar institution.  On the notion of 
nation-building and national unity, he says, “the press has never been unwilling to 
see a larger picture”.  In that sense, the press has been a major promoter in the 
creation of the Nigerian enterprise (Cole, interviewed in Lagos). 
Ofeimun aligns with Cole and says, “to a very large extent, the press 
has helped to nationalise the Nigerian opinion; and in a lot of ways, 
they succeeded.  Even when they were based on disagreements, 
national opinion engaged every area of Nigerian life (Ofeimun, 
interviewed in Lagos).  
7.4.2 Ownership Rules: Serving the Elite Agenda  
The question then arises – Whose voice is the press?  Whose position does it 
represent? Does it merely re-echo the contentious voices of the political elite?  Does 
the press have its own voice different from that of the ownership paymaster? 
Kolade21 provides a basis for this and says that from the beginning the press was not 
set up to be autonomous; people who had certain interests established them to serve 
those interests. Aimufua (2007) submits that, “ownership control of the Nigerian 
press” to a large extent determines “the nature and character of the press and 
therefore its editorial direction” (p300).  And Agbaje proffers a similar view: 
The way the press was constructed socially, physically and 
economically, it could not have played a role significantly different 
from the role defined by their owners who unfortunately were 
partisan…the fact that both (political) leadership and key press 
ownership converged was quite toxic to Nigeria’s early political 
history; they were publishers, they were owners, they also recruited 
                                                    
21  Dr. Christopher Kolade is former Nigerian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, a former 
Chairman/Managing Director of Cadbury Nigeria Plc, and former Pro-Chancellor of the Pan-Atlantic University. 
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and they converted to manage the press (Agbaje, interviewed in 
Ibadan). 
7.4.3 The Piper’s Many Tunes: Ownership, Ethnic, and Regional 
Pulls  
There is little doubt that the Nigerian Press has a rich history of successful political 
battles, and with combat scars to prove victories.  Indeed, as Abati notes, “the 
newspaper is an instrument of power, and because it’s an instrument of power, you 
cannot delink it from politics.” Questions abound: But power to what end?  Does the 
press have to be homogenous in a pluralistic society?  Can it?  Should it?  Abati posits 
that most newspapers mainly speak to regional interests “even though they all 
pretend to be national. The average newspaper does not have the luxury of choice on 
issues that are of consequence, without a deep consideration that is dictated by 
ownership objectives.” Adebanwi (2016) says, “the Nigerian press renders itself 
totally captive to ethno-regional and ethno-religious passions and calculations” 
(p223).  Says Abati: 
No matter how nationalistic a newspaper claims to be, they end up 
getting a label in terms of the identity of the owner. You can identify 
newspapers in terms of the regional interest that they defend (Abati, 
interviewed in Lagos on May 11, 2016).  
Adesina is of the same view as Abati’s with some modifications. He is of the view that 
the approach of the press has been mixed: their interests oscillate between national 
and regional or ethnic antipodes, on issue-by-issue basis, cross-checking with the 
pulse of its primary constituencies, driven by whatever is in line with ownership 
interests. Occasionally, says Adesina, the press stand together across the nation to 
fight a national cause, but they would retreat as quickly to their regional enclaves 
whenever a perceived threat to regional or ethnic positions arises.  He illustrates his 
view, with the annulled presidential election of 1993, which became known as the 
June-12 protests, of which he says: 
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The June-12 struggle began as a national struggle. Later, after General 
Sani Abacha had taken over, it became a regional and an ethnic 
matter.  So, while the press in one part of the country became very 
lukewarm on the issue, in the other part, the matter was still a front-
page issue. However, when it came to campaigning against the 
military government and for the return to democratic government, all 
the press came back together (Adesina, interviewed in Abuja on April 
19, 2016).  
Kolade’s concern is excessive loyalty to regional agenda over that of the nation that 
still exists in some newsrooms, but Tony Momoh22 explains why this is the case: no 
one sets up a press to undermine his or her own personal or group interests.  Says 
Momoh, the press will always work for the ownership interest, and it does not matter 
whether the ownership is private or government; or whether such interests are 
political, ethnic, regional, religious, or economic.  In Tony Momoh’s view, every news 
organisation is most influenced by the singular factor of ownership.  
Momoh’s notable point is supported by Aimufua whose investigation on the role of 
the press in promoting national identity found that because of ownership’s “sundry 
selfish interests… journalists have to toe the proprietors’ line, irrespective of the 
damages that such might cause to issues of national integration and unity” (Aimufua, 
2007, p. 300).  However, both Momoh and Aimufua must make room for Adebanwi 
(2016) who believes, and after an exhaustive and extensive investigation affirms that 
“the Nigerian press has influenced - both positively and negatively - the pattern of 
interaction among the disparate ethnic nationalities in Nigeria” (p20). 
Certainly, ownership’s role is crucial but, as Haruna observes, even within the 
restrictions of ownership, there is some wiggle room for journalists to take 
professional stands against bad policies or poor judgements.  In a pluralistic media 
environment, journalists can achieve more, if only they are willing to challenge the 
status quo.  Says Haruna: 
                                                    
22 Prince Tony Momoh is a politician.  He is also a former Federal Minister of Information and Culture, and 
former General Manager and Editor of the Daily Times of Nigeria.  
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I blame us (journalists); we don’t stand up enough for the ethics of our 
profession.  Once you make up your mind to do something, you should 
know that sacrifices come with the territory – that you may even lose 
your job. I always see the plurality in media as a help to us. The media 
really should have exploited the advantages of plurality more (Haruna, 
interviewed in Kano on June 23, 2016).  
Haruna’s position is quite in consonance with Aimufua’s submission that, the press 
“exhibit negative tendencies that run counter to their professional ethics and 
therefore act as a hindrance to their role in the Nigerian society” (Aimufua, 2007, 
p208) 
Still on aligning professional, ownership, or group interests with the nation’s, 
Biakolo is not persuaded that Nigerian press worked seriously enough for national 
unity.  His view is that the press tended to pursue and defend the perceived ethno-
political interests of their audience or readership.  While this is understandable from 
a business sustainability point of view, Biakolo is in tandem with Haruna’s view; he 
thinks there was always room for the press to have asserted its professional self 
more: 
I think history will not be very kind in judging the Nigerian press in 
terms of this overriding promotion of the ethnic interests, being 
therefore interest of their consumers to the detriment of wider agenda 
of national cohesion (Biakolo, interviewed in Lagos).  
7.4.4 The Press: National Agenda Setter or Broker of Influence? 
It is generally acknowledged that agenda-setting responsibilities belong to the press; 
the press shapes narratives and it selects or deselects issues in the exercise of this 
responsibility. According to Utomi, narratives constructed in the press have shaped 
every election cycle in Nigeria. However, such associative powers of influence 
exercised over time have not always or altogether been constructive or in the interest 
of the nation as an entity. 
In more recent times, the media has been (though you can’t use one 
tar to paint everybody) significantly a broker, a contractor of influence. 
This newspaper (picks up a newspaper, during the interview to 
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illustrate his point) is a classic example of a newspaper as a broker of 
influence (Utomi, interviewed in Lagos). 
But generally, Utomi believes that the influence of the press can be exaggerated 
because there are so many other intermediating factors.  It is necessary to consider 
how the press sees its role, as against how those who set up the press see its role: the 
two views are often different.  This is the central point earlier made by Tony Momoh.  
Expanding on the point, Abati says:  
When a man sets up a newspaper, he has an agenda – that was the 
case during the First Republic. Those newspapers were almost all 
directly linked to political parties; their owners had no qualms about 
using the newspapers to pursue their political agenda(s) and interests 
(Abati, interviewed in Lagos). 
In other words, much as the press can and does influence views and opinions, there 
are forces at work influencing the press itself, often not with the best motivation, or 
outcomes.  According to Joseph Stiglitz, ownership of newspapers by wealthy 
individuals and corporations is more than another business proposition; it is “to 
advance their political philosophies. Many purchase newspapers because of the 
possibility that the media give them to influence thinking, perception of events, and 
therefore politics itself’ (Stiglitz, 2017, p12).  However, Agbaje sees such influence in 
the press as a two-way relationship. According to him, while news reports and 
commentary help to define and construct Nigeria’s political culture; politicians and 
the evolved culture also exact influence on the way the press reports and comments 
(Agbaje, interviewed in Ibadan). 
7.4.5 Rethinking an Alien Media Model  
However, for Tony Momoh, it is political leaders and their parties that create political 
cultures, with “very minimal” input from the press, noting “their word of mouth like 
the town criers had more impacts than newspaper” (T. Momoh, interviewed in 
Abuja). 
Momoh’s point is plain: circulation figures are very low comparative to population 
size; most newspapers are urban-based, limiting their reach in the hinterland. This is 
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also Adesanoye’s (1990) argument: that mass communication does not exist in 
Nigeria, since in reality communication excludes a large majority of Nigerians.  What 
does exist, he says, is 'massive incommunication'. Adesanoye cites Ndegwa’s work in 
1985, which found that about 79% of those living in rural areas are excluded in the 
communication process, and states: 
if communication is to be viewed as a process of sharing and 
participation by everybody concerned…then (in Nigeria) it is 
misdirected, unproductive and, therefore, irrelevant to the 
development efforts of the country (Adesanoye, 1990, p62). 
Adesanoye further posits that the language of Nigerian newspapers is by and large 
too sophisticated to effectively communicate with the average Nigerian reader.  His 
view is that newspapers are published for the tiny minority of elite urban dwellers. 
And he concludes, “It is elite communication par excellence, both in conception and 
practice” (Adesanoye, 1990, p65).  It is of little wonder, then, that there is not a single 
Nigerian mass circulating newspaper in existence. This is dismal performance in a 
country of over 180 million people.  Anya fully shares Adesanoye’s views; he sees the 
press as part of the national elite that takes part in, curates, and manages the 
national dialogue.  As such, Anya says the press cannot be viewed in isolation; they 
are part and parcel of an elite system.   
7.5.0 THE ELITE: ETHNICISATION OF POLITICS AND 
POLITICISATION OF THE PRESS 
The elite of a nation are usually the leaders – articulators, producers, and custodians 
of the nation’s ideology and values. This leadership category incorporates politicians 
and the military, press owners, academics, and other thought leaders. In the case of 
Nigeria, according to Anya, 
The quality of what you call the political elites in Nigeria has been 
unfortunate, it has not been our best educated, it has not been our best 
achievers, (and) it has not been our hardest thinkers that have 
populated the political elites (Anya, interviewed in Lagos). 
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The quality of the Nigerian elite no doubt accounts for the absence of an articulated 
original body of values native to the nation, only borrowed values dressed in ill-
fitting foreign ideological garments. Osinbajo also agrees that the quality of thought-
leadership is poor, and he assigns culpability to the nation’s thinkers and intellectual 
elite.  
I don’t even think there is much introspection... Our elites are 
individualistic; there is no sense of community, no sense of how the 
community should be organised. No sense of that. So basically, people 
are promoting very, very narrow selfish interest and use all manner of 
platforms and ideas to do so…the same elites will use ethnicity when 
it’s convenient, they will use religion when it’s convenient…to serve 
narrow, very, very narrow selfish cause[s]. 
7.5.1 Elite Political Armoury: Weaponised Press and Ethnic 
Strategies  
Arising from the colonial circumstance of its origins, the Nigerian press has variously 
been characterised as a tool, an instrument, and a weapon. Obasanjo, for example, 
categorised it as either subservient or antagonistic towards government, depending 
on its ownership. Embedded in this depiction is the notion that the Nigerian press 
has not been able to move beyond its age-old colonial and reactive “opposition-to-
government” mode, fixed, as it were as an antagonistic weapon. Obasanjo explains: 
The press in the Nigerian context has not really been friendly with 
government, and that is understandable. It was one of the main tools 
or weapons used by our fathers who fought for independence; the 
press, therefore, developed an anti-government culture, always seeing 
government in a particular type of light. So, we had the press that had 
developed the culture of antagonism. When the government became 
our own, we had two type of press: the antagonistic and the 
subservient (Obasanjo, interviewed in Abeokuta on May 12 and June 
15, 2016). 
Seen in this light, it is understandable why some view the press in Nigeria as 
combative, or acquiescent whether against the colonial powers or the military and to 
a limited extent, the politicians. According to Obasanjo, the press has formed “an 
anti-government culture.”  What happens when the national press perpetually 
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evinces and projects the images of an antagonism and seen as a weapon of war? Has 
Nigeria’s antagonistic press produced an antagonistic political culture?   
7.5.2 Elite Press and the Politics of Exclusion  
Adesanoye’s position is that by the deliberate wish of those in authority, the media in 
Nigeria were designed to cater for the elite and exclude the mass of the people.  His 
position is in tandem with that of John Merrill (1974) whose view it is that when a 
nation’s media only mobilises a few privileged citizens, instead of all citizens towards 
defined objectives, such media should be adjudged of failure “in one of its most 
important roles: as an agent of change” (p47). In some societies, Merrill (1974) 
contends that true mass media do not exist; what exist and prosper are “specialized 
or elite media… elite lines of communication; from elite to elite within the power 
structure” (p47).  The elite press exist to serve elites’ needs to preserve its hold on 
power. 
For the press, this age-worn role in Nigeria’s brand of democracy is constitutive, 
according to Agbaje, who thinks that “the press whether they are aware or not have a 
defining role to play, as we try to build a democracy, because I don’t think we are a 
democracy yet” (Agbaje). In this regard, Kolade agrees that the press “still has a lot of 
work to do to get people to understand that a national identity must take pride of 
place over whatever ethnic tendencies we have.” 
7.6.0 THE POLITICS OF BELONGING 
Nigeria is nothing if not a patchwork of ethnic cross-stitches.  According to General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar, “Nigeria is a conglomeration of tribes…anywhere you go, you 
will find a dominant tribe, and the minority tribes”.  
Many chorused the fact that while there is nothing wrong with ethnic groups as units 
of political formations, ethnicity as an ideology pushed by an elite class, has formed 
the bedrock of political divisiveness, as amply demonstrated in the 2011 elections.  
Babangida makes the point that “ethnicity in Nigeria is a means by which politicians 
or elites try to place themselves in the scheme of things”. Part of the problem as 
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Osinbajo notes is that ethnicity is “not reflected in a positive way.” Negative 
perception about ethnicity is the direct consequence of how ethnicity has been used 
by the elite as a device “to cause disunity amongst the people, and the press presents 
the platform for it” (Osinbajo). 
According to Nira Yuval-Davis (2011), symbolic boundaries sketched by the politics 
of belonging are more enduring and more divisive, and they “separate the world 
population into ‘us’ and ‘them’” (p3).  What the elite has done is not just to forge 
these “symbolic boundaries”, but to also to take advantage of them in order to extract 
relevance and different forms of advancements. In Abati’s views, there is nothing 
wrong with a person proclaiming where he or she originates from; what is wrong is 
when one stands on that pedestal to oppress or exclude others who do not belong to 
their subgroup.  Anya agrees and says no one can wish away ethnicity, but that no 
one should feel justified to use it to create conditions of the oppression.  From the 
views of most of the other interviewees, ethnicity is a reality for which leaders need 
to find more positive and inclusive uses for in Nigeria’s democracy.   
7.6.1 Ethnicity and the Construct of Common National Identity 
Some have proposed that ethnic identities precede the construct of a national 
identity; Adinoyi-Ojo calls the ethnic group the first level or sketches of identity, 
before the construct of the nation-state, however, its provision of a sanctuary of 
belonging does not and should not supersede that of the nation-state.  The 
enjoyment of a higher preference over the nation is foundational to the tension.  As 
Osaghae (2006) states, referencing, Ihonvbere (1994) and Osaghae (1999): 
African states are not nations yet because identities and loyalties to 
ethnic, religious, regional and racial groups are stronger than those to 
the state, something that has been attributed variously to the 
‘artificiality’ of the state as a colonial creation, its irrelevance to the 
material well-being of citizens, and its inability to satisfy the 
imperatives of statehood (p4). 
Adinoyi-Ojo, however, is optimistic that ethnic politics was pervasive only in the 
First and Second Republics and will soon be out of vogue; it no longer has a place.  
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The pull to ethnicise politics, which was stronger among the older generation of 
politicians, persisted only because, according to him, the press had not helped to 
fashion a needed overarching national identity.  Instead the press reflected the view 
of ownership, which was preoccupied with various (ethnic, political, religious, 
business, or economic) group interests (Adinoyi-Ojo). 
While Adinoyi-Ojo’s optimism is welcome, the reality is this: there is still the absence 
of a strong, value-oriented, and acceptable national identity, and people still tend to 
revert to primordial identities.  Also, when there is a crisis, and a high level of 
uncertainty, the need to retreat into the non-threatening comfort of primary sub-
groups identities is even higher. “You know”, says Utomi, “when people don’t know 
what to do; the last refuge is to the clan, ethnicity is always the last refuge of the 
confused” (Utomi). 
7.6.2 Multiplicities of Citizenships or Multiple Citizenships 
Essentially therefore, the politics of belonging is negotiative and constructed in that 
they tend to “include struggles around the determination of what is involved in being 
a member of… a community” (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p3). In a world defined by ‘us’ and 
‘them’, the politics of belonging within the ethnic space: 
Involve(s) not only the maintenance and reproduction of the 
boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political 
powers (within and outside the community) but also their 
contestation, challenge and resistance by other political agents (Yuval-
Davis , 2011, p3). 
Yuval-Davis’ argument here is that recognised citizenship, as it were, should not be 
limited to only state citizenship. In fact, she argues that it is only possible to 
understand a nation-state citizenship when “the multi-layered structures of people’s 
citizenships… of sub, cross and supra-state political communities” (p4) are analysed. 
This she refers to as intersectionality; the concept attempts to decipher the 
multidimensional nature of communities that form modern states.  Everyone in the 
modern state, according to Yuval-Davis (2007), belongs to and are defined or shaped 
by their intersectional memberships of “local, ethnic, religious, national, regional, 
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transnational and international political communities” (p562).  She further argues 
that people of ethnic minority are “affected by this multiplicity of citizenships even 
more than those of people who belong to hegemonic majorities” (p562).  
In Nigeria, multiplicity of “citizenships” through the sub-group is a reality, and 
identity, while it is important, valid and even valuable, it should not subvert the 
catholic, pan-national identity.  According to Abati, tied to that sense of each unique 
identity are other important items, such as “culture, relationship with other people, a 
sense of history, and values.” Obasanjo’s observation becomes relevant here, that, it 
is not being born an Igbo man or a Yoruba man or an Edo man that is the issue, “it’s 
how your ethnic identity is used against the nation or other ethnic groups that is the 
problem” (Obasanjo).  In other words, distinctive identity must not become a vehicle 
of conflict and violence that is used as an oppressive instrument against other less 
powerful groups within the state.   
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PART 2.  NEWSPAPER DISCUSSION 
In Part Two of Chapter 7, I will discuss the findings earlier presented in Chapter 6, 
along the lines of the seven themes that emanated from the coding categories. These 
are: 1) The Newspapers, 2) The News Genres, 3) Illustrations of News Reports, 4) 
Direction of News Reports and Editorials, 5) Ethnic References, 6) Purpose of the 
Stories, and 7) Level of Objectivity. 
7.7.0 THE NEWSPAPERS: THREE ERAS AND THE CHANGING 
CHARACTER OF THE PRESS 
The findings in the study showed that in structure and character, the Nigerian press 
has changed over the period of the study.  However, in motivation and purpose, the 
consequence of elites ownership stronghold of the press has not changed. Combative 
ethnocentric promotional language of the early 1960s has given way to a subtler and 
more restrained approach; without given up on the broad ethnocentric objectives or 
missions.  
A closer look at the research period (1959-2011), highlights three eras of newspaper 
history, each era reflecting a different characteristic of the press.  Political changes in 
each era affected the character of the press. The three post-colonial eras are: The 
(post-independent) political press of the First Republic; the military era press, and 
the post-military era press.   
7.7.1 The (post-colonial/independent) political press of the First 
Republic 
In this period, defined by the two elections of 1959 and 1964, virtually all the 
prominent newspapers were directly connected to the prominent political parties or 
personalities, as well as bearing strong ethnic affinity. Many influential journalists of 
this period were ideologues and disciples of the parties their newspapers 
represented. They were not paid hacks; as such, they were able to represent the 
ideological positions of the political parties without undue apologies.  Bombastic 
language use was common; they were not shy to be abusive if they thought insults 
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were called for; they wrote whatever they thought was necessary to mobilise the 
troupe behind the party’s cause. As extensions and mouthpieces of the respective 
political parties, they were able to cast headlines with little professional subtleties. 
Here are a few examples like:  
 “Balewa is now touring with thugs.” Tribune, November 17, 1959 FP. 
  “Movement of AG Hooligans.” Pilot, November 24, 1959. 
 “To Vote NCNC is to Vote for Slavery.” Tribune, December 1, 1959. 
 “To the NPC, We Are But Dogs.” Tribune, December 10, 1959. 
 “Dr Azikiwe Must Resign – Let Heavens Fall.” Citizen Ed., March 10, 1964. 
This navel string tie of politicians with journalists is indicative of the relationship the 
journalist had with politician, a carry-over from the nationalist era when they fought 
side-by-side to end colonial rule. 
7.7.2 The Military Era Press 
The years after the Civil War, from 1970s into 1990s marked a significant period in 
which the military state invested huge sums of money in the media business, the 
newspaper-press inclusive. It also marked a shift in the profession of journalism, as 
government employed a majority of working journalists in one capacity or another. 
Establishment of (none overtly political) private media houses began with the 
founding of the Punch, the Guardian and numerous weekly news magazines in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, but they were few and mostly urban-based. The period 
produced a mass of acquiescent ‘public sector’ journalists, but also, more 
importantly, an effective group of subversive guerrilla journalists, led by weekly news 
magazines that fought the military establishment like caged lions.  However, state-
owned media dominated the era, in which the military legislated harmony and unity 
producing inorganic and forced unanimity among political parties; and tepid, truce-
seeking headlines like:  
 “Talks On Alliance Flopped, Says Azikiwe” Daily Times, August 4, 1979 FP. 
 “No One Will Step Down – Waziri” with a rider: “No Accord Yet, Says, Awo” 
Daily Times, July 31, 1979 FP.  
CHAPTER 7 
 
253 
Though government-controlled, many newspapers still managed to reflect, advocate 
or defend primary ethnic and regional interests. The era produced careful ethnic or 
personality-laced front-page headlines like these: 
 “I Can’t Step Down For Shagari – Azikiwe” Daily Times, August 8, 1979. 
  “Do Not Threaten Nigeria’s Existence” The New Nigerian, July 15, 1983. 
 “My Victory Ends Tribal Politics – President Shagari New Nigerian, August 12, 
1983. 
 “Give Peace a Chance” Daily Times Ed., August 10, 1983. 
During this period, the press was indeed a tool in the control of government but, 
gradually, private, non-political papers began to be more assertive.  
7.7.3 The Post-military Press  
By 1999, most state-owned newspapers were spent, perhaps occasioned by excessive 
demand by officials of state for journalists to be everything else except journalists.  
State-owned papers appeared at newsstands less regularly and their content was 
almost irrelevant.  More private independent newspapers stepped into the vacuum.  
While none was owned outrightly by any political party as in the first era, ownership 
of quite a few had their fortunes tied directly to some political interests, or 
individuals who were party bigwigs. The headlines were not as combative or as docile 
as the two previous eras. 
 “I Was Betrayed Like Awo...Ige Speaks on Falae’s Nomination.” The Punch, 
February 15, 1999. 
  “We’ve Been Cheated – Yoruba Leaders” The Punch, February 19, 1999. 
  “Accept Poll Results...Yoruba Parapo tells Falae” The Punch, March 3, 1999. 
  “Jonathan: I’m in Best Position to fix Nigeria” ThisDay, March 27, 2011. 
 “Lamido: Northerners Have Voted against Sectionalism.” ThisDay, April 12, 2011. 
  “ACN: South-west Voted for Goodluck, Not PDP” ThisDay, April 18, 2011. 
 
Some other newspapers of the era went to bed with who ever paid the bidding price: 
peddling influence became normal business but still keen on defending sectarian and 
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ethnic nationality interests.  Odia Ofeimun labelled the press of the period, 
“contractor press” and Utomi referred to some of them as “brokers” and “contractors 
of influence”. For the most part, many of them could be described as ethnic, but 
pragmatists, nonetheless. 
7.8.0 GENRE: NEWSPAPER AS WEAPON OF WAR 
The study found that newspaper editorials and front-page news stories were heavily 
used to support party politics.  The voice of the press was viewed as a required 
necessity to advocate political positions.  Obviously, politicians place a high premium 
on the power of the press to extend their voice and ideas and to help magnify their 
public image in order to influence the electorate.  The press is also viewed as a 
suitable weapon for wounding an opponent that could be an opposing political party, 
a fellow politician, or the ‘other’ ethnic group.  
Below are two examples of editorials: one from 1959, the other from 2011. Editorials 
are the voice of the newspapers; they express the ideological position of the paper 
and the stand of the paper on a given issue. The two papers are privately-owned 
papers, one was more manifest in party politics; their use of language, approach, and 
tone were different, but their stout defence of ethno-regional interest was not 
disguised. (Note that the Nigerian Tribune is a southern newspaper, critical of a 
northern political party, the NPC; while the Daily Trust is a northern newspaper, 
critical of a southern presidential candidate, Goodluck Jonathan).  
“NPC Malady” Nigerian Tribune, November 17, 1959 Front Page Ed. 
The present behaviour of the NPC party in Nigerian politics could be likened 
to the cowardly resort of a boxer who has been trying to fight gamely for 
sometime, but suddenly sensing defeat takes to scooping up dust and 
throwing it in the other man’s eyes hoping to win the fight by launching fresh 
attack with his teeth while the other man is temporarily blinded.” 
“Jonathan’s Challenge”, Daily Trust Editorial, April 27, 2011.  
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In times like these when the chasms in our ethnic, religious and 
regional fault lines seem to have been deepened by the acrimony that 
attended, first the PDP’s primaries and then the violence that followed 
the outcome of the presidential election in many Northern states, the 
president is expected to be more measured in his public utterances. 
For instance, while the post-election violence in some states in 
Northern Nigeria is condemnable, it was an error of judgment on the 
part of the president to have likened it to the circumstances that led to 
the civil war. Such analogies can also worsen the regional, ethnic, and 
religious dimensions of the crisis (p36).  
The results also firmly demonstrate the grip of ownership to strongly push the ethnic 
card, whether that ownership stock is state-owned (under the military or civilian) or 
privately-held. Virtually all the privately-owned papers endorsed and supported 
candidates who shared regional or ethnic affinity with paper ownership. 
7.9.0 ILLUSTRATIONS OF (FRONT-PAGE) NEWS REPORTS: MOVE 
FROM (ELITIST) TEXTUAL DOMINANCE 
The findings revealed an attempt by newspapers to gradually move away from heavy 
dependence on textual materials, and use photos and other forms of illustrations in 
front page news stories.  This shift, though gradual, is significant in the sense that the 
dependence on text in the early period further attests to the fact that the main 
audience of newspapers was still largely urban and elitist in orientation.  
With time, several factors forced newspapers to seek a bigger market, a larger 
reading audience: a) new titles like the Punch, National Concord and the Guardian, 
entered the newspaper market. The new entries were more profit-oriented, they 
needed more mass readership to break even, unlike government or party-supported 
newspapers; b) technology made it easier to use photos and other illustrations to tell 
stories. Up until 1992, colour photography was not in use in newspapers. The Sunray 
weekly newspaper in June of 1992 became the first newspaper publication to 
introduce colour prints in newspaper business in Nigeria (Anim, 2006); c) 
competition from television meant that the newspaper-press no longer had exclusive 
monopoly on media audience – this made it necessary for newspapers to also show, 
and not just tell. 
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In spite of the drive to be increasingly populist and grow circulation figures, the 
newspaper-press still remained largely urban and elitist in orientation. 
7.10.0 DIRECTION OF NEWS REPORTS OR EDITORIALS: ETHNIC 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND DIVISIVENESS, A CONSTANT. 
The findings showed that the direction of news reports and editorials, as revealed by 
tone and language choice, remained consistently divisive. News treatment over the 
period also showed a changing trend – an observable toning down in the use of 
caustic language; however, the pursuit of the goal to promote ethno-regional interest 
was not in any significant way diminished. 
Stories were hyped to give a positive twist about favoured party, candidate, or party 
members. On the other hand selected news items about the opposition party and 
their candidates were hardly ever positive, or even neutral, but mostly negative 
stories.  Occasionally, whenever there occurs a dip in the number of negative stories, 
(from 82.7% in 1964 to 58.5% in 1979) it is usually indicative of a strong election 
umpire threatening fire and brimstone as it was in the case of the 1979 elections. The 
military in government then, mounted steady pressure on the press to keep divisive 
stories out of the press, which by 1979, were mainly state-owned. 
Another significant trend in the study is that consolidation elections (1964/65, 1983, 
and 2011), raked up the highest points in negative and divisive stories, in terms of 
ethnic, regional, and religious cleavages. A key point to note is that they were each 
followed by a period of bloody political crisis. The aftermath of unrest and mayhem 
of the 1964 elections directly led to the Civil War; the 1983 winners were overthrown 
in a military coup within three months of being in office; and the aftermath of the 
2011 elections was a series of bloody clashes, which have tagged the year’s election 
now the bloodiest in Nigeria’s history. 
 “Only AG Can do the Job” Nigerian Tribune, December 1, 1959. 
 “A Program of lies (2)” Nigerian Tribune, December 2, 1959 FP Ed. 
 “Why You Must Reject AG 24” West African Pilot, December 1, 1959. 
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  “Police Round Up AG Top Men For Alleged Fraud” West African Pilot, 
04/12/1959 FP. 
Contrast the above front-page headlines with election period headers during the 
highly controlled press of the military era (1979), which was also carried over to the 
Second Republic (1983). 
 “Join Hands To Build A United Nigeria – Shagari” The New Nigerian, December 
18, 1979.  
 “Do Not Threaten Nigeria’s Existence” The New Nigerian, August 15, 1983 FP. 
 “Give Peace a Chance” Daily Times, August 10, 1983 FP Ed.  
During the third era, (which includes 1999 & 2011) the press had been delivered from 
the military, but it was neither fully professional nor totally delivered from strong 
ethnic and regional political interests; see below: 
 “We’ve Been Cheated – Yoruba Leaders” The Punch, February 19, 1999 FP. 
 “ACN: South-west Voted for Goodluck, Not PDP” ThisDay, April 18, 2011 FP.  
 Sule Lamido, “Lamido: Northerners Have Voted Against Sectionalism,” ThisDay, 
April 12, 2011. 
7.11.0 ETHNIC REFERENCES IN THE PRESS: THE ETHNIC CARD 
LOOMS LARGE 
From the findings, election news stories about ethnic minority groups spiked in 2011 
at 54.3%.  Up until then, news reports on minority ethnic groups were marginal; the 
three major ethnic groups dominated election news stories.  However in 2011, Dr. 
Goodluck Jonathan, a minority from the Niger Delta Region, was propelled by 
circumstances to run for the office, supported by a loose coalition of southern 
minority ethnic groups. In the background, the three leading ethnic groups jostled 
for position of kingmaker or chief spoiler.  (A point to note: ethnically neutral stories 
got the lion share of stories during most elections. This could be misleading, but it 
should not come as a surprise; numerous government information service stories 
designed to educate people, got front-page placements). 
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Interestingly, after Jonathan won the election, dominant Northern and Western 
regions felt a need to explain how or why this ‘unusual’ candidate won.  Sule Lamido, 
Governor of northern state of Jigawa put a spin on the election result: 
“Northerners Have Voted Against Sectionalism  
- Lamido.” ThisDay, April 12, 2011. 
And a few days later, the Western Region dominated ACN party felt a need to explain 
why the region voted in the way it voted:  
“ACN: South-west Voted for Goodluck, Not PDP”.  
ThisDay, April 18, 2011. 
These headlines and news reports betrayed the fact that political elites in the 
majority ethnic groups felt they had made a big concession by allowing an ethnic 
minority candidate to run and win. These reports, among others, helped to unveil the 
trend of elite consensus and recruitment that had been prevalent in Nigerian politics 
from time. 
7.11.1 Elite Consensus and Recruitment 
The election year of 1999 was unusual but significantly interesting.  For the first time 
an electoral gladiatorial fight became non-ethnic, but intra-ethnic, inter party and 
personality centred.  The two leading candidates of the two leading parties – Chief 
Olusegun Obasanjo (former Military Head of State, 1976-1979) for Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP), and Chief Olu Falae for Alliance for Democracy (AD), were 
both of the Yoruba ethnic group, as a result, inter-ethnic conflicts were rested for the 
season.  The military and political elites reached a consensus that the candidate for 
the 1999 election should come from the South Western Yoruba Region; they also 
determined who the candidate should be, in the person of Obasanjo. And he won.  
This trend of elite consensus and recruitment, with active support of the press, the 
study found is consistent with every transition election since 1959, when the British 
more or less hand-picked NPC and Balewa; in 1979, the military, led by then General 
Olusegun Obasanjo, determined to hand power to the northern dominated National 
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Party of Nigeria (NPN). On the 1979 elections I had the following exchange with 
Chief Obasanjo: 
Richard Ikiebe: So why did you decide to hand power to a particular part of 
the country after you in 1979? 
Chief Olusegun Obasanjo: No, not a particular part of the country, a 
particular individual.  
Ikiebe: Really? 
Obasanjo: Come of it. A particular individual!  
Ikiebe:  And why was that…? 
Obasanjo: Because I looked at the individuals that came up as candidates, 
and from their backgrounds that I knew, and all of what I saw… 
Ikiebe: Looking back do you think that view was justified? 
Obasanjo: Absolutely!  
Ikiebe: But his government didn’t last…  
Obasanjo: Well, the fact that he didn’t last does not mean that the view was 
not justified; the fact that he did not last did not mean that I did not give good 
account... alright?  
Examples of elite recruitment and consensus candidates are common occurrences in 
Nigeria’s negotiated democracy, where election rituals results matter little. The 
election processes and the press helped to make everything look legitimate, normal, 
acceptable, and respectable.  In 1999, the two Yoruba candidates were imposed; the 
difference is that one was an imposition by the serving and retired military oligarchy, 
while the other was imposed on his party’s elite, both voiding true and essential 
internal party and national democratic processes. 
7.12.0 PURPOSE OF THE STORIES: ETHNIC FAULT LINES IN BARE-
KNUCKLE ELECTIONS 
Consistently, findings show that elections were fought bitterly along regional and 
ethnic fault-lines; they represented bare-knuckle dogfights, with overriding need to 
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castigate and bring others into public ridicule and disrepute. Even in 1979, with 
strong military oversight, divisive stories of castigation still commanded over a 
quarter of election stories.  As a direct consequence, violence attended most 
elections.  
The scorecards for the 1964 and 2011 elections mudsling campaigns produced two of 
the lowest needs to ‘persuade’ anyone; stories with castigation intent were at their 
highest.  The candidature of Goodluck Jonathan, in particular, was strongly detested 
by a strong component of Northern elite, but supported across party by southern 
politicians.   
These findings also highlighted a key problem with consolidation elections, where 
the need to retain power by all means often collided with the drive to gain power by 
means fair and foul. 
7.13.0 OBJECTIVITY: WHERE SUBJECTIVITY RULES 
The findings produced a pattern to indicate that in national elections since 1959, the 
press was mostly subjective. The closest the press came to achieving a high rating in 
objectivity was 1979, when the military, through exacting ownership control, 
regulations, as well as threats and intimidation, kept a lid on vitriolic political 
disputations and on the types of stories the newspapers could report.  Objectivity, 
which includes fairness in reporting, adequately representing all the parties, and 
shades of opinion as reasonably possible, was difficult for most papers as they were 
aligned very closely to political parties.  And in the latter years when most papers had 
decoupled themselves from political parties’ apron strings, cash-and-carry politics 
did not allow objectivity to thrive. 
With headlines like these: 
 “To vote NCNC is to vote slavery” Nigerian Tribune December 1, 1959 
 “Police Round up AG top men for Alleged Fraud” West African Pilot December 4, 
1959 
 “Enemies of Unity” a Front page editorial by Nigerian Citizen March 10, 1964  
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 “Yorubas Now Stink: SLA Prostrated to The IBOS?” Nigerian Tribune December 
28, 1964  
The findings indicate that press almost always took sides, which, perhaps, is related 
to ownership’s interests.  What the findings reflect is ownership ties between papers’ 
newsrooms, and the ethnicised political parties.  During election seasons, all 
pretences to objectivity seem to be suspended. One observable trait is that there are 
more proclivities for subjectivity in the dynamics of consolidation election. 
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7.14.0 PART THREE 
From the discussions so far in the first two parts of this chapter, the following 
deductions and their implications can be safely made:   
7.14.1 Contextualising Colonialism 
 That while it may be an inadequate (or lazy) argument to heap all culpabilities for 
the current woes of Nigeria on the colonial (or even the military rulers for that 
matter), the reality of the consequences of the foundation laid by colonial rulers 
cannot be dismissed perfunctorily. It is crucial to establish these as important 
causal factors that form essential parts of the genesis of the larger Nigerian social-
political definition.   
 That colonialism is a historical reality, and the essential sponsor of 
postcolonialism; searching either for clues must be elevated above a fault-finding 
scheme, or a mere search for whom to blame.  The interrogation of history should 
be about finding solutions, and about understanding the magnitude and 
complexity of a problem, which begins with a clear appreciation for the origins of 
the problem. 
 That colonialism remains the enduring burden of a post-colonial state. The 
political elites that inherited governance from the colonial rulers were 
inexperienced and ill prepared for democratic government in general, and 
federalism in particular. For many, democracy was a process of getting elected 
into office; thereafter, one did as he pleased, with minimal democratic procedural 
signposts here and there.  As a result, they were imperceptive of the need to, and 
ignorant about how to dismantle the colonial apparatus; they used the system 
that birthed the suffocating post-colonial conditions and its mind-set to run the 
alien parliamentary system, without thinking. 
7.14.2 Ideology and Values 
 That an ideological vacuum occasioned by an absence of a national value 
orientation exists. Common values and nation-specific ideology based on 
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communal experience are essential navigational components that enable all 
members of the imagined nation-state to pull in the same general direction. 
 That to be driven by, and allow matters to be determined solely on ethno – 
regional ideological basis precludes the considerations of other - inclusive 
national discourse.  A value-free society is a potential recipe for an all-comer 
dumping ground for all kinds of values and ideologies.  
 Evolve organically and codified OR formally discussed and enshrined in the 
nation’s statute book i.e. constitution. 
7.14.3 The Nation-State and the Press 
 That the press cannot be expected to be homogeneous in a non-homogeneous, 
multi-ethnic society, or be faithful to a non-existent ideology or poorly defined 
national goals. The role of the press is to report and mirror society back to itself in 
an unfettered and open village-square dialogue of all to all. To demand a single 
and unified voice on all matters under present circumstances is a call for 
uniformity of position that can only be achieved under an authoritarian system. 
  That in spite of ownership exaction, economic pressure, or government 
intimidation, the press has, on balance, managed tension between several interest 
groups and that of the nation. Thus, though lacking in the guidance that central 
national values orientation could have provided, the press has provided a national 
platform for exchange of ideas, within the boundaries of an ill defined, or an 
unstructured political culture.   
 That the press operates a Martian media model blindly imitative of alien press 
systems, without the barest local makeover. The consequence is that the adopted 
structures and processes have neither roots in the community, nor relevance in 
the society, with many protocols, practices, and conventions that are mostly 
bereft of meaning to the people.  It is not a wonder, therefore, that no Nigerian 
daily newspaper (daily or weekly) can openly state its circulation figures without 
feeling embarrassed in a nation of an estimated 180 million people. 
 That the failure of the press to genuinely decouple itself from the political elite 
indeed made transparent in participatory democratisation difficult. The Nigerian 
press became a “vehicle for uncritical assumptions, beliefs, stereotypes, 
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ideologies, and orthodoxies… that blunt critical awareness” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, 
p2). The press, according to Olatunji Dare, “operated primarily to strengthen the 
grip of (political) leaders over their followers, and thereby the fragmentation of 
the country” (2000, p. 15).  
7.14.4 The Captured Media or Owned Press is a Weaponised 
Battle-Axe 
 That the newspaper-press is weaponised; a battle-axe to fight in elites’ inter-
ethnic wars, in equal measure the same way they used the instrument of ethnicity 
to advance their political power-grabbing objective.  
 That the press is a victim, often misused by the political elite. It lost its 
effectiveness and power to cause change when it became as polarised and as 
divided along the same political and ethnic fault lines that divided the politicians 
and the nation.   
 That the coalition of convenience between press and political elite in the pursuit 
of non-integrative ethno-cultural interests produced a detrimental political 
culture, serving the mainly parochial, and often personal purpose of the political 
elite.    
 That journalists are under the illusion that they operate a libertarian press system 
when in fact they have been firmly captured – knowingly or unknowingly by state 
or private authoritarian ownership system. A newspaper bears the image of its 
paymaster, (ruling/government, political or economic elite) no matter how 
heavily disguised (One sign of capture is the glaring absence of investigative 
stories in a state rife with stories of power abuse waiting to be told) 
 That an owner will always have more power to overrule the journalist’s 
professional judgement, even when such controls are not often exercised.  
Support for ownership’s ethno-regional interests, economic interests, or political 
cause is expected, even when such support is not overtly demanded. 
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7.14.5 Elites and Elite Politics 
 That the Nigerian press is urban-based and produced for the elite.  It is elite-
inspired in its orientation, and elite-driven in character and performance, as the 
journalist is a strong member of the elite class.  This accounts for the low 
circulation, its choice of language and location. 
 That the elite intra and inter-ethnic consensus and recruitment of political office 
candidates have proved more important than the actual electoral process of 
casting votes; this is explained by the godfather syndrome.  
 That the power and control over an ethnic or regional group is a negotiative 
currency that is worth its political weight in gold. And equally that a newspaper 
platform is a mobilising tool like no other. 
 That while research attention may have been given to elite manipulation of ethnic 
affiliations to enhance and advance political careers and personal livelihoods 
rather than nation-building, not as much research attention has been accorded to 
the fact that the newspaper-press in particular, and the media in general were 
also victims of the elite manipulations.   
 That the newspaper-press was a formidable weapon of offence and defence; an 
indispensable tool for ethnic mobilisation; and vocal instrument of negotiating 
the treacherous political terrain. 
7.14.6 Belonging 
 That the crisis of identity created by the need to choose between the grand nation 
and the ethnic nationality is an elite construct to force differentiations between 
‘us’ and ‘them’.  That disputes over loyalty to the nation or the ethnic groups need 
not exist, as loyalty to both can co-exist. This point is proved by Aimufua who 
avers “the press that is sectional and able to represent nationality perspectives, 
can indeed still promote a sense of national identity amongst different groups 
within any socio-political context” (Aimufua, 2007, pp301–302). 
 That while ownership types, structures, and tones of some newspapers may have 
changed, ethno-regional agenda of the political elite has remained constant and 
consistent throughout the period of the study, even in the eras when papers are 
no longer overtly owned by the politically partisan. 
CHAPTER 7 
 
266 
CHAPTER 7 
 
267 
7.15.0 PART FOUR 
Findings from the Research Questions 
Having discussed the thematic findings to give robustness to the outcomes of the 
study in the last section, I shall now proceed further to the findings as presented in 
Chapter 5 to discuss more directly and specifically, the findings in relation to the 
study research questions.  This study was designed to investigate what contributions 
the press has made (outside the commonly acknowledged agitative nationalist role) 
to the forging of culturally divergent multi-ethnic nationalities, into the post-
colonial, democratic Nigerian state.   
My quest was to better understand the contribution of the press in the promotion of 
identity and belonging or inclusion in the multi-ethnic commonwealth of Nigeria.  As 
stated in Chapters 1 and 4, the study was conducted under four composite research 
questions, which provided framework for investigation into the subject matter as 
follows.  A discussion of the findings against each of the question follows after. 
1. Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct 
Nigeria’s political culture and national identity? 
2. Did press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflect or 
affect the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the search to 
belong”?  
3. Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their 
leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism?  
4. Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation 
building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy and federalism? 
7.15.1 Research Question 1:  
Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct 
Nigeria’s political culture and national identity?  
The evidence and findings from the presented data demonstrated that the press did 
help to define and shape ethnic/tribal identities, but this is not a claim the press can 
make directly, or boast about because the press on its own did not will it, the press 
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was a tool, a weapon in the hands of owners of the press, whether state-owned under 
military or civilian government, or privately held by political elite. The views among 
the interview participants (with varying degrees of emphasis on different touch 
points) indicate that the press has helped to define and construct Nigeria’s political 
culture and national identity. The direct effect of reportage and commentary, if any, 
was minimal among the mass of Nigerians, but was magnified among the elites. 
Consequently the press mainly reflects Nigeria’s political culture, as constructed by 
the political elite.  
7.15.2 Research Question 2:  
Did press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflect 
or affect the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the 
search to belong”? 
The study found that press reportage and commentary at federal election season 
reflected or affected the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in the 
search to belong. Despite the mostly across the board agreement, on the main 
proposition, different reasons were adduced on why election reportage mirrors 
ethnic cleavages and identities. 
7.15.3 Research Question 3:  
Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their 
leadership or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or 
regionalism?  
The surprising consensus of the interview participants was that the press and 
political elites exploited their positions to foster ethnicisation of electoral politics.  
This finding confirmed earlier studies (Nnoli, 2003, Osaghae, 2006) that 
ethnicisation is a basic political currency required at the entry point. Tony Momoh 
was emphatic, that the elite did not just foster ethnicisation of politics, “They caused 
it!” he said.  The surprising thing about this finding is that they were all members of 
the elite class. 
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7.15.4 Research Question 4:  
Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation 
building, and national unity, and the practice of democracy and 
federalism? 
The findings from this question state that the press is not a lone ranger; it acts in 
concert with other institutions of the society to effect any change.  The findings also 
highlight the power of ownership, whether state-owned or private, the effect is the 
same; ownership interests often override the professional judgement of the 
journalists.  That said, it must be borne in mind that the press is not a unipolar 
institution.  Cole considers it dangerous to even contemplate its role in that manner.  
Even when the press raises uncomfortable questions, it is in the nature of the press 
to do so…those uncomfortable questions eventually serve the overall interest of the 
nation. 
7.15.5 Conclusion: Single vs. Multiple Citizenships 
Overall, this study has found that in the period of focus (1959-2011), there was a 
resurgence of elite-driven, ethnic-based identity politics, due to the failure of, what 
Nyamnjoh called, “a single political and legal citizenship” to take root after so many 
decades of independence (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p19). Nyamnjoh’s implied position is 
that a single citizenship is preferred, but contrary to this view, the study found that 
there are, in reality, layers of overlapping citizenships.  In plural, multi-ethnic 
intersections of any imagined post-colonial nation-state, insistence on a single 
political citizenship would be hard to realise, and perhaps harmful, as it has been in 
Nigeria.  For most people, there are other legitimate identities outside that of the new 
state.  
What the insistence on a single legal citizenship does is to cast identity or belonging 
as a single item issue, which further intensifies the passion in the competition for 
that single space. The study found that if values are streamlined, and used to design a 
common ideological roadmap, the toxic tension between a single political citizenship 
and other variants of multiple citizenships would seize to exist, or to matter, and the 
need to explain other expressions of identity would cease. 
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In addition, the study found that the thick clouds of ethno-centric political culture 
that have enfolded the land were not the sole making of the press, but rather the 
disguised hand of the elites bearing the false hand of the press, which, as a dutiful 
messenger, merely proclaims the paymaster’s wishes.   
The study also found that the press and politicians have been willing bed mates from 
time; both are beneficiaries, though unequal partners. At the beginning of their 
collaboration (1959-1966), they both believed in the ethno-regional cause, the press 
requiring no extra inducement, matching the politicians’ zeal as ideologues. Later 
(1967-1998) the role changed, the press became, not entirely an unwilling 
collaborator, facilitating the legitimisation of military rule, and latterly a rebel 
against the same military.  The last stage (1999 - date) is the era when the press 
learned how to commodify its position and the platforms, the era of 
commercialisation of media access and profit from influence.  
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CHAPTER 8 
“There is no peaceful way out of anybody getting out of Nigeria, Nigerians must 
find a peaceful way of living together”. 
Former President Olusegun Obasanjo 
8.1.0 INTRODUCTION 
When I set out on this quest, the objective was to unravel the role of the press in the 
politics of identity and belonging, in the tottering, post-colonial, multi-ethnic 
Nigerian nation-state.  In this chapter, I try to outline the summary of the work, how 
it was executed, and its main findings as well as draw some conclusions while 
pointing out areas where future work needs to be done. 
The study itself mainly focused on the trifocal nature of the nation-building 
relationships between the press, democratic process of elections, and the concept of 
belonging.  In looking at identity politics in the unique ethno-regional federation of 
Nigeria, contentions over fairness and equity, if not equality and size, are central to 
understanding election politics, and the dependency on ethnicity as an ideology, and 
as a strategic inter-ethnic negotiation tool.  According to Osaghae (2006) “historical 
inequalities and imbalances… have historically fed ethnic mobilisation in adversarial 
characterisation” (p17). 
It was Ernest Renan, who in 1882, according to Ernest Gellner, stated that nations 
are made by human will. Gellner (1987) used Renan’s claim to further his own 
argument in order to “deny any naturalistic determinism of the boundaries of 
nations” (p8).  While not entirely discarding the role of language, geography, race, 
and religion in nations creation or formation, Gellner’s own position is that it takes a 
more purposeful determination on the part of any nation’s founding fathers to 
deliberately create what is imagined into an entity called a nation (cited in Martin 
Thom, 1990, p.23). If, indeed, Renan is right that nations’ creation resides with the 
will of the founding nationalists, it then means that perhaps, it is in purposeful 
deterministic approach to a nation’s construct, that Nigeria was most short-change.  
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8.1.1 The Press in the Construct of Realities in a Post-colonial 
State 
In Chapter 3 I established the notion that a paradigm is a construct, and that a 
construct is relative to a given situation or location.  The question then arises, how 
does the press simultaneously participate in the construct of dual or multiple 
identities (ethnic, religious, as well as national all at the same time) in a post-colonial 
state?  What this study found is that the role of the press has become rather 
complicated since a newspaper must report, reflect, and comment on everyday 
realities within its readership community.  This poses an ontological dilemma for the 
press more so in situations where inter-ethnic political relationships are toxic. 
It is important to restate that in order to form historic and contextual perspectives, 
the study re-examined colonialism, and post-colonialism theories, among others, to 
help to explain and provide understanding for sequencing past events and their 
consequences on present events. Therefore, central to this study as backgrounds are 
some significant political actors, historical events, and factors that led to the creation 
of Nigeria.  In the context, therefore, colonialism served as a backgrounding concept, 
while post-colonialism becomes the new reality immersed in fixtures of perennial 
ethnic tensions and conflicts, as a result of the former.   The objective was not to 
blame the past, but to explore additional clues as to how the nation has arrived where 
it is.  
8.2.0 WHAT THE STUDY SET OUT TO DO AND WHAT WAS DONE 
All theories are underpinned by defined philosophical paradigms. To provide an 
appropriate setting for the study I first explored and established its ontological and 
epistemological contexts; I then engaged in a theoretical and methodological review 
to provide a basis for the construction of conceptual understanding to develop a 
foundation that would sustain the work.  In this context I examined the pros and 
cons of wholesale transferrals of Western political thought on democracy and press 
models.  Several researchers have, in the past, advocated the urgent need to counter 
Euro-centrism in African academia by probing the motivation, methods, and 
audience for the production of knowledge (Eshun, Zakaria and Segbefia, 2015).  
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Noting that academia in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa is not immune to post-
colonial academic propensity for mimicry, the study found that the same scale of 
measurement cannot be applied in two situations with dissimilar histories and 
realities.  For this reason, application of theories cannot be done indiscriminately, 
but contextually with a situational sensitivity. According to Okigbo (1987), a 
philosophy must impact significantly on people's lives.  And in order to do so, the 
people’s experiences and reality must count, and significantly too.  
In this respect, I examined a collage of theoretical perspectives, works that I regarded 
as germane to the research: for example, the idea of new state formation in a multi-
cultural setting within a post-colonial environment. I also examined an array of 
conceptual perspectives on nations and nation-states, nationalism and ethnicity, 
elites, the press, and elections research - to provide an overview and understanding. 
What became clear is that conceptual understanding and practice, African and 
Nigerian democracy is essentially an event not a goal-oriented process engaged to 
achieve certain beneficial objectives for the entire nation. A type of nominal electoral 
democracy which some have called pseudo-democracy. 
Also, the heart of the work are concepts of the press in society and politics, which 
provided the scope on which to sufficiently investigate electoral democracy.  In this 
respect, the study looked at issues emanating from the incursion of the military into 
politics, press ownership and control, and how long military rule has redefined both 
press and politics.In focusing on issues of election/democracy in post-military states, 
and military authoritarianism, what the study found is instability, perpetual conflict, 
and political unrest; all arising from different notions of power, politics, and 
relations. Essentially, military governance culture is about conquering, command, 
and control, not inclusion, an essential element of democracy. As a result even 
civilian administrations have adopted military authoritarianism with its forced 
harmony and order, two concepts that are strangers to genuine democracy.  
Within the scope of politics and media, the study pulls in the works by Chantal 
Mouffe on agonistic pluralism conceived from the position that society by nature is 
inherently conflictual.  Mouffe acknowledges that it is impossible to eradicate 
antagonistic politics, but that it can be significantly mitigated by agonistic approach 
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– a process of open and continuous mediation.  However, the military’s 
understanding of “opposition politics” is beyond mere disagreement on issues.  In 
1975 as explained in Chapter 3, General Obasanjo as military head of state strongly 
believed that under the parliamentary system, opposition politics was nothing short 
of a call to arms for political parties who regarded each other as enemies that needed 
to be “crushed”.  This mind-set is what makes agonism particularly attractive and 
relevant to the African and Nigerian situations; it provides a practical and functional 
framework for legitimising confrontations without drawing blood in an open forum. 
Mouffe, though essentially Western and Eurocentric in her work, seems to 
understand the problems of Africa, for according to her, 
the conditions existing in many African countries are the consequence 
of the inadequate political system that was bequeathed to them by 
their former colonizers. Often, independence left them not as stable 
national states, but as a patchwork of ethnic fiefdoms, burdened with 
parliaments based on those of the former colonial power. In countries 
with so many ethnicities, languages, customs and cultures, multi-party 
democracy has led to fragmentation and bitterly divided politics 
(Mouffe, 2013, pp38-39). 
African states need to re-confront and reconsider postcolonialism with a fresh mind-
set. Rather than point accusing fingers at the past as scapegoats for the failure of the 
present, the past must be confronted to give us the liberty to dismantle the mind-set 
and excuses prone, blame opportunity and fault-finding.  
8.2.1 Methodology and Research Design  
I began by providing a foreground on the choice of methods with an examination of 
the peculiarities of the African research cosmos. The study discussed the mixed 
methods choices of semi-structured, elite in-depth interviews; and content analysis, 
both of which I found most suited for meeting the objective requirements of the 
research.  Equally, I found the two methods most suitable to drive the process of data 
collection, organisation, and analysis. In-depth elite interviews were conducted with 
22 key personalities in politics, academia, and the press; selected nine newspaper 
publications during election periods of the study were content analysed.  
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8.3.0 FINDINGS 
Findings of this study were discussed in the last chapter.  However, it is important to 
highlight some key findings, which may not have been exhaustively discussed.   
8.3.1 Appearance of, and the Sameness of Change  
As far as the interrelationships between the press, politics, and belonging are 
concerned, nothing has substantially changed in over half a century on how the press 
represents and presents ethnic issues. And particularly, ethnic issues have become 
more complex, their militia have multiplied and have become more violent. Splinter 
ethnic groups have increased, become bolder and more vocal, leaving big old ethnic 
groups more segregated.  
After barely 5 years of independence in 1965, the Nigerian Tribune in an editorial 
wrote that,  
The country’s press, unfortunately and inexplicably too, have pitched 
up their tents with this or that tribal war crier. Principle of national 
unity has been sacrificed on the altar of petty tribal gods (The 
Nigerian Tribune, 1965, p1). 
More than 50 years after the editorial, this study affirms that not much has changed. 
Osaghae and Agbaje, among other scholars, attest that Nigeria may actually be worse 
off than it was in 1959.  Osaghae, however, notes that though press is still openly and 
politically partisan, it is also “still conscious of its national role as a civil society 
constituent”.  This paradox runs through the study revealing the complexity of the 
Nigerian situation. Agbaje is not surprised that the newspaper press became an 
important political partisan element. He avers that it was in the nature of multi-party 
political systems for the newspaper-press  
at one point or another to affect and reflect partisan considerations, 
[however] what jeopardises such a political system… is when the 
pursuit of partisan considerations becomes, for the press, the raison 
d'etre” (Agbaje, 1990, p224).   
CHAPTER 8 
 
276 
As long as the press is unable to uncouple itself from the political elite, and regards 
its main reason for being the service to politics, so long does the jeopardy remain. As 
noted in the beginning chapter, the situation has reduced the press to “a vehicle for 
uncritical assumptions…that blunt critical awareness and make participatory 
democratisation difficult” (Nyamnjoh, 2005 p2).  The study shows that elite owners, 
who have strong ethnic, regional or political affiliation, almost exclusively 
manipulate the press. 
Regarding this finding, it is important to highlight Colin Sparks’ (2007) position that 
some may not be sufficiently “sensitive to the nature of the pressures and constraints 
on news production arising from the economic and political realities of capitalist 
democracy” (p68). According to him, most ordinary journalists are not necessarily 
willing collaborators or allies with the elites; rather, they remain “potentially allies of 
those who wish to build a different and better world” (p68).  He submits that most 
behind the scene contestations between owners and journalists remain low-key 
newsroom disagreements until “times of intense class struggle (when) the social 
distance between the owners (and journalists) becomes an obvious, unbridgeable, 
social and political ‘chasm’” (p.83). Colin’s position is an important point, for indeed, 
there are many collaborative stories in the Nigerian newsroom experiences to prove 
it (Ikiebe, 2012).  
8.3.2 The Press in an un-Imagined Ethno-Regional Federation 
According to Cooper (2002), the British designed ethno-regional federation  
had the perverse effect of encouraging first a winner-takes-all quest for 
electoral power within each of the three regions, and then competition 
between the regions for power at the federal level (p69).   
 
Thus, the British institutionalised a type of nominal electoral democracy, where the 
structures of state were deliberately designed and tilted to serve the interests of some 
better than others.  The balance of power between the three arms of government is 
an extension of a much more crucial equilibrium of power between the centre and 
the federating units. 
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The British did not make any pretensions to create, let alone preserve a balance of 
power.  According to Lynn (2006), they were more worried about letting a particular 
section of the nation down.  In the process, they contrived a power centre away from 
the federal centre around which they designed the rest of the nation to revolve.  As 
with most things British, the ethno-regional creation (sired by veiled intentions and 
motives) was dubiously christened in familiar political labels and acceptable federal 
vestments. 
 
The result is that virtually every election since 1959 has been carefully choreographed 
along ethno-regional lines by the leadership elites, and sold to the people through the 
press.  Not many people dispute the success of the Nigerian press in the campaign 
against colonialism, authoritarian military, and autocratic politicians trying to bend 
the constitution to accommodate their unconstitutional ambition for a third term in 
office. 
 
However, the tripartite relationships between press owners, journalists, and those in 
power have remained complex and defy easy explanations. The British, and later the 
political elite, created opportunistic structures that mostly favoured those already in 
the driver’s seat, or those who had access to them. A key point this study also reveals 
is that the elites used the press, just as they used ethnicity, and every other means – 
foul or fair – to acquire, maintain, and retain power – nothing was too sacred; not 
even religion.  Indeed, the study found uses of the press to be central to the elites’ 
mobilisation agenda.  This is not entirely a surprise since leading newspapers, from 
the early days, were purposefully established as political papers (Omu, 1978), and 
politics continues to serve as a strong motivation to own a newspaper even in these 
days. 
8.3.3 A Homogeneous Press in a Pluralistic State 
The results of this study reveal that there are those who think that the role of the 
press is solely to unite the nation with a singularly homogeneous narrative. The 
group imagines that the press does the nation a disservice by taking any ethno-
regional position on national issues. There is another group that thinks the press 
should be able to tell all the stories in the imagined community, so that the nation 
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can dialogue with itself.  And then there is the group that imagines that the press 
ought to provide a value template upon which the ideological direction of Nigeria can 
be scripted and action taken, and monitored. For each of these positions, a strong 
case could be made; however, those who expect the press to be homogenous forget 
that the society itself is not homogenous. Homogeneity of voice defeats the spirit of 
dialogue and debate. Likewise, divergent voices do not necessarily imply disunity or 
divisiveness. 
What these findings have revealed is that the press may not have adequately 
provided a supportive intellectual base for across ethnic-dialogues; rather, it has 
joined in the jingoism of the average politician. Thus, the press is perceived to have 
been divisive in the way it has lent voice to the elite as a tool to promote negative 
ethnic politics. It is therefore not surprising that the study found a consensus that the 
effects of the press have been material to the nation’s present state.  However, the 
point must still be made that it is difficult to measure or evaluate press performance 
in a heavily ethnicised pseudo-democracy.  
8.3.4 Ethnicity, Elite, and the Politics of Belonging  
Elites’ manipulation of ethnicity and deployment of the press to serve their parochial 
and partisan political interests are at the heart of this study, and this misuse of 
ethnicity is perhaps responsible for the uncontested negative perception that most 
people now have about ethnicity.  Thus, to understand ethnicity, it is important to 
understand the role of the elite, hence one of the more popular “perspectives in the 
study of ethnicity is the elite perspective which posits that ethnicity is an ideology 
employed by the elites to further their constitutive interests” (Osaghae, 1991, p43). 
The study found that, virtually all sectors have become tainted with negative 
perceptions about ethnicity and politics.  The pestilential features of ethnicity, which 
have been on the display for far too long made it easy to see ethnicity as an 
obstruction to national unity. Thus tainted, the value of ethnicity in a federal system, 
as an asset or a resource, is lost.   It is important nevertheless, to restate the fact that 
there are unharnessed, positive sides to the issues of ethnicity and belonging, 
particularly under a federal system of government. Ofeimun believes Nigerians have 
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been frightened into the view that ethnicity is dangerous to nation building; he does 
not see it as negative or evil. Under the right conditions, ethnic groups are assets, 
which cannot be dismantled since they form part of the existing national social-
political fabric. 
8.3.5 Consequences of Elites’ Ethnicisation of Politics 
The study also found that consequences of ethnicisation are multitudinous, and that 
they account for the deep divisions and distrusts from which the nation suffers. (It is 
important to note that deliberate ethnicisation of politics is different from ethnic-
based politics). 
 Ethnicisation encourages elite consensus, a form of groupthink along with 
compromises that have produced for Nigeria, a non merit-based political system.  
The decision of who occupies a political office is taken from an ethnic point of 
view rather than in the national interest. 
 Unequivocally, the study found that negative ethnicisation, as manipulated by the 
elites, has been detrimental to building a stable and united nation. Elections or 
appointments to official positions have become a non-competitive, non-
competency driven regime in which virtually all positions are politically 
negotiated.   
 Ethnic interests take precedence over national interests: as strong ethnic-politico 
base becomes a more valued political currency, it has become more needed for 
national leadership position, than requisite competencies and capabilities of the 
individual. 
 Leadership wise, ethnicity has robbed Nigeria and national politics of the best 
and the brightest minds, since elite consensus invariably leads to elite 
recruitment of candidates into key elected and non-elected political positions, 
making democracy a deceptive cover for grand nepotism in which the press is a 
supportive apparatus used to manipulate ethnic sentiments.  Power gained in this 
manner is used to advance group and personal interests; thus, it leads to the 
corruption of the system and of the individual.   
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8.4.0 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
8.4.1 Intersectional and Antipodal Forces on the Press 
One significant contribution to knowledge of this study is that the press is seldom 
driven by a single interest at any point in time, not even its own self-assigned nation-
salvaging mission. Many interests – ownership, economic, ethnic, national, and of 
course, its own professional ethos – govern press pursuits. Despite the often critical 
appraisal of the Nigerian press, it must be acknowledged that press, has over the 
years succeeded in negotiating the tight ropewalk between, not two, but several 
antipodes – national, regional, ethnic, and professional; this relative or limited 
success has often been overlooked or undermined.  The average journalist also is 
governed by his own multiple identities; for example, he has a professional identity, 
civic national identity, ethnic (or regional) identity, and in many cases, a religious 
identity.  Whichever of these identities is strongest determines his worldview on 
given issues.   
 
These factors, in different combinations, the study found, act in concert to make the 
press powerful or weak, effective or ineffective, a failure or a success.  However, of 
these layers of intersections of contending interests, the elite ownership interest 
(with its wedded relationship with ethnicity and politics) has been most dominant.  
Being an intersectional institution itself, with many masters, the press has managed 
to maintain a minimal equilibrium.  The nation consists of even more intersections 
and the press has been able to navigate these multiple intersects and maintain a 
sense of identity, even if blurred, for the imagined nation.  
8.4.2 The Press and Ethnicity: Weaponised Products of the Elite 
This study also revealed that the press, as well as ethnicity, are products of the elite 
weaponisation in their quest for political power. The press is used, as the study 
indicates, to mobilise or manipulate ethnic groups for the purpose of politics.  In past 
studies, rather little understanding is usually provided on the direct links between 
the press and ethnicity.  What this study has done is to situate the press as the critical 
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legitimisation, mobilisation, and propaganda arm of the elites in their opportunistic 
match towards their political power-grabbing objective.  Indeed, according to 
Osaghae (1991), the unmobilised ethnic group is an ethnic group in hibernation 
(p45). 
8.4.3 Contestable Press System  
Many take for granted that Nigeria has a press system; I used to think so also.  But 
this study has brought home to me the fact that Nigeria may not have a home-grown 
functional press system, after all.  What the nation appears to have is a system that 
mimics the liberal Western press, the tenets of which may not be fully applicable 
functionally in a place like Nigeria, because of the autocratic nature of governments 
and the overbearing influence of business elite on media income.  This study showed 
the several contradictions that exist: for example, the press is mainly urban-based 
and monolingual, yet it regards itself to be populist, pursuing the interest of the 
common man; it is elite-controlled and in the pockets of big businesses, yet it 
perceives itself to be the freest crusading press in Africa; its values are Western and it 
claims to be liberal, yet it is obtuse in its pro-establishment stance. Anya sums it up, 
“We pretend that we are speaking for all; you cannot be speaking for people whose 
values you do not share” (Interviewed in Lagos). 
8.4.4 The Press/Media as Thought Leaders 
One consistent contributive idea that permeated the study is the desirability of a 
guiding philosophy, or ideology, or a value bank from which the press and political 
elite can draw for common inspiration and guidance.  The study demonstrated that 
when intellectual leadership is absent in any area, knowledge and idea production in 
that area become severely limited, shallow, and mostly self-serving.  There is the 
notion that Nigerian intellectual elites, particularly in communication, may have 
failed to produce an ideological guide and thought-leadership, leadership in the 
sciences, in the arts, and in technology for the nation.  According to the Vice 
President, Yemi Osinbajo, the intellectual elites have not lived up to expectations 
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(Interviewed in Abuja). Prof. Charles Okigbo made the same point in 1987, and 
advocated for an African communication philosophy that would aid, 
systematic investigation of communication phenomena and situations 
in Africa. Without this important element, African communication 
research will continue to be mostly like shots in the dark. Sometimes 
we might hit the bull's eye, but we cannot know even when we do 
(p21). 
8.5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH WORK 
8.5.1 Intellectual Elite Contribution to Knowledge Production 
There is the notion that Nigerian media and other intellectual elites, may have failed 
to contribute grounding knowledge ideas to form a basis for an ideological guide for 
the field, and for the nation.  If Okigbo raised the matter 30 years ago, and it still 
maintains currency to this day such that the vice president flags it as a key deficiency, 
then it requires serious investigation. 
8.5.2 The Press System 
When held against other media systems around the world, the media system in 
Nigeria presents a liberal façade under the clutches of one authoritarian regime or 
another.  Just as every nation needs a guiding ideology, every nation’s press system 
needs a guiding philosophy. The non-discriminatory adoption of other people’s press 
philosophies and ideologies without thorough domestication makes them superficial 
and impracticable with a drastically reduced chance of having a meaningful impact. 
As this study has revealed, if there is any philosophy now, it is in orientation clearly a 
pro-establishment elite press, geared towards providing service for the urban elite’s 
political access and communication needs.  The current system, therefore, needs a 
further and thorough investigation. It suffers from what may be considered as 
significant contradictions in how the press perceives itself and how others perceive it, 
particularly its owners, as against how it actually performs.  These suppositions need 
further and more thorough investigations. 
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Also, as an inherited system, basically, with attendant post-colonial burdens in an 
ethno-regional federation, more work, preferably a policy change oriented research, 
is needed to: a) investigate what Nigeria’s media and communication philosophy is, 
if it ever existed; b) define where we ought to be, need to be; c) investigate what 
needs to change from where it is now and why; and d) propose bold policy changes.  
8.5.3 The Paymaster, the Piper, and the Tune 
The nature and character of the relationship between the pro-establishment elite 
press and their owners has featured prominently in this study.  Whereas much 
research attention has been devoted to the dynamics of elite/ethnic group 
relationships (Nnoli, 2003, Mamdani, 2005, Osaghae, 2006, Kifordu, 2011, etc.), 
there has been no commensurate extensive research attention paid to similar trend 
of elites’ manipulation of the press.  Yet, as this study has shown, ownership interests 
(often politically aligned) remain a huge influence on the final decision on important 
stories in the newsroom.  Clearly, elite media capture reflects in the paymaster/piper 
relationship between elite ownership and professional journalists.  Apart from 
owners, another group that has significant influence over what gets published in the 
press is big businesses, particularly those in the financial industry, energy, and 
telecommunication. These 2 key areas of politics and commerce that have captured 
the media and press have escaped the scholarly searchlight of researchers 
commensurate with their level of influence and control.  
8.5.4 Ethnicisation of Politics vs. Ethnic-based Politics  
This study has provided direct links between the press, the elite, and the success of 
ethnic politics. It has also hinted at differences between ethnicised politics and 
ethnic-based politics. The negativism that has long been associated with ethnicised 
politics has made it difficult to see the positives of ethnic-based politics. What the 
study has done is to highlight the fact that ethnic groups can become assets and 
resources as federated units to democratically move the nation forward.  Thus, the 
study opens new ways to begin the investigation of ethnic-based politics as against 
ethnicised politics currently in practice. 
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There is therefore a strong need for such an investigative research: to re-evaluate 
“ethnicisation of politics” as different from “ethnic-based politics”. The subject 
matter could be explored from a comparative studies perspective, with nations like 
Ethiopia or Somalia where ethnic/clan-based politics has been institutionalised.  The 
outcome of such a study will help to de-stigmatise ethnicity and engage the press in 
the mission to de-contaminate ethnicity from partisan politics. 
8.6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.6.1 Constructing a Unified National Identity 
Augustus Adebayo (1986) was the regional head of the civil service in the old 
Western Region during the First Republic.  He tells the story of a firsthand 
experience at a cabinet meeting in the First Republic to illustrate inter-regional 
antipathy and antagonism: During one cabinet meeting in 1964, the Prime Minister, 
Tafawa Balewa, presented a memo proposing the location of an iron and steel 
industry somewhere in his home region of the North.  A prolonged and heated debate 
ensued: each region presented a strong argument to justify why the industry ought to 
be sited in their respective territories. After a long acrimonious debate Balewa 
withdrew the memo.  Adebayo’s telling observation: “Members who a moment ago 
were at daggers drawn, sat back with a look of satisfaction, everyone beaming with 
smiles” (Adebayo, 1986, p45). Nothing was ever heard of the project again until the 
Military took over power.  
For democracy to succeed, several factors need to align. What has become plain in 
this study is that the form of democracy currently practised in Nigeria and most 
other African nations has lacked alignment of key factors, no roots in the culture and 
experiences of the people.  As earlier noted, Mouffe traced Africa’s postcolonial 
political problems to its colonial roots, as this study has confirmed.  
Adebayo’s eyewitness account of the cabinet meeting ostensibly links elite distrusts to 
what Larry Diamond (1988) calls, “the failure of political integration … of flawed 
institutional arrangements, regional disparities, and a restricted political process” 
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(p15); these reflect a chronic lack of alignment of people and structures at perhaps the 
most strategic levels.  The interplay between cabinet members, perhaps, the pinnacle 
of the leadership elite, demonstrates the exact opposite of Mouffe’s agonistic 
encounter, which she defined as  
a confrontation where the aim is neither the annihilation nor the assimilation 
of the other, and where the tensions between the different approaches 
contribute to enhancing the pluralism that characterizes a multipolar world 
(Mouffe, 2013, p41). 
 
History and contemporary experiences, as documented in this thesis, demonstrate 
that much of the repetitive toxic features in the contemporary narratives have their 
origins buried in certain events and in specific historical experiences. These, perhaps, 
more than face-value understanding of today’s news headlines, are responsible for 
Nigeria’s longstanding challenges to nationhood.  It is my belief that now is the time 
for the nation to engage in a much needed, but long neglected historical 
understanding of these events and national experiences through the eyes of the press 
and media.  
8.6.2 Belonging:  Constructing an All-Inclusive Sense of Belonging  
In the period of this study, which spans six selected elections in a little over 50 years, 
Nigeria’s political history consistently painted a picture of a troubled postcolonial 
nation-state threatened by complete democratic failure.  The nation seemed 
perpetually at war with itself, the very epitome of the unending adversarial 
relationships, but what makes a person feel belonged and earns the nation, its 
citizens’ loyalty? Belonging is about emotional attachment, about feeling ‘at home’ 
and, it is about feeling ‘safe’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p4).  It is central to how the citizens 
of a nation identify and define themselves. The identity that emanates from a sense 
of belonging is at the heart of the concept of nationhood. 
A sign of a politically distressed state, evident in Adebayo’s narration from the point 
of view of ‘agonistic pluralism’, is the obvious display of battle zone antagonism in 
which the opposition is an enemy to be annihilated. Nigeria must now identify 
middle grounds and compromises.  According to Mouffe, “the aim of democratic 
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politics is to construct the ‘them’ in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an 
enemy to be destroyed” (Mouffe, 2009, pp101-102). She explains that, 
agonistic encounter is a confrontation where the aim is neither the 
annihilation nor the assimilation of the other, and where the tensions 
between the different approaches contribute to enhancing the pluralism that 
characterizes a multipolar world” (Mouffe, 2013, p41).  
The features that bind must be made stronger and more rewarding than the features 
that divide, and winning ethnically motivated political points must be made to seem 
less attractive alternatives to genuinely all-inclusive projects.  If Nigeria must 
reinvent itself into a nation with a future, the elite must pledge themselves and 
commit to a common national destiny in which the hegemonic interests of ones 
ethnic group are not above those of the nation and the other groups.   
8.6.3 The Press: Providing Agonistic Forum for Re-imagined Post-
colonial Nation-state 
In modern democracies, contentions in politics are not unexpected or inexplicable. 
As noted earlier, Walter Ong defines agonism as “programmed contentiousness” or 
“ceremonial combat”, that allows a gamely discussion rather than an acrimonious do 
or die, scorched earth debate that promotes only the “defects and weaknesses of 
opponents”. Ong posits that what is needed is a “believing game” in which we look 
for strengths rather than weaknesses (Ong, 2012, p215).  According to Diamond, the 
stability of a democracy depends on “its capacity to resolve crises and conflicts 
effectively” (Diamond, 1988, p18).  This approach calls for a new and complete 
orientation on the part of both the press and their elite owners.  
In an imagined nation, Enahoro states the obvious, saying, “Our knowledge of public 
affairs comes from the journalists” (1990, p22). The giving and receiving of nation-
nurturing information is the oxygen of democracy, especially in an imagined nation.  
Of all the functions of the press in a democracy, the forum function is, perhaps, the 
most dominant, though mostly unacknowledged used responsibly, it acts as 
guarantor for a successful democracy. Robert Hutchins author of the 1947 Hutchins 
Commission Report listed five key roles for the press in a modern liberal democracy: 
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first, a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's 
events in a context which gives them meaning; second, a forum for the 
exchange of comment and criticism; third, a means of projecting the 
opinions and attitudes of the groups in the society to one another; 
fourth, a method of presenting and clarifying the goals and values of 
the society; and, fifth, a way of reaching every member of the society 
by the currents of information, thought, and feeling which the press 
supplies (Cited in Kwame Karikari, 2005, p12).  
This explains why the press, as an institution, oscillates between the hall of fame and 
that of infamy, praised, or vilified when political systems succeed or fail.  According 
to Adebanwi, “the narratives in the press are not tangential but critical. And by 
critical I mean that the narratives are fundamental or indispensable and even 
potentially dangerous” (Adebanwi, 2016, p5).  The indispensability of press 
narratives is all the more reason its forum function should be taken more seriously 
by journalists themselves and academics, equally. 
As Tom Rosenstiel and Bill Kovach (2001) also stated, constructive forum functions 
of the press provide enabling and ennobling environment for democracy to thrive 
even in a large, diverse country (cited in Giles, 2001, p22). Measured against 
Hutchinson’s forum function, the Nigerian press, as this study demonstrates, may 
have been promoting what Rosenstiel and Kovach have called “the argument culture” 
which turns politics into an antagonistic, acrimonious, and divisive engagement 
(cited in Giles, 2001, p22). 
In imagined communities, communication and other forms of information exchange, 
which give every segment equal opportunity to speak and be heard, create a feeling of 
belonging, a sense of common identity, which make fraternal relationships possible. 
They are the means by which a community dialogues with itself, defines self, and 
maintains the defined identity. As such, the role of the press in mobilising to unite 
ethnic fragments to build and shape a nation, imagined or not, becomes almost 
indispensible to the creation, nurture and survival of that community. 
For democracy to work, it  
requires providing channels through which collective passions will be given 
ways to express themselves over issues which, while allowing enough 
possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but 
as an adversary (Mouffe, 2009, p103).   
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These channels are what the press represents. 
8.6.4 Towards an Equitable and Inclusive Society  
Over half a century after independence, there is no agreement among Nigerians 
about a most basic concept – federalism, or the structure that informs the Nigerian 
version. There are divisive conversations about everything; and everywhere there is 
widespread political upheaval.  There is a general mistrust and suspicion for 
ethnicity.  Yet there is room for optimism, for deep down most Nigerians desire a 
fairer, more equitable nation.  After all has been said, democracy, however defined or 
interpreted, is an ideal that rests on the tripod of equality, fairness, and consensus, 
the same tripod that makes a citizen loyal and feel belonged to a nation, values that 
have only been selectively fostered by the press, when and if they serve an ulterior 
agenda. 
What can be deduced from this study is that while the press may have done a lot in 
defending the nation against colonialism and militarism, not enough has been done 
about building across ethnic national cohesion.  The press may have fought against 
excessive state control, but it has not entirely been free from the control and 
manipulations of its elite owners, who surreptitiously use the press to perpetuate 
ethnic rivalry and division.  The press may have proved independent of military 
captivity, but it has also become a captive of sectional loyalties and of business 
moguls; it has not taken advantage of occasions to push the boundaries of 
independence when there was room to do so; it has not engaged in the articulation of 
domesticated ideology for itself, it has failed to invite the nation into a dialogue with 
itself in a non-partisan agonistic forum. 
This study has revealed that a nation’s press system ought not to mimic or measure 
itself against textbook standards based on foreign philosophies, whose authors have 
little notion about the nation’s people and ethnic compositions, its culture, and 
informational needs.  What is required are homegrown press models, and “forms of 
democracy more adapted to African customs” (Mouffe, 2013, p39).   
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In order for an inclusive nation-state where all groups feel belonged to emerge, the 
elites need to reconcile themselves to the fact that all voices, not sanctioned 
homogeneous narratives emanating from one source, need to be heard. What this 
suggests is that the press and other media forms should champion inclusive and 
integrative national discourses in which all sub-groups can feel belonged, without 
necessarily losing touch with the nation’s ethnic centres. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE NEWSPAPERS 
1. Daily Times Established 1st of June, 1926. 
The Daily Times “for long Nigeria’s most successful newspaper”, was established in 
1926 by four businessmen – three British and a Nigerian. From a modest 1,500 
copies daily circulation in 1926 (Omu, 1978, p261), the Daily Times at the height its 
publishing history, “enjoyed a circulation of over 500,000 copies in the 1970s” 
(Olukotun, 2004, p28). Though its first Editor, Ernest S. Ikoli, went from journalism 
to become one of the political figures of the era the paper itself, “charted a 
remarkably independent course and therefore maintained its credibility...”.  
“TheDaily Times, (Ibelema, 2008, p14) West African Newspapers Limited, (1936 – 
1948)  (Omu, 1978, p253) 
The paper’s editorial policy claim to be liberal, with “...a strong sense of sane 
nationalism.” However, Fred Omu (1978) called it a ‘distinctly conservative’ paper 
(p239). In fact, it started out as a pro-establishment paper, with a promise to be 
detached from local politics which the paper says has never “risen above petty 
personal squabbles”.  Further it stated: 
The bigger problems which affect Nigeria as a whole will be our immediate 
concern and these will provide for a long time to come, enough outlets for our 
energies”   
(Nigerian Daily Times, 1 June 1926 cited in Adesoji, A.O. & Hahn, H.P., (2011, 
p190). 
Over time, most Nigerians considered the Daily Times a conservative national paper.  
2. West African Pilot Established 22nd of November, 1937 
The West African Pilot came in at a “period of great opportunity provided by absence 
of serious and respectable political newspapers” (Omu, 1978, p239).  The period was 
also the time of “emergence of the new epoch of Nigerian politics and nationalism 
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symbolised by the rise of the Nigerian Youth Movement in 1938” (Omu, 1978, p240). 
The promoter and sole owner of the paper was the recently returned Nnamdi Azikiwe 
from studies in United States of America (Omu, 1978, p254). 
The motto of the Pilot was “Show the light and the people will find the way” (Sklar, 
1963, p51) and the mission was to become the “sentinel of popular liberty and 
guardian of civilization” (Omu, 1978, p69). In its maiden edition, the West African 
Pilot stated that it believes in “genuine cooperation between the Government and the 
governed” promising to be “independent in all things and neutral in nothing which 
affects the destiny of Africa....” (West African Pilot, 22 November 1937 cited in 
Adesoji & Hahn, 2011, p186). It regarded its role as that of an instrument for the 
crystallization of social and economic security to the nationals and residents under 
the aegis of that state’s territorial sovereignty. It further stated: 
we shall not claim to be pro-this or anti-that. ... it will be our supreme task, as 
a sentinel of popular liberty and guardian of civilization, to make our 
assertion in non-ambiguous terms  
(West African Pilot, 22 November 1937 cited in Adesoji & Hahn, 2011, p186). 
By 1939, within two years of its establishment, the paper reached a circulation of 
10,000 (King & Kilson, 1999, p147) and “the circulation of the Pilot in the last 
quarter of 1966 was 40,000” (Azikiwe, 1970, p390). 
The paper started out as a nationalistic newspaper; it became partisan in the 
emergence of modern political parties in early 1950s, and it became the flagship and 
mouthpiece of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) (Omu, 1978). Key 
staff of the West African Pilot held strategic positions in the NCNC; Sklar (1963) 
reports that, Mr. Blankson, Editor-in-Chief of the West African Pilot and Mr. F.S. 
McEwen, National Secretary of the NCNC, held cross positions in paper and political 
party. Earlier perceived as a national paper, it gradually began to be seen as an 
NCNC paper.  Gradually, the paper lost its professional purpose, and huge 
followership as it became more and more partisan. It seized publishing just before 
the civil war. 
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3. The Tribune. Established November 16, 1949   
The Nigerian Tribune was founded and owned by Chief Obafemi Awolowoin 1949, at 
the height of nationalism, and it is the only paper from that era that has survived, 
still in publication – the oldest continuous daily paper in Nigeria.  The policy of the 
Tribune leaned more in the direction of progressive populism with occasional 
attempt at radicalism, almost always against the dominant interests of the national 
core elite and largely independent of the state. There is little doubt about the political 
and ethnic affiliation of the newspaper.  The paper predated Chief Awolowo’s 
political parties: Action Group (AG) party in the 1950s and 1960s; and the Unity 
Party of Nigeria (UPN) in the 1970s and 1980s. From the beginning, therefore, the 
Tribune was sympathetic towards the cause of ethnocentric politics of Western 
Nigeria. 
In the 1950s and in the early years of independence, the Nigerian Tribune, was 
basically in the political mobilisation wing of the AG, and “its fundamental aim was 
to represent the interest of the Yoruba (ethnic) group in the Nigerian equation” 
(Aimufua, 2007, p178). Most people perceived it as a paper with strong regional, 
ethnic and partisan political interest.   
When Chief Obafemi Awolowo formed the Action Group in 1951, the paper became 
the mouthpiece of the party.  
4. New Nigerian.Established January 1, 1966 
When the regional government of northern Nigeria established the New Nigerian 
newspaper in 1966, the political atmosphere in the country was  already tense and 
toxic. (Aimufua, 2007, pp90 - 91). And barely two weeks after the newspaper was 
launched, Nigeria witnessed its first military coup d’etat (January 1966), in which the 
Prime Minister, the regional  premier and several others in the political leadership of 
the North were killed.  The events that followed subsequently led to the outbreak of 
the civil war, which threatened the corporate existence of the Nigerian State” 
(Aimufua, 2007, p92) 
The main promoter of the newspaper was Premier of the Northern Regional 
government, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and its owner was the regional government. 
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(Aimufua, 2007, p91) The Federal military government of Nigeria in 1976 acquired 
the newspaper. (Aimufua, 2007, p90).  The paper unapologetically considers itself “a 
Northern newspaper”, which seeks to identify itself with the North, its peoples, 
interests and aspirations. But it also claims to “oppose the evil extremes of tribalism, 
all forms of racialism and discrimination…” considering itself a “champion the vital 
need for national unity”. The paper in its stated mission acknowledges that without 
national unity, and the trust and mutual respect that go with it, Nigeria will never 
find its rightful place in the sun.  
The New Nigerian fiercely defended the interests of Northern Nigeria and Islam and 
the interests of the federal government of Nigeria, when they align with northern 
interests. Its Editorial outlook was conservative. (Maiden edition, New Nigerian, 
January 1, 1966:1, cited in Aimufua, 2007, p91) 
5. The Punch 1971 
The Punch newspaper was promoted and established by two friends, late James Olu 
Aboderin and Sam Amuka, the former an accountant, and the later a professional 
journalist.  The Punch is a general-interest, liberal newspaper, with no overt political 
party affiliation, other than unstated sympathies with the interests of people who 
claim to be politically progressives. The Punch is perceived a national tabloid with 
little political inhibitions.   After a period of tribulations with the military 
government, the paper matured and became perhaps the most commercially 
successful paper in the country. It now claims the title of the highest circulating 
newspaper in Nigeria. 
6. Guardian - Established February 27, 1983 became daily on the 4th of July, 
1983 
According to Omu, the Guardian, established int 1983, was “the first newspaper in 
Nigerian history to have been set up purely in response to Nigeria’s economic and 
socio-political environment” (Omu, 1996, p11).  Main promoters and owners: 
Established by Chief Alex Ibru (owned by him) with Dele Cole and Stanley Macebuh, 
with Ibru retaining the controlling shares of the company. 
The Guardian claims to be  
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“an independent newspaper, established for the purpose of presenting 
balanced coverage of events, and of promoting the best interests of Nigeria. It 
owes allegiance to no political party, ethnic community, religious or other 
interest group. Its primary commitment is to the integrity and sovereignty of 
the Federation of Nigeria.” 
The Guardian considers itself “a liberal newspaper, committed to the best tradition 
and ideals of republican democracy…(and) committed to the principle of individual 
liberty and freedom, but believes that all citizens have duties as well as rights”. The 
Guardian is widely respected and it is considered a national paper. 
7. This DayEstablished January 22, 1995(Started as a weekly) 
Mr. Nduka Obaigbena established Thisday newspaper as its Editor-in-chief, 
publisher and chairman of the board. Owned and published  by his company Leaders 
& Company Ltd, Thisdayis promoted as a liberal paper in support of free enterprise.  
The public perceives the paperas a national newspaper. 
8. Daily Trust Est. March 1998 as Weekly Trust, became daily on January 15, 
2001 
The Daily Trust is published by Media Trust Ltd, a company established in 1998 by 
Mallam Kabiru Yusuf, a journalist and a former university lecturer.  First in its stable 
was the Weekly Trust, which first hit the streets in March 1998 and was joined by 
Daily Trust in January of 2001.  The Abuja base Media Trust group of papers has 
become the most successful and longest surviving private newspaper from Northern 
Nigeria. The vision of the group is to be a world class media company that earns 
public trust. The newspaper is perceived as a regional and conservative paper, which, 
according to Jide Jimoh (2014), is “known to rise in defence of Northern and Muslim 
interests in its reportage and analysis of issues” (p78).    
9. The Nigerian Citizens Est. 1948 
The Nigerian Citizen was established in 1948 more or less an English edition of the 
Hausa newspaper, established in 1939.  It was published three times a week. Both the 
Gaskiya and the Citizen were preceded by a quarterly bulletin, Jaridar Nijeriyaa Ta 
Arewa (Northern Nigerian Newspaper), put out by the office of the Lieutenant 
Governor of Northern Nigeria at the time. The papers were designed and established 
as Government public relations organs. This was plainly stated in the very first 
edition of Gaskiya on 1st January, 1939.  
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The Citizens was targeted at the non-Hausa speaking Northerners as a counter-
propaganda organ against southern-based papers and the Kano-based Comet.  
According to Mamman Daura, Northern Nigerian Government was “locked in the 
most fierce competition with the two other regions of the Nigerian Federation… The 
Government was displeased and dissatisfied with the press coverage its activities 
received from other newspapers, the Comet, in particular believing it was set up to 
export and propagate programmes of the non-northern political party – National 
Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). The Nigerian Citizen and its successor, the 
New Nigerian were considered necessary to propagate the views of the northern 
regional Government, and to fight for Northern interest in all disputes at the federal 
level. The paper, which according to Turi Muhammadu funded by the British 
Commonwealth Development Corporation to spearhead a concerted drive against 
wide spread illiteracy in English and Hausa, became the official organ of the 
Northern People’s Congress 
Charles Sharp, a Briton, was the first editor of the Nigerian Citizen while late Bisi 
Onabanjo, a Yoruba from Western Nigeria, was the first indigenous editor. 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE PROFILE OF THE INTERVIEWEES 
MEDIA LEADERS 
1. MR. REUBEN ABATI  
Geopolitical Region: South West (SW) 
Current: Columnist/Journalist, Lawyer 
Previous: Chairman, The Guardian Newspaper Editorial Board; Special Adviser on 
media & publicity to former president, Goodluck Jonathan. 
2. MR. FEMI ADESINA 
Geopolitical Region: South West (SW) 
Current: Special Adviser (Media) to President Muhammadu Buhari (2015 - )  
Previous: Executive Director (Publications), Sun Newspapers; Deputy Editor-in-
Chief/Deputy Managing Director, Sun Newspapers; Managing Director and Editor-
in-Chief, Sun Newspapers; President, Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE). 
Awards: The Editor of the Year by the Nigeria Media Merit Award. 
3. DR. ONUKABA ADINOYI-OJO 
Geopolitical Region: North Central (NC) 
Political antecedent: Gubernatorial Aspirant, 2015 Kogi State elections. 
Previous: Journalist, Playwright and Teacher, University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria; 
Information officer, Division of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United 
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); Adjunct Professor, Mass Communication, 
School of New Resources. College of New Rochelle, New York; Press Officer, 
Department of Public Information, United Nations (New York); Managing Director, 
Daily Times of Nigeria Plc, Lagos, Nigeria; Spokesman, Office of the Vice President, 
Nigeria. 
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4. MR. JOHN IREM 
Geopolitical Region: South South (SS) Region (A group of Southern Minority 
States) 
Current: Director, Special Duties/Public Affairs at Independent National Electoral 
Commission, Nigeria.  
5. MALLAM MOHAMMED HARUNA 
Geopolitical Region: North Central (NC) 
Current: Columnist with Daily Trust 
Previous: Managing Director, New Nigerian Newspapers; Managing 
Director/Editor in Chief, the Citizen Magazine; Chief Press Secretary, to the Head of 
State; Senior Lecturer, Department of Mass Communication, Ahmadu Bello 
University Zaria. 
6. DR. CHRISTOPHER KOLADE 
Geopolitical Region: South West (SW)  
Previous: His career has spanned Education, Broadcasting, Business, and 
Diplomacy; as  Director–General of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation; 
Chairman, Managing Director of Cadbury; Nigeria High Commissioner to the United 
Kingdom. Pro-Chancellor and Chairman of the Governing Council of the Pan-
Atlantic University. 
7. PRINCE TONY MOMOH 
Geopolitical Region: South South (SS) 
Current: Chieftain, All Progressive Congress (2013- ) 
Previous: President, Nigerian Guild of Editors; Editor/Deputy Managing Director 
of Daily Times; Minister of Information and Culture; Chairman of the African 
Conference of Information Ministers; Director of the Alex Ekwueme Presidential 
Campaign Organization (1999); Chairman, All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) 
Campaign Organisation (2003 and 2007 elections); Chairman of the Political 
Committee of the Muhammadu Buhari Organisation; Chairman of the Congress for 
Progressive Change (CPC). 
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8. ODIA OFEIMUN  
Geopolitical Region: South South (SS) 
Current: Poet, Writer. Politician 
Previous: President, the Association of Nigerian Authors; Private (Political) 
Secretary to Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria; Editorial 
Board of The Guardian Newspapers, Lagos; Editorial board of A.M.News, The News 
and Tempo magazines. 
POLITICAL LEADERS 
9. GENERAL ABDUSALAMI ABUBAKAR 
Geopolitical Region: North Central (NC); 
Previous: Military Head of State (1998–1999) Chief of Defence Staff; Commander 
of the 3rd Mechanized Brigade, Kano; United Nations Peacekeeping Force, Lebanon; 
Military Secretary; General Officer Commanding, the 82nd Division. Successfully 
oversaw the transition that birthed the fourth republic and handed over to a civilian 
president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
10. PROFESSOR ANYA OKO ANYA 
Geopolitical Region: South East (SE) 
Current: Chartered Biologist; Pro-Chancellor and Chairman of the Governing 
Council of the Michael Okpara University of Agriculture, Umuahia; Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees of the Alpha Institute for Research in Science, Economics and 
Development.  
Previous: President of Ndigbo; Vice President & President, Nigerian Academy of 
Science; President, Union of African Biologists; Founding CEO of the Nigerian 
Economic Summit Group; Chairman of the Governing Board of the Nigerian 
National Merit Award; Fellow, Nigerian Academic of Science; Fellow, Cambridge 
Philosophical Society. 
11. GENERAL IBRAHIM BADAMOSI BABANGIDA  
Geopolitical Region: North Central (NC) 
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Previous: Military Head of State; Chief of Army Staff. 
Political affiliation: He attempted to be a presidential nominee under the 
platform of the PDP towards the 2007 and 2011 elections. 
12. DR. PATRICK DELE COLE 
Geopolitical Region: South South (SS) 
Current: Chairman, Airlines Services & Logistics PLC (ASL), Member of Guardian 
Newspapers and Chairman, Tabod Nig. Ltd. 
Previous: Managing Director of Daily Times Nigeria Limited; Ambassador of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria to Brazil; Deputy National Chairman, People’s 
Democratic Party of Nigeria, and Special Adviser on International Relations to the 
President, Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
13. GENERAL THEOPHILUS Y. DANJUMA 
Geopolitical Region: North East (NE) 
Current: Founder/Chairman, the South Atlantic Petroleum Limited (SAPETRO); 
TY Danjuma Foundation. 
Previous: Federal Minister of Defence; Chief of Army Staff; Founder, Nigeria-
America Line (NAL); Founder; COMET Shipping Agencies Nigeria Ltd; Chairman of 
Agip Africa; Chairman of the NatCom Development & Investment Limited (ntel). 
14. CHIEF OLUSEGUN OBASANJO 
Geopolitical Region: South West (SW) 
Previous: President of Nigeria (1999-2007); Head of State 1976-1979, the 
firstmilitary leader to hand power to civilian administration; Federal Minister of 
Petroleum; Federal Minister of Works and Housing; Chief of Staff (military Vice 
President). Founder and Chairman, African Leadership Forum; Chairman, African 
Leadership Foundation Inc., New York. The Olaf Palme Commission (Independent 
Commission on Disarmament and Security). Member WHO Committee of experts on 
the Effects of Nuclear Weapons; Co-Chairman, Commonwealth Eminent Persons 
Group on South Africa; Chairman, Advisory Council, Transparency International 
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(TI); Advisory Council, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts; UNDP 
Human Development Ambassador. 
15. PROFESSOR YEMI OSINBAJO 
Geopolitical Region: South West (SW) 
Current: Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Previous: Senior lecturer of Law at the University of Lagos; Adviser (legal advice 
and litigation) to the Federal Attorney-General and Minister of Justice; Professor of 
Law and Head of Department of Public Law, University of Lagos; Member of 
Cabinet, and Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice, Lagos State; Professor 
of Law, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Lagos; Senior 
Partner, Simmons Cooper Partners (Barristers and Solicitors). 
16. PROFESSOR PAT UTOMI 
Geopolitical Region: South South (SS) 
Current: Founder/CEO, Centre For Values In Leadership; Professor, Lagos 
Business School, Pan Atlantic University; Social/Political Activist of Various Courses. 
Previous: Presidential Aspirant, 2007 & 2011 Federal Elections; Vice-chairman, 
Platinium–Habib Bank; Director of The Centre For Applied Economics at the Lagos 
Business School; Adviser to the President of Nigeria; Chief Operating Officer for 
Volkswagen of Nigeria; Scholar-in-residence, American University, Washington DC, 
USA; Research Associate, the Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts, USA. 
Visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advance International Studies (SAIS). 
ACADEMICIANS 
17. PROFESSOR ADIGUN AGBAJE 
Geopolitical Region: South West (SW) 
Current: Professor, University of Ibadan  
Previous: News Agency of Nigeria; Political Correspondent, The Guardian 
Newspaper Nigeria; Director-General, Obafemi Awolowo Institute of Government 
and Public Policy, , Lagos. Researcher, Social Science Council of Nigeria/Ford 
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Foundation; ACU/CSCUK Fellowship, University of Oxford; USAID/Hoover 
Institution. 
18. PROFESSOR EMEVWO BIAKOLO 
Geopolitical Region: South South (SS) 
Current: Professor of Communication, School of Media and Communication, Pan-
Atlantic University, Lagos, Nigeria 
Previous: Dean of the School of Media and Communication, Pan Atlantic 
University. Lecturer, University of Ibadan; Editorial Board, The Guardian 
Newspapers; Senior Lecturer, University of Botswana; Director of Publications and 
Media of Black Accents Communications; Director, Centre for Media and 
Communication, Pan-Atlantic University, Lagos. 
19. PROFESSOR ABUBAKAR MOMOH 
Geopolitical Region: South South (SS) 
Current: Professor of Political Science; and Director-General, The Electoral 
Institute, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). 
Previous: Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Lagos State University; Boards 
of the Centre for Democracy and Development, CDD, and Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA); Vice President of 
African Association of Political Science (AAPS); Visiting Researcher, University of 
London; Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Open University, England; Post Graduate 
Research Supervisor, Bielefeld University, German, among others. He has also been 
on several technical teams of the African Union Commission (AUC), and helped in 
designing the Elections Bench-marking for the African Union. He has served as 
election Observer to several African and European countries.  
20. PROFESSOR OKWUDIBA NNOLI 
Geopolitical Region: South East (SE) 
Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Author of Several Books which includes 
Ethnic Politics in Africa, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria and Ethnicity and Democracy in 
Africa: Intervening Variables 
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21. PROFESSOR EGHOSA OSAGHAE 
Geopolitical Region: South South (SS) 
Current: Professor of Comparative Politics and Vice Chancellor of Igbinedion 
University, Okada, Nigeria. 
Previous: Leader of the Ford Foundation-funded Programme on Ethnic and 
Federal Studies; Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the 
University of Ibadan, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Studies at 
the University of Transkei, South Africa (1994-1998); Visiting 
Professor/Fellow/Distinguished Senior Scholar at the Carter Centre of Emory 
University USA (1989)  
22. PROFESSOR UMARU PATE 
Geopolitical Region: North East (NE) 
Current: Dean, Faculty Of Media, Communication and Film Studies, Bayero 
University, Kano 
Previous: Head of the Department of Mass Communication, University of 
Maiduguri; Vice President of the Communication Association of Nigeria, CANI 
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APPENDIX 3 
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Did reporting and commentary of the press help to define and construct Nigeria’s 
political culture and national identity? (Newspaper Content Analysis) 
 Did press reportage and commentary at federal election season reflect or affect 
the self-identity of the components ethnic-nationalities in “the search to belong”? 
(Newspaper Content Analysis) 
 Did the political elite foster ethnicisation of politics by exploiting their leadership 
or press ownership positions to promote ethnicity or regionalism? (In-depth 
Interviews)  
 Was the effect of the press beneficial or harmful to the notion of nation building, 
and national unity, and the practice of democracy and federalism?  (In-depth 
Interviews) 
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APPENDIX 4 
THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Has the press contributed to the issue of ethnicity and self-identity through 
their reportage of, and comments on elections in Nigeria?  How has the press 
contributed?  
2. Would you say that during election, political elite use the press to promote 
ethnicity and regionalism and uses ethnicity or regionalism as a consideration 
for deciding on who occupies political offices?  
3. In your opinion, has the press, in the process of reporting elections, fostered 
ethnicity and regionalism questions as central to election success in the 
country?  
4. Generally, who would you hold responsible for the state of the politics of 
belonging among ethnic nationalities in Nigeria –the colonial masters, the 
press, the politician or the military?  
5. In your assessment, has the Nigerian press worked more for regional cohesion 
or for national unity?  
6. What is your view about ethnicity and self-identity in Nigeria?  
7. Have issues of ethnicity and self-identity affected the practice of democracy in 
Nigeria since independence? If so, how do you think they have affected the 
practice of democracy? 
8. What would you say is the central role of the press in a democracy like 
Nigeria’s? 
9. Would you say the press has played such role during federal elections in 
Nigeria? 
10. How has the role of the press during federal elections affected the political 
culture in Nigeria? 
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APPENDIX 5 
THE DATES AND VENUES OF THE INTERVIEWS 
 INTERVIEWEE LOCATION DATE 
1 Prince Tony Momoh Abuja 18th April, 2016 
2 Mr John Irem Abuja 18th April, 2016 
3 Prof. Abubakar Momoh Abuja 18th April, 2016 
4 Mr Femi Adesina Abuja 19th April, 2016 
5 Dr. Onukaba Adinoyi-Ojo Abuja 19th April, 2016 
6 Prof. Eghosa Osaghae Okada, 
Edo State 
4th May, 2016 
7 Dr. Christopher Kolade Lagos 9th May, 2016 
8 Lt-Gen.  T. Y. Danjuma Lagos 11th May, 2016 
9 Dr Reuben Abati Lagos 11th May, 2016 
10 General Olusegun 
Obasanjo 
Abeokuta 12th May and 5th June, 2016 
11 Prof. Emevwo Biakolo Lagos 20th May, 2016 
12 Mr Odia Ofeimun Lagos 20th May, 2016 
13 Prof. Nnoli Okwudiba Enugu 24th May, 2016 
14 Dr. Patrick Dele Cole Lagos 26th May, 2016 
15 Prof. Adigun Agbaje Ibadan 1st June, 2016 
16 Prof. Pat Utomi Lagos 7th June, 2016 
17 Prof. Anya O. Anya Lagos 14th June, 2016 
18 General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar 
Minna 16th June, 2016 
19 General Ibrahim 
Babangida 
Minna 21st June, 2016 
20 Mal. Mohammed Haruna Kano 23rd June, 2016 
21 Prof. Yemi Osinbajo Abuja 23rd June, 2016 
22 Prof. Umaru Pate Kano 29th June, 2016 
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APPENDIX 6 
CODING GUIDE 
The Press and The Politics of Belonging in Nigerian  
For each individual unit of analysis (i.e. editorial content in the newspaper), coders 
will use this list of eight (8) descriptive variables (content cate1gories) to document 
information on an Excel spreadsheet. 
Story ID:  
Serial numbers- Each unit of analysis (editorial content to be coded) is assigned one 
ID number starting from 1 and ending with the last story.  The default: Excel 
Spreadsheet assigns numbers automatically. 
Category 1- The Newspaper: editorial items published on the front page and 
editorial by the newspapers used for this study 
Each of the Nine (9) newspapers has been assigned a unique ID number starting 
from 1 for Daily Times to 9 for Nigerian Citizen, as follows: 
1. Daily Times (1). 
2. West African Pilot (2) 
3. Nigerian Tribune (3) 
4. New Nigeria (4) 
5. Guardian (5) 
6. Punch (6) 
7. Thisday (7) 
8. Daily Trust (8) 
9. Nigerian Citizen (9) 
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Category 2- Genre/Type:  Front page political news stories and politically related 
editorials.  The type of story content   
1. News 
2. Editorial  
Category 3 -Illustration:  Is the story illustrated or not, and how? 
0. No illustration/photo 
1. B&W Photo  
2. Colour Photo 
Category 4 – Direction Is the story/content positive, negative, or neutral? 
1. Positive 
2. Negative 
3. Neutral 
Category 5 – Ethnicity/tribal identities of political actors  
Is the tribal affiliation mentioned? 
1. Yoruba 
2. Hausa 
3. Igbo  
4. Minority ethnic group 
5. None  
Category 6 - Purpose of Story 
What is the main purpose of the story/content? 
1. Awareness/education   
2. Persuade (positive influence)   
3. Propaganda (negative Influence) 
4. Castigate and bring to disrepute  
Category 8- Objectivity 
Does the story/content appear mostly objective or mostly subjective?    
1. Mostly objective – use of evidence and verifiable facts 
2. Mostly subjective – use of emotions and no evidence or verifiable facts 
3. Can’t say (appears balanced) 
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APPENDIX 7 
Newspaper Front-Pages/News Reports 
 
West African Pilot, December 4, 1959 
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Nigerian Tribune, November 17, 1959 
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Nigerian Citizen, March 24, 1965 
APPENDIX 7 
 
337 
 
Daily Times Nigeria, July 23, 1979 
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New  Nigerian, August 4, 1979 
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The Punch Newspaper, February 9, 1999 
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Daily Trust March 27, 2011 
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The Guardian, February 25, 1999 
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This Day, April 18, 2011 
 
 
APPENDIX 8 
 
343 
APPENDIX 8 
INVENTORY OF NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES 
The Nigerian Press Council (NPC), during its 2013 Inventory of Newspapers and 
Magazines in the 36 states and FCT recorded 267 newspapers and 128 magazines, 
making a total of 395 print media in Nigeria. But since the last review was carried out 
about five years ago, we had to verify which of the newspapers are still alive. 
After weeks of meticulous research, these are the ones0 we can verify. In our 
research, we noticed that some of the newspapers published by the NPC have either 
gone strictly online or are no longer being published. 
NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
S/N DAILIES (PRINT) NON-DAILIES (PRINT) ONLINE 
1.  The Punch Desert Herald Nigeria Standard 
2.  The Guardian The Leader Sahara Reporters 
3.  Thisday The Advocate Premium Times 
4.  Daily Trust The Abuja Inquirer The Cable 
5.  Leadership Daily National Express National Daily 
6.  Orient Daily New Statesman The Will 
7.  National Light Century Newsfront National Accord 
8.  Vanguard The Pioneer YNaija 
9.  Business Day National Newsbreak The Trent 
10.  The Champion Announcer Express 
Newspaper 
Pulse NG 
11.  Nigerian Tribune Nigerian Horn Daily Post 
12.  The Nation National Network The News 
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Many of the daily newspapers above have weekend publications on Saturday and Sunday. 
 
13.  Daily Independent  The News Journal 
14.  New Telegraph  The Nigerian Times 
15.  Daily Sun   News Express 
16.  P.M. News  The Herald 
17.  The National Mirror  The News Chronicle 
18.  The Tide   
19.  The Pointer   
20.  Citizens’ Advocate   
21.  The Nigerian Observer   
22.  Osun Defender   
23.  The Truth   
24.  Newsday   
25.  Peoples Daily   
26.  Nigerian Pilot   
27.  Blue Print   
28.  The Authority   
29.  Metro Sports   
30.  Soccer Star   
31.  Sporting Life   
32.  Daily Times   
33.  Complete Sports   
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INDIGENOUS LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS PUBLISHED IN INDETERMINATE FREQUENCY 
1. S/N PUBLICATION LANGUAGE 
2.  Bauchi Lokoci Ya Yi Hausa 
3.  Rariya Hausa 
4.  Taurararuwa Hausa 
5.  Aminiya Hausa 
6.  Leadership Hausa Hausa 
7.  Gaskiya Hausa 
8.  Hukumar Kula Da Ma’aikatan Kananan 
Hukomomi Ta Jihar Katsina 
Hausa 
9.  Alheri Hausa 
10.  Jigawa A Yau Hausa 
11.  Manharga Arewa Hausa 
12.  Rigar Zamani Hausa 
13.  Matasa Kashin Bayan Al’umma Hausa 
14.  Obakwu Ibo 
15.  Ka O Di Taa Ibo 
16.  Okakachi Igala Igala 
17.  Ikpamkor Tiv 
18.  Iroyin Owuro Yoruba 
19.  Akede Agbaye Yoruba 
20.  Alariya Yoruba 
21.  Alore Yoruba 
22.  Alangba Oodua Yoruba 
23.  Ojutoye Yoruba 
24.  Bojuri Yoruba 
25.  Alaroye Yoruba 
26.  Iwe Iroyin Yoruba 
Some of the language publications above are magazines, while others are papers; most 
of them are monthly publications. 
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COMMUNITY MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS 
S/N PUBLICATION S/N PUBLICATION 
1.  Bakatsiniya 21. Obanta newsday 
2.  Kogi Echo 22. Ogun Update 
3.  Esan Now 23. Ugbu News Xtra 
4.  Community Outreach Newspaper 24. Isoko Mirror 
5.  Ebira Aview 25. Urhobo Voice 
6.  Weekly Ibom Voice 26. Kogi Express 
7.  Izon Times 27. Katsina State Local Government 
News 
8.  Kogi Affairs 28. Igbo Life 
9.  Okun Parrot 29. Arise Igala 
10.  Ibadan Newspaper 30. Kogiwatch Magazine 
11.  Izon Link 31. Urhobo Times 
12.  Kogi Express 32. Afenmai Heritage 
13.  Ounko People Voice 33. Anioma Trust 
14.  Eggonnews 34. Okun People Magazine 
15.  Ekinigbo Watch 35. South South International Magazine 
16.  Oke Ogun News 36. Ekiti Link 
17.  Izon Apia 37. Jigawa State Newsletter 
18.  Ijaw News 38. Lekki Times 
19.  Agege Pulse 39. The Prestige 
20.  Kano Chronicle 40 Oriwu Sun 
 
There are other publications with indeterminate appearances on the newsstand. Some are irregular 
and we imagine there are x number of other publications; many of them are community papers mostly 
published in English like Izon Link, Anioma Trust, Okun People Magazine, Bakatsiniya, e.t.c. 
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FORTNIGHTLY PUBLICATIONS 
S/N PUBLICATION S/N PUBLICATION 
1.  Democracy News 9. AM Times 
2.  National Investigator 10. Banner News 
3.  Mein Express 11. Independent Recorder 
4.  Global Overseer 12. The Navigator 
5.  Readers’ Opinion 13. The Forum 
6.  The Light 14. The Projector 
7.  Golden Pen 15. Forthright 
8.  The New Agenda   
 
 
QUARTERLY AND MONTHLY PUBLICATIONS 
1 News Hawk 23 The Hope Newspaper 
2 The Northern Star 24 Vision Update 
3 Eagle Eye 25 Gateway Footprints 
4 Living Hope 26 Glimmer 
5 News Research 27 Deepstory Synergy 
6 News Point 28 Rural Front 
7 Nation Trumpet 29 Gateway Echo 
8 Reflection Newspaper 30 The Zion Nationale 
9 The investigator 31 The Royal Heritage 
10 Benchmark 32 The Jewel News 
11 Our Nation 33 Gateway News Update 
12 Urban News 34 Equity Newspaper 
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1 News Hawk 23 The Hope Newspaper 
13 Easterner Pilot 35 Confluence Times 
14 Dateline 36 News Crest 
15 The Intellect 37 Confluence Tide 
16 Donac Pilot 38 The Thinker 
17 National Calvary 39 Nigerian Prime (Prime News) 
18 State Graphics 40 The Courage 
19 The Vigilant Watchman 41 The Orator 
20 World Link 42 The Informer 
21 Kunav Times 43 The Tower 
22 First Awareness Newspaper   
 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS INCLUDING NEWSMAGAZINES PUBLISHED 
WEEKLY,  
BI-MONTHLY, MONTHLY, QUARTERLY AND ANNUALLY IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
1 PUBLICATION S/N PUBLICATION 
2 Allure Vanguard 41. Metropole 
3 Boss 42. Motherhood in Style 
4 4Bravo 43. National Image Magazine 
5 Busines5s Insurance 44. National Infinity 
6 Cele6brities 45. National Standard 
7 City E7xpress 46. News of the People 
8 City P8eople 47. Newswatch 
9 Complete9 Fashion 48. Newsweek 
10 Consumer Watch 49. Newswire Magazine 
11 Eagle Eye International 50. Picture This 
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1 PUBLICATION S/N PUBLICATION 
12 Echo 51. Pilot Property 
13 Economic Confidential 52. Pleasures 
14 Educational Radiance 53. Real Estate Environment 
15 Effizzie Model 54. Royalty International 
16 Encomium 55. Simple 
17 Event and Party 56. Style Nania 
18 Exceed 57. Super Smart Magazine 
19 Exquisite 58. Tambari 
20 Fabulous 59. Tell 
21 Ferina 60. The Insight 
22 Finance and Investment 61. The Politico 
23 Fortune 62. The Public 
24 Genevieve 63. The Smash 
25 Glam and Essence 64. The Source 
26 Glendora Review 65. The South South 
27 Global Excellence 66. The Target 
28 Global News 67. The Trumpet Magazine 
29 Hello 68. Today’s Woman 
30 High Society 69. Top Celebrities 
31 Hip Hop World 70. Top Elegance 
32 Insight 71. Ultimate fashion 
33 Islanders 72. Verbatim 
34 Ivy Interior 73. Vibe.ng 
35 Jemima 74. Vogue Afrique 
36 Kilimanjaro 75. Voice of the Sahel 
37 Life 76. Watchman 
38 Living Etcetera 77. Wedding Planner 
39 Lolly Fashion 78. Wow 
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1 PUBLICATION S/N PUBLICATION 
40 Media Review 79. Yes International 
41 Media Trust   
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Summary of Newspapers and Magazine Publications in Nigeria (Including Online Papers) 
S/N PUBLICATION NUMBER OF TITLES FREQUENCY LANGUAGE 
1 Daily Newspapers 33 Daily English 
2 Online Papers 17 Daily/ Real 
Time 
English 
3 Community, State/Ethnic 
Newspapers  
40 Mostly Twice 
Weekly/Monthly 
English 
4 Monthly and Quarterly 
Publications 
58 Monthly and 
Quarterly 
English 
5 Publications in Indigenous 
Languages 
25 Indeterminate 
Frequencies but 
mostly 
Fortnightly and 
Monthly 
Hausa (12) 
Yoruba (9) 
Ibo (2)  
Igala (1) 
Tiv (1) 
6 Other Publications 79 Indeterminate 
Frequencies 
English 
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Public Television Stations in Nigeria 
 TV STATIONS (FG OWNED) LOCATION (STATE) 
1 The Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) Channel 6, Aba Abia 
2 NTA Umuahia Abia 
3 NTA Yola Adamawa 
4 NTA Uyo Akwa-Ibom 
5 NTA Awka Anambra 
6 NTA Channel 35 Onitsha Anambra 
7 NTA Bauchi Bauchi 
8 NTA Yenagoa Bayelsa 
9 NTA Makurdi Zonal Network Centre Benue 
10 NTA Zonal Network Centre Maiduguri Borno 
11 NTA Calabar Cross-River 
12 NTA Asaba Delta 
13 NTA Sapele Delta 
14 NTA Warri Delta 
15 NTA Abakaliki Ebonyi 
16 NTA Auchi Edo 
17 NTA Benin Zonal Network Center Edo 
18 NTA Iruekpen Edo 
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 TV STATIONS (FG OWNED) LOCATION (STATE) 
19 NTA Ado-Ekiti Ekiti 
20 NTA Enugu Zonal Network Center Enugu 
21 NTA Abuja FCT 
22 NTA PLUS,  Garki, Abuja FCT 
23 NTA Gombe Gombe 
24 NTA Owerri Imo 
25 NTA Channel 10 Dutse Jigawa 
26 NTA Kaduna Zonal Network Center Kaduna 
27 NTA Channel 5 Kano Kano 
28 NTA Channel 8 Katsina Katsina 
29 NTA Kebbi Kebbi 
30 NTA Lokoja Kogi 
31 NTA Patigi Kwara 
32 NTA Ilorin Kwara 
33 NTA-2 Channel 5,  and Lagos Network Centre Lagos 
34 NTA Lagos Lagos 
35 NTA Lafia Nassarawa 
36 NTA New Bussa Niger 
37 NTA Minna Niger 
38 NTA CHANNEL 12, Abeokuta Ogun 
39 NTA Ijebu-Ode Ogun 
40 NTA Imeko Ogun 
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 TV STATIONS (FG OWNED) LOCATION (STATE) 
41 NTA Akure Ondo 
42 NTA Okitipupa Ondo 
43 NTA Ikare Osun 
44 NTA Ile-Ife Osun 
45 NTA Osogbo Osun 
46 NTA Ibadan Zonal Network Center Oyo 
47 NTA Ogbomosho Oyo 
48 NTA Oyo Oyo 
49 NTA Saki Oyo 
50 NTA Jos Plateau 
51 NTA Port Harcourt Network Centre Rivers 
52 NTA Zonal Network Centre Sokoto Sokoto 
53 NTA Jalingo Taraba 
54 NTA Damaturu Yobe 
55 NTA Gusau Zamfara 
 STATE GOVERNMENT OWNED LOCATION (STATE 
1 Broadcasting Corporation of Abia (BCA) TV, Umuahia Abia 
2 Adamawa Television (ATV), Yola Adamawa 
3 Akwa-Ibom Broadcasting Corporation (AKBC) Akwa-Ibom 
4 Anambra Broadcasting Service (ABS) TV, Awka Anambra 
5 Bauchi Television (BATV) Bauchi 
6 Bayelsa State Broadcasting, Niger Delta TV Bayelsa 
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 TV STATIONS (FG OWNED) LOCATION (STATE) 
7 Benue TV Benue 
8 Borno Radio Television (BRTV), Maiduguri Borno 
9 Cross-River Broadcasting Corporation (CRBC), Calabar Cross-River 
10 Delta Broadcasting Service Warri TV Delta 
11 Delta Broadcasting Service TV, Asaba Delta 
12 Ebonyi State Broadcasting Service TV Ebonyi 
13 Edo State Broadcasting Corporation TV, Benin Edo 
14 Ekiti State Television Ekiti 
15 Enugu Broadcasting Service TV Enugu 
16 Gombe State Government TV Gombe 
17 Imo Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) Orient TV, Owerri Imo 
18 Jigawa Broadcasting Corporation TV, Dutse Jigawa 
19 Kaduna State Television (Capital TV) Kaduna 
20 Kano State Television (CTV-67) Kano 
21 Abubakar Rimi Television (ARTV) Kano 
22 Katsina Broadcasting TV Katsina 
23 Kebbi Broadcasting Service, Birnin Kebbi Kebbi 
24 Kwara State Broadcasting Corporation Kwara 
25 Lagos State TV Lagos 
26 Nassarawa State Broadcasting Service TV Nassarawa 
27 Niger State Media Corporation Niger 
28 Gateway Television Ogun 
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 TV STATIONS (FG OWNED) LOCATION (STATE) 
29 Ondo Radiovision Corporation TV Ondo 
30 Osun State Broadcasting Corporation TV, Osogbo Osun 
31 New Dawn Television (NDTV), Ibokun Osun 
32 Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State (BCOS), Ibadan Oyo 
33 Plateau Radio Television (PRTV), Jos Plateau 
34 Rivers State Broadcasting Corporation TV, Port-
Harcourt 
Rivers 
35 Sokoto State (Rima TV) Sokoto 
36 Taraba Television Corporation Taraba 
37 Yobe Broadcasting Corporation (YBC) Yobe 
38 Zamfara State TV Zamfara 
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PRIVATE TV STATIONS IN NIGERIA 
AIT  (26 Stations, with 14 
Stations in the North and 
12 in the South) 
FCT 
Lagos 
Akure, Ondo 
Borno 
Edo 
Kebbi 
Gombe 
Kano 
Kwara 
Jigawa 
Katsina 
Kaduna 
Oyo 
Plateau 
Bayelsa 
Enugu 
Rivers 
Osun  
Adamawa 
Benue 
Bauchi 
Sokoto 
Abia 
Anambra 
Imo 
Delta 
English General 
Entertainment 
and News 
Channels TV (4 Stations) Lagos 
Abuja 
Kano 
Benin, Edo 
English News 
Silverbird TV  (7 Stations) Lagos 
FCT, Abuja 
Jos, Plateau 
Awka, Anambra 
Port Harcourt, Rivers 
Yenegoa, Bayelsa 
Benin Edo 
English Entertainment 
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Galaxi TV (3 Stations) Lagos 
Ibadan, Oyo 
Akure, Ondo 
English 
Yoruba 
Yoruba/ English 
General 
Murhi International 
Television (MITV) 
Lagos 
Ibadan 
 General 
Minaj Broadcasting 
International 
Lagos English General 
    
Desmims Independent TV 
(DITV) 
Kaduna Hausa General 
Gotel TV Adamawa English/Hausa General 
Independent Television 
(ITV) 
FCT Abuja English General 
Galaxy TV Lagos English General 
ONTV Lagos English Entertainment 
Superscreen Lagos English Entertainment 
TV Continental (TVC) Lagos English General 
Degue Broadcasting 
Network (DBN) 
Lagos English General 
Independent television 
(ITV) 
Benin, Edo English/ 
Pidgin English 
General 
 
SOME PRIVATE TV STATIONS RESTRICTED TO CABLE SATELLITES ALONE 
S/N NAME LOCATION LANGUAGE BROADCAST 
FOCUS 
1 Wazobia TV Lagos 
Port Harcourt  
Abuja 
Pidgin English Movie & Other 
Entertainment  
2 Wazobia Max Lagos 
Port Harcourt  
Abuja 
Pidgin English Family 
Entertainment 
3 TV Continental 
News 
Lagos English News 
4 Cool TV Lagos English Music 
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S/N NAME LOCATION LANGUAGE BROADCAST 
FOCUS 
5 Rave TV Lagos English Family 
Entertainment 
6 Tiwa n Tiwa Lagos Yoruba Musical & Life 
Style  
7 Soundcity TV Lagos English Music & 
Entertainment 
8 Dasalam 
Television 
Network (DTN) 
Abuja English Documentary & 
Entertainment 
9 Arewa24 TV Kano Hausa General 
Entertainment 
and Lifestyle 
10 Liberty TV Kaduna 70% Hausa, 30% 
English 
News and 
Currents Affairs 
11 MYTV Yoruba  Yoruba Movie & Other 
Entertainment 
12 Dove TV Ogun English Christian Gospel 
13 Farin Wata  Hausa Documentary & 
Entertainment 
14 Nigezie Lagos English Music, 
Entertainment & 
Lifestyle 
15 Wale Adenuga 
Productions (WAP) 
TV 
Lagos English Family 
Entertainment 
16 Orisun Lagos Yoruba Movie & 
Entertainment 
17 TVC Hausa  Hausa Promotion of 
Hausa Language & 
Culture 
18 Mount Zion TV Ibadan, Oyo State  Christian Gospel 
Movies 
19 Yoruba Swaga Lagos Yoruba Music & Total 
Entertainment 
20 Trace Naija Lagos English Afrobeat Music 
21 Awa TV Lagos Yoruba & Pidgin 
English 
Entertainment 
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S/N NAME LOCATION LANGUAGE BROADCAST 
FOCUS 
22 Pidgin TV Lagos Pidgin English Entertainment 
23 Trybe TV Lagos Yoruba and 
English 
Movies & 
Entertainment 
24 STAR Dadin Kowa Abuja Hausa Entertainment 
25 African Christian 
Broadcasting 
Network 
Television (ACBN 
TV) 
Lagos English Gospel 
254 Mercy TV Delta English Gospel 
26 HIP TV Lagos English Entertainment 
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APPENDIX 10  
SUMMARY TABLE OF RADIO STATION BY STATES 
 
S/N NORTH 
CENTRAL 
NORTH EAST NORTH WEST SOUTH WEST SOUTH EAST SOUTH SOUTH 
1 Fed. Capital 
Territory 
(16) 
Adamawa 
State (4) 
Jigawa 
State (5) 
Ekiti State 
(3) 
Abia State 
(10) 
Akwa Ibom 
State (7) 
2 Benue State 
(5) 
Bauchi 
State (3) 
Kaduna 
State (18) 
Lagos State 
(31) 
Anambra 
State (18) 
Bayelsa 
State (5) 
3 Kogi State  
(4) 
Borno State  
(5) 
Kano State 
(14) 
Ogun State 
(10) 
Ebonyi 
State  
(2) 
Cross River 
State  
(5) 
4 Kwara State  
(8) 
Gombe 
State  
(5) 
Katsina 
State  
(4) 
Ondo State 
(12) 
Enugu State 
(13) 
 
Delta State 
(12) 
5 Nasarawa 
State  
(7) 
Taraba 
State  
(2) 
Kebbi State  
(4) 
Osun State 
(10) 
Imo State  
(9) 
Edo State 
(11) 
6 Niger State  
(6) 
Yobe State  
(3) 
Sokoto 
State  
(4) 
Oyo State 
(24) 
 Rivers State 
(16) 
7 Plateau 
State  
(11) 
 Zamfara 
State  
(2) 
   
TOTAL 57 22 51 90 52 56 
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NORTH CENTRAL 
FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY (FCT) 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1 92.9 – Kapital FM (FRCN), Abuja 88.5 – Zuma FM, Abuja 
2 107.7 – Armed Forces Radio, Mogadishu 
Cantonment, Asokoro, Abuja. 
88.9 – Brilla FM, Abuja – Sports 
3 909KHz on 303MW Band, FRCN 94.7 – Rhythm FM, Abuja 
4 93.5 – Aso FM,  Garki Abuja 96.9 – Cool FM, Abuja 
5  99.5 – Wazobia FM, Abuja 
6  100.5 – Ray power FM, Abuja 
7  92.1 – Vision FM, Abuja 
8  95.1 – Nigeria Info, Abuja 
9  98.3 – Hot FM, Abuja 
10  99.9 – Kiss FM, Abuja 
11  104.5 – Love FM, Abuja  
12  106.3 – WE FM 
TOTAL (16) 4 12 
 
 
BENUE STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  95.0 – Radio Benue, Makurdi 96.5 – Joy FM, Otukpo 
2.  103.5 – Harvest FM, FRCN Makurdi 99.9 – Ashiwaves FM, Katsina-Ala 
TOTAL (4) 2 2 
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KOGI STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  94.0 FM – Kogi Broadcasting Corporation 
(Confluence FM, Lokoja) 
95.5 – Grace FM, Lokoja 
 
2.  101.5 – Prime FM Radio Nigeria, Lokoja 101.9 – TAO FM, Okene 
TOTAL (4) 2 2 
 
KWARA STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  99.0 – Midland FM (Radio Kwara), Ilorin  95.1 – Royal FM, Ilorin 
2.  103.5 – Harmony FM FRCN (Radio 
Nigeria), Idofian 
101.9 – SOBI FM, Ilorin 
3.  612.8 Khz– Radio Kwara, Ilorin 106.5 – Raypower FM, Ilorin 
4.   105.7 Okin FM, Offa 
TOTAL(7) 3 4 
 
NASARAWA STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  102.5 – Precious FM (Lafia, FRCN) 95.9 – Maloney FM, Keffi 
2.  97.1 FM – Nasarawa Broadcasting Service 
(Lafia) 
91.1 – Platinum Radio, Keffi 
3.  92.3 – Option FM (Akwanga)  
4.  92.5 – Solid FM, Nasarawa  
TOTAL (6) 4 2 
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NIGER STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  91.3 – Crystal Radio, Minna   
2.  91.7, Prestige FM, Minna  
3.  100.5 – Radio Nigeria Power FM, Bida – 
FRCN 
 
TOTAL (3) 3 - 
 
PLATEAU STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  88.60 – Radio Plateau, Jos 101.9 – Jay FM, Jos 
2.  101.5 – Highland FM, Radio Nigeria 93.7 – Rhythm FM, Jos 
3.  90.5 – Peace FM, Jos Broadcasting Radio 
Station 
100.5 – Raypower FM, Jos 
4.   93.3- Unity FM, Jos 
5.   103.9 - KT FM, Jos 
6.   104.3 – Tin City FM, Jos 
TOTAL (9) 3 6 
Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the North-Central region 
Public Radio Stations – 21 
Private Radio Stations –  28 
Total – 49 
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NORTH EAST 
ADAMAWA STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  95.7 – Adamawa Broadcasting 
Corporation 1 (ABC), Yola 
917 kHz – AM Radio  
91.1 – FM Gotel Yola 
2.  101.5 FM – Lighthouse FM, Yola 92.3 – Pulaaku FM, Yola. 
TOTAL (4) 2 2 
 
BAUCHI STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  94.6 – Bauchi Radio Corporation (BRC) 2 
FM, Bauchi 
95.7 – Ray Power FM, Bauchi 
2.  98.5 – Globe FM (FRCN), Bauchi  
TOTAL (3) 2 1 
 
BORNO STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  94.5 Borno Radio Television (BRTV), 
Maiduguri 
99.5 Freedom Radio Maiduguri 
2.  95.3 Borno Radio Television (BRTV) 
Metropolitan FM Maiduguri 
 
3.  102.5 Peace FM (FRCN), Maiduguri  
TOTAL (4) 3 1 
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GOMBE STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  91.9 – Gombe FM 97.3 Progress Radio 
2.  103.5– Jewel FM,Radio Nigeria, Gombe Ray Power 93.1 FM 
3.   98.1 Amana FM 
TOTAL (5) 2 3 
 
TARABA STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  90.6 – Solid FM, Taraba State Broadcast 
Service (TSBS)Radio, Jalingo 
 
2.  104.5 FM – Gift FM, Radio Nigeria, 
Jalingo 
 
TOTAL (2) 2 - 
 
YOBE STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  801 KHz Yobe Broadcasting Corporation  
2.  89.5 FM pride of the Sahel Damaturu  
3.  104.5 – Sunshine FM, Radio Nigeria, 
Damaturu 
 
TOTAL (3) 3 - 
 
Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the North-East region 
Public Radio Stations – 14 
Private Radio Stations – 7 
Total – 21 
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NORTH WEST 
JIGAWA STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  1026MW – Radio Jigawa AM 99.9 FM – Freedom Radio, Dutse 
2.  93.5 – FM Andaza  
3.  95.5 – Dutse New world FM  
4.  100.5 – Horizon FM, Radio Nigeria, 
Dutse 
 
TOTAL (5) 4 1 
 
KADUNA STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  89.9 – Rockside FM, KSMC, Kaduna 88.9 – Brilla FM 
2.  90.9 – Capital Sounds FM, KSMC, 
Kaduna 
91.7 – Liberty Radio (English) Kaduna 
3.  92.1 – Karama FM, Kaduna (FRCN) 103.1 – Liberty Radio (Hausa) Kaduna 
4.  96.1 – Supreme FM, Kaduna (FRCN) 92.9 – Freedom Radio FM, Kaduna 
5.  594 AM – FRCN (Hausa), Kaduna 97.7 – Alheri Radio FM, Kaduna (HAUSA)  
6.  1107  AM– FRCN (English), Kaduna 106.5 – Ray Power FM Kaduna 
7.  94.1 – KSMC Queen FM 747 kHz MW – Nagarta Radio 
8.  639 kHz MW – Kada 1  
TOTAL (15) 8 7 
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KANO STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  729 MW – Radio Kano I AM. 88.5 – Dala FM, Kano. 
2.  89.3 – Radio Kano II FM. 90.3 – Express Radio FM, Lamido 
Crescent, Kano. 
3.  103.5 – FRCN Pyramid FM, Madobi, 
Kano. 
93.1 – Arewa Radio FM, Farm Centre, 
Kano. 
4.  94.4 FM, Kano State Radio 95.1 – Wazobia FM, Farm Centre, Kano.  
5.  101.1 – Abubakar Rimi Television 
(ARTV) FM, Maiduguri Road, Kano. 
96.9 – Cool FM, Farm Centre, Kano. 
6.   97.3 – Rahma FM, Kano. 
7.   99.5 – Freedom Radio FM, Kano. 
8.   106.5 – Ray Power FM, Kano 
TOTAL (13) 5 8 
 
KATSINA STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  104.5 – Radio Nigeria Companion FM, 
Katsina 
106.5 – Ray Power FM, Katsina 
2.  9772 kHz AM– Katsina State Radio 
Service 
92.1 – Vision FM Katsina 
TOTAL (4) 2 2 
 
KEBBI STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  95.5 – Kebbi State Radio, Birnin Kebbi Vision 92.1 FM, Birnin-Kebbi, Kebbi 
2.  945.801 MHz - Kebbi Broadcasting 
Corporation (Radio) 
 
3.  103.5 – Equity FM, Radio Nigeria, Birnin 
Kebbi 
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S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
TOTAL (4) 3 1 
 
SOKOTO STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  97.1 – Rima FM, Sokoto State Media 
Corporation 
92.1- Vision FM 
2.  101.5 – Royal FM, Radio Nigeria 99.5 – Freedom FM 
TOTAL (4) 2 2 
 
ZAMFARA STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  
 
102.5 Pride FM Radio Nigeria, Gusau Raypower 100.5 FM, Gusau, Zamfara 
TOTAL (2) 1 1 
 
Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the North-West region 
Public Radio Stations – 25 
Private Radio Stations – 22 
Total – 47 
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SOUTH WEST 
EKITI STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  100.5 – Progress FM, Radio Nigeria, Ado 
Ekiti 
89.9 – Voice FM 
2.  91.5FM – Golden voice of Ekiti, 
Broadcasting Service of Ekiti State 
 
TOTAL (3) 2 1 
 
 
LAGOS 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  89.7  – Eko FM, Ikeja 88.9 – Brilla FM – Sports Broadcast only 
2.  92.9 – Bond FM, FRCN, Lagos 90.9 – Top Radio FM 
3.  96.1 – Lagos Traffic radio 91.3 – Lagos Talks FM 
4.  97.7 – Metro FM – FRCN 92.3 – Inspiration FM  
5.  103.5 FM –  Radio One  FRCN 93.7 – Rhythm FM 
6.  Radio 107.5 FM. Tiwantiwa– Ikeja,  
Lagos, (Also of Eko FM) 
95.1 – Wazobia FM, Lagos 
 
7.   Urban 96.5 FM, Lagos 
8.   Cool 96.9 FM, Lagos 
9.   97.3 – Classic FM 
10.   98.1 – Smooth FM, Lagos 
11.   98.5 – Soundcity FM, Lagos 
12.   98.9 – Kiss FM, Lagos 
13.   99.3 – Nigeria Info 
14.   99.9 – The Beat FM, Ikoyi Lagos 
15.   RayPower 100.5 FM, Alagbado, Lagos 
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OGUN STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  94.5 – Paramount FM, Radio Nigeria, 
 Abeokuta 
94.1 – Rainbow FM 
2.  90.5 – Ogun State Broadcasting 
Corporation (OGBC FM, Abeokuta) 
101.9 – Rockcity FM, Abeokuta 
3.   91.7 – Women FM (first Women’s Radio 
Station) Arepo, Isheri, Ogun State 
4.   107.1 – Sweet FM, Ibadan-Abeokuta 
Expressway, Abeokuta. 
5.   88.5 – Family FM Radio kalka 
investment building Abeokuta 
TOTAL (7) 2 5 
 
ONDO STATE 
16.   101.5 – Star FM, Ikeja 
17.   Max 102.3 FM – Ikosi Ketu, Lagos 
18.   102.7 – Naija FM 
19.   104.1 – Kennis FM, Lagos 
20.   104.9 – SMA FM, Lagos 
21.   105.1 – City FM, Oregun, Lagos 
22.   106.5 – Faaji FM (Also of Raypower FM) 
TOTAL (28) 6 22 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  96.5 – Ondo State Radiovision 
Corporation (OSRC FM, Orita-Obele, 
Akure) 
88.9 – Adaba FM, Ilara-Mokin via Akure 
 
2.  102.5 – Positive FM (FRCN), Akure 91.9 – Breez FM, Akure 
3.  94.5 – Orange FM, OSRC, Akure 96.1 – Raypower FM, Oba-Ile,Akure 
4.   101.9 – Sun City Radio, Ondo City. 
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OSUN STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  95.5 – Gold FM, Radio Nigeria, Iloko-
Ijesa road, Ilesa 
91.7 – Rave FM, Oroki Estate, Osogbo 
2.  89. 5 – OSBC Orisun FM, Ile-Ife 95.1 – Raypower FM, Oke Pupa, Osogbo 
3.  96.3 – Odidere FM, Reality Radio-Vision 
Service (RRS), Iwo. 
90.9 – Oodua FM, Toll Gate, Ile-Ife 
4.  104.5 – OSBC Living Spring FM, Ile-
Awiye, Oke Baale, Osogbo. 
101.5 – Crown FM, Eleyele, Ile Ife 
5.   103.1 – Uniq FM, Ara Station, Okesa, 
Ilesa 
TOTAL (9) 4 5 
 
OYO STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  92.1 – Ajilete FM, Gambari, 
Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State, 
BCOS,   Ogbomoso  
90.1 – Space FM, 136, Liberty Road, 
Ibadan (1st Trilingual Radio Station in 
Nigeria) 
2.  93.5 – Premier FM (FRCN), Ibadan 91.5 – Star FM, Secretariat, Ibadan 
3.  96.3 – Oke-Ogun FM, Alaga 92.5 – Impact Business Radio, Akobo, 
Ibadan (Nigeria’s first Business Radio) 
4.  98.5 FM, Oluyole FM – BCOS, Ibadan 92.9 – Royal Root FM, Jericho Area, 
Ibadan 
5.  99.1 – Amuludun FM, Moniya, Ibadan 94.9 – Thirty-Two FM, cocoa house 
Dugbe, Ibadan 
6.  756 kHz – Radio O.Y.O Ile-Akade Orita 
Bashorun (Radio AM) 
95.1 – Raypower FM, Cocoa house 
Dugbe Ibadan 
7.   96.7 – Lagelu FM, Ibadan 
8.   97.9 – Beat FM, Bodija, Ibadan 
9.   100.1 – Jamz FM, Lagelu Estate, Felele 
Area, Ibadan 
5.   106.5 – Music & Culture FM, Ondo City 
TOTAL (8) 3 5 
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S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
10.   101.1- Parrot FM, Ogbomosho 
11.   100.5 – Inspiration FM 
12.   102.3 – Petals FM, Old Bodija, Ibadan 
13.   102.7 – Naija FM, Bodija, Ibadan 
14.   105.5 – Splash FM, Felele, Ibadan 
15.   105.9 – Fresh FM, Ibadan 
16.   106.3 – Lead Radio, Ibadan. 
TOTAL (22) 6 16 
Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the South-West region 
Public Radio Stations – 23 
Private Radio Stations – 54 
Total – 77 
SOUTH EAST 
ABIA 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  88.1 – Broadcasting Corporation, 
Umuahia 
89.7 – Buzz FM, Aba 
2.  103.5 – Pacesetter FM FRCN, Amakanma 
old Umuahia 
94.9 – Flo FM, Umuahia 
3.   102.9 – MAGIC FM Aba 
4.   103.9 – Love FM, Aguiyi Ironsi layout, 
Umuahia 
5.   104.1 – Vision Africa FM, Umuahia 
TOTAL (7) 2 5 
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ANAMBRA STATE 
 
EBONYI STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  98.1 –  Salt FM, Ebonyi Broadcasting 
Service FM (EBBS) 
 
2.  101.5 – Unity FM, Abakaliki  
TOTAL (2) 2 - 
 
ENUGU STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  92.9 – Coal City FM (FRCN) 92.5 – Dream FM, Enugu 
2.  96.1 – Sunrise FM, Enugu State 
Broadcasting Service  
100.9 - Solid FM, Enugu 
3.  96.7 – Voice FM, Nsukka (FRCN) 94.5 – Urban Radio, Enugu 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  90.7 – Anambra Broadcasting Service, 
Onitsha 
88.9 – Brilla FM, Onitsha – Sports 
2.  88.5 – Anambra Broadcasting Service, 
Awka 
89.4- Minaj FM Obosi 
3.  102.5 – Purity FM, Radio Nigeria, Awka 89.7- City Radio, Onitsha 
4.   91.5 – Blaze FM, Oraifite 
5.   95.3 – Radio Sapientia FM, Onitsha 
6.   95.7 – Rhythm FM, Awka 
7.   98.3 – Ogene FM, Awka 
8.   99.1 – Odenigbo FM, Obosi 
9.   103.5 – Gist FM, Ogidi 
10.   106.5- Alpha FM Nnobi 
11.   90.1- Lumen FM, Uga 
TOTAL (14) 3 11 
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S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
4.  828 – Radio Nigeria 1 Enugu  
TOTAL (7) 4 3 
 
IMO STATE 
Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the South-East region 
Public Radio Stations – 13 
Private Radio Stations – 24 
Total – 37 
SOUTH SOUTH 
AKWA IBOM STATE 
 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  94.4 – IBC Orient FM, Owerri. 99.5 – Hot FM, Owerri. 
2.  100.5 – Heartland FM, Radio Nigeria, 
Owerri 
101.1 FM – My Radio FM Owerri 
3.   105.7 – Zanders FM, Owerri 
4.   97.3 – Megaband FM, Owerri 
5.   107.3-Darling FM Owerri 
TOTAL (7) 2 5 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  90.5 – Akwa Ibom Broadcasting 
Corporation (AKBC) 
95.1 – Comfort FM 
2.  104.5 – Atlantic FM Radio Nigeria 101.1 – Planet 
 FM 
3.   105.9 – Inspiration FM 
TOTAL (5) 2 3 
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BAYELSA STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  97.1 – Bayelsa State Broadcasting 
Corporation (BSBC) Glory FM, Radio 
Bayelsa, Ekeki Yenagoa 
94.7 – Silverbird Rhythm FM, Oxbow 
Lake Swali, Yenagoa 
2.  106.5 – Creek FM, Radio Nigeria, 
Yenagoa 
95.5 – Royal FM, Yenagoa 
3.   102.5 – Ray Power FM, Elebele, 
Yenagoa 
TOTAL (5) 2 3 
 
 
CROSS RIVER STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  89.9 – Ikom FM, CRBC 93.1 FAD FM, Calabar  
2.  105.5 FM – Cross River Broadcasting 
Corporation (CRBC)  
95.9 Hit FM, Calabar 
3.  99.5 Radio Nigeria Canaan City, Calabar  
TOTAL (5) 3 2 
 
DELTA STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  88.6 – Melody FM, Delta State 
Broadcasting Service, Warri 
89.9 – Crown FM, Effurun 
2.  97.9 FM, Voice of Delta Radio, Asaba 93.1 – Quest FM, Ughelli-Patani Road, 
Ogor  
3.  104.4 – Charity FM Radio Nigeria, Asaba 96.1 – Ray power FM, Oghara 
4.   98.7 – Bridge Radio, Asaba. 
5.   100.5 – Kpoko FM, Warri (Pidgin 
Broadcast) 
6.   100.9 – Trend FM, Asaba 
7.   106.7 – Rize FM, Warri 
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S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
8.   96.5 – Hot FM, Asaba 
TOTAL (11) 3 8 
 
EDO STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  95.775 – Edo State Broadcasting 
Service, Aduwawa 
92.3 FM – Independent Radio, Benin 
city 
2.  101.5 – Radio Nigeria Bronze FM, Benin 92.7 K-U FM, Benin-Auchi road, Enyea 
bypass Benin city-Edo state. 
3.   93.7 – SilverBird Rhythm FM, Ugbowo, 
Benin city. 
4.   96.9 – Speed FM, Benin City 
5.   97.3 – Vibes FM, Benin city 
6.   105.5 – RayPower FM, Ikhuen Niro, 
Benin city. 
TOTAL (8) 2 6 
 
RIVERS STATE 
S/N PUBLIC PRIVATE 
1.  89.9 – Garden City FM Rivers State 
Broadcasting Service Corporation (RSBC)  
Classic FM 91.1 
2.  98.5 – Treasure FM Radio Nigeria  91.7 – Wave FM 
3.  99.1 – Radio Rivers 92.3 – Nigeria Info 
4.   Naija FM 92.7 
5.   93.7 – Rhythm FM 
6.   94.1 – Wazobia FM, Port-Harcourt 
7.   95.1 – Today FM 
8.   95.9 – Cool FM, Port-Harcourt 
9.   97.7 – Love FM (Family Station)  
10.   The Beat 99.9FM 
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Categorisation of public and private radio stations in the South-South region 
Public Radio Stations – 15 
Private Radio Stations – 33 
Total – 48 
 
TOTAL NUMBER OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS 
Public Radio Stations – 111 
Private Radio Stations – 168 
Total – 279 
 
NOTES  
1. There are a couple of Internet radio stations in Lagos, Abuja and a few other states in Nigeria.  
2. Data of radio stations compiled from the NBC website (which gave about 98 radio stations on 
their website) and other sources. 
11.   106.5 – RayPower FM 
TOTAL (14) 3 11 
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NORTH-CENTRAL 
BENUE STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  89.9 Benue State University, BSU FM, Makurdi 
TOTAL 1 
 
KWARA STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  89.3 – University of Ilorin, Unilorin FM  
TOTAL 1 
 
NASARAWA STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  101.1 – Nasarawa State University Mass Communication Dept. FM 
TOTAL 1 
 
NIGER STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  92.3 – Search FM, Minna (Federal University of Technology, Minna) 
2.  103.9 – Ultimate FM (College of Education) Minna 
3.  89.1 – Click FM (Ibrahim Babangida University, Lapai)  
TOTAL 3 
 
PLATEAU STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  96.1 – University of Jos Campus Radio 
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S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
2.  98.9 – Plateau State Polytechnic, Rock FM 
TOTAL 2 
Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the North-Central region -8 
NORTH-EAST 
BORNO STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  University of Maiduguri Radio, Kanem FM 
TOTAL 1 
Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the North-East region – 1 
 
NORTH-WEST 
KADUNA STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  98.5 – KASU FM (Kaduna State University Radio) 
2.  102.5 – Teachers Radio (Nigeria Institute of Teachers NIT) 
3.  Samaru FM, Ahmadu Bello University Radio 
TOTAL 3 
 
KANO STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  98.9 - BUK FM, Kano (Bayero University Kano FM) 
TOTAL 1 
Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the North-West region – 4 
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SOUTH WEST 
LAGOS 
 
OGUN STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  89.1 – Hope FM (Babcock University Radio station, Ilisan-Remo) 
2.  95.9 – Hebron FM (Covenant University Radio Station, Ota) 
3.  92.1 – OOU FM (Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye) 
TOTAL 3 
 
ONDO STATE 
 
OSUN STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  94.5 – Great FM, Obafemi Awolowo University, OAU Ile-Ife 
TOTAL 1 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  95.7 – LASU Radio (Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos) 
2.  103.1 – Unilag FM (University of Lagos) 
3.  105.9 – NOUN FM (National Open University of Nigeria) Victoria Island 
TOTAL 3 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  93.1 – FUTA FM (Federal University of Technology, Akure) 
2.  100.9- Eki FM, Ondo city 
3.  100.1 – Kakaki Ondo Community Radio, Ondo City (First Community Radio in 
Southern Nigeria) 
4.  107.3 – Varsity Radio (Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko) 
TOTAL  4 
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OYO STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  89.1 – Lead City University Campus Radio FM, Ibadan 
2.  101.1 – Diamond FM, University of Ibadan, Ibadan 
TOTAL  2 
Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the South-West region – 13 
SOUTH-EAST 
ABIA 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  101.9 – Abia State University FM, Uturu 
2.  107.1 – Green FM, (MOUAU), Umudike 
3.  93.3 FM –Rhema University Radio, Aba 
TOTAL  3 
 
ANAMBRA STATE 
 
ENUGU STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  91.1 – Lion FM, University of Nigeria Nsukka 
2.  98.7 – Caritas University FM Radio 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  93.3 – Madonna Radio (Madonna University) FM, Okija 
2.  94.1 – Unizik (Nnamdi Azikiwe University) FM, Awka 
3.  107.1 – Tansian Radio (Tansian University) FM, Umunya 
4.  106.1  COOU FM, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University 
TOTAL  4 
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S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
3.  106.9 – Gouni FM (Godfrey Okoye University) Radio, Enugu 
4.  106.5 – Stallion FM (Federal College of Education, Ehu-Amufu) 
5.  106.5 – ESUT RADIO, Enugu 
6.  107.2 – IMT RADIO, Enugu 
TOTAL  6 
 
IMO STATE 
Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the South-East region – 15 
SOUTH-SOUTH 
AKWA IBOM STATE 
 
DELTA STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  103.7 – Delta State University (Delsu FM), Abraka 
TOTAL 1 
 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  103.2 – Federal  Polytechnic, Owerri FM 
2.  90.90 – Imo State University STAR FM 
TOTAL 2 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  100.7 – UNIUYO FM (University of Uyo) 
2.  104.9 – Heritage FM (Heritage Polytechnic, Eket) 
TOTAL 2 
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EDO STATE 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  90.5 – Okada Wonderland FM, (Igbinedion University Radio) Okada 
2.  94.1 – Hillside FM (Auchi Polytechnic Radio), Auchi 
3.  100.1 – Uniben FM (University of Benin Radio), Benin city 
TOTAL  3 
 
RIVERS STATE 
 
Number of Community/Campus Radio Stations in the South-South region – 8 
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMMUNITY/CAMPUS RADIO STATIONS IN NIGERIA – 49 
 
 
S/N COMMUNITY/CAMPUS 
1.  88.5 – Uniport Unique FM (University of Port Harcourt) 
2.  103.7 – Radio UST FM (University of Science and Technology) 
TOTAL  2 
